Keywords

1 Introduction

Intensification in the use of digital technology has led to the creation of new communication practices and new religious spaces, and has transformed religious practices globally. There has been a growing interest in the intersections between digital media and religion in the work of scholars in the humanities and social sciences since the late 1990s, and among the earlier studies is an analysis of engagement with virtual spaces or cyberspace that has altered our understanding and practice of religion (see, for example, Hoover and Clark 2002; Lawrence 2002; Højsgaard and Warburg 2005; Lövheim 2007; Horsfield and Teusner 2007; Campbell 2007; Teusner 2015; Campbell and Teusner 2015; Cloete 2016). During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the introduction and rapid rise of social media sites created new spaces and contexts where users have framed their religiosities, understanding what being religious means and modifying their religious landscapes. At the centre of these transformations are young people, who are the predominant users of these digital media and technology, particularly social media sites. Young people are seen to have consumed and shared religious resources and expressed their (non)religious self on social mediascapes. Such media practices facilitate the religious expressions of young people. Despite these observations of the active engagements of young people, their online religiosities are underexplored, particularly within the subfield of geographies of young people and geographies of religion (van Blerk 2019; Olson and Reddy 2019).

The examination of young people’s everyday lived religiosities through the circulation, exchange and reproduction of religious content in new spaces created by social media is more pertinent today. It is particularly relevant in Brunei Darussalam, a Muslim-majority country where Islam as the official religion is institutionalised and embedded in everyday social and cultural practices. Being a Muslim is closely tied to the ethnic identity of being Malay. The country has a remarkable internet and social media penetration rate: 95% and 99% of the total population respectively in 2021 (Kemp 2021). The high rate of participation in social media has impacted on the lives of young people, including their religiosities. Religiosities are understood as the ‘embodied experience of religion or the belief, practices, and relationships that individuals or collectives produce while constituting the sacred and the secular’ (Olson and Reddy 2019: 459), and are expressed through behaviour and practices. This contemporary youth religious social mediascape begs the question of what form of youth religiosities can be observed in these new communication practices and spaces. Are these religiosities in contestation with the practices of existing predigital religious institutions? Can we expect to see fewer performances of religious identity in exchange for more secular everyday practices? What form will youth religious culture take in these new spaces?

This chapter examines Malay Muslim Bruneian lived religiosities in the context of their everyday engagements on social media. It offers a microgeography of young people’s religiosities influenced by both local and global developments, and how contemporary youth religious culture is shaped. Despite observing more religious expressions of young people in the country through their self-disclosure on social media sites, many others are reluctant to reveal their religious identity and are questioning the markers of religiosities. As Malay Muslims in Brunei, they must negotiate the expectations of their peers, parents and the wider Malay Muslim community. In this regard, religiosities are both individual and communal. Their portrayal of religiosities depends on their aspirations, their negotiation with the community’s expectations (intergenerational and intragenerational), and the infrastructure of and accessibility to social mediascapes, which can be liberating yet confining. I argue that despite the common observation that young people are less religious and the growing displays of religious transgressions on their social mediascapes, they shape their religiosities in ways relevant to their lives, which do not necessarily indicate a lack of piety. In the penultimate section of this chapter, I offer a reflection of youth religiosities and youth religious culture of Malay Muslims and the sociocultural and religious transformations of Brunei society.

2 Young People’s Lived Religiosity and Digital Media Engagement

New religious practices have been discussed extensively in growing scholarly engagements on religion and digital media from ritual studies, geographies of religion, material culture, studies focusing on the representation of religion, to performance of religiosities. Morten T. Højsgaard and Martin Warburg’s (2005) edited volume Religion and cyberspace was one of the first to examine interactions in cyberspace, covering broad religious traditions, diverse apps and methodologies. Meanwhile, Heidi Campbell’s (2013) edited collection Digital religion: Understanding religious practice in new media worlds, although not focusing specifically on young people, offers an overview of young Muslim and Christian individuals’ engagements with the new media. Geographers have recently called for more studies on young people’s religiosities in the online context (van Blerk 2019; Olson and Reddy 2019) to add to the already existing body of literature on geographies of youth and religion (Holloway and Valins 2002; Hopkins and Pain 2007; Vanderbeck 2007; Hopkins et al. 2011; Siti Mazidah 2014; Hemming 2016). There is also a strong presence of research on young people, religion, and popular culture and digital media from other disciplines (Weintraub 2011; Lyden and Mazur 2015; Janmohamed 2016; Kamaludeen 2016).

New religious practices and presentations of religious identity, particularly on social media sites, are intricately linked with the notion of self-identity development, self-exploration and self-expression through active or passive self-disclosure. With the growing use of social media sites, young people are sharing religious-related information and self-reflections, which may be intended as personal reflections (Siti Mazidah 2018a, 2018b). While analysing such changes in young people’s religious practices, we need to consider the transformation beyond the individual to the institutional and micro level to meso level. One example is the transfer of authority of religious sharing from institutions to individuals (Campbell 2007; Campbell and Teusner 2011). In the pre-social media era, the public relied on officially appointed individuals from religious institutions to disseminate information. However, the power to create and circulate content, including religious content, is now in the hands of the users, made possible by Web 2.0, which began to be developed around 2003–2004, which enabled user-generated content and facilitated a more participatory culture.

Globalisation, transcultural flows and the consumption of popular culture are continuing to transform young people’s understanding and practice of religiosities. With the rise of digital content creators (such as social media influencers and microcelebrities), a different landscape of youth religious culture has surfaced, piquing academic and public interest in how religiosities are (re)produced (Islam 2019; Siti Mazidah and Nurzihan 2021). Within the Southeast Asian region, the rise of young qualified Islamic scholars (ustaz, ustazah) and women who wear head coverings (hijabi) as microcelebrities or religious influencers using digital media exemplifies the transfer of religious authority, young Muslims’ performance of religiosity, and their engagement with digital media and popular culture. These hijabi and religious microcelebrities/influencers use their everyday lives, struggles and engagements with their audiences to create religious content relevant to young Muslims, rather than any formal religious education.

Eva F. Nisa (2018) and Annisa R. Beta (2019) have demonstrated how religious social media influencers in Indonesia, through their everyday sharing of religious content in the form of self-reminders and proselytisation (dakwah), can influence the religious landscape of the country. Elsewhere I have argued that hijabi celebrities such as Vivy Yusof, although not a religious influencer herself, are able to promote hijab wearing among the Muslim women in the region (Siti Mazidah and Nurzihan 2021; Siti Mazidah 2021). In contrast to the expectation of Muslim women to maintain modesty, hijabi microcelebrities/influencers are reframing what modesty and the hijab mean for them. This reveals different forms of religious practices which are embedded in the everyday life of social media users. From the audience’s perspective, we can observe a different form of religious consumption. The audience does not rely solely on mass-produced information by religious institutions or bodies (such as schools or religious classes), but instead look to material they willingly consume by following these (non)celebrated religious individuals. In such a situation, one’s religious or spiritual journey is relatively individualised through the selective consumption of religious content.

Brunei’s youth religious landscape is a good example of the changing demographics of religious agents and the transfer of religious authority. We continue to observe and appreciate young Bruneians as new (certified) religious agents such as Ustazah Hanisah Othman and Ustaz Khairul Nazif. Their dakwah, delivered in English and Brunei Malay, and sometimes with humour, are relatable to everyday contexts and young people’s experiences. For example, Ustazah Hanisah, using her personal Instagram profile, performs relatable dakwah between her everyday postings. There are also young people who work individually and collectively on Instagram to remind Muslims of their responsibilities and duties: @nasihat4qalby, @matters.oc and @cm.adam. Similarly, young globalised Muslims in Singapore and Sydney are circumventing local constraints and contesting the religious and cultural teachings and expectations of the older generation. Their rereading of Islam does not render them ‘as either “liberal” or “conservative”’, but represents their lived and everyday experiences (Kamaludeen 2016: 4). These young Muslims offer lay and lived everyday religion, which may or may not be in contestation with the official institutionalised religious practices. Consequently, young people’s engagement with religion today markedly contrasts with that of the older generation and the expectations of official institutions. I am not suggesting a decline in the authority of religious institutions, but rather wish to draw attention to the diversification of the sources of religious information, transmission and consumption, as well as a rethinking of religion and religiosities and religious expression enabled by the new digital communication spaces.

As I have noted elsewhere, it is essential to study individual religious experiences at a micro level, particularly in the online context (Siti Mazidah 2014). The use of those sites and experiences is individualised. These analyses offer more nuanced insights into young people’s religiosities, spatialities and cultures. Over two decades ago, Lily Kong (2001: 408, 410) asked three questions that are still relevant today, concerning technology, religion and space. First, how has technology changed and facilitated new religious practices? Second, how has religion harnessed technology? And third, ‘how will geography and place [contribute to] … the reproduction of religion as rituals’ transform? The first and third questions are relevant to the discussion in this chapter on young people’s lived religiosity and digital media engagement. The current practices we observe on social media sites, websites, blogs and video-sharing sites are examples of how technology has changed and facilitated new religious practices. They are utilised to share religious knowledge, portray a religious self and create new religions.

As these new practices become rituals conducted day in and day out, sometimes subconsciously, what we understand as religious space/sacred space is no longer the same. Digital media provide the spaces that Kong (ibid.: 405) calls techno-religious spaces: ‘Technological developments have opened up new spaces of religious practice—or “techno-religious spaces”’. For scholars of geographies of religion, mass broadcasting via television and radio as well as physical offline spaces are considered to be these new religious spaces. However, virtual or online spaces in their sociocultural and religious contexts have yet to be conceptualised as a techno-religious and lived space. Lived space is usually examined in the context of social, cultural and political concerns of everyday life (Worth 2015), and by geographers studying young people’s offline spaces and what it means to be young in specific locations (Hopkins 2010). The notion of lived space is relevant to how technology has changed religious practices and how geography and place figure in the reproduction of religion, and what youth religiosities have emerged from these new communication practices and spaces. Youth religiosities may be further examined by focusing on space and place as the site of self and identity—fluid, relational and contingent (Valentine 2007; Worth 2015; Hemming 2016; Olson and Reddy 2019). As mentioned in the introduction, young people’s digital media use and their online spaces have not been unpacked well enough yet to fully understand their religiosities.

3 Researching Young People’s Religiosities

Since 2014 I have developed an interest in the religiosity of young Muslims in Brunei. This was sparked by the PhD research I conducted from 2010 to 2014 on the cultivation and performance of the cosmopolitan self on Facebook by Malaysian Malay Muslim students while studying in Britain. The complexities and nuances of the respondents’ everyday lives revealed interesting conceptions of the religious self, online and offline lived religiosities, and their embeddedness in cosmopolitanism (Siti Mazidah 2014). The insights from this research led me to question what forms of religiosities could be observed in Brunei. In this Muslim-majority state, Islam is accepted as a way of life visible in the day-to-day practices of Malay Muslims, particularly in light of the implementation of syariah law introduced in 2014 (Department of Information 2014).

Although I concentrated predominantly on the online space, the mutually constitutive aspects of online and offline environments require both spaces to be analysed. The observations conducted on social media sites such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and, very recently, TikTok are guided by a number of factors: what young people post on social media; the specific religious content they post; how the audience responds to the religious content young people share; what is shared on different social media sites; and the changes in the content shared over time. Over the years, I have observed a growing number of religious postings by young Bruneians and dedicated profiles, which have contributed to the sharing of religious content and creating a religious communal presence on the social mediascape. To further obtain insights into the young people’s thoughts, practices and experiences, I discussed my observations with students in my undergraduate modules. I used an online discussion, qualitative content analysis (QCA) and conversations with a few young people to inform my investigation.

An online discussion page was created on Canvas, a learning management system, for students enrolled in one of my undergraduate modules. These students are young people between the ages of 21 and 25. Several key questions guided the discussion: What are the students’ thoughts of young people’s religiosities? Do they portray their Muslim identity in the online space? What are their reasons for (not) sharing religious content or displaying the religious self on their social media sites? Fifty-three discussion entries were recorded, and only entries from Malay Muslim Bruneians are included in the analysis. Permission to use their entries was obtained before the discussion was posted online. While facilitating this online discussion, I was concerned that the presence of other Malay Muslims in the discussion space may discourage them from freely expressing their views. However, I found the students to be upfront and open with their opinions and experiences. Forum discussions have been used in religion and digital media studies (Tsuria et al. 2017), and such platforms have also been known to offer respondents a relatively accessible space to examine personal issues (Im and Chee 2006). Respondents have more time to formulate their opinions and contribute to what others have shared on the site. The key findings from the online discussions include their search for a religious identity and its markers, realisation that social and worldly matters distract young people from dedicating themselves to Islam, intergenerational and intragenerational tensions that need to be negotiated, and a lack of in-depth Islamic knowledge affecting their portrayal of a religious self.

The findings from the observation and discussion are used as guides for the QCA. The QCA was conducted to obtain content specific to religious sharing and how young people (individuals and groups) portray their religious self online and was categorised into three parts. The first was on individual and community Instagram and Twitter profiles dedicated to spreading Islamic belief and practices. The second was on random young people’s profiles to obtain an idea of what content is circulated on the sites while the third was on random postings that are relevant to young people’s thoughts on religious practices online. Conversations with a few young people to obtain deeper insights into their online practices and religiosities have also been conducted to supplement the two main methods.

While observing the burgeoning sharing of religious views by young people on social media sites, I have found that there are Malay Muslims who have never shared religious content on social media and others who have kept it to a minimum. My research findings do point to a growing religiosity among young people, while noticing young people who openly display religious transgression. Living in a country where the majority of society are Malay Muslims, I expected greater expression of a religious self. Interestingly, my respondents indicated that they are quite reluctant and cautious with sharing religious practices or portraying a religious self for several reasons. The reluctance or caution in expressing their religious selves on social mediascapes are important issues discussed in the next section. This reluctance to openly portray their Muslim identity online is linked to the growing uncertainty with what religiosity entails today, the differences in intergenerational and intragenerational religious expectations and practices, the opportunities social mediascapes offer for their presentation of identity, and their everyday social interactions with others on the sites and in the offline environment.

4 Questioning Religiosity and Managing Moral Policing

These young people’s online presence becomes performative with the growing intensity of self-disclosure evident in the amount of information posted on social media sites. Their social media presence is not just about disclosing their everyday activities, likes or dislikes, and what they think. Instead, these disclosures collectively become their identity markers of how other people view them. In this context, being a good Muslim is not an individual and personal matter that remains only between oneself and Allah. The notion of a good Muslim is linked with the idea of maintaining one’s religious identity in both online and offline spaces. One cannot present a self that is religious online but portray a different self offline or vice versa. The nature of the online spaces such as the persistence of information on the sites, the social reach of the information, the search functionality of the internet allowing for one’s information to be located, and the replicability of data through copying, pasting and screen capture makes one’s online presence permanent (Boyd 2008). Unlike offline and face-to-face self-presentation, which are temporal, the online self remains accessible indefinitely. Information shared on these sites can be retrieved later.

Apart from the nature of the online space, their audience, predominantly Malay Muslims, expects their image to be consistent in both spaces. Constructing and maintaining one’s identity in the online space is not a straightforward task. Brunei is a Muslim-majority country with a close-knit community where people consider themselves related to one another via marriage or blood. There is a strong connection between culture and religion in which Islam is embedded in Bruneians’ everyday social and cultural practices. A Muslim religious identity is often conflated with a Malay ethnic identity. Religious transgressions are often taken as culturally transgressive behaviour. In such a context, religiosities that should be personal become a collective and cultural concern. An individual is thus conscious of a consistent self-presentation. The respondents expressed concern about being criticised as hypocritical. Such expectations from the audience and the sites’ accessibility discourage these young people from sharing religious information and presenting their Muslim selves on the sites. One’s online presence becomes interpersonal and must be carefully managed to avoid misunderstanding and judgment, especially by other Malay Muslims.

What arises from this concern of maintaining one’s religious identity is the question of what religiosities entail. To this end, self-comparison, assessing what other Muslims are doing, and questioning markers of religiosity and piousness are common. When asked what these young people think about their religiosities, one respondent replied by asking what is needed to present oneself as a Muslim. If we are not sure of what religious practices are used to measure religiosity, what does it mean to be religious? Often, the expectations of being a good Muslim are questioned and contested.

Despite knowing the audience’s expectations in one’s presentation of the Muslim self, they insist on not displaying their religious identity for several reasons. First, there is a fear of being judged in case they are unable to maintain their religious or Muslim identity, as the following discussants disclose.

In my opinion, yes most young people are expected to be less religious. But what does being religious mean? Is praying five times a day considered as religious? What if someone does fewer religious activities such as looking at inappropriate things online but still prays five times a day? Would that be religious or not? (Discussant, male)

I didn’t want to be seen and categorised by people as being a more religious or less religious type of person. It is very complicated to me because being seen as either could make people misunderstood, make assumptions or treat me differently. Mainly because the fear of being judged too. If I seem to look or act religious, someone might say ‘You did [these] religious activities, praying and all these but you forgot to cover your intimate parts of the body that must be hidden from the view of others [aurat], etc., how could you not know these things? Are you being fake religious?’ or they pointed out some of my actions or flaws that could affect my self-esteem. (Discussant, female)

The answer is no, I don’t really see me portraying myself as a religious figure on the internet. There is no definite reason behind it. However, one of the reasons that I can think of is that to be someone who is ‘religious’ I need to be someone who is perfect in every aspect. Because, in the eyes of society, these religious people are regarded as [perfect beings], someone who doesn’t make mistakes, someone who does good in every action, etc. One small mistake and these people are already clicking in their phone, bashing the keyboard on these people’s weaknesses. We live in a judgmental society and we are bound by it. In the end I just keep a religious image of me for myself to see. (Discussant, male)

Second, they are conscious of their lack of knowledge about Islam and being called out. Admitting their lack of in-depth knowledge of Islam, the respondents are not ready to show their religious self or at least their understanding of Islam for fear of being criticised as ignorant and lacking in religious knowledge. The young people I spoke to commonly say or write, ‘I’m not religious’. This declaration acts as a defence mechanism to safeguard themselves from the scrutiny and expectations of their peers.

I don’t usually portray myself online as I felt that it is an act of showing-off that I’m a good or pious person, far better than anyone else. Back then, I used to share religious postings online. However, I felt that I’m not fit to do so as there are still spiritual flaws that require me to improve myself first before advising or influencing others.… I used to share and show my Muslim identity through postings which included hadiths, religious inspirational quotes, etc. (Discussant, male)

Third, presenting oneself as a devout Muslim could lead to arrogance, a behaviour that is disapproved in Islam. The narrative of ‘learning to be a better Muslim’ is commonly used to justify not portraying a Muslim self online. Some felt that religiosity is not something that should be openly demonstrated for fear of showing good deeds to others for attention or praise (riak, riya’ or riyaa’), which could lead to arrogance and haughtiness. Muslims have to carefully tread their performance of piousness due to the likelihood of committing riak. Keeping one’s good deeds and religiosity hidden from the public could help avoid riak, maintain a desirable image, and side-step possible contestations and negative responses from their audiences and the Muslim community. Sharing religious-related information on their social media sites is thus more of a self-reminder and self-reflection rather than showing off religious piety. Self-reminders are made evident through the use of dedicated hashtags such as #selfreminder and #selfreflection in their captions which helps to neutralise the posts, justify their sharing of such information and negate any potential negative overtones. Preaching or explicitly reminding others to do good deeds and refraining from sinning may be negatively misconstrued. Similarly, in Indonesia, Muslims have to renegotiate riak potentially caused by online charity (sedekah) and Qur’an reading in various ways, such as by emphasising one’s intention and reassuring themselves that Allah forgives those who seek forgiveness (Husein and Slama 2018). Several of my informants commented in the following terms:

No, I don’t portray a religious self online. I don’t dare to call myself religious because it can cause me to develop riyaa’ [the act of showing off that you are religious]. Usually, whenever I posted something religious, actually it is an act to reflect on myself rather than to preach to my audiences. I don’t think the way I portray myself can be called religious when my attitude or character shown in my social media are the opposite. (Discussant, female)

First, I am a hijabi, that already shows that I am a Muslim. Second, sometimes I posted religious quotes or hadith which, as I mentioned above, is as a self-reflection. Third, I think the way how I show my friends or family, or my surroundings also can tell my Muslim identity online, such as how I celebrate Ramadan, Eid-ul-Fitr and attending some mosque events. Finally, the most obvious one is I also put words of the Qur’an in my [Instagram] bio-profile which obviously tells everyone that I am a Muslim. (Discussant, female)

Personally, I have no interest in portraying a religious self online, as I feel that my religiosity is a personal matter that should be kept out of the public eye. However, my usual online activities often consist of posts on [Instagram] stories or [WhatsApp] status updates, and occasionally they will feature words of advice or motivational quotes from religious scholars and preachers, supplications for various needs and situations, as well as news reports and social media posts which highlight the ongoing oppression against Muslims around the world. These habits of mine may be perceived by some as my efforts to portray or affirm my Muslim identity online, but in actual fact I’m just doing it out of habit. I’m in the rhythm, so to speak. (Discussant, male)

Fourth, the discussants shared that displaying a religious self is unnecessary as their audience is already aware of their Muslim identity. I expect such a view coming from young people who are comfortable with their Muslim identity. However, a few young people expressed the relevance of displaying one’s religious identity as religious beliefs and practices are embedded in one’s everyday life, both online and offline. Regardless of the time and space, as a Muslim, one’s religious self should be visible and performed. Another mainstream practice among the respondents is avoiding moral policing by fellow Malay Muslims on the sites by not disclosing religious identity and practices and not blatantly displaying religious offences.

For the question on how I show my Muslim identity/religiosities online, I honestly found this question puzzling. This is because the first thing that popped in my mind is ‘Why should I show my Muslim identity when my followers already know I am a Muslim?’.… I am not interested to show my Muslim identity online, since it’s already quite obvious to my followers. (Discussant, female)

I never thought of this, to be honest. We live in a Muslim country and the majority of the people are Muslims, so I think it’s not really necessary to ‘show your Muslim identity online’. (Discussant, female)

Young people’s everyday concerns and strategies to avoid contestation is a complex matter. Their social media presence is often monitored, scrutinised and, if seen as offensive, contested by their audience. Consequently, it is more common to hear young people refusing to share religious information and make known their religious practices or opinions.

5 Challenging Intergenerational Religiosities and Status Quo

I have argued that being a good Muslim is not simply a private matter but a collective and cultural concern. The audience, usually other Malay Muslims, has a say in other Malay Muslims’ social practices or lack of religious display. Surveillance and moral policing put pressure on some young people to conform to expectations. Some others insisted on not performing their religious self online in order to present a neutral identity. Notwithstanding the surveillance and self-censorship in Brunei society (Siti Mazidah 2019: 53), I observed more young people daring to disclose sensitive practices to the Malay Muslim community.

It is common to hear young people say, ‘It’s between me and Allah’ when they negotiate their religious identity offline and on social media sites, and sometimes when justifying the act of not disclosing their religious views. Interestingly, the same statement has also been used to justify actions questioned and contested by Islam, such as defending religious transgressions. The religious transgressions here include Muslims not covering their aurat, public displays of affection between unmarried couples, cross-dressing and showing effeminate tendencies. Young Muslims are expected to be religious and portray their religious identity and faith through Muslim sartorial presentation such as wearing a long robe or dress for males and females (jubah, gamis or kurta) and using Islamic phrases such as ‘Inshallah’ (if God wills), ‘Mashallah’ (what God has willed) and ‘Alhamdulillah’ (praise be to God). Their refusal or reluctance to conform to such expectations are often met with disapproval. These young people contest the restrictions that limit their religious expressions.

The image that I have [of] what a religious man and women would look and act like … would be [a man] wearing a jubah or kurta with something to cover the top of their head [topi haji], while for women the attire would be a gamis. This will also be coupled with how they behave and interact with people using ‘InsyaʾAllah’ instead of ‘maybe’ or ‘MasyaʾAllah’ instead of ‘wow’ and so on. Although this may not be in the theme of what people perceive as being a religious person. Many of my friends and people I know who are considered as youth, including myself, do not really act and dress like a religious [individual] as often as people in the older generation do, but it does not mean the youths are not religious just a bit below what the devout [warak] would be. (Discussant, male)

The expectation of youth being less religious comes from the elders and I think it is because they expect that for one to be religious they would need to cover up, pray five times a day, be knowledgeable about the religion and follow the dos and don’ts. However, things are different now, as mentioned before one can dress up as how they please [against the religion] but still pray and worship their God. (Discussant, female)

It’s because a lot of old people believe and think and see us young people as immature who don’t know the consequences of our own actions and need constant [reminders] of what’s right and wrong. Also due to the fact that old people seeing the generalised nature of the young people being actively involved in things related to this temporary world [dunia], such as playing games and whatnot. (Discussant, female)

Many old people might think, ‘These kids need to do something more beneficial to them like doing prayers, etc., instead of [doing whatever we might be doing; playing games/going on social media/engaging in our hobbies/hanging out with friends] those things’. Other young people could be annoyed by this as they listen to this kind of religious talk [ceramah] often and could made them disobey and refuse to listen the old people. (Discussant, female)

In the respondents’ opinions, being caught doing an action deemed wrong by older Muslims and the religious authorities does not render them lacking piety. The broad spectrum of religiosities is often used to defend one’s behaviour. As observed in the captions and comment sections of social media sites, religious transgressions and cultural offences such as not dressing according to syariah code, proudly and openly discussing premarital intercourse and disclosing their non-heteronormative identities are commonly justified and normalised by other Malay Muslims’ display of religious offences. Young people are actively working on creating or justifying their religious identities in a changing sociocultural and religious landscape.

A case in point is a young fitness influencer justifying his body transformation by displaying it on social media. With the growing fitness community in the country and the concern for a positive body image appropriated from the West, we observed males and females sharing their bodybuilding practices, struggles to achieve their goals, success stories, body transformations and physical displays. Any Muslim knows that one’s sartorial presentation and modest coverings are important markers of religiosity. Hence, their physical appearance and bodily display are commonly scrutinised by other Muslims. Religious transgressions in this situation are justified and compensated by the greater good that their body display could encourage, in terms of a healthy lifestyle and positive self-esteem.

Social media have increasingly shed light on the growing presence of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex (LGBTQI) community in Brunei. Even though non-heteronormative identities are not openly embraced, we could observe openness towards the LGBTQI community among Malay Muslims. Exploration of sexual identities, posts about coming out and cross-dressing are gradually being seen on Twitter, Instagram and TikTok. Young adults and teenagers openly support freedom of sexuality, evident in their affirmative responses to the social media sharing of the individuals. Although homosexuality (and other non-heteronormative practices) is prohibited in Islam, the audience justifies its acceptance of an LGBTQI presence by citing Islam as a religion of peace and justice. Brunei is a nation devoted to God (negara zikir), a state that accepts ‘Islam as the religion of Allah the Almighty whose teachings were conveyed through His messenger Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)’ (Izah 2021). As such, this involves ‘the practice and dissemination of Islamic teachings by respecting and dignifying the Syi’ar [and] … institutionalising Islam into the system of government, customs and society’ (ibid.). As a consequence, such sexual awareness and presence are a matter of concern to Malay Muslims in the country.

The experiences of these young people do share similarities with other young people in other contexts. For instance, Malay Muslim performance of religiosities in Malaysia is shaped by their community. Presenting a neutral self and avoiding displaying religious transgressions online are strategic responses to their community’s surveillance (Siti Mazidah 2014). Similarly, Peter E. Hopkins et al.’s (2011: 319–325) findings on young Scottish Christians’ religiosities reveal correspondence (the transmission of religion and religious practices from parents to children), compliance, conflict and challenges in intergenerational religiosities. These similarities in the religiosities of young Bruneian Malay Muslims, Malaysian Malay Muslims and Scottish Christians are significant. Regardless of their religion and contexts, the general concerns the young people have are quite similar.

6 Young People’s Religious Culture and Lived Religiosities: A Reflection

This chapter examines the individual, social and spatial construction of youth religiosity. Questions about the markers of religious identity, lack of religious knowledge, social representation and fact-checking by their peers are among their concerns in portraying their religiosity, especially in social mediascapes. The lived religiosities of the young people are shown to be relational and contingent on the space they take place in. The nature and infrastructure of social mediascapes, such as their searchability function, social reach, replicability through copying and pasting, and the presence of an audience, influence young people’s self-disclosure and presentation of the self. The online space is a lived space where these young people’s identities and everyday practices are actively shaped. Their religious self-disclosure is always negotiated in consideration of their audience, who are predominantly Malay Muslims. We expect users to be more comfortable portraying their religious self in this Malay Muslim context and environment. However, this is not the case for most of the respondents. Their audience is a significant influence on these young people’s expression of their religious views. It is important to note that not displaying an acceptable moral identity does not render them less religious but reveals a different form of religiosity that is sensitive and relevant to their lives.

Digital technology (games, social media, the internet) and popular culture are some of the factors that are thought to have distracted young people from religious practices, with which the respondents agree. As one discussant wrote, ‘young people are seen to be spending more time on dunia [world] matters than akhirah [afterlife] … [p]eople are naturally curious and we can be easily influenced with what we see on social media’. Exposure to other cultures from social media results in what a respondent called a ‘crisis in faith’. One respondent noted: ‘Now in a social media age youths have more questions regarding the restrictions within Islam when they compare their lives with those of non-Muslim backgrounds’. Similarly, another respondent said: ‘With technology the youth is exposed to different cultures and religions, the youth are curious and can question the ethics and morals of the religion’.

Digital media, as shared by the respondents, expose young people to social practices that are different and may be incompatible with their own. The vast amount of information and resources available on social media has opened up questions on what religion is, the markers of religiosity, who sets the markers and what religious piety means. The respondents emphasised that an individual should not be assessed by visible religious markers such as sartorial display, posting religious content, and reciting Islamic phrases and supplication. It is interesting to note that most young people in this study consider their group to be less pious according to the expectations of the older generation or religious institutions. It is more appropriate to say that they are making sense of piety and piousness in their own terms and challenging conventional expectations.

The emergence of (new) youth religiosities and religious culture needs to be considered in the context of alternative sites of everyday interactions and communication. Everyday youth rituals have been transferred to the online space, a space with its own modus operandi and infrastructures that could alter religious meanings and practices. Combining each of those individual users’ practices on social media could create a religious landscape unique to the community (young people, Muslim and ethnicity) they are representing. This is evident in the landscapes shaped by different groups of young people such as the religious community through their social media postings, the fitness community justifying their body display practices and an online LGBTQI presence challenging the country’s social norms as a nation devoted to Islam. Young people as active creators of (religious) content are individually and collectively utilising the social mediascape as a platform for empowerment, transformation and possibly resistance. What these young people are doing is ‘develop[ing] their own complex religious identities that often challenge dominant representations and discourses’ (Hemming 2016: 59).

7 Conclusion

This chapter has offered an examination of Malay Muslim Bruneian lived religiosities through an understanding and portrayal of religiosities in respondents’ everyday engagements on social media. Young people’s religiosities are complex and are an outcome of different processes at play: sociospatial constraints and negotiations, intergenerational and intragenerational pressures and challenging the status quo. I have argued that young people shape their religiosities in ways relevant to themselves in the face of real constraints imposed by the communal expectations of Brunei society. Questioning religiosities and their markers, coping with moral policing, and challenging and managing intergenerational pressures are some of these young people’s responses in making sense of their religiosities. I have only highlighted one facet of their religiosity—their reluctance to display religious identities on the social mediascape. Further investigation into different aspects of their religiosities is necessary. To this end, I offer three potential research issues to unpack young people’s religiosities. First, an investigation of the acceptance and normalisation of religious transgression among young people. Second, studying how young people behave in different online spaces, and how the sites’ affordances and the audiences enable and constrain religious self-expression. And third, examining the intergenerational tension that exists between younger and older Muslims. Such research would reveal the specific practices that are contested and negotiated, the ever-changing lived religiosities and religious cultures of today’s youth, and would shed light on what it means to be a young Malay Muslim in a Muslim-majority country.