Keywords

1 Introduction

This chapter aims at achievement of the optimum condition for societal growth. Therefore, we have to cooperate to solve difficult challenges with the government, the UN, regional organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) because they have the power to realize SDG Goal 16, based on peace, justice, and strong institutions.

In recent times, democracy is on a shaky ground. However, it remains a central concept of any political system in protecting basic human rights. Therefore, why do we still hear that democracy is regressing or even going backward? The intentional or inevitable interpretation of democracy differs from country to country. In modern society, the interpretation of democracy is invisible to one’s own country. This is reminiscent of a swaying ship loaded with “Democracy,” which has the same concept on board but sways even though it is supposed to be anchored. The concept of democracy is indeed fluctuating in recent times.

I have been thinking about development in developing countries for many years, ever since I traveled around Southeast Asia as a backpacker at the age of 20. The reality that I have always faced in developing countries, especially since the late 1990s, is the “contemporaneity of development.” For example, since the referendum in August 1999, I have closely observed peace building and subsequent state building in Timor-Leste after the conflict.

For example, in restoring and reconstructing telecommunication systems that had been destroyed in the conflict, the spread of fixed-line telephones quickly surpassed, and now almost all young people have cell phones, even smartphones, and are connected to the rest of the world through social media networks, such as Facebook. However, a certain amount of poverty still exists in the rural areas in Timor-Leste; in those areas, certain instances of underdevelopment exist that are different from the standard of living in urban areas. In short, an “uneven development” exists in the society with income disparity as the backdrop.

Furthermore, the confrontation between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, which has become more conspicuous with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, is similar to the Cold War structure of the former U.S.–Soviet era; however, it is not an ideological confrontation of the past. While President Xi Jinping himself has stressed the importance of free trade, the former U.S. President, Donald Trump, had adopted a more protectionist approach with his “country first” policy. Although the current U.S. president, Joe Biden, has called for a shift to a more cooperative international policy, the conflict between the U.S. and China, over economic relations, is expected to continue.

Alternatively, in areas of politics and security, China has drawn a forceful territorial sea line, as seen in the nine-dashed line in the South China Sea, and frictions over territory with Vietnam, the Philippines, and other Southeast Asian countries exist. The U.S., which is supposed to be the leader of liberal democracy, has become increasingly protectionist, while China, which has an authoritarian regime under a one-party communist dictatorship, is appealing for free trade and international cooperation within a state-centric structure.

In this chapter, I would like to consider the current state of contemporary society, based on my own experiences in the field, with three key words: “fluctuating democracy,” “uneven development,” and “peace without a center of human.” Thereafter, I would like to reconsider the nature of “democracy,” “development,” and “peace,” as human beings are born with the basic human rights of freedom and equality. I would also like to ask whether SDG Goal 16, “Peace and justice for all,” is being provided.

Finally, “peacebuilding” in this chapter refers to conflict prevention. The term “conflict” here, includes not only physical violence but also structural and cultural violence, such as discrimination, oppression, and poverty, as presented by Galtung (1969). I have analyzed and discussed these conflicts as three types of pathologies, namely “The Trilogy of Peacebuilding,” in the hopes of creating new international peace, as these are important factors for maintaining a peaceful society.

2 What is Liberal Democracy?

Hiroshi Tanaka states that even if the origin of liberal democracy is unclear, the meaning of this term is a combination of modern economic liberalism, such as “market economy,” “laissez-faire,” and “harmony between private and public interests,” as used in economics, and the idea of political democracy, which ensures “equality” and “peaceful society” through “the participation of the whole people in politics.” (Tanaka 2013, p. 12).

Liberalism has two aspects: political liberalism, which focuses on the political institutions of the state, and economic liberalism, which focuses on the market. While the former is based on institutional liberalism and democratic peace theory, which addresses international issues through international organizations and various international treaties; the latter is based on interdependence through trade and investment due to the expansion of the international economy.

I am especially concerned about the recent global retreat of “liberal democracy”; and this concern is adeptly reflected in book titled The People versus Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It, written by Yascha Mounk. He suggests that liberal democracy is the transformation of popular ideas into public policies, whilst protecting individual rights. However, in the modern state, the liberal democracy function is receding; while various democracies can be illiberal, conversely, liberal institutions can also be undemocratic, even when there are regular and competitive elections (Mounk 2019, p. 30).

According to Monk’s categorization, I have classified the composition of democracy in Asia, where I have been working on democratization; this is shown in Table 7.1. Including Timor-Leste, which is not yet a member, the ten Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and East Asian countries can be classified as follows.

Table 7.1 Forms of democracy in East and Southeast Asia
Full size table

Other Asian countries such as Vietnam, Laos, China, and North Korea are the one-party rule system and Brunei Darussalam is only an absolute monarch. However, Myanmar is not at a stable place at present because of military coup in 2020.

2.1 The Fluctuating Democracy at Present

The trend in international politics seemed to shift from the realism of the Cold War era to idealism and liberalism. However, as Welsh points out, “The return of history” awaited the international community. In other words, how optimistic was the notion that “Western liberal democracy has been universalized as the final form of human governance” was also expressed in Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man published in 1992.

As Fukuyama pointed out, after the Cold War, the international community accepted the UN-centered multilateralism of international cooperation against the backdrop of an increase in liberal democracies, as well as in the role and expectations of the UN. However, after 2010, the UN faced a fundamental threat to the Western-led liberal democracy model. “The end of history” predicted by Fukuyama, although international community expected idealism or liberalism after realism during Cold War, prophesied that the path to peace will collapse (Fukuyama 1992).

What is the “counterattack of history” that Welsh developed? First, it is a “return to barbarism” that goes against international humanitarian law, such as the emergence of the Islamic State (ISIS). Secondly, it is the “return to mass refugees,” the unprecedented refugee and immigration problem that is hitting Europe. Thirdly, Vladimir Putin’s geopolitical return to power, and finally, a “return to social inequality” based on growing economic inequality within Western liberal democracies (Welsh 2017, pp. 40–41).

Another point must be added to Welsh’s four turning points, which is, the rise of China. Xi Jinping first became the general secretary of the Communist Party of China in 2012 and then became the president in 2013. He is aiming for the great revival of the Chinese nation. China has modernized its military force from a revolutionary army to a national defense force, and now has a navy and air force, second only to the U.S. While China is politically strengthening the one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party economically, it is aggressively introducing a market economy similar to that of Western countries, known as a socialist market economy.

China, being the second largest economy, with the presence of aid policies based on the “One Belt, One Road Initiative” (BRI) policy in the country, and a massive economic zone initiative, have caused the degree of freedom in the nation—that used to be a liberal democracy—to recede; contrarily, the number of democratic nations that hold skeleton elections has increased. In other words, an increasing number of states are either flying on one side of the democratic fence or moving toward authoritarian political systems (Kan 2018, pp. 160–169).

However, during the latter half of 2017, critical expressions against China, such as the “Chinese debt trap” and “neo-colonialism,” emerged from the littoral countries of the “One Belt, One Road Initiative.” According to the Center for Global Development (CGD), a U.S.-based research organization, China has invested $8 trillion in transportation, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure in its massive network of 68 countries in Europe, Africa, and Asia; however, 23 of the 68 countries are in a debt crisis. (CGD Policy Paper 2018, p. 121).

Contrarily, the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC) of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, has published an interesting survey report. In it, 58 questions were asked to 1308 respondents, working in five professional areas: research institutions, business and finance, public sector, civil society, and media, drawn from 10 ASEAN countries, between November 12 and December 1, 2019.1 According to an analysis of the ISEAS-ASC report, for ASEAN countries, China has two aspects: China’s expectations based on the backdrop of massive economic aid, and China’s threat based on its assertive territorial claims in the South China Sea and other areas.

Therefore, China has two contradictory faces: “expectations and threats.” It can be said, that, Southeast Asian countries’ political systems fluctuate between a free political system (liberal democracy) and an unfree political system (illiberal democracy). When the balance between liberal democracy and illiberal democracy is upset, countries are towed, either visibly or invisibly, toward authoritarian regimes, using China as a cover.

Conversely, intellectuals may expect the United States, Japan, and the European Union to tow the ASEAN region back to a free political system or liberal democracy. This expectation is an analysis that can be interpreted from the data indicators in the ISEAS-ASC report.

2.2 New Movement Against Democracy

I would like to consider two examples of democracy. One of these considerations is the restoration of geopolitics and the political system of “sovereign democracy,” as advocated by Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (Welsh 2017, p.41). When Putin assumed presidency in 2000, in his Millennium thesis, he advocated the revival of a stronger Russia based on the country’s real economy, which has declined to one-tenth that of the U.S., and one-fifth that of China. If we consider the characteristics of the Russian economy, which relies on energy resource states—“geo-economics”—then in terms of “geopolitics,” Russia is located in the center of Eurasia, exerting influence over the Pacific, Arctic and Atlantic Oceans, and the Middle East. Thus, Russia remains a superpower in geopolitical terms (Shimotomai 2016, p. 296).

Rather than ties based on the ideology of communism, as in the former Soviet Union, Russia emphasized soft power that connects it with its neighbors through ties, such as energy exports, language, religion, and civilization. However, Putin’s soft power has often been described as “soft coercion,” and he is pursuing foreign policy based on national interests and pragmatism. Shimotomai points out that from a geo-economic perspective, Putin is seeking to develop energy and logistics routes through the Arctic Ocean and is adopting a strategy of shifting Russia eastward that he refers to as “De-Europe and In-Asia” (Ibid., pp. 297–298).

Moreover, it is known that the Soviet Union eventually disintegrated due to the Perestroika policy that was welcomed by the Western countries. However, for many Russians, the disintegration of the state was not a pleasant event, as their livelihood depended on the state that controlled the administration and economy. The inflation rate reached 2600%, immediately after the collapse, affecting the middle class of government employees, teachers, military personnel, students, and pensioners. The democratization and market economy suddenly introduced by Boris Yeltsin deprived them of their livelihoods. Furthermore, the existence of a series of political merchants who flocked to the privatization of Yeltsin’s regime, widened the gap in the Russian society.

Putin launched a patriotic campaign and won the presidency through his support base—the United Russia. After assuming office, he restructured his political party and decisively rebuilt the nation after the collapse of the Soviet Union by articulating a strong state and sovereign democracy, backed by the idea of vertical control. Shimotomai states that Putin’s achievement in his first term was bringing order to the relationship between the state and the market by avoiding corrupt oligarch tax evasion and making taxation simple and flat. Moreover, Putin’s soft authoritarianism, what he calls “vertical control,” “management democracy, or sovereign democracy,” was accepted by the Russian population (Ibid., pp. 197–200).

Russia belongs to the category in Monk’s Table 7.1. The country is in a situation where its axis is shifting from an illiberal democracy to an authoritarian political system. Poland and Hungary, which used to be part of the Soviet bloc and ruled by a single communist party, the Polish United Workers’ Party, and the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, have undergone a regime change with the democratization of Eastern Europe and joined the EU in 2004. However, the recent political systems of both countries are leaning towards what Monk classifies as a non-liberal democratic system. In this instance too, a fluctuating democracy can be identified.

Another movement against democracy is the “Sharp Power,” which has been discussed mainly in the U.S. as a new type of power, in the context of today’s fluctuating democracy. It goes without saying that the existence of power in international politics is an important source of exercising power. The power that existed in the Cold War era resulted in that specific period being named as the era of hard power, backed by the military and economic power of the major powers. However, the influence of hard power was diminished by the end of the Cold War. Rather, it encouraged the emergence of soft power in its following eras. Joseph Nye opined that peace and prosperity could not be brought about, merely by the exercise of America’s mighty military and economic power. The U.S. president needs to make the ideals of democracy and capitalism more attractive. Thus, soft power is embodied in a country’s culture, values, and policies at the national level (Nye 2009).

In contrast to these three concepts of power, one can wonder, what is “sharp power?” In 2017, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) published a 150-page book, Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence. The NED is a private, non-governmental organization created under the Reagan administration in 1983 that works with the Network of Democracy Research Institutes (NDRI) on democracy, democratization, and international affairs, worldwide, to provide funding and support for the growth and strengthening of democratic research institutes (Walker and Ludwig 2017, pp. 2–3). Although it is a non-governmental organization, it has a close relationship with the U.S. government, as most of its funding comes from the U.S. national budget.

Considering the current state of modern society, the authoritarian states of China and Russia are spending billions of dollars on methods that are neither hard power nor necessarily soft power, such as people-to-people exchanges, extensive cultural activities, educational programs, development of media companies, and global information operations. In short, it can be noted, “rather than engaging or persuading, it instead looks to disruption and manipulation,” to systematically stifle political pluralism and domestic freedom of expression to secure its interests.

In the official journal of the NED, published by Johns Hopkins University (Journal of Democracy 2018), Walker analyzes why authoritarian states, such as China and Russia, have made a comeback.

First, he states the stagnation of democracy. This is because the countries that have led democracy today are deprived of confidence and are perplexed in the face of authoritarian states challenging them on the level of ideas, principles, and standards.

Second, he noted that dictatorships focus on the openness of democratic systems. If it is news or information on politically important subjects, China and Russia will control them. This is because the two countries leading authoritarianism today, find ways to protect themselves from the political and cultural influences of democracies, and exercise control in the realm of ideas.

Third, the eclectic state-capitalist regimes in China and Russia allowed autocrats to deftly penetrate the commerce and economy of democracy-led states through state-linked business activities in ways that were almost impossible during the Cold War. For example, Walker says that businesses in China rely not on the success or failure of their performance, but on meeting the demands of the government (Walker 2018, pp. 10–11).

Beyond the political sphere, the harmful effects of sharp power are now clearly increasing in the cultural, academic, media, and publishing spheres, which is important for citizens of democracies to perceive and understand the world. This is because the culture, academia, media, publishing (CAMP) field is open, accessible, and vulnerable in democracies, while China and Russia, with their sharp power, are prime targets in these areas. As a striking example, China has more than 500 Confucius Institutes around the world, including 100 in the U.S. university campuses, to teach Chinese language and culture across the cultural and academic worlds. They are funded by the Chinese government as part of the country’s strategy which influences socio-political areas in the democratic countries (Ibid, pp. 12–13).

Sharp power also permeates CAMP media, especially in the modern digital realm. Dictatorial regimes, such as in China, Russia, are censoring their citizens’ free access to media using online equipment and technologies that preclude their use by international standards. Thereafter, Walker goes on to state that China is currently putting pressure on foreign technology and printing companies, such as Google and Facebook, to increase global freedom or the other way around (Ibid, pp.15–16).

The clear difference between soft power and sharp power is that, in a liberal democratic system, it is based on non-military, non-coercive power, and only on free values and appeal to influence other countries. However, as Nye pointed out, soft power is still an effective diplomatic tool, and Western democracies must first promote the appeal and value of free and open political systems to fragile democracies through aid and support (Nye 2009). Consequently, the “fluctuating democracies” that are being towed by “sharp power,” can be brought back to liberal democracy through soft power.

3 Inequitable Development

Welsh considers the “return to an unequal society” at the end of the “Return of History” phenomenon. Specifically, when we rethink the vulnerability of liberal democracy, while we have been seeking human rights that guarantee various freedoms, there are many individuals whose right to life is threatened. This is the reason behind the choice of authoritarian regimes with strong leadership. In the following section, I focus on the disparity between wealth and income spreading throughout the international community. Thereafter I will close with a consideration of the reality of “uneven development.”

3.1 Inequitable Development in the World

Ahead of the World Economic Forum, held annually in Davos, Switzerland, to discuss the promotion of liberal trade, the international NGO, Oxfam, issued a report on the current state of global poverty inequality. The report, published on January 20, 2020, stated that the assets of the world’s top 2153 richest people now exceed those of the world’s poorest 4.6 billion people. According to the UN’s 2019 population statistics, the world’s population is 7713 million, which means that the assets of the world’s poorest people, or about 60% of the world’s population, are equivalent to those of the top 2153 richest people.

In this regard, the 2020 report provided interesting interpretations. The 22 richest people in the world are richer than all African women. There are 12.5 billion unpaid women and girls in the world’s workforce every day, contributing at least $10.8 billion to the global economy each year, and the world’s manufacturing sector records more than triple this statistic. It also states that if the richest 1% of the world’s population paid an additional 0.5% estate tax for 10 years, it would provide enough money to create 117 million jobs for the care for the aged, childcare, education, and health industries (OXFAM International 2020).

As demonstrated by Oxfam, the gap between the rich and poor in the world widened in the 1990s. After the Cold War, the international community focused on human security (HS) rather than national security. The concept of HS ensures the safety of people and communities in which they live their daily lives. The method of perceiving security began to transition to a bottom-up approach from a top-down approach.

Regarding the difference between the two security concepts, the Commission on Human Security, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, considers the following four points in its report: First, HS is people-centered, that is, it focuses on protecting people from a variety of threats rather than on attacks by external forces. Second, it incorporates threats that include environmental pollution, international terrorism, large-scale population movements, infectious diseases such as HIV-AIDS, and long-term oppression and impoverishment. Third, the era of the state, alone as the bearer of security, is over and many people, including international and regional organizations, NGOs, and civil society, play a crucial role. Finally, ensuring security and strengthening the capacity of people and societies are inextricably linked. People find their own solutions and solve their own problems. The commission appeals that capacity building is necessary for this purpose (Commission on Human Security 2003, pp. 12–13).

The 1994 Human Development Report (HDR) published by the United Nations Development Programme was a catalyst for the spread of HS in the international community. The HDR was developed with the aim of representing basic human rights and presents the Human Development Index (HDI) with basic human needs (BHNs) in mind. The HDI, specifically, is calculated using three indices: an education index based on adult literacy and gross enrollment rates, a health index based on life expectancy at birth, and gross national income (GNI) per capita, based on purchasing power parity.

The purpose of The 1994 HDR was to present a new way of thinking about human security, from the perspective of human development. In this report, seven areas are recognized as crucial to human security: economy, food, health, environment, individual, community, and politics.2 These can be grouped together into two categories, freedom from chronic threats, such as hunger, disease, and oppression, which falls under “freedom from wants,” and protection from the sudden disruption of daily routines, such as home, work, and community, which corresponds to “freedom from fear” (HDR 1994, pp. 23–33).

Freedom from wants, as the Oxfam report mentioned above, shows, is the result of the growing disparity between the rich and the poor, which has narrowed the traditional middle class and divided it into a few upper and many lower classes, resulting in an extreme increase in the number of people suffering from scarcity. Contrarily, the scope of “freedom from fear” continues to increase with the rise of conflicts, terrorism, natural disasters, and the fear of new infectious diseases, such as the new influenza and the novel coronavirus (COVID-19). Currently, increasingly complex problems of scarcity and fear, such as environmental problems, are rising in the society. Thus, the HDI index is important for visualizing the reality of scarcity and fear that the international community is currently facing. The existence of the HDI presented by the HDR is also noteworthy in arousing international public opinion by showing the situation of human rights violations (Yamada 2016, 2019).

While the right to liberty and social rights were called first-and second-generation human rights, Karel Vasak, Director of the UNESCO Division for Human Rights and Peace, identified the right to solidarity as a third-generation human right in his 1977 article. It specifically includes “the right to development,” “the right to the environment,” “the right to peace,” and “the right to ownership of the common heritage of mankind.” In short, it states that these rights reflect the visionary power of the community and can only be achieved through the collective efforts of individuals, states, and other organizations, including public and private institutions (Vasak 1977, p. 29).

The UN adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development in its 41st session on December 4, 1986. Here, “the right to development as a human right” is clarified in Article 1. However, the meaning of development is quite comprehensive as it includes not only basic living standards, but education, health, food, housing, employment, and fair income distribution. In other words, it provides a guarantee for human life.

To commemorate the 20th anniversary of the conference, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), was held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, where both, the rights of the environment and development were discussed simultaneously. However, the first time that the environment and development were discussed together was at the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development, which provided an opportunity for “Sustainable Development” to spread globally. It was also called the Brundtland commission as it was chaired by Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlen Brundtland. In its report, “Our Common Future,” the Commission stated that the environment and development are compatible.

However, “sustainable development” is a vague phrase that is easier said than done, meaning that it is difficult to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the needs of future generations. The Rio Declaration, which aimed to build a global partnership, was adopted as an outcome of the UNCED. Furthermore, to enhance the effectiveness of the Rio Declaration, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Convention on Biological Diversity, Statement of Forest Principles, and Agenda 21 have been adopted and signed. The Kyoto Protocol flows from the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which led to the Paris Agreement, later known as the post-Kyoto Protocol. “Rio+10” was held in Johannesburg in 2002 to confirm the progress of the Rio Declaration, and “Rio+20” was held, again in Rio de Janeiro, in 2012.

Thus, the concept of human rights has expanded from freedom rights to social rights, development rights, and environmental rights. In this context, one might wonder, are these concepts of human rights applicable only to liberal democracies originating in Western Europe? In conclusion, there are “human rights” that can be applied to undemocratic liberal states, non-liberal democratic states, and even authoritarian states. Alternatively, it can be said that the proliferation of the concept of human rights has led to the existence of human rights that can be selected for each political system.

3.2 Inequitable Development Inside Countries

Before the globalization of the 1990s, which began in earnest after the Cold War, the stereotypical categorization of rich northern countries and poor southern countries existed as an extension of the north–south problem in the contrast between advanced industrialized countries and developing countries. However, this dichotomous composition of wealth and poverty is dissolving as globalization, which has been underway since the 1990s, is causing disparities between the rich and the poor within developed countries, which were supposed to become even more prosperous. Similarly, inequalities also occur in developing countries, especially in emerging countries. This is the background to the second pathology that I consider, “uneven development.”

To understand “uneven development,” the analysis of Branko Milanovic, a World Bank economist, is noteworthy. Milanovic coined a term called “Elephant curve” analysis, where he put the growth rate of per capita household income from 1988 to 2008 on the vertical axis, and the income distribution strata from poor to high income on the horizontal axis. The chart portrays the income imbalance associated with globalization, that is, the winners and losers of globalization. Milanovic analyzed the winners and the losers in the 20 years of globalization from the end of the Cold War to the 2008 financial crisis.

As the winners, he cites the richest people who have gained a lot of wealth from globalization, followed by the new middle class, especially in China, India, and the emerging market economies of Indonesia and Brazil. These new middle classes will make up more than one-third of the world’s population. The richest 1% of the world’s population have seen their incomes increase by more than 60% over the past 20 years. Contrarily, as shown in Fig. 7.1, the 200 million Chinese, 90 million Indians, and about 30 million Indonesians, Brazilian, and Egyptians, who make up the new middle class, are at or near 80th and 70th percentile in terms of per capita income growth. These are the richest people in the world. Thus, these two groups, the wealthiest and the new middle class, have been positioned as the winners of the globalization era over the past two decades (Milanovic 2013, pp. 202–204).

Fig. 7.1
figure 1

Source Branko Milanovic (2013), “Global Income Inequality in Numbers: in History and Now,” Global Policy, Vol.4. Issue2, p.202

Milanovic’s “Elephant Curve”: Change in real income between 1988 and 2008 at various percentiles of global income distribution (calculated in 2005 international dollars).

Full size image

Indeed, the income distribution of many people in the new middle class belongs to the 40–70th percentile, excluding the poorest five percent (the World Bank changed less than $1 a day to less than $1.25 in 2015), whose income level has not changed. However, according to the World Bank, the percentage of the poorest population has decreased from 44 to 23% over the past 20 years. Conversely, the largest losers during this period, the losers in the age of globalization, are the middle class in developed countries, who are in the 75–90th percentiles of the income distribution as shown in Fig. 7.1, and whose income growth rate is around zero (Ibid.).

It is noteworthy that this situation occurs in the top 25% of the wealthy, with the top 1% and those within 5% gaining substantial wealth, while the next 20% have no or stagnant income growth. This means that there is a rift in the distribution of income among the wealthy, specifically the privileged 60 million people in the world and the miniscule section of three million people in the U.S., who belong to the richest 1% of the world’s population. In other words, the wealthiest people are 12% of Americans and certain numbers of the British, Germans, French, and Japanese. The remaining 1%, including Europeans, Brazilians, Russians, and South Africans, compete with each other to join the same class (Ibid.).

Finally, I wish to highlight the new middle class of emerging economies, such as China and India, which belong to the winning group. In 1988, the median income bracket in China was only slightly more than 10% of the world’s population; however, a similar income distribution in China 20 years later shows that Chinese people are now richer than more than half of the world’s population. India’s median income, although more modest, has risen from 10 to 27th globally, and Indonesia too saw a similar increase from 25 to 39th position, while Brazil rose from 40th to the 66th position in the hierarchical distribution (Ibid.). The existence of a new middle class in these countries seems to have increased the average income of the concerned countries.

On reading the background of Milanović’s elephant curve, we can observe that due to economic globalization, consumers in industrialized countries are purchasing inexpensive export products from emerging countries, while companies in industrialized countries are shifting their production bases to emerging and developing countries to produce these inexpensive products. Alternatively, as phrases, such as “industrial hollowing out,” permeate industrialized countries along with structurally depressed industries, the employment of the middle class in industrialized countries is gradually being lost.

As a result, while income growth stagnates due to unemployment, employment in emerging countries increases in the opposite direction. Globalization has increased the size of the world economy; however, in the end, it has created a middle class in emerging countries in exchange for a decline in the income of the middle class in developed countries. Simultaneously, however, the world’s poorest people remain unchanged.

The worsening living conditions of the middle class in developed countries and their dissatisfaction with the government are said to be the reasons behind President Trump’s election in the U.S. and Britain’s exit from the European Union (Brexit). The frustration and anger of the middle class, who were laid off due to the structural recession in the manufacturing industry, known as the Rust Belt region in the U.S. and the U.K., led to the birth of the Trump administration in January 2017, which called for an “America First” policy. In addition, the decline of the two major political parties in the UK—the Conservative Party and the Labour Party—was marked by the existence of people left behind (Mizushima 2016, pp. 173–176).

Globalization has promoted the transfer of manufacturing industries from developed countries to developing countries, while developed countries are required to change their industrial structure to a higher level. One of these changes is the digital revolution. As a result of the digital revolution, workers in traditional manufacturing industries face job losses and lower wages, and immigrants are recruited to compensate for these lower wages. This is also the main reason for the breakthrough of right-wing and right-wing political parties in Europe and the U.S., calling for the exclusion of immigrants and refugees. This is not to mention that Trump in the U.S. has explicitly called for the exclusion of immigrants adhering to the “home country first” policy.

Finally, this section is summarized as follows: This means that developed countries are no longer developed countries of the past. Developed countries face internal fragmentation. As social rights and the right to life in liberal democracy are threatened, the right to liberty, the most important human right in the Western world, is losing its importance. The evidence for this is the anti-immigrant and anti-refugee movement, across many parts of the world, which has led to a high level of support and rapid growth of right-wing and right-wing political parties that call for such a movement.

As shown in the background of the Elephant curve, the middle class in developed countries that cannot catch up with changes in the industrial structure, such as the advanced digital revolution, which is not staying put but rather is further widening the wealth gap with the rich. In short, the gap between the upper and lower classes has widened significantly, and a relationship between the wealthy, who are immensely rich, and low-wage workers, whose employment is unstable, has been established in many countries. This is the background of the “uneven development” discussed in this chapter.

4 Tackling Each Actor for a Peaceful Society

In Asia, many countries have enforced authoritarian policies on their citizens while ensuring economic growth. However, the consciousness of the middle class, which had been conservative toward an authoritarian regime, is clearly changing and is now welcoming it. It has been observed that the Arab Spring prompted Myanmar’s military regime toward democracy in 2011.3 Furthermore, Asian countries have already opened-up their markets and made great progress in liberalizing their economies. Contrarily, the progress of political and social liberalization varies greatly depending on the political system. Civil society aims to ensure the progress of political and social liberalization by manifesting its role.

4.1 Good Governance for Conflict Prevention

Asia has a variety of political systems. In many state-dominated countries, civil society, including NGOs, have been assiduously developing their activities. Civil society is trying to protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Specifically, it is the realization of a society in which justice is guaranteed.

In the 2002 edition of the Human Development Report, the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, “Good governance is perhaps the most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development”(HDR 2002, p. 58). In a special section on “Governance and Human Development,” good governance from a human development perspective is defined as follows (Ibid.):

  1. (1)

    The human rights and fundamental freedom of people are respected, and people can live with dignity.

  2. (2)

    People have the right to make decisions that affect their lives

  3. (3)

    People can demand accountability from decision-makers.

  4. (4)

    Social interaction is based on inclusive and equitable rules, institutions, and practices.

  5. (5)

    Women are equal partners to men in the private as well as public spheres of life and decision-making.

  6. (6)

    People are free from discrimination based on race, ethnicity, class, gender, or any other attributes.

  7. (7)

    Current policies reflect the needs of future generations.

  8. (8)

    Economic and social policies respond to people’s needs and aspirations.

  9. (9)

    Economic and social policies aim to eradicate poverty and expand the choices in the lives of all people.

In the 1990s, the UNDP published the HDR, which placed human development at the center of development scheme. Instead of measuring human wealth in terms of the size of the economy, such as gross national product (GNP) or gross domestic product (GDP), the report attempted to measure the wealth of a country by incorporating indicators such as education level, healthcare level, and income level, all of which are necessary for people to lead a basic social life.

However, the human development strategies for the twenty-first century further emphasize not only individual participation through good governance but also participation with an emphasis on collective activities. Specifically, social and political movements, such as those for environmental protection, promotion of gender equality, and protection of human rights, were recognized as the driving forces to advance the central issues of human development. Political freedom also empowered people to claim their economic and social rights, while education enhanced their ability to demand economic and social policies that responded to priority issues that needed to be resolved (Ibid p. 61).

In the UNDP report, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines governance more broadly than the World Bank, including participation, involvement of civil society in policymaking, protection of human rights, prevention of corruption, democratic institutions, rule of law, and reduction of excessive military expenditure. It refers to “good governance” by assessing the governance of the country. Inada states that the UNDP’s concept of governance is an intermediate category between the World Bank and the DAC (Inada 2006, pp. 9–12).

He introduces three types of criticisms of the governance indicators introduced by the World Bank and IMF. The first criticism is that the governance indicators of Western-led international development institutions are a uniform imposition of Western values, which are incompatible with the values of developing countries with diverse histories, societies, and cultures. This is based on criticism of the World Bank and IMF’s conditionality-based structural adjustment policies (SAPs), for loans to developing countries.

The second criticism is that the conditionality associated with World Bank and IMF lending, violates the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, which is the norm of the international community. This is a criticism that in the past, the World Bank and IMF provided economic aid based on the premise of the separation of politics and economics and non-interference in domestic affairs. The third criticism is that the World Bank and IMF are U.S.-led, and that economic interests and political interests for the U.S. are their priority as well as the driving force behind them. This is referred to as the “Washington Consensus” criticism. In the end, the World Bank and the IMF are “exporting democracy” to serve the global strategy of the U.S. (Ibid., pp. 18–19).

4.2 Alternative Approach for Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding means “building peace and is closely related to peace studies. In Sakio Takayanagi’s book, Introduction to Peace Studies for Understanding War, he states that research on the causes of war has been conducted with the aim of solving various problems that threaten peace and helping to solve them in any nation by applying the scientifically accumulated knowledge of peace studies (Takayanagi 2000, p. 7).

He defines peace studies as the study of the causes of war and the search for conditions for peace through the application of many disciplines. He highlights the interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, and applied research methods, of peace studies and its various research subjects. They specifically include environmental issues, gender issues, human rights oppression, marginalization and exclusion, development issues, and migration issues. He further states that it is a discipline that studies these issues using law, economics, political science, and other disciplines (Ibid., pp. 12–14).

Peace research was the origin of peace studies, and there are two lineages. One started in the U.S., with the publication of the Journal of Conflict Resolution, based at the University of Michigan. With the aim of avoiding World War III using nuclear weapons during the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the researchers of this journal used mathematics and statistics, including game theory, to objectively and scientifically disseminate the results of their conflict-resolution research.

Another trend of peace research originated in Europe. The most significant influence was that of Johan Galtung, who founded the International Peace Research Institute in 1959 at the University of Oslo, Norway (Ibid., pp. 17–18). Galtung identified the structural violence. This theory is based on the “peacelessness” proposed by Sugata Dasgupta of India (Taga 1984, p. 158). He stresses that the opposite of peace is not war, but a state of non-peace, “peacelessness” because of his experiences in India, which Indians suffer from poor, traditional socio-economic framework.

In addition, Western societies believed that without war, which is physical violence, it would be possible to develop science and industry to ensure social and economic benefits and that war and peace are incompatible to each other. Galtung’s structural violence includes cultural competence that arises in social structures. Alternately, the absence of physical violence, that is, war and organized violence between groups, was distinguished as negative peace.

The NGOs working in the fields of human rights, development, and the environment, have been highly regarded for their expertise as consultative bodies in the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), since the founding of the UN. However, the UN Security Council, which deals with peace, is led by sovereign states, and the role of NGOs has been limited because weapons are the exclusive domain of governments involved in national security. However, the high number of Nobel Peace Prize laureates, especially since the end of the Cold War, from the civil society and NGOs, is evidence that governments are no longer the only major actors in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

The 1997 International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) may have provided an impetus for NGOs to make significant contributions to the field of peace internationally. In 2005, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), concluded a treaty to abolish nuclear weapons. These Nobel-Prize winning organizations may be attributed to the fact that civil society and NGOs have a presence that cannot be ignored as actors promoting international peace.

In December 2008, Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) led the Convention on Cluster Munitions with a strategy similar to that of the ICBL, which resulted in the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines, which aimed at providing justice to individuals deprived of their dignity in terms of human rights violations, and tried to conduct the Convention through the Ottawa Process, which involved the Canadian government, civil society, and NGOs, including the U.S. Veterans Affairs. A similar strategy led to the Oslo Process in Norway, where a coalition of some 200 NGOs responded to a call for a ban on the use, manufacture, possession, and transfer of cluster munitions.

This NGO-led strategy for the enactment of the Convention was also reflected in ICAN’s “World without Nuclear Weapons” campaign (Nuclear Weapons Convention) mentioned above. It aroused international public opinion not from the perspective of international politics or security, but from the humanitarian perspective that nuclear weapons destroy human health and cause enormous damage to society and the environment. The treaty was adopted by 122 UN member states and territories in July 2017. With the ratification of the treaty by Central America and Honduras in October 2020, the number of countries required for the treaty to enter into force reached 50 and the treaty came into force on January 22, 2021.

An ongoing debate on how to support post-conflict peacebuilding by blending the values of local society and Western-style liberal democracy led to Roland Paris’s suggestion that peacebuilding assistance must first be “institutionalized before liberalization” (Paris 2005, p. 7). He opines that the imposition of the Western model of liberal democracies destroyed the values and cultural resources of the countries concerned and led to political and social turmoil. As a result, it is believed that the post-conflict government foresaw that it would provoke a major backlash and pose a new threat to the country.

Richmond argues that post-conflict peacebuilding, state-building, modernization, and development environments have become more responsive to local communities. He argues that peacebuilding in local societies should consider local communities with local customs and pay attention to the effects of modernization on local societies, while simultaneously discussing long-term changes, including hierarchies, inequalities, new hereditary systems, gender, and socioeconomic issues that shape the local soil for peacebuilding (Richmond 2011, p. 3).

As a post-liberal peace, Richmond urges the emergence of a “local-liberal hybrid” concept of peacebuilding. Rather than imposing liberal norms on local societies, Richmond argues that we should aim for a fusion between local societies and liberalism, in the broadest sense, and encourage a new blend of the two in each context. Particularly, what is interesting about the post-liberal peace proposal is that it encourages mutual aid and reunification of liberalism and local society rather than mutual rejection of both. He argues that “hybrid mix of local and liberal” peacebuilding will be the result of clashes and exchanges between fundamentally different political organizations and societies (Ibid., pp. 18–19).

Finally, I confirm that the subject of this section is the question of achieving “peace for whom.” My answer is clear because of peace for the innocent beyond “pacifism without a center of human.” I have discussed an alternative method for a peacebuilding approach with several topics. However, I have also stressed that the center of peace is human security.

5 Conclusion: Role of SDGs for International Harmony and Cooperation

In conclusion, I considered 17 goals of the SDGs. This chapter focuses on Goal 16, which is the realization of a “peaceful and just” society. From the given context, the realization of SDGs suggests that it will be impossible to achieve them by 2030 without cooperation among various stakeholders that transcend national borders. In this respect, it is difficult to realize a society where “no one left behind” with the “home-country-first” approach that is currently prioritized in the international community.

As discussed in this chapter, it is necessary to build an international society in which, the right to freedom, social rights, environmental rights, and development rights are balanced. To achieve this, we must first break away from the “home-country-first” principle and rebuild an international society that allows for international harmony and pluralistic cooperation.

Even after mid-December 2021, the global number of novel coronavirus (COVID-19) infections continues to grow in developing countries, where medical care is weak, as well as in developed countries. The international community’s attention is shifting from infection prevention, such as the use of masks, to vaccine development and vaccination. It is common knowledge that the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the virus a pandemic, this sentence can be framed as follows: However, the spread of the novel coronavirus pandemic has provided has new insights in the context of peacebuilding.

In this chapter, I emphasized the three issues of “fluctuating democracy,” “uneven development,” and “peace without center of human.” These three issues have become more apparent with the spread of novel coronavirus infections that we are now facing. Therefore, I will briefly highlight the challenges faced by the international community based on the prospects for solutions.

First, the problem of income disparity, which has increased due to globalization, has become increasingly apparent. With the spread of the novel coronavirus infection, the “losers” based on the concept of “the Elephant curve” are facing a crisis that is greater than income disparity under normal circumstances. The inability to access national social insurance services, especially for low-wage workers, has prompted the further spread of infection. As a result, many workers died from infection to avoid expensive medical care owing to limited finances. In short, the pursuit of efficiency and cost reduction in a globalized economy has impoverished the middle class.

In this sense, the lesson learned is that rebuilding the impoverished middle class is a pre-requisite for basic economic and political stability of the society. Simultaneously, the spread of the disease to vulnerable groups must be seen as a human rights issue that the international community must address. In the U.S., where the disease is spreading explosively, a high mortality rate among Africans, Hispanics, and other minorities has been reported (Matsuoka 2020, Newsweek Japan, June 19). Preventing the spread of the disease to the poor is the most recent challenge that must be addressed by the international community, which is committed to human security.

Second, the COVID-19 epidemic started in China, and under the strong political authority of the Communist Party dictatorship, China took uncompromising measures to prevent infection, including the purchase of masks, the emergency construction of simple hospitals, and implementing a curfew with penalties. Consequently, the early spread of the disease was controlled. However, the infection continued to spread to Europe and the U.S., but the Chinese government saw the spread of the infection in Western Europe as a perfect opportunity to point out the vulnerability of Western-style liberal democracy and began to counterattack the criticism of China by international public opinion. China’s Sharp Power strategy, discussed in this chapter, has sharply cut into the vulnerabilities of the liberal democratic system, leading to a “democracy without liberalism” and a shift to an authoritarian political system.

In other words, the spread of the novel coronavirus revealed the vulnerability of Western-style liberal democracies. While the Asian approach, which emphasizes social order, was able to halt the spread of the disease to a certain extent, the Western approach, which emphasizes the right to freedom, took measures against the infection based on the premise that individuals are responsible for their own actions. The extent to which the aggressive curfew policy in the media can be balanced by human rights, remains to be seen.

Third, globalization has promoted an international society in which goods, money, and information can travel freely across borders based on the premise of people’s international movement. Thus, one of the reasons for the spread of the novel coronavirus can be attributed to the international movement of people who freely cross borders. After the outbreak, we can expect a strong backlash and further rejection of immigration and refugee exclusion. Consequently, populist politics seems to be gaining more power in Europe.

However, it is also clear that the lessons learned from this incident underscore the need to rebuild international cooperation, which populist political leaders and parties have neglected. Rather than seeing the spread of the virus as a problem caused by the international movement of people in the wake of globalization, it may be that it is the regression of international cooperation, which is the source of this threat. As an international public good, the WHO is based on the principle of international cooperation and assumes multilateral collaboration. In fact, the WHO-led COVAX Facility aims to ensure an equitable supply of vaccines to developing countries.

Fourth, even if there are conflicts of national interest among governments, the need for a global network of civil society and NGOs that transcends national borders and emphasizes human interest has been strengthened as an actor in promoting the human community. Simultaneously, there exists a threat to information manipulation. In addition to the large amount of existing information, it is difficult to select necessary and reliable information from social media. We are the target of not only physical terrorism but also cyber terrorism, which are a threat to human security. Now we need to conduct serious discussions based on liberal democracy to combat such threats. More proactive development of global networks will open-up newer prospects for human interest.

The final appeal of this chapter is to ensure everydayness in our lives. We should build various networks daily that emphasize international coordination and cooperation in building a peaceful society. Although the novel coronavirus belongs to a typical event of extraordinary nature, liberalism and democracy are the basis for creating peace in our daily lives and guaranteeing “freedom from fear.” “Freedom from poverty” is also a longstanding goal of humanity, as is the realization of a world where the SDGs aims at the slogan, “Leave no one behind.”

Notes

  1. 1.

    A breakdown of the 1308 respondents by country shows that 224 (18.6%) were from Myanmar, 222 (17%) from Singapore, 163 (12.5%) from Malaysia, and (11.6%) from Vietnam, and Indonesia.

    11.3%; Philippines, 10.5%; Brunei, 7.4%; Thailand, 7.3%; Cambodia, 2 Cambodia 2.5%, and Laos, 1.8%. By occupation, 40% of the respondents were engaged in government, regional, and international organizations; 36.2% in researchers, think tanks, and research institutes; 6.6% in business and finance; and 6.5% in civil society and NGOs.

  2. 2.

    According to the 1994 HDR, HS comprehends various securities, especially 7 arears, that are necessary for our daily lives except traditional security, such as territory and military.

  3. 3.

    In an interview with Benedict Rogers, a British human rights activist who supported the democracy movement in Myanmar, Than Shwe, a former longtime military ruler— including others—said, based on multiple sources, that “they probably saw what happened to the Arab dictators and decided it was safer to tolerate the reform path” (The Asahishimbun, April 5, 2012, morning edition article). However, in response to the overwhelming victory of the National League of Democracy (NLD) after the second general election in 2020, following the transfer of civilian rule, the armed forces claimed that an illegal election was held, causing a coup d’ état in February 2021. At the end of December 2012, Myanmar’s political and social situations remained uncertain.