Abstract
Punishment is an important mechanism promoting the evolution of cooperation among nonrelatives. We investigate the coevolution of cooperation and punitive behavior from the perspective of spiteful behavior. Firstly, we analyze the effect of selfish punishers, which are defectors that punish other defectors in the coevolution of cooperation and punishment. We show that the updating rule and the spatial structure influence the role of selfish punishers in the coevolution of cooperation and punishment. In particular, the score-dependent viability model presented in chapter 2 promotes the evolution of spiteful behavior, and selfish punishers promote the evolution of cooperation and punishment. Then, in light of empirical evidence of punishment targeted at cooperators, we also study the effect of so-called “anti-social punishment.”
Secondly, assuming the cooperation level and punishment level, we investigate whether graduated or strict punishment can promote a higher cooperation level in the score-dependent viability model. Our evolutionary simulation outcomes demonstrate that stricter punishment promotes increased cooperation in a spatially structured population, whereas graduated punishment increases cooperation when players interact with randomly chosen opponents from the population.
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Change history
08 April 2023
Chapter 2: Figures 2.3 (b), 2.5 (b), 2.6 (d,e) and 2.8 (a,b,c,d) have been replaced with new figures.
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Nakamaru, M. (2022). The Effect of Peer Punishment on the Evolution of Cooperation. In: Trust and Credit in Organizations and Institutions. Theoretical Biology. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4979-1_3
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