In his later years, Qian Xuesen had two framed items hanging in his bedroom: one was the portrait of his father, Qian Junfu, and the other was a traditional Chinese painting, entitled “A Corner of the West Lake”, depicting his hometown scenery of the West Lake in Hangzhou. The painter was Jiang Danshu, a close friend of Qian Junfu. Jiang Danshu painted it in early spring of 1941 and sent it to Qian Xuesen, then far away in the United States. When Qian Xuesen returned to China in 1955, he brought the painting back. “Returning in another day” was an inscription on the painting, which also revealed the Qian Xuesen’s original ideal in his pursuit of knowledge during his overseas years. This traditional Chinese painting was regarded as his lifelong treasure and was indeed of special significance to him.
In his later years, Qian Xuesen had two framed items hanging in his bedroom: one was the portrait of his father, Qian Junfu, and the other was a traditional Chinese painting, entitled “A Corner of the West Lake”, depicting his hometown scenery of the West Lake in Hangzhou. The painter was Jiang Danshu, a close friend of Qian Junfu. Jiang Danshu painted it in early spring of 1941 and sent it to Qian Xuesen, then far away in the United States. When Qian Xuesen returned to China in 1955, he brought the painting back. “Returning in another day” was an inscription on the painting, which also revealed the Qian Xuesen’s original ideal in his pursuit of knowledge during his overseas years. This traditional Chinese painting was regarded as his lifelong treasure and was indeed of special significance to him.
The painter
“A Corner of the Westlake” was painted by Jiang Danshu, alias Jing Lu. Born in Liyang, Jiangsu Province in 1885, Jiang graduated from Nanjing Liangjiang Superior Teacher’s Training College in 1907, majored in painting and handicraft. He had traveled to Japan and North Korea. In 1911, he taught at Zhejiang Two Level Normal School as a teacher of drawing and handicraft, and he also taught art courses at Zhejiang Women’s Normal School and Zhejiang No. 1 High School. In 1924, he taught basic art courses at Shanghai Art College and at Hangzhou National Art College. He commuted between the Shanghai and Hangzhou, staying in each city for three or four days respectively in a week.
When Jiang was teaching in Zhejiang Two Level Normal School, he befriended with Qian Junfu, who was teaching at the same school. The Qian family had lived at No. 28, Fengqiqiao River Road in Hangzhou, next to Jiang’s family. Jiang Shukai, the son of Jiang Danshu, once recalled:
Aunt Qian (Qian Xuesen’s mother) was kind and well educated, and a lady of the house. There were various trees and flowers in my garden and a lush bamboo forest. We invited aunt Qian to dig some bamboo shoots every spring. My youngest sister, Qiao Chun, was only six or seven years old, the most adorable one of my five sisters. Aunt Qian liked her very much and recognized her as her goddaughter. Unfortunately, aunt Qian died of typhoid fever in 1934.
After Qian Junfu took the position of inspector in the Ministry of Education in Beijing, he still kept correspondence with Jiang Danshu. In 1917, Qian Junfu assisted in the publication of Jiang Danshu’s book History of Art to be approved by the Ministry of Education, which was designated as textbook for five-year teacher training schools. This textbook History of Art was the pioneering work in the study of modern art history in China, which included a wide range of topics such as architecture, sculpture, printing, calligraphy and arts and crafts, and history of Western art and the art of India and the East. Jiang Danshu had successively compiled Reference Book on Art History, Collection of Art Papers, Perspective, Thirty eight Lectures on Art Anatomy and other books.
After Qian Xuesen was admitted to Jiaotong University in 1929, he returned to Hangzhou every summer vacation and spent a year in Hangzhou to recuperate from typhoid fever. Meanwhile, Qian Xuesen often went to Jiang Danshu’s house. Once, he told Jiang that he was studying radio technology and needed to pull an antenna between the two houses on the third floors. Jiang Danshu readily agreed. In 1931, Jiang Danshu gifted Qian Junfu a painting entitled “Xixi Wetland”, and inscribed on the painting a poem:
西溪打桨觅诗材, 诗未成吟画已催。芦花万亩柿千树, 疑是雪中送炭来。
Paddling in Xixi for poetic muse, before which comes the art source;
Persimmon trees and reed blossoms in wetland, truly are gifted beauty to my hand.
On Qian Junfu’s 60th birthday, Jiang Danshu also created a painting to celebrate his birthday. It could be seen that the relationship between the two families of Qian and the Jiang was very harmonious.
In 1937, when Qian Junfu lived in Shanghai after the Japanese occupation of Hangzhou, Jiang Danshu also moved to Shanghai and they often met with each other. Jiang was very concerned about Qian Xuesen, and would ask him about his studies and life in the U.S. After the founding of People’s Republic of China in 1949, Jiang Danshu was transferred to Wuxi East China Art College. Shortly after Qian Xuesen returned home in 1955, Qian Junfu wrote to Jiang to tell him the news and asked him not to worry about Qian Xuesen. After that, Qian Junfu moved to Beijing from Shanghai, but there had been constant correspondence between the Qian and Jiang families. On June 8, 1962, Jiang Danshu died of illness in Hangzhou. Qian Junfu sent ten yuan for memorial ceremony.
Returning in another day: “native land emotion” in a traditional Chinese painting
In the history of modern art, Jiang Danshu occupied a very important position as he pioneered art courses in anatomy, perspective and photography. However, he rarely created artworks for quite a long time afterwards; instead, he devoted most of his time to teaching, and trained many great artists, such as Feng Zikai, Pan Tianshou, Lai Chusheng, Zheng Wuchang and so on.
“A Corner of the Westlake” was created by Jiang Danshu in early 1941 at a time when he became more adept with his painting skills. Upon the request of Qian Junfu, Jiang created this painting and sent it to Qian Xuesen. Jiang Danshu did not immediately put pen to paper, but took some time in the conception of this painting and decided to paint in the form of “memory writing” with the content of West Lake scenery in Qian Xuesen’s hometown. When the painting was finished, Jiang Danshu wrote an inscription with more than 100 Chinese characters as follows:
I learned the way of Yu Gong Yishan (i.e., a Chinese parable about “the old man Yu Gong moving the mountain”) and moved West Lake to the canvas by trickery. This painting will travel with the ship only that I am still on the east side of the earth. West Lake is still the same as it was back then, where will it be covered with dirt? The landscape of our hometown is contained in this painting, and I will trust it with my thoughts for thousands of miles to appease.
You have been studying in America for many years, so you must yearn for your homeland. I am sending this painting to you as a way to enjoy the West Lake. I have left West Lake for four or five years, but when we return to West Lake, the landscape will still be the same. Let us commit to revisit West Lake together. This painting should be our dwelling place.
Inscription by Jiang Danshu on the Spring of the Year of Xinyi (Fig. 1)
This inscription was short, but contained extremely rich emotions. It was not only the emotional expression of the painter through the artwork, but also his ardent expectation for Qian Xuesen (Fig. 2). At a time when the anti-Japanese war was stalemated, Jiang Danshu could only imagine the creation of the West Lake in the “isolated island where the birds live in a cage”, which was quite a sense of helplessness. During Qian Xuesen’s summer visit to his family in 1947, he and Jiang Danshu fulfilled the agreement of “revisiting West Lake together.” When Qian Xuesen and Jiang Ying got married, they invited Jiang Danshu to attend the wedding.
It was conceivable that Qian Xuesen, who was far away from home in the United States, and Jiang Danshu, who was “living in an isolated island”, had the same emotion that their hometown was being occupied and ravaged by Japanese invaders, and their hearts were full of grief and longing. Therefore, for Qian Xuesen, who had been studying in the United States for six years, “A Corner of West Lake” could undoubtedly help relieve the “nostalgic thoughts of the homeland.” But more importantly, this painting carried Jiang Danshu’s earnest expectation for Qian Xuesen: “When you returned in another day, the lakes and mountains would remain unchanged.” “Return in another day” was the initial thought of Qian Xuesen during his overseas study. Whether he was at home or abroad, he would never forget his original ideal of serving the country with science and technology, just like “the lake and the mountain remain unchanged.” It was not until 1955 that Qian Xuesen finally returned to his homeland after all the hardships, finally realizing his original ideal of serving his country.
Qian Yonggang once mentioned: “In my father’s later years, he asked me to take out “A Corner of the Westlake” and hang it in his bedroom. This painting was very important to my father as he usually did not like keeping stuff in his bedroom.” Though this traditional Chinese painting only depicted a corner of the West Lake, it Qian Xuesen’s deep emotion for his motherland. This “native land emotion” was deeply burned in Qian’s heart and had become the centralized embodiment of his patriotic spirit.
2 Secret Letter from the “North Bureau”
Recent archival disclosures and historical research show that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) started to mobilize foreign students to return to China to participate in socialist construction as early as the eve of the founding of People’s Republic of China. Qian Xuesen was one of the scientists who were invited to return to China, but when he received a letter from the “Northern Bureau” and booked a plane ticket to return to China, he was detained in the United States for five years on the grounds of supporting communism and carrying classified documents.
Receiving the letter from the “North Bureau”
In early summer of 1949, Zhou Enlai instructed that “the central task was to mobilize Chinese intellectuals in the United States, especially high-tech experts, to return home to construct a new China.” After that, the CPC Central Committee made a series of decisions to encourage overseas students to return to China, and established the Committee for Handling the Return of International Students to China as a special responsible organization. Against this background, Qian Xuesen received a secret letter from the “Northern Bureau” written by Cao Richang.
On May 14, 1949, Cao Richang [1], a professor of psychology at the University of Hong Kong and head of the Hong Kong branch of the Chinese Association of Science and Technology, wrote a letter to Qian Xuesen, as instructed by his superiors. Since Cao Richang did not know much about Qian Xuesen, he wrote another letter to Ge Tingsui at the University of Chicago, hoping to encourage more people who “were politically pure and had expertise” to return to China. Cao wished that Ge would hand over his letter to Qian Xuesen as he wrote:
You surely know Mr. Qian Xuesen. The “North Bureau” wishes that he could return home and ask me to contact him. I don’t know his correspondence, so I’m enclosing a letter to ask you to pass it on and to give him more encouragement, it would be the best if he could return home! Please assist in this matter [2].
On May 20, Ge Tingsui forwarded this confidential letter to Qian Xuesen with the following message.
You have such great academic achievement and international reputation. If you are willing to return home, all Chinese people studying or working in the United States will be encouraged to come home for the construction of new China, which will benefit all Chinese people. I deeply feel that personal attainments and academic status are infinitely insignificant compared to the struggle for survival of the nation. Considering that we have been abroad for a long time, I feel sad and ashamed of not being able to participating in the great struggle of survival at home [3].
Ge Tingsui copied the secret letter before sending it out, so this copy of this precious secret letter from Cao Richang was kept, which wrote:
Mr. Xuesen,
I have heard about you from several students studying in the United States. It is a pity that we haven’t the opportunity to meet with each other.
I think you know well about recent domestic situation. The national liberation is imminent. The Northeast and the North China have already settled and various industries are being actively restored, and the aviation industry is also underway. The director responsible for northern industries has heard of your name long time ago. He specially asked me to give his regards to you. If you may quit your job in the U.S., it is our earnest wish that you can return to China and lead the establishment of aviation industry in Northeast or North China. I will do my best to assist you in transportations. Finally, I would like to introduce myself. I am a psychologist and teaching at the University of Hong Kong. Because of the location of Hong Kong, most friends in foreign countries would transit via Hong Kong when they return to the mainland. Looking forward to your reply.
Best wishes
Cao Richang
May 14, 1949
Cao Richang’s letter (Fig. 3) played an important role in prompting Qian Xuesen to make the decision to return to China. In 1993, Qian wrote in his congratulatory letter on Ge Tingsui’s 80th birthday: “I will never forget it is you who guided me back to the embrace of my country.” On the eve of receiving the secret letter, Qian had learned that western suburbs of Beijing were liberated and the defeat of the Kuomintang army was a foregone conclusion. However, Qian Xuesen had already accepted the offer from Caltech and signed the employment contract. After discussing with Jiang Ying, he decided to work at Caltech and then took the opportunity to find the right reason for returning home. In preparation of returning to China at any time, Qian began to resign from part-time positions in the Army Air Forces Scientific Advisory Group, the Naval Artillery Research Institute, the Naval Ordnance Laboratory and other institutions.
After resuming his post at Caltech, Qian Xuesen went to the Oaknoll branch of the First National Bank of Los Angeles Security in the Oaknoll neighborhood of Pasadena on July 18, 1949, to get a demand passbook. He would be able to withdraw money any time he wanted, which was an indication that Qian was ready to return to China whenever possible.
Fig. 3
Letter from Cao Rizhao to Qian Xuesen on May 14, 1949 (copy by Ge Tingsui)
After the end of World War II in 1945, the U.S.-Soviet alliance quickly disintegrated. The fear of communism in the United States and the successful development of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union eventually plunged international relations into a Cold War in which the two camps of capitalism and socialism confronted each other. The U.S. launched an “anti-Communist campaign” at the beginning of the Cold War, and President Harry S. Truman issued a “loyalty investigation” on March 21, 1947, to investigate Communist sympathies, but in fact to liquidate domestic Communist and related organizations. This was followed by the FBI, CIA, and the House Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities (HCUA), which created numerous cases of contempt of Congress, refusal to express political beliefs, communist sympathies, and membership in communist organizations, resulting in either prison or bail. Examples include the Joint Committee Against Fascist Exiles, the Hollywood Ten, the Eisler Case, the Joseph Case, and the Machaney Case, the Morford Case and so on.
The culmination of this “war against the Communist movement” in the United States was the sentencing of Eugene Dennis, General Secretary of the Communist Party of America, to one year in prison and a $1,000 fine for “contempt of Congress” in 1947. Meanwhile, in 1948, the U.S. launched a frontal “war of annihilation” by arresting twelve members of the National Political Bureau Committee of the Communist Party of America for violating the Alien Registration Act of 1940 (the Smith Act). It was against this backdrop, and as the outcome of the war for power between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang became clearer, that the alliance formed between the United States and China during World War II tended to disintegrate. As the alliance gradually turned hostile, Qian Xuesen’s identity as a Chinese scientist naturally attracted attention, especially whether he had communist tendencies.
The FBI made special visits to the MIT and the CIT, where Qian Xuesen worked, as well as to the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Sigma Xi Society, where Qian worked. The results of the investigation showed that Qian Xuesen had subscribed to pro-communist newspapers, but he was not found to have communist tendencies. However, when the “McCarthyism” in the name of protecting the national security interests of the United States became widespread, anti-communist and xenophobic movements became rampant, and the “loyalty investigation campaign” resumed. All those who served in the military, government, universities and scientific institutions were subject to such investigations; even Albert Einstein was not spared.
The so-called “Qian Xuesen Case” occurred against such a complex historical background, and it began when the FBI discovered a “valuable” lead. Sidney Weinbaum’s membership in the Communist Party coincided with his recommendation for a position at JPL by Qian Xuesen. The FBI took this as a clue and conducted an intensive investigation from May to August 1949, which revealed that Qian Xuesen and Weinbaum were friends and that Qian Xuesen’s political leanings were not apparent.
As the FBI investigated, the CIA, specialized in gathering foreign intelligence, stepped in. On August 8, 1949, the CIA’s Los Angeles Bureau wrote to the Pasadena Police Department in California and the Cambridge Police Department in Massachusetts to find out what was going on. The results were disappointing, as the two police departments replied on August 12 and 15, respectively, that no records had been found. But when the CIA went to the FBI’s Los Angeles Bureau on August 18 to review the documents again, it was convinced that the “John M. Decker” on a list of Communist Party members was none other than Qian Xuesen. This discovery convinced the FBI and the CIA that Qian Xuesen was a member of the American Communist Party and was sympathetic to and supportive of communism.
Subsequently, the FBI and CIA gradually expanded the scope of the investigation, and Qian Xuesen’s entire circle of friends became the target of the investigation. They hoped to find more conclusive evidence through “peripheral” channels. For example, on September 27, CIA officers went to Cornell University’s Department of Aerospace Engineering to question Qian’s former colleague at Caltech, Professor William Rees Sears; and on October 3, the FBI went to MIT to question two of Qian’s colleagues, Professor Sartre Stuart Ober and Professor John Makam [4].
In fact, the “peripheral” evidence gathered by the FBI and CIA was not sufficient, as Sears, Ober and Markham testified in favor of Qian Xuesen. What really changed the dynamics of the case was not the joint investigation by the FBI and CIA, but the involvement of the U.S. military. Even during the FBI and CIA investigation, Qian Xuesen still had a license to lead and participate in classified research projects, but the U.S. military’s involvement changed the situation completely.
After the “Weinbaum case”, Qian Xuesen realized that he had to leave the United States as soon as possible, “so he decided to go back to China under the pretext of visiting his family, and never returned.” But he did not know that the FBI and CIA were already investigating him, especially after the spread of McCarthyism and the outbreak of Korean War, the U.S. military became involved, and they thought it was not in the U.S. interest to keep Qian Xuesen’s classified license.
On May 18, 1950, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force Military Security Agency held a joint meeting specifically to discuss the matter of Qian Xuesen’s classified license. The meeting reached a consensus that there was no good reason to ask Qian to resign from the Guggenheim Jet Propulsion Center at Caltech at this time, but it was clear that retaining his classified status permit would do the United States more harm than good. Even though not enough evidence was presented at the meeting, two points were recognized. First, Qian Xuesen had been a member of a communist organization that the Justice Department had determined to be subversive in nature. Second, Qian Xuesen had a relatively close relationship with and was sympathetic to members of the Communist Party.
This meeting finally reached a consensus and decided that the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force Military Security Agency would send a letter to Qian Xuesen requesting that he would be banned from participating in any level of classified scientific research projects. Why would the U.S. military convene a special meeting to discuss whether to cancel Qian’s license for classified status? The reason was very simple. Qian Xuesen was the director of the Guggenheim Jet Propulsion Center at Caltech, and his research projects mainly came from the U.S. military. If the classified license was cancelled, it meant that Qian Xuesen would not be able to participate in classified projects.
The U.S. Army’s Sixth Army Headquarters sent a letter to Caltech on June 6, as requested by the joint meeting, informing that Qian Xuesen’s classified status would be revoked, and that Qian could appeal under the Industrial Employment Review Board’s regulations. Upon receipt of the letter on June 16, Qian Xuesen showed his intention of resignation to Professor Fred Lindvall, chair of Caltech’s mechanical engineering discipline, on the same day, saying emphatically: “I felt that I was no longer welcome in the United States, and the only thing I could do now was to resign and return to China.” The FBI then called Qian to verify the details. Qian said: “I resigned from Caltech unofficially. I had expressed my readiness to resign to Dr. Fred Lindvall, chairman of the mechanical engineering discipline, because that was the only thing I could do. No information had been received from him so far, and it was not yet known whether the resignation has been accepted. However, if the resignation was approved, I would return to China immediately.”
The FBI wanted to interview Qian Xuesen on the phone, to which Qian agreed. The interview was scheduled on June 19. During the interview, Qian told the FBI that he had made contributions to the development of science and technology in the United States in the past ten years, but now he was not welcome. The only thing he could do was to return to China once his resignation was approved. In the following day, Qian Xuesen formally submitted his resignation request to Professor Ernest C. Watson, chairman of the Committee of teaching staff at Caltech.
Soon after, Qian Xuesen wrote to the U.S. Department of State on July 29 to express his willingness to return to China, while inquiring about the U.S. International Trade Service Association and booked a flight to Hong Kong on August 28 with Canadian Pacific Airlines. In order to prepare for his return to China, Qian Xuesen called the staff of Bekins Van and Storage Company to his home and office to pack his luggage for two consecutive days on August 18 and 19.
However, things were not as simple as Qian Xuesen had planned. The whole situation took a sharp turn for the worse when the manager of the Bekins Van and Storage Company snitched on him. This snitching incident seemed to be a coincidence, but it was inevitable against the background of the “anti-communist war” and the McCarthyism in the United States. At the same time, the United States began to take the initiative, and Qian gradually fell into a passive situation.
Qian Xuesen Case
Qian Xuesen and his family would have boarded the flight to Hong Kong on August 28 as scheduled without the snitch from the manager of Bekins Van and Storage Company. However, when an employee of the Bekins found that certain papers in Qian Xuesen’s luggage were marked with “secret”, “confidential” and “internal” on August 19 and he immediately informed his boss, Harold Sexsmith. Sexsmith immediately contacted Los Angeles customs official, who told him to proceed no further with the packing and reported the situation to the Navy, Air Force, State Council and Atomic Energy Commission, requiring them to send representatives to inspect Qian’s luggage on August 21.
On the morning of August 21, representatives from Los Angeles Customs, the Navy, the Air Force and the State Department were appointed to form a delegation to the warehouse. The FBI learned of this and volunteered to send a representative to join in order to keep abreast of the information. Because of Qian Xuesen’s status as a Chinese scientist, the entire investigation operation was then led by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the U.S. Department of Justice, which coordinated the investigation. The delegation drew boxes and examined them and found that some of the papers, notes, and letters were marked with classified levels, mainly related to atomic energy, rockets, missiles, and jet propulsion. However, the delegation was cautious to hold the baggage first so that the information could be fully reviewed by professional technical experts, and classified documents should be judged by the issuing agency.
Between the afternoon of August 21 and 22, Los Angeles Customs notified the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Ordnance of the State Department, the Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of Business and Industry Enforcement of the Department of Commerce of the preliminary results of the review. The State Department officials recommended seizure of the documents and Qian’s detention while the U.S. attorney’s office in Los Angeles wanted Qian put under surveillance. Los Angeles Customs applied for a civil warrant of detention for his cases of documents on the grounds that Qian might have violated the Export Control Act, the Neutrality Act, and the Espionage Act.
From August 21 to 23, Qian Xuesen was in Washington, where he met with Admiral Dan Kimball, telling him everything and he was ready to return home. On August 23, when Qian arrived at Los Angeles airport that night, the chief inspector of the INS was waiting for him and handed him a paper from Department of Justice forbidding him to leave the country. Without any option of returning home, Qian reluctantly canceled his reservation on Canada Pacific Airlines to travel from Vancouver to Hong Kong scheduled on August 28.
On August 24, the Los Angeles District Court signed an official order to detain Qian Xuesen’s luggage. This was apparently done without his knowledge as he only knew the detention from the news report carrying headline “Secret Data Seized in China Shipment” in the Los Angeles Times the next day on August 25, which wrote:
The ship was loaded with eight boxes of secret and confidential documents that Caltech Professor Qian Xuesen was attempting to transport to China. Yesterday, government agents filed charges against him. The U.S. government announced that they had seized books, photographs, sketches, photocopied negatives, records, and a large amount of technical information on rocket research in coded form.
In fact, the Los Angeles Times did not really have the inside story of the case, and relied only on “gossip” to report on the case under the title “Secret data seized.” It was this news report that turned “Qian Xuesen case” into a public event. On August 26, Jiang Ying called the manager of Bekins to see if he could get Qian’s luggage back on the grounds that his daughter had just been born and needed a washing machine, but all her efforts were in vain. In response to the sudden seizure of his luggage, Qian Xuesen decided it was necessary to make a public statement. On August 26, he issued a statement that was reprinted in the Examiner:
I planned to return to China as a family and would come back later. My father was in China and there were family issues that required my return. I had arranged for a transportation company to take care of the packing of my luggage. On Wednesday night, I received an order from the INS that I could not leave the United States. Before that, my luggage was all packed and ready to be shipped. Before I packed my personal documents, I went through them, took out all the classified information and stored it in a cabinet in my office, with the key given to Mr. Milliken. To the best of my knowledge, there were no internal, top secret or secret documents among those I carried (Fig. 4).
In fact, Qian Xuesen’s luggage did contain classified technical documents, but subsequent investigations disclosed that these documents had already been declassified. The day of September 6, 1950 was the darkest moment in Qian Xuesen’s life. At 4 p.m., officials from the INS of the U.S. Department of Justice, armed with an arrest warrant, quickly knocked on Qian’s door. The moment Qian Xuesen opened the door, the INS officer took him away for violating immigration law. Qian was then detained in a prison on Terminal Island, south of Los Angeles. At this time, only Jiang Ying and her two young children were left at home, and her daughter Qian Yongzhen was still a three-month-old baby.
This was the sensational “Qian Xuesen Case” that took place in the United States in 1950. In the end, Qian Xuesen was released on bail on September 23, which was set at $15,000, paid by a wealthy American friend through purchasing U.S. bonds. For comparison, Eugene Dennis, the general secretary of the Communist Party of the United States, was sentenced for a year and paid a fine of $1,000; the figure of bail for Qian was unusually high. Qian lost thirty pounds of weight and even had auditory hallucinations. When Jiang Ying visited him, he could barely speak but nod to her.
The detention of Qian Xuesen quickly became hot news with continued coverage in the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post and other mainsteam newspapers, making it so much publicity. He Guozhu, who returned home with Qian Xuesen on the same ship in 1955, recalled:
After Qian Xuesen was detained, the U.S. State Department convened a meeting with presidents of ten universities, inquiring about the policies on the detained Chinese scientists. Under normal circumstances, Chinese students would have to return home after graduation, and not been allowed to work in the United States. These presidents reached an agreement that students, especially those majored in science and technology, should not be allowed to return to China [5].
In 1950, the U.S. Congress passed the China Area Aid Act of 1950, which allowed the government to allocate $6 million for relief work for international students and scholars. Due to this Act, a total of about $8 million was spent to support 4,000 international students, which achieved the purpose of retaining Chinese students in their home countries. However, it was only temporary, and the tide of returning home never stopped after the founding of People’s Republic of China.
3 Suspicion and Detention
Ever since the “Qian Xuesen Case” occurred, the truth had been shrouded in layers of fog. Seemingly, the Case was the confrontation between Qian Xuesen and the United States. But its occurrence and development was rather a tense game between Qian Xuesen and the U.S. military, the U.S. Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the U.S. Department of State. Qian Xuesen was finally in the state of “to be expelled but not deported”, and this was the response taken by all parties after comprehensive consideration in accordance with their own interests. But what Qian Xuesen did not expect was that there was another force behind the game, the close attention from his motherland and that the Chinese government was ready to rescue him at any time.
Consideration of U.S. interests by various parties
The FBI and CIA, the two major American intelligence systems, aiming at safeguarding the national security interests of the United States, were important participants. To some extent, they were the co-makers of the Qian Xuesen case. From “Weinbaum case” to “Qian Xuesen case”, the FBI and CIA relied on their own intelligence sources to investigate Qian Xuesen, expecting to find any valuable clues. The FBI was responsible for the surveillance of Qian for five years, “the secret service agent watched me, checked our letters, listened to our phone calls, and questioned our friends who came to see us,” as Qian Xuesen said.
The CIA was also actively involved in the “Qian Xuesen Case” because of Qian’s status as a Chinese scientist and his involvement in external affairs. Moreover, the new director of the CIA at that time was Walter Bedell Smith, the former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, who had already learned about the Soviet Union’s development of sophisticated weapons such as missiles and atomic bombs through his intelligence network he had established during his tenure as ambassador to the Soviet Union, and was therefore particularly interested in Qian Xuesen as a rocket technology expert in China who had once hoped to return to the Soviet Union.
The U.S. military (Air Force, Navy and Army) focused on two core issues during the course of the case: whether Qian Xuesen’s possession of a classified license would have a negative effect on U.S. interests; and whether Qian carried classified documents in his luggage. On the first issue, the joint meeting of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Military Security Agency held on May 18, 1950 reached a consensus that Qian’s classified license must be revoked immediately. For the second issue, the U.S. Customs Service and the INS proposed to conduct technical identification of the documents in Qian’s luggage.
Technical appraisal of Qian’s seized documents
The technical appraisal of the classified documents carried in Qian Xuesen’s luggage to China was led by the U.S. Customs Service, which organized technical experts from the Navy, Air Force, and Army research institutions. The entire identification process had three steps. In the first step, the U.S. Customs Service commissioned the U.S. Wright-Patterson Air Force Base to microfilm the documents, which were done from September 5 to 8. In the second step, the documents were catalogued according to whether they were classified or not. In the third step, the Customs Service invited technical experts from Air Force, Army, and Navy research institutions to identify the contents of the classified documents based on the Presidential Decree No. 2776 list of prohibited equipment and its design drawings, and the FBI assisted in investigating the source of the classified documents.
Since the majority of the classified documents were in aerospace science, the identification process was primarily undertaken by the U.S. Air Force. The Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Intelligence Department reclassified the documents and appraised them in three batches. The results of the three batches were returned on September 27, October 17 and October 30, respectively. The results of the report showed that the appraisal materials were all internal, and the documents concerning the Air Force were unclassified in nature and also showed that these papers were not included in the prohibition list of Presidential Decree No. 2776. Therefore, Qian Xuesen did not violate the law [6].
The technical appraisal results for the U.S. Army and Navy were released simultaneously on November 20. The results from the U.S. Army’s Los Angeles Ordnance Department showed that documents marked as classified were issued by other agencies and were not under the Army’s jurisdiction, while unclassified documents and publications could be obtained through purchase. The U.S. Navy Bureau of Aeronautics gave similar results to those of the Army’s Los Angeles Ordnance Department. The technical appraisal results from the U.S. Army and Navy therefore revealed the ambiguous attitude towards Qian Xuesen [7].
While the U.S. military was conducting a technical examination of the contents of the classified documents, the U.S. Customs Service and the FBI were also investigating the “source” of Qian Xuesen’s access to the classified documents. The agencies that issued the classified documents included the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the U.S. Air Force Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Aviation Advisory Board, the U.S. Navy Ordnance Agency Technical Liaison Office (Southern California District), the U.S. Army Ordnance Department in Los Angeles, the U.S. Air Force Acquisition Office in Los Angeles, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at the California Institute of Technology, all of which participated in the identification process. The results of these appraisals indicated that the classified documents had been declassified and did not pose a threat to the United States. These declassified documents might be used by other countries, but including those listed in the Presidential Decree No. 2776.
Not giving up any chance, the FBI went to Caltech on September 22 to search Qian Xuesen’s office for clues. When the FBI entered the office and found two locked safes, they immediately ordered Clark Milliken to open the safes and found that many classified documents were stored. The FBI then asked Customs to compare the documents in the luggage with those in the safes, and they found that a note on jet propulsion in the unclassified documents was highly similar to the printed document in the safe. However, Milliken clearly explained: “Qian Xuesen did a great deal of work editing this document and contributed a great deal to its final completion. He further put: “I believe that as one of the authors, he has the right to retain the materials formed by their scientific research activities as collaborator, just as most professors have believed so [8].”
The FBI then asked Milliken to provide a list of all the projects in which Qian Xuesen participated, as well as the names of the institutions and professors in charge of the projects, in order to fully verify the possibility of issuing classified documents to Qian Xuesen. But the results of the investigation turned to be disappointing. Moreover, the FBI failed to find any record of Qian ever copying any classified materials in the records of similar classified project management offices at Caltech.
In fact, before Qian Xuesen packed his luggage, he had sorted out the documents and classified them into different types. In particular, when Caltech executed the order to revoke Qian’s classified license, Qian Xuesen took the initiative to return the classified documents, and those that could not be returned temporarily were stored in the office safe, the key to which was handed over to Clark Milliken. This was why the U.S. military found nothing after repeated technical appraisals. Also, it showed that Qian Xuesen had made a lot of preparations for his return to China, and he had anticipated the possible “obstacles” and made arrangements in advance.
Hearings
The focus of the “Qian Xuesen Case” was first on whether he was a communist or supporter of communism, and later on whether he violated the President’s Decree 2776 on carrying classified documents. However, all the efforts of the FBI, CIA and the U.S. Customs Service were in vain and failed to collect any evidence of violations of the law on the part of Qian Xuesen. When the Customs Service reported to the U.S. Department of Justice on November 24 on its final findings, it remained inconclusive as to whether Qian had violated the law, noting only at the end, “If criminal prosecution was contemplated, we would submit the case report usually required.” At this point, the U.S. Department of Justice, which had legal discretion, became involved in the Qian Xuesen Case. How exactly would the U.S. Department of Justice rule as it was so tricky a case?
When Attorney General Dowling of the U.S. Department of Justice, Los Angeles office wrote to Customs representative Glazer on January 4, 1951, he was careful to point out that there was not sufficient justification for charging Qian Xuesen with violating the Espionage Act, either for involvement in subversive communist activities, or for violating the Export Control Act for allegedly carrying classified documents. Accordingly, Qian Xuesen should be granted personal freedom under U.S. law. However, Dowling added in his letter that Customs should retain the luggage until INS decided whether to initiate deportation proceedings. Customs then held the “classified documents” at a Los Angeles Customs warehouse, pending for further review.
The Department of Justice held four hearings in the six months from November 1950 to April 1951. The two sides went head-to-head in the hearings, which centered on Qian’s participation in Communist Party organizations and on attending their meetings and activities from 1938 to 1939. Qian’s attorney Grant B. Cooper was involved throughout the case and provided quite professional legal advice and defense strategies. Undoubtedly, Qian Xuesen suffered physically and psychologically on the six-month hearing. Nevertheless, the moral support from von Kármán, Caltech President DuBridge and Harry Guggenheim, President of the Guggenheim Foundation of the United States, provided much help and comfort to him. DuBridge wrote a private letter to Norman Chandler, publisher of the Los Angeles Times on October 18, hoping that the Los Angeles Times could publish positive reports on Qian’s case.
U.S. Department of Justice organized four hearings in accordance with legal procedures. However, whether there was a chain of evidences to prove that Qian Xuesen was an American Communist was no longer important just as Qian Xuesen exclaimed: “How would the enemy let me go easily!” On April 26, 1951, the U.S. Department of Justice finally ruled that Qian had joined the Communist Party of the United States in 1938 and issued a legal decision to deport him (Fig. 5).
On May 3, 1951, Qian Xuesen received the verdict as calmly as ever, because deportation meant he could leave the United States. It can be imagined that Qian Xuesen was under great pressure from May 18, 1950, when his classified permit was revoked, to April 26, 1951, when the verdict was handed down. During the politicization and complication of the case, the birth of his daughter on June 26, 1950, brought him comfort and infinite hope.
Qian Xuesen’s defense attorney Cooper filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Justice on May 23, 1951, and it was not until February 8, 1952 that the U.S. Department of Justice responded by upholding the verdict, but at the same time stressing that the execution of the deportation order was still subject to clear instructions. Subsequently, Cooper filed several appeals without success. In the end, “to be expelled but not deported” became the result of the game between the various parties engaged in Qian Xuesen Case. As late as December 2, 1952, a reporter from the New York Times asked the Los Angeles Immigration Department whether it had received an order to deport Qian Xuesen. This again threw the case into a fog. However, on March 6, 1953, a report in the New York Times wrote, “The departure of Qian Xuesen, a rocket expert at the Caltech, would harm the core interests of the United States.”
The Chinese government’s action
According to the declassified archives in recent years, the Chinese government had been closely monitoring the development of the Qian Xuesen case since its occurrence and was ready to rescue Qian Xuesen at any time.
When the China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs learned that Qian Xuesen was detained by the United States in 1950, it immediately took corresponding measures. It collected news reports from the New York Times and Agence France-Presse, and closely followed the progress of the case. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also asked Jin Yinchang on October 5, 1950, who had just returned from the United States and was working at the Chinese Academy of Sciences about the exact situations. Jin Yinchang mentioned:
When Qian Xuesen decided to return to China in mid-August, his luggage, including books, notes, etc. weighing over 2,000 pounds, was inspected on the Los Angeles Wharf. It was found that some of Qian’s papers were printed with “Top Secret”, and Qian Xuesen was not allowed to leave the country. However, according to the dean of the California Institute of Technology, Qian was not carrying any top secret government documents, but only records of his own research and books that had been sold publicly [9].
Ling Qing, head of the first section of the U.S.-Australia Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reported to his superiors that it was not suitable for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue a statement to denounce the irrationality of the U.S. government as Qian Xuesen was detained because he carried secret documents. He suggested that nongovernmental groups and organizations could issue a public declaration. Thus, after Qian Xuesen was banned from returning to China in 1950, organizations such as the Wuhan Branch of the Chinese Association of Scientists, the All-China Natural Science Specialists Society, and the Jiu San Society issued a joint statement protesting the U.S. actions and demanding the release of Qian Xuesen to China. Tao Menghe, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, also suggested to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that “our government could ask the Indian Embassy in the United States to request from Washington for the speedy release of the arrested persons.” On the other hand, when the Chinese Academy of Sciences discussed the establishment of research institutions in 1950, it planned to set up a Preparatory Office for Engineering Science Research to “recruit Qian Xuesen and Lin Jiaqiao, who were still abroad, to return to China to prepare for the establishment of such institutions [10].”
On October 5, 1951, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs learned from Cao Richang, Director of the General Office of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, that the U.S. might send Qian Xuesen to Taiwan, it immediately took corresponding countermeasures and proposed two sets of plans. If Qian Xuesen was expelled by the U.S. Empire and might go to the vicinity of Hong Kong, it should telegraph Wu Dizhou, who was doing United Front work in Hong Kong, to take care of him and try to get him back. If Qian Xuesen could not move freely and was sent to Taiwan under U.S. surveillance, it should telegraph J. G. Crowther, a famous British progressive scientist, to mobilize forces in the U.S. to rescue him from being sent to Taiwan under the surveillance of the United States [11].The Ministry of Foreign Affairs then adopted the first plan, and wrote to Wu Dizhou, a Xinhua News Agency correspondent in Hong Kong, “to keep an eye on Qian’s whereabouts”, hoping that Wu Dizhou would “try to escort him to Guangzhou” if Qian passed through Hong Kong. However, the United States did not take any action to deport Qian Xuesen or send him to Taiwan. For security reasons, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to adopt the second plan and sent a telegram to Ambassador Tan Xilin in the Czech Republic on January 7, 1953, briefly explaining the circumstances of the “Qian Xuesen Case” as follows:
On December 26, 1952, the AFP news agency in Taipei said that the U.S. had decided to expel Qian Xuesen from the country, but no action had been taken yet, and his recent status was unknown. Please contact Xinhua News Agency to ask Crowther, a famous British progressive scientist, to help Qian return to China safely through the British Communist Party [12].
On January 18, Tan Xilin sent a telegram back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saying: “Chen Tiansheng and the British Communist Party wish to know further information about Qian’s situation so that they could find some way in assisting him in returning to China [13].” Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept a close eye on the case after Qian Xuesen was trapped in the United States, and collected all kinds of reliable information in order to find opportunities to rescue Qian Xuesen. Such an opportunity did not come until 1955, when ambassadorial-level talks were held between the United States and China.
4 Return to China
“For every single moment, my wish of returning home and participating in the great construction of China never ceases.” This was Qian Xuesen’s true thought in the last five years in the United States. He continued to work while waiting for the opportunity to return to China. In 1954, Qian Xuesen published Engineering Cybernetics, a book on systems of communication and control and he also developed physical mechanics, which was beyond the research scope of classical mechanics. All his intellectual efforts were “to get prepared to help Chinese people when I return to my country one day,” as Qian Xuesen put. When the opportunity of Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks came, Qian Xuesen wrote a letter to Chinese government, expressing his earnest wish to return to his homeland, who finally sent personnel to greet and escort him back to China.
Moments of bitterness and sweetness
From March 1953 to September 1955, Qian Xuesen had been forbidden to travel outside the boundaries of Los Angeles. During this period, he was required to report his whereabouts to the Los Angeles Immigration Bureau on a monthly basis. For a scientist who once had classified license and access to the Pentagon, one could imagine how frustrated and depressed he was! On his way home from the monthly report, there was a café and Qian would usually stop and console himself by having a cup of his favorite coffee.
Qian Xuesen was only 39 years old and at the peak age of scientific research when his classified license was revoked in 1950. During his last five years in the U.S. from 1950 to 1955, Qian was still a professor and doctoral supervisor at Caltech and he continued to work, teach and do researches. He turned to other fields of research, such as the study of games and economic behavior. In 1954, he published a book entitled Engineering Cybernetics. Following the new trend of scientific and technological development, he developed physical mechanics by drawing on microscopic theories such as atoms, molecules and condensed matter and his Lecture Notes on Physical Mechanics became the pioneer of this new discipline. It was these two academic works that made Qian Xuesen surpass his mentor von Kármán academically. In his later years, Qian Xuesen recalled the experience in this period:
I studied under Von Kármán, a world-renowned authority on engineering mechanics and aeronautics, a mentor whom I can never forget, and who taught me the perspectives and methods of modern science and technology. In the summer of 1955, I was allowed to return to China. When I went to say goodbye to my teacher with my kindergarten-aged son and daughter, I gave him my newly published book Engineering Cybernetics and a copy of Lecture Notes on Physical Mechanics. “You have now surpassed me academically,” said Kármán. He was 74 years old at this time. When I heard his words, I was very excited and thought, “My goal of 20 years of endeavor has finally come true. This is the first time in my life that I am so excited! [14]” (Figs. 6 and 7)
Fig. 6
Qian Xuesen maintains an optimistic attitude towards life while trapped in the United States for five years
Handbook for Returning to China, in Qian Xuesen’s collection, was compiled and printed by the General Union of Chinese Students in Britain in April 1954
It was for his outstanding scientific achievements that Qian Xuesen received the Pendray Aerospace Literature Award in 1953, representing the world’s top achievements in aerospace science, but he did not accept the award, and the trophy was still kept at Caltech to this day. As a matter of fact, the two disciplines pioneered by Qian Xuesen are closely related to rocket and space research. Engineering cybernetics, in particular, became the guiding technical thought for the development of China’s aerospace industry after Qian returned to China. On October 27, 1966, the New York Times reported under the headline “The Valuable Chinese Scientist Qian Xuesen”:
It is an irony of Cold War history that a man who was trained, educated, encouraged, respected, paid and trusted by the United States for fifteen years helped the Chinese Communist Party put the first atomic bomb into the sky with a missile.
This report summarized the complex relationship between Qian Xuesen and his era. Would he think of the small cafe he consoled himself during the five years of being trapped in the United States at the time when China independently completed the development of missiles and the combination of the two bombs? Perhaps that cup of good-tasting coffee was a metaphor for Qian’s five year life in the United States, a taste of sweetness and bitterness. It should also be objectively pointed out that the reason why Qian Xuesen was able to return to China in 1955 was related to President Eisenhower’s decision, or perhaps miscalculation to release Qian in 1955.
A Miscalculation by the U.S. President
During the 1954 Geneva Conference, China and the United States began discussing the repatriation of American prisoners of war (POW) and returning of Chinese students. Although no consensus was reached during the talks, the United States began to review the issue of Chinese students residing in the United States. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, asked the Department of Justice to speed up the trial of the exit of 123 Chinese students who were previously not allowed to leave the country in exchange for the early release of POWs by the Communist Party of China. The Department of Defense had doubts about the merits of letting Qian go as “he would, if released, take back with him high competence in his professional field, much background information on jet propulsion as applied to weapons, and unusual ability to interpret technological progress in the U.S.,” and claimed, “Qian himself seems to have no intention of leaving the United States [15].”
On September 3, 1954, the first Taiwan Strait Crisis broke out, once again putting in jeopardy the relations between China and the United States, which had just resumed exchanges. But at the end of the year China sent word through India suggesting that the POW issue was comparable to the issue of returning Chinese students to China. So when, during the Bandung Conference in April 1955, Premier Zhou Enlai issued a statement that the Chinese government was willing to negotiate with the United States. In response, the U.S. began to seek a resumption of Sino-American talks and re-intensified its review of Chinese students’ exit permits, and in late April 1955, the U.S., through UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld, informed China that all Chinese scholars could leave the U.S. at any time except for two who had learned high technology in national defense and one of them was Qian Xuesen [16].
At the end of May 1955, China released four American POWs and asked the United States to respond accordingly. Under external pressure, President Eisenhower made the final decision about Qian Xuesen and the other Chinese scientist that it was “quite probable that any classified information which Qian possessed at that time is by now outdated by later research and is common knowledge in the Soviet Bloc.” President Eisenhower’s decision was to express his sincerity to China in exchange for American POWs held in China. However, the U.S. Department of Defense “reluctantly agreed to let the last scientist who learned missile technology return to the mainland China [17]” not until the end of July, the eve of the ambassadorial level talks. Qian Xuesen was informed of the news on July 27, He sent a letter to his father on July 29, written by Jiang Ying, that “July 27 was a day that we should commemorate and we shared the same feeling even across the sea, so please be patient for the time being [18].”
On the course of Sino-U.S. talks, Qian wrote the famous “letter for help” to Chen Shutong “for fear of missing the opportunity” when China and the United States were trying to talk. What is less known is that before writing that letter, Qian Xuesen repeatedly told Xu Zhangben, who was about to return to China, to convey a message to the Chinese government that “he was willing to return to China in the middle of this summer [19].” The archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs show that on July 29, 1955, after his return to China, Xu Jangben wrote to the All-China Federation of Specialized Societies of Natural Sciences, saying:
Mr. Qian is eager to return home and serve our country. I hope that the Federation could consult with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks in Geneva, our government will try our best to enable Mr. Qian Xuesen be free of the unreasonable obstruction of the U.S. government and help him to return to our country.
On August 4, the Federation forwarded Xu Zhangben’s letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After receiving the letter, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to Xu on August 10 through Xu Yonghuan, director of the U.S.-Australia Department, stating, “Regarding the return of Professor Qian Xuesen, who was unreasonably detained by the United States, we were trying to assist him to return to China at an early date to participate in the country’s construction work.” And on August 4, the INS of the U.S. Department of Justice officially notified Qian Xuesen of the announcement to lift the ban of August 23, 1950, which he received the following day. This meant that the legal obstacles to Qian’s return to China had been cleared, and he booked a steamship ticket to Hong Kong immediately.
Arguably, Eisenhower’s judgment was a miscalculation. In fact, it was not the technical documents that posed a threat to the United States, but the scientific ideas that were in his head. Professors Seifert and Alperin of Caltech’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory commented, when asked about the value of the documents in Qian’s luggage: “The contents were already in his head.” As an immigrant country, the United States needs a large number of excellent intellectuals, who might be a potential threat to the United States under certain historical conditions. This ambivalence continues unchanged to this day. As an American scholar concluded in his analysis of the “Qian Xuesen Case”, “JPL was not only training scientists for the United States, but also training scientists for America’s enemies [20].”
Qian Xuesen’s letter for help
The belief of “returning home in another day” became stronger and stronger during Qian Xuesen’s last five years in the United States. When he learned that ambassadorial talks between China and the United States were being held in June 1955, and especially when he saw a newspaper report about Chen Shutong, his father’s teacher, on his “spirit of service and effort for the people”, he wasted no time in making the central government recognize his strong desire to return to China through a letter for help. Qian Xuesen wrote a letter to Chen Shutong (Fig. 8), expressing his earnest wish of returning home. The content of the letter was as follows:
Dear respectable Mr. Shutong,
We have not corresponded for a long time since September of 1947. Upon reading the news report about your spirit of serving for the people, I am deeply touched. I have been detained by the U.S. government for five years. But I have never failed to think of returning to my country to participate in the great construction. Compared with the more important and urgent issues, the situations of an individual like me were nothing and I could not complain much about it. During these years, I have only tried to study and carry out researches as much as possible to prepare for my return.
I have read from the newspapers that China and the United States may exchange detainees. The United States is lying about that all the Chinese students who are willing to return to China have been released. I am really anxious about it. Apart from me, there are other compatriots who are not allowed to return home. To my knowledge, Prof. Yung-Hui Kuo at Cornell University is the one.
Of course, I understand that our government is clear about the tricks of the U.S. However, we are very anxious about missing the opportunity. Attached is the news clipping from New York Times, describing my situation in the United States in the past five years.
The news clipping mentioned in Qian’s letter was the report in the New York Times on March 6, 1953. This report confirmed that there were no classified documents in Qian’s luggage and that he was deported but not allowed to leave the United States because his departure would harm the core interests of the United States. Regarding how the letter was forwarded, many biographies suggest that Mr. Chen Shutong sent it to Premier Zhou Enlai the same day he received it, but this is not what is recorded in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
As Qian Xuesen was under surveillance, he sent this letter to Jiang Ying’s sister Jiang Hua in Belgium, who forwarded the letter to Qian Junfun in Shanghai immediately. Jiang Ying recalled later:
It was impossible to send the letter directly to China, so we had to send it to my sister Jiang Hua in Belgium. We drove to a convenience store where many black people frequented and quickly dropped the letter into the mailbox. My sister was also very smart and forwarded this letter to Qian Xuesen’s father in Shanghai. Chen Shutong then forwarded this letter to Premier Zhou after receiving it from Qian Junfu [22].
This letter was actually not directly transferred to Premier Zhou Enlai. On July 7, Qian Junfu forwarded this letter to Chen Shutong, then vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and vice chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese people’s Political Consultative Conference, in the hope that Chen would pass his request along to the responsible Chinese authorities (Fig. 8).
Fig. 8
Letter for help written by Qian Xuesen to Chen Shutong on June 15, 1955 (the original is in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Chen Shutong did not forward this letter directly to Premier Zhou Enlai, but to his friend Zhu Kezhen, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. On July 12, Zhu Kezhen forwarded the letter to Zhang Jiafu, Secretary of the Party and vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, asking him to help. Zhu said:
It is clear from Qian Xuesen’s personal letter that he was eager to return to China and was extremely reluctant to stay in the U.S. But from the enclosed news clipping from the American newspapers, we can see that the Americans regarded him as an authority on aeronautical engineering and used him as an expert on developing missiles. Therefore, the true reason of detaining was not the 1,800 books he carried, but that they were afraid that he would return to serve his country. Please try to help Mr. Qian Xuesen leave the U.S [23].
On July 17, Zhang Jiafu wrote to Chen Yi, Vice Premier of the State Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, to “try to secure his return”, and on July 21, Chen Yi instructed Zhang Hanfu, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, “to find a way”. After a detailed investigation of Qian Xuesen Case, Xu Yonghwan, Director of the U.S.-Australia Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that the U.S. would not easily release a rocket expert like Qian Xuesen, but the U.S. had accepted the proposal of direct negotiations announced by Premier Zhou at the Bandung Conference, so there was a possibility of releasing him back. At the same time, Xu Yonghuan also proposed to Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu to deal with the situation.
Zhang Hanfu agreed with Xu Yonghuan’s opinion and sent a telegram to Wang Bingnan On August 2, who was conducting ambassadorial-level talks between China and the United States in Geneva. Wang Bingnan was required to be flexible with the situation at the ambassadorial talks, to argue on the basis of reasoning, and to insist on the release of Qian Xuesen to China with a reasonable attitude. Qian Xuesen’s letter eventually became the direct cause in winning his return at the Geneva Talk.
Welcome from the Chinese government
On September 17, Qian Xuesen and his family boarded the steamship President Cleveland bound for Hong Kong and embarked on a journey home. The moment Qian boarded the steamship, his U.S. permanent residence permit lost its legal effect, and he automatically obtained the nationality of the People's Republic of China upon his return to China. What is less known is that the Chinese government made elaborate arrangements to ensure his smooth arrival in Beijing when he departed for China.
On the one hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a telegram on September 21 in the name of his father, Qian Junfu, asking Qian Xuesen to pay attention to his personal safety, saying, “I am very relieved to know that you will soon return to China. I hope you will take care of yourself and do not disembark along the way. The government will send someone to pick you up at the border station.” On the other hand, careful arrangements had been made in Hong Kong and mainland China as the situation in Hong Kong was complicated. In order to avoid unnecessary troubles, Premier Zhou Enlai instructed the Ministry of Foreign Trade to entrust the China Resources Corporation, which had a Communist background, with the responsibility of receiving Qian Xuesen in Hong Kong. According to the recollection of Cui Zhe [24], on September 20, 1955, the General Office of the Ministry of Foreign Trade received a confidential document from Premier Zhou Enlai’s office, in which Premier Zhou instructed the Ministry of Foreign Trade to telegraph China Resources Corporation to “designate reliable comrades, together with Cai Fu and Fang Yuanhong, to transport Qian Xuesen and others. The expenses will be allocated by Zhang Ping.” (Figs. 9 and 10).
Fig. 9
Telegram sent to Qian Xuesen in the name of Qian Junfu by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the original is in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Cui Zhe immediately handed the confidential letter over to Li Qiang, Vice Minister of Foreign Trade. Under Li Qiang’s instruction, Cui sent a telegram to Zhang Ping, general manager of China Resources Company, who quickly contacted Cai Fu [25] and Fang Yuanhong of Hong Kong China Travel Service (HCT) to handle this matter. HCT was specifically responsible for this matter because HCT staff was more complex, with Chinese Communist Party members, members of Kuomintang and some old gang members, making it suitable for this task in the direct intervention and communication with the British Hong Kong authorities and various forces in Hong Kong. HCT had no experience of transporting such an important and sensitive patriot as Qian Xuesen. As Cai Fu recalled later, both China Resources Company and HCT took the same responsibility in the coordination to ensure Qian’s safe arrival in Shenzhen, Guangzhou Province.
Subsequently, China Resources Company and HCT worked out a set of safe and reliable pick-up and drop off plan. China Resources Company would send its own personnel to get in touch with Qian Xuesen before docking of President Cleveland. This would require coordination with Hong Kong shipping industry, customs and immigration departments of Hong Kong British authorities. Due to the complicated situation in Hongkong, Qian Xuesen was suggested not stop in Hong Kong. Zhang Ping, general manager of China Resources Company, would book the train tickets for Qian’s family from Kowloon to Shenzhen on October 8.
On September 27, the State Council sent Zhu Zhaoxiang of the Chinese Academy of Sciences to Shenzhen to greet them and asked the Guangdong Provincial People's Committee to help with accommodation and food arrangements. On the early morning of October 8, when the President Cleveland approached Hong Kong, the family was met by HCT. They boarded a yacht sailing directly to Kowloon. Then they took train from Kowloon to Shenzhen through Luohu Port. In the letter to Bao Shixing and Gu Mengchao on November 10, 1998, Qian Xuesen recalled vividly, “I crossed the Pacific Ocean by passenger ship in 1955 and landed in Kowloon. Shenzhen was the first city in the motherland after being stranded in the United States for 20 years. I remember the excitement of seeing the five-Star Chinese red flag and the statue of Chairman Mao right at the border!”.
On October 9, Qian Xuesen boarded a train for Guangzhou, a southern metropolis on the banks of the Pearl River. He visited the Peasant Movement Training Institute and the Soviet Union Economic and Cultural Achievements Exhibition. In Shenzhen, Qian had gained some perceptual knowledge and direct experience about socialist China. He also purchased Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and The First Five-Year Plan of the People’s Republic of China for Developing the National Economy (1953–1957). On October 10, accompanied by Zhu Zhaoxiang, Qian Xuesen and his family boarded the train to Shanghai and arrived in Shanghai. His father, now 74, met him at the train station on October 12. Afterwards, all the family members went to his childhood home of Hangzhou to pay respect to his deceased mother and to sweep her grave, while meeting with relatives and friends (Fig. 11).
Fig. 11
A group photo of Qian Xuesen with his family in Shanghai after his return to China (the first one on the right is Qian Yuehua, Qian Junfu’s goddaughter)
During Qian Xuesen’s stay in Shanghai, he returned to his alma mater, Jiaotong University, on October 22 and 25 for visits and talks. The symposium held on October 25 were attended by more than 30 people, including the provost, department chairs, and faculty deans, and was chaired by the Mr. Chen Shiying, who was then the vice president of Jiaotong University. In the symposium, Qian Xuesen explained the difficulties encountered in the scientific researches by citing his personal experience in the United States, and he pointed out that China’s science and technology would surely have a bright future and will surpass the United States one day.
On October 28, Qian Xuesen and his family finally returned to Beijing, the capital of People’s Republic of China. A delegation of twenty distinguished scientists greeted him at the station. The group included Wu Youxun, Hua Luogeng, Zhou Peiyuan, Qian Weichang and Zhao Zhongyao and others in the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Two days after their arrival in Beijing, Qian Xuesen and his family visited Tiananmen Square, feeling so excited in front of the flying five star flag. On November 1, Guo Moruo, president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, presided a welcome dinner for Qian at the Beijing Hotel. Zhu Kezhen, who had met Qian Xuesen eight years ago and was now vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, also attended the dinner. Zhu Kezhen wrote in his diary: “I haven’t seen Qian Xuesen for seven or eight years. He looks a litter older than his age at 43. He must have suffered a lot from the detaining and surveillance in the United States.” Qian also met Mr. Chen Shutong, his father’s teacher. Thirty years later, he recalled with passion:
In 1955, our family was able to return to the motherland which we dreamed day and night. I am much grateful to my Mr. Shutong, who helped us at the critical moment. The Communist Party of China led all Chinese people to establish the great People's Republic of China and China was no longer a target of bullying [26].
Qian Xuesen was exceptionally moved to see the full enthusiasm of domestic scientists during his short time back in China, which made him feel the care and attention of the Chinese Communist Party for the cause of science and scientists. In an interview with People’s Daily reporter Bai Sheng, he said:
I have just returned to my motherland and still have a lot to learn. I am willing to fully contribute to our country with my research achievements over the past 20 years and to train young research scholars for my country [27].
Soon after his return to China, Qian Xuesen was appointed as the director of the Institute of Mechanics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, presiding over and leading the research of mechanics in China. Qian Xuesen knew that his work would not be limited to the Institute of Mechanics, but that a major national project was waiting for him.
5 A Declassified Confidential File
On December 11, 2011, a library dedicated to the memory of Qian Xuesen was opened at the Xuhui Campus of Shanghai Jiaotong University, where he once studied. This is the largest memorial hall for scientists in China, and it is a national patriotic education base and a national science education base. On the opening day, a top-secret file was published in full for the first time. This top secret file was entitled the Opinions on the Establishment of China’s National Defense Aerospace Industry (hereinafter the Opinions), drafted by Qian Xuesen, which laid the foundation for the brilliant course of China's aerospace industry.
Trips to Northeast China
From October 30 to November 11, 1955, Qian Xuesen visited research institutions and universities such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Peking University and Tsinghua University to learn about the scientific achievements since the founding of People’s Republic of China. Arranged by the State Council, Qian Xuesen made a special trip to the three northeastern provinces to comprehensively evaluate the feasibility of developing aerospace industry. The telegram sent by the State Council on November 20 to the three northeastern provinces and relevant institutions stated: “Qian Xuesen’s expertise lies in mechanics, automatic control, aeronautical engineering and so on. It will be helpful to his future research in knowing about our country’s current construction and technical level.”
From November 22 to December 21, Qian Xuesen visited cities, institutions and factories in Northeast China proposed by the State Council as follows:
Harbin: Harbin Institute of Technology, Institute of Civil Architecture, Academy of Sciences, Automatic Electric Heating Factory, Linen Factory, Measuring and Cutting Tools Factory, Mechanized Farm;
Changchun: Institute of Mechatronics, Institute of Applied Chemistry, Instrument Museum, No. 1 Automobile Factory, Northeast People’s University, Chinese Academy of Sciences;
Jilin: Xiaofengman Hydropower Station, Northeast Institute of Technology, Institute of Metals of Academy of Sciences, Machine tool factory, Pneumatic tool factory, heavy machinery factory, smelter and agricultural cooperative;
Fushun: open pit coal mine and oil plant;
Anshan: Angang Steelmaking Plant;
Lüshun and Dalian: Dalian Institute of Technology, shipyard, Institute of Petroleum, Chinese Academy of Sciences;
In addition to the above-mentioned institutions and factories, Qian Xuesen also took the initiative to visit the Harbin Military Engineering Institute. Through the visit and discussion, Qian Xuesen gained a general picture of the country’s industries and the foundation of China’s aerospace industry. Later, he wrote in the Opinions:
Our aerospace industry is currently rather weak. We have only recently moved from the stage of aircraft repair to the aircraft production, and have an aircraft factory and one jet propulsion plant built. But these two factories are now completely dependent on the drawings supplied by the Soviet Union, and are not yet able to design new aircraft by ourselves, much less to conduct engineering and scientific research for design purposes. As for missiles and rockets, we do not have them at all.
We are also short of materials used in aerospace industry. There is only one aluminum plant with an annual capacity of 20,000 tons. We still have to import the specialized metals from foreign countries. The electronic equipment factory has just been established and is not yet ready to produce all types of spare parts.
As for aeronautical research, we only have some wind tunnels and experimental equipment mainly for teaching purposes. We don’t have any equipment used for research, let alone large equipment for design research. So we have absolutely no aerospace research. We are short of researchers and scientists. In terms of mechanics, it is estimated that there are 180 teaching staff in mechanics in the country. Among the senior researchers of mechanics, only about 30 are the most capable and can do leadership work. The number of aerospace researchers, only a part of the mechanics researchers, is even smaller.
Overall, Qian Xuesen concluded from his trip to the northeast provinces that the foundation of China’s aerospace industry was very weak. Was it possible for China to develop missiles totally on itself? A conversation between Qian and Chen Gang, director of the Harbin Military Engineering Institute, on Nov. 25 answered this question. Chen Gang asked: “Could China develop missiles?” Qian Xuesen replied, “Why not? If foreigners could do it, why couldn’t we Chinese do it? Are the Chinese weaker than the foreigners?” Chen Gung said, “Good, this is the answer I am expecting.” Qian Xuesen’s confidence came from the fact that during his visit, he found that although China’s scientific and industrial foundation was extremely weak, it already had the “sparks” for missile development. The conversation between Chen Gung and Qian Xuesen was widely circulated and set the stage for Qian Xuesen to write and submit the Opinions to the central government.
The drafting of the Opinions
After Qian Xuesen returned to Beijing, he visited Minister of National Defense Peng Dehuai, who was hospitalized due to illness, accompanied by Chen Gung and Zhu Zhaoxiang on December 26. During the conversation, Peng Dehuai revealed that what China urgently needed at present was anti-aircraft rockets, followed by rockets for maritime targets, which were required to be able to hit objects as far as 300–500 km. During the conversation, Peng Dehuai directly asked Qian Xuesen: “Could we build a missile with a range of 500 km by ourselves? What human and material resources would the development of such a missile require? How long was it estimated to take to build it?” Why did Peng Dehuai ask whether a missile with a range of 300–500 km could be developed? This was mainly in response to the military threat of Taiwan, because this distance is comparable to the width of the Taiwan Strait, which is about 200-km wide in the north and 410-km wide in the south. If a missile with a range of 500 km could be developed, the entire Taiwan would be within the range, thus effectively suppressing the military threat from Taiwan.
No information was available on how Qian Xuesen answered Peng Dehuai’s question, but a conversation between Qian and Wan Yi (then head of the Equipment Planning Department of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army) on December 27 provided an answer. Qian Xuesen said that the development of missiles with a range of 300–500 km “was within two years from the development of trial production to industrial production, but this only solved 20% of the problem; the automatic flight controller was more difficult, accounting for 80% of the whole task and it might take ten years to develop automatic flight controller without outside help.” Qian Xuesen followed up with a detailed discussion of technical personnel, institutional set-up and capital investment, and suggested that the Military Commission should discuss and resolve to start the research work on this weapon.” Subsequently, Wan Yi immediately reported to Peng Dehuai the contents of this conversation.
In February 1956, Qian Xuesen and Jiang Ying, accompanied by Chen Gang, were invited to the home of Marshal Ye Jianying, Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission. During the meeting, the topic of their conversation was still how to develop missiles. Ye Jianying’s goddaughter Dai Qing later recalled in My Godfather—Ye Jianying, “When I was a student in junior high school and one day, my father invited Qian Xuesen and his wife to dinner, who had just returned from the United States. Before the guests arrived, he was extremely happy to tell the children that the incoming guest was a remarkable scientistwho was researching a kind of bomb that could chase the flying airplane.”
Qian Xuesen then received a special assignment from Premier Zhou Enlai, and was received by Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi on February 16, 1956. Also present were Fan Changjiang, deputy director of the State Science and Technology Commission, Zhang Jiafu, vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Liu Jie, Vice Minister of Geology. On February 17, Qian Xuesen began to write the Opinions on the Establishment of China’s National Defense Aerospace industry in accordance with Premier Zhou Enlai’s commission. Qian Xuesen later recalled:
Marshal Ye invited me and my wife to dinner at his home, probably on Saturday night, and Chen Geng was also there. After dinner, they said we would meet the Premier who was dancing at the Three Seats Gate. We went there, and Marshal Ye and Chen Gung talked with the Premier. Then it was probably settled, and the Premier gave me a task, asking me to write the Opinions on how to organize this research institution. Then I wrote the Opinions which was discussed in a meeting held in the West Flower Hall, and decision to engage in missiles was thus made.
The nine pages and 2,700 words of this Opinions are divided into four sections: several parts in aerospace industry, the organization of the aerospace industry, the current situation in the country, and the development plan. At the start, it emphasized that the development of missiles was not simple production of military weapons, but the need for “a sound aerospace industry.” So, what exactly does this sound aerospace industry entail? The Opinions proposed four conditions from the perspective of system engineering and functional division of labor: a leading agency, scientific research, design research and production plants. Subsequently, Qian further analyzed the respective responsibilities.
1.
Leading agency
The leading agency that Qian Xuesen referred to was not purely administrative, but “an agency for comprehensive planning and arrangement, which should include scientific, engineering, military, and political personnel” and was proposed to be located in the Ministry of Defense. This recommendation was related to the national situation, as the development of missiles required a coordinating body to ensure the cooperation of different institutions. This suggestion was quickly implemented, and on May 26, 1956, when Zhou Enlai announced the development of missiles on behalf of the CPC Central Committee: “More people should be mobilized to help and support the development of missiles. The technical experts and administrative cadres needed for this work will be drawn from the parts of industrial construction, higher education, scientific research, and the military, and the military should play an exemplary role.” Accordingly, in July 1956 the Central Military Commission approved the establishment of the Missile Administration Bureau (the Fifth Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense) as the leading agency for the work of developing missiles.
2.
Scientific research
Missile development is not only an engineering project, but also involves applied mechanics, explosive mechanics, materials science, chemistry, electronics, cybernetics and other theories. The Opinions suggested that these theoretical studies could rely on the Chinese Academy of Sciences as it put:
The research work of the Institute of Mechanics in the Academy of Sciences is more or less related to the aerospace industry, and other institutes in high-temperature materials research, electronics research, computer research and so on , are also closely related to aerospace industry. In the future, new institutes will be established to promote researches in certain areas, such as the Institute of Aerodynamics and the Institute of Automatic Control. It is estimated that there will be 600 researchers working in this area when the whole system is completed, of whom 120–150 will be at the level of candidate doctor or above.
Qian Xuesen’s first position after his return to China was the director of the Institute of Mechanics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. During his tenure as director, the Institute of Mechanics undertook a considerable number of missile development tasks and made great contributions to the development of Chinese aerospace. Later, Qian Xuesen also served as the director of the Fifth Research Institute of the Ministry of National Defense, effectively coordinating the division of labor and collaboration between the Fifth Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense and the Chinese Academy of Sciences.
3.
Design research
The main task of the design study proposed by Qian Xuesen was “to produce new products in the trial production and conduct test flights. In this section, Qian Xuesen answered Peng Dehuai’s question about the human and material resources needed in developing the missile. Qian Xuesen estimated that the entire system would require about 6,000 technicians, including 500–600 candidate doctors or more, and a site of 200 km2. The Opinions proposed that the institution could be called Aviation Design Institute and be divided into the following institutes according to its mission: Aerodynamics Institute, Materials Research Institute, Fuel Research Institute, Structural Research Institute, Rocket Propulsion Research Institute, Ramming Propulsion Research Institute, Turbine Propulsion Research Institute, Control System Research Institute, Application Research Institute, Design Bureau, Pilot Plant, and Test Flight Station. This recommendation was implemented and executed. The Fifth Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense was established on October 8, 1956, and its subordinate institutions were set up in general accordance with the Opinions.
4.
Production plants
The Opinions noted that the eventual production of finished missile weapons would also require “a series of plants in the aerospace production, which could manufacture the new designs massively.” Specifically, these production plants would include metal plants, non-metal material plants, electrical manufacturing plants, fuel plants, and various parts plants. Most of these factories were under the leadership of the Second Ministry of Machinery Industry, and would be coordinated through a lead agency located in the Ministry of Defense. This was one of the reasons why Qian Xuesen proposed to locate the leading agency in the Ministry of National Defense, which facilitated the coordination of related institutions.
Obviously, these four conditions are the four “small systems” that together make up the “big system” of missile development which explain to the central government the conditions needed to carry out missile project. For these four conditions, the first one is relatively easy to achieve. For the other three conditions, i.e., research, design, and production, it was more difficult due to the unevenness of their respective bases and development. Qian Xuesen proposed a basic principle: “Research, design, and production went hand in hand. But at the beginning, the focus was on production, then on design and research.” This idea later proved to be correct. Only by improving the factories’ production capacity could we provide materials and spare parts for design work. The Chinese Academy of Sciences had already gathered a group of accomplished scientists and accumulated some theoretical research results.
Relying on foreign aid or independent development
Qian Xuesen had studied in the United States for twenty years and made extraordinary research achievements in the field of aeronautical engineering, aviation science and other areas. Based on his experience, Qian Xuesen believed that the development of missiles would take twenty to thirty years without outside help as he pointed out that “China must win over the help of the Soviet Union and other countries.” At the time Qian Xuesen drafted the Opinions, China and the Soviet Union were negotiating assistance for Chinese weapons development projects, including missiles. Therefore, it was specifically pointed out in the Opinions that in order to develop a successful missile in a short period of time, “we must enlist the help of the Soviet Union and other sister countries.” It was for this reason that Qian Xuesen visited the Soviet Union in 1956 to see what specific assistance the Soviet Union could provide. Therefore, the Opinions suggested that domestic aerospace researchers and corresponding military and political personnel should be selected as soon as possible to organize visiting delegations to the Soviet Union and other countries in the near future and to discuss cooperation proposals.
Also, the Opinions expressed an extremely important point, “Relying on foreign aid was not a long-term solution, and China must have the full capability to develop missiles.” Objectively speaking, Soviet scientists and technicians played a role in China’s missile development, but the fundamental reason for China’s success in developing missiles after the withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960 was that China chose the path of independent development from the very beginning of its missile project, and the key was to gather a group of “senior talents” into this project. In the Opinions, a list of senior scientists was selected as follows:
Aerodynamics: Shen Yuan, Lu Shijia, Zhuang Fenggan, Luo Shijun, Lin Tongji, Pan Liangrun;
Aerostructure: Wang junkui, Qian Weichang, Wang Ren, Du Qinghua, Hu Haichang, Qian Lingxi, Zheng Zhemin, Li Minhua and Fan Xuji;
These scientists were the pioneers and laid the foundation for China’s space industry. A detailed personnel training objectives were laid down in the Opinions. Year by year, the research work of the Chinese Academy of Sciences related to aerospace would be expanded, reaching the number of 600 people in 1967. According to the above development plan, the number of graduates from aerospace related departments of higher education institutions was needed every year as follows:
In 1956: 400 (100 in craft, 300 in design);
In 1957: 400 (complete craft);
In 1958: 400 (complete craft, starting missile manufacturing)
In 1959: 600 (complete design, starting work in aviation design institute);
In 1960: 700 (100 in craft, 600 in design);
In 1961: 700 (100 in craft, 600 in design);
In 1962: 800 (200 in craft, 600 in design);
In 1963: 800 (200 in craft, 600 in design);
In 1964: 800 (200 in craft, 600 in design);
In 1965: 800 (in craft, 600 in design);
In 1966: 900 people (300 in craft, 600 in design);
In 1967: 900 (300 in craft, 600 in design);
By 1967, there will be 2,400 technicians in factories and 5,700 technicians in design institutes.
Since then, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, colleges and universities, and other research institutions have set up majors to train personnel in aerospace science research and design. Moreover, Qian Xuesen himself taught the course of Introduction to Missile and weekly workshops were held at the Institute of Mechanics. At the time he drafted the Opinions, the State Council was formulating a twelve-year scientific plan from 1956 to 1967, and included jet and rocket technology as one of the key development projects. By placing the timing in 1967, Qian Xuesen was able to incorporate the missile development program into the national scientific development plan, thus gaining the greatest support and input from the state. At the very start, the missile development work was a top-down national project which has received full support and active cooperation from the central government as well as from the military industry, universities, research institutions, factories, and other systems since it was launched.
On February 22, Premier Zhou Enlai sent the Opinions on the Establishment of the National Defense Aerospace industry written by Qian Xuesen to Mao Zedong for his review, with a letter stating in particular, “This was the Opinions I asked Qian Xuesen to write, and I was going to talk about atomic energy.” On February 28, Zhou Enlai sent the Opinions to the Central Military Commission and the Ministry of National Defense, as well as to other Party and State leaders. The Opinions soon entered the implementation stage and became the guiding document for China’s missile development project.
There were two major reasons that Qian Xuesen’s Opinions in 1956 was quickly approved by the central government and used as a guiding document for missile development. For the first, as the first scientist who provided advice to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai who seriously listened and took concrete actions, Qian Xuesen provided the government the most important thing, the confidence; for the second, Qian Xuesen formulated a set of feasible schemes from top-level design to specific development plans, and integrated them with China’s national development plan.
Qian Xuesen said very modestly: “I was ashamed to think of it now, for I did not know anything about the situation in China at that time and there must have been many shortcomings in the Opinions.” On October 8, the central government announced the establishment of the Fifth Burean of the Ministry of National Defense and appointed Qian Xuesen as the director, with full responsibility for missile development.
To date, China’s aerospace industry has developed for more than 60 years, starting from nothing, and growing larger and stronger. It is the endeavor, dedication and efforts of tens of thousands of spacefarers, including Qian Xuesen, and even their precious lives.
References
Secret Letter from the “North Bureau”
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Xu Zhangben (1911–1988), a Ph.D. from the same California Institute of Technology as Qian Xuesen, received his doctorate in 1940, specializing in anti-missile technology, and after returning to China, he worked at Institute of Telecommunications in Shanghai Jiaotong University.
Related Materials on the Return of Scientist Qian Xuesen to China, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, File No. 111–00081–03 (1). In this case, the word “entrusted” was originally “sent”, but in the official telegram, the word “sent” was changed to “entrusted.” This shows the degree of importance attached to it.
Cui Zhe, then deputy director of the General Office of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and Yang Chenguang, then secretary of the Hong Kong China Travel Service, compiled the oral material “Escorting Mr. Qian Xuesen to the Motherland”, which recounts the specific process of receiving Qian in Hong Kong by China Resources and the Hong Kong China Travel Service, whose recollections are reliable and authentic and have important historical value. This oral material was provided by Professor Qian Yonggang.
Cai Fu was the deputy manager of the Hong Kong China Travel Service and a member of the Chinese Communist Party; Fang Yuanhong was the manager of the Hong Kong China Travel Service; Zhang Ping was the general manager of the China Resources Company.
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Lv, C. (2022). Communism Enlightenment and Dedication to His Country.
In: Return to China One Day. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5755-0_6
