Keywords

1 Introduction

The goal of no. SDGs17 is to “activate the global partnership toward sustainable development.” However, in East Asia, to establish such a partnership and make it work, it is necessary to build trust as a precondition. To build trust in this region, “history” must be overcome. However, the history of perpetration and victimization has been politicized, casting a shadow on the trust between nations and their peoples. This chapter aims to propose methods to build the global partnership by seeking solutions to the “history problem” that extends outside the realm of “historiography.” In this sense, rather than discussing economic issues such as direct investment, technology, and trade, this chapter, by focusing on multi-stakeholder partnership, pays attention to the building of a civil society partnership.

For a long time, historians from different countries have been repeatedly engaged in solid joint studies and historical dialogue. In the dialogue, historians have shared the belief that we must start from the sharing of relevant historical documents and facts about “aggression,” “colonial rule,” and so on. This chapter points out the effectiveness of “reconciliation studies”—as a field to deal with the issue of historical perception that has become a bottleneck for public sentiments—in putting an end to the phenomenon of “history” being linked to “politics.” It also examines the situation of the community of historians, as a practical case of the global partnership. The purposes of the partnership desired by historians are: (1) To find how to reduce the confrontation made in history and how to put the relations between nations on the track to peace, stability, and cooperation. (2) To provide a pathway to ensure that commitments are met and the state of reconciliation is sustained between nations and between nations and individuals. (3) To propose the methods of avoiding new conflicts, so that the “history problem” does not cause new tension. (4) The state and society provide an environment that reflects on the past of victimization and perpetration at the individual level and achieve the “peace of mind.”

In addition, this chapter points out the lack of an “intellectual reconciliation” that mediates the reconciliations between governments and between peoples. To achieve the “intellectual reconciliation,” it proposes the creation of world citizens’ history that is indispensable for the global partnership, fusing people’s history and academic history and combining empirical and macroscopic history.

2 “Reconciliation” and the Global Partnership

2.1 Advocating “Reconciliation Studies”

In 2000, scholars gathered and launched a joint research program on “history and reconciliation.” In their view, the academic research that would resolve the conflicts between the public sentiments of Japan and China over the issue of historical perception and bring about true reconciliation in East Asia must start. The joint research, named “Japan–China Young Scholars Conference on History,” received full support from private organizations and continued for 15 years.Footnote 1

20 years ago, the government-led channel for historical dialogue had yet to be established, and non-official historians made small attempts. The historians’ dialogue, based on the belief that “the key that brings reconciliation lies in ‘history’ itself,” (Kurosawa and Nish 2011) revolved around the confirmation of the facts of “aggression” and “colonial rule” in the modern history. This dialogue aimed to share “historical materials” and “historical facts.” Historians from different countries argued that “there can be no true conciliation unless it is based on the understanding of facts.” (Ibid.) It was the consensus among the historians that the cross-border joint research provides the basic condition for achieving reconciliation that allowed the persistence of the long-term, solid joint research.

However, despite historians’ efforts, the issues such as history textbooks and visits to Yasukuni Shrine cast a shadow on the political and diplomatic relations between Japan, China, and South Korea, and threatened the framework of political reconciliation achieved by the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1965 and the Japan–China Joint Communique of 1972. The conflicts triggered by history did not stop at the political level, but also caused the deterioration of the public sentiments. The three governments recognized the significance of the problems. In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, backed up by the governments, the Japan-Korea joint research started in 2002, and Japan–China joint research was launched in 2006. This was the beginning of the so-called government-led joint historical research. The governments supported scholars’ joint research to avoid the escalation of the history problem in diplomacy. By intervening in the history problem, the governments took measures to keep the history problem within the realm of “history,” and prevent it from becoming a factor influencing politics and diplomacy.

However, the overflow of the history problem outside the realm of “history” could not be stopped. The following reasons should be considered.

Firstly, the times and social environment have changed. As Onuma Yasuaki pointed out, after entering the twenty-first century, the views of war, colonial rule, and human rights issues have dramatically changed in the international community. According to the Korea-Japan Treaty and the Japan–China Joint Communique, the issues of war and colonial rule, which should have been legally settled, have been called for reconsideration since the 1980s. Additionally, while the Japanese people have been reflecting on the problems of war and colonial rule, the feeling of “unfairness” imposed by the Tokyo Trial cannot be eliminated. On the other hand, the Chinese who got some space of expression and the Koreans who gained democracy have become more readily to direct their victim mentality to the perpetrator, Japan (Onuma 2015, pp. v–vi). Their free opinions are delivered in the world through diverse media, represented by the internet. Everyone has the freedom to imagine and talk about “history.” The “popularization of history,” accompanying with the changing times and social environment, is one of the reasons for the overflow of the history problem.

Secondly, “history” is easily used as a diplomatic card. As Kurosawa Fumitaka said, the phenomenon of the “politicization” of “history” dramatically changed in the 1980s (Kurosawa and Nish 2011, p. 3). Prior to the 1980s, the conflicts over the interpretation of history mainly appeared in Japanese domestic politics. Since the 1980s, history has been used in Chinese and Korean domestic politics and has functioned as the diplomatic card. For example, when the diplomatic conflicts over the nuclear test, Taiwan issue, territorial issue, and trade frictions happened between Japan and China, “history” was often used as a method to deal with these issues. The historical memory of the past “economic aggression” and “territorial aggression” were evoked, and “history” was expected to be an effective card to gain significant results in diplomatic negotiations.

Third, the environment in which historians live varies among countries and regions, and in some countries, historians do not obtain sufficient conditions to deal with the “history problem.” In China, the Marxist historical view is regarded as the orthodox historical view. The interpretation of the modern history, as an issue related to the regime legitimacy, is placed under government management. Historiography is closely tied with politics. Since the 1980s, positivist historiography has enjoyed unprecedented prosperity in universities and research institutes, and many historical studies based on the modernization historical view and the civilization historical view have emerged. However, in recent years, the free space of historical studies has been narrowed. The interpretation of the modern history is now strongly required to be consistent with the Communist Party’s historical view.

Therefore, it is extremely difficult to achieve historical reconciliation based solely on traditional joint history research by historians from different countries and the research outcomes based on it. In other words, to deal with the issue of historical perception that runs counter to historical reconciliation between nations and peoples and becomes a bottleneck for interstate relations and public sentiments, the search for new knowledge is indispensable. It is this new knowledge that can be “reconciliation studies.” Furthermore, since “enmity” was born in “history,” “reconciliation studies” and historiography are certainly inseparable. One of the goals of SDGs is “to revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.” It is crucial to build trust that transcends history to achieve this goal.

2.2 Reconciliation and the Creation of “Reconciliation Studies”

Here I want to first confirm that achieving “reconciliation” between nations and peoples and creating “reconciliation studies” to overcome the history problem have the same direction, but different points of arrival.

If we, invoking the legal meaning, understand “reconciliation” as “a contract in which disputing parties make concessions to each other and promise to stop disputing,” (Kojien) historical reconciliation, in summary, can be defined as a state of sustained compromise and peace achieved based on treaties between adversaries.

55 years have passed since the signing of the Japan-Korea Treaty and 48 years since the announcement of the Japan–China Joint Communique, but the fact that the issue of reconciliation still lies before the three East Asian countries indicates the difficulty of historical reconciliation. Japan and Korea have intensified their confrontations over the issues of comfort women and forced workers, and the public sentiments in both countries are violently clashing. The top-level diplomacy between Japan and China was suspended due to prime ministerial visit to Yasukuni Shrine and the textbook issue, and the distance between the hearts of the peoples continued to grow. The reconciliation in East Asia once achieved through the treaty and the joint communique has been broken with the change of the times.

From a historian’s standpoint, Kurosawa Fumitaka listed the following five conditions for reconciliation. First, the related parties are willing to reconcile with each other. Second, they continually make efforts to maintain the reconciliation after it is reached. Third, reconciliation is a two-way issue between the parties, rather than a one-sided thing. Therefore, the spirit of modesty and tolerance is needed. Fourth, do not be absolute in one’s own thinking. Fifth, sincerely confront the past history, and truly pass on historical facts to the next generation (Ibid. pp. 12–13). Kurosawa did not rush to ask for “universal values,” but emphasized “the spirit of modesty and tolerance” and “the sincere confrontation with the past history.”

And then what kind of study is “reconciliation studies”? “Reconciliation studies” is not only to elucidate the mechanism how the history problem becomes a fetter and impedes historical reconciliation. In addition to investigating the historical reasons for the failure to achieve reconciliation, we must also present the methodologies of future-oriented reconciliation.

Here, the “reconciliation studies” that is not limited to the history problem is considered to be the broadly defined “reconciliation studies”. The “reconciliation studies” that focuses on conflicts caused by the issue of historical perception is the narrowly defined “reconciliation studies.” The contribution of historiography and historians to the narrowly defined “reconciliation studies” is to induce the overflowed history problem into the area of “historiography.”

I want to explain a little more about the broadly defined “reconciliation studies” and the narrowly defined reconciliation. Mori Kazuko argued that when people become free in concept and if possible, in substance from the three boundaries—the boundaries of nation, ethnicity, and gender—the hypothesis that “true reconciliation” exists can be formulated, and the study built on this hypothesis is “reconciliation studies.”Footnote 2

The creation of a “true reconciliation,” eliminating the three boundaries, is the widely defined “reconciliation studies.” However, when looking back the history that mankind has walked through and the issues that are happening on the earth, there is a long way to go before achieving this “true reconciliation.” In East Asia, we still need to continue our effort to foster the environment that transcends the three boundaries. Therefore, pursuing a gradual “reconciliation” is more realistic. If we see Mori’s “true reconciliation” as a “future reconciliation” and an idealistic goal, as the step before its realization, we must first aim to “reconcile from the past.”

In East Asia, since many historical and cultural assets are shared, it is difficult to notice nuanced differences and easy to have misunderstanding and conflicts. Conflicting values based on different political systems and differences in social structure are also the obstacles. In addition, there is a competitive structure in this region that prioritizes each nation’s historical view.

The above indicates that “reconciliation studies” is a field with strong “timely” and “regional” characters.

The so-called “timely” character is that “times” are different between the moment when a hostile relationship was formed and the current moment when we are trying to overcome that relationship and reconcile. We can neither recreate the time environment where the hostile relationship appeared nor pursue reconciliation in the same time environment. We must start from the recognition of the current time environment. The consequence of the progress of globalization with the movement of people, things, and information is that the world has transformed from the time centered on “national consciousness” into the time centered on ethnic consciousness, civil society consciousness, and “human rights” consciousness. There are reversals against this flow in some countries and regions, but the trend of the times has already reached a point where it cannot be turned back. Therefore, we cannot pursue the “reconciliation studies” built on “national consciousness.” The “international reconciliation” in East Asia was achieved during the Cold War because of the historical background centered on “national consciousness.” Today, the prominence of the issue of reconciliation among the people is related to the rising “human rights consciousness.” Future “reconciliation studies” should be built with “civil society” and “human rights” consciousness.

Meanwhile, the so-called “regional character” means that different countries and regions face different challenges in their own historical contexts when working toward reconciliation. The process of pursuing reconciliation is also a process of psychologically evolving oneself. What are the barriers that Japan, China, and Korea must overcome respectively? For the Japanese, the questions of how to protect the goal of “independence and self-respect” made since the modern age and how to build a “beautiful country” are vital when considering reconciliation with other countries. On the other hand, for the Chinese and Korean, the issue is how to face the “victim mentality” and “national justice and dignity.” Especially for China, it is impossible to “reconcile” with foreign countries without examining the relationship between “law” and “justice,” between ethnic diversity and the “unified state.” In conclusion, “reconciliation studies” must be based on knowledge accumulated in area studies.

“Reconciliation studies” discussed in this article refers to the “narrowly defined reconciliation studies.” Here I would like to limit the target region of the “narrowly defined reconciliation studies” to East Asia. In East Asia (Japan, South Korea, North Korea, Mainland China, and Taiwan), affected by diverse political systems and values and unstable interpretations of history, unfortunate historical events that were thought to have been resolved are sometimes unearthed as “unresolved historical issues” and impact on political and diplomatic relations in this region. When regaining our calmness after the impacts, we find that we cannot even reach agreements on the perceptions of many historical facts themselves. Especially since the 1980s, the disputes over historical interpretations have constantly occurred among Japan, China, and South Korea. The characteristic of the disputes in this region is that diplomatic problems are often structurally connected with “history,” frequently provoking conflicts in public sentiments. Based on the above facts, when constructing “reconciliation studies,” we need to first explore the academic knowledge that contributes to historical reconciliation in East Asia. And if we need to give a tentative definition of such “reconciliation studies,” it should be a “policy science” that seeks to end “historical conflicts,” sustain peace among nations and within domestic societies, prevent further conflicts, and find the “peace of mind.”

Now I want to summarize the purposes of such “reconciliation studies” as the following four points. First, to find how to reduce the confrontation made in history and how to put the relations between nations on the track to peace, stability, and cooperation. Second, to provide a pathway to ensure that commitments are met and the state of reconciliation is sustained between nations and between nations and individuals. Third, to propose the methods of avoiding new conflicts, so that the “history problem” does not cause new tension. And fourth, the state and society provide an environment that reflects on the past of victimization and perpetration at the individual level and achieve the “peace of mind.”

3 “Doing History” and the Contribution to SDGs

For the humanities and social sciences contributing to SDGs, a variety of traditional disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, history, political science, sociology, and economics must be mobilized in an interdisciplinary manner. Since the incentive for conflicts between nations and peoples is “history” itself, the role of historiography is important. The contribution of historiography to SDGs not only includes historical studies based on historical methods, but also means to bring “history” back from politics to the realm of historiography and “manage” (research) it, which is essential. This work cannot be accomplished in one country, but requires dialogue and collaboration among historians from different countries. Through dialogue and collaboration, if a common space of knowledge can be created, it will function as a platform for reconciliation. The method of building this knowledge platform shaped by historians will also contribute to SDGs. In other words, the three methodologies—historical methods, separating history and politics, and building historians’ communities—are the issues of historiography that can contribute to SDGs. The process of exploring the three methodologies itself is the process by which historiography, along with other disciplines, makes contributions to SDGs. This article will describe this process as “doing history.” (Osawa 2019).Footnote 3

3.1 Exploring the Methods of the New Historiography

An overview of the process of exploring the three methodologies will be as follows. The first is the search for new methods of historiography.

Originally historiography is the study of exploring the past facts. However, as soon as the orthodox historiography crosses national borders and begins dialogue with historiography in foreign countries, it has to face two difficulties. The first is the difference in how to capture the past “facts.” Each country in East Asia has developed its self-centered sense of history through its own “national history” research and history education. In the case of Japan and China, what caused the Marco Polo Bridge Incident as the starting point of the Sino-Japanese War? What is the number of victims in the Nanjing Massacre? The facts of these incidents are still unsettled since there are no definitive historical records. However, China’s official view is that the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was made by the Japanese army, and the number of victims in the Nanjing Massacre is 300,000. For Chinese historians, even if they may not agree with this official view, it is important for them to have the “basic recognition” that the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was a key step in Japan’s aggression of China and that many Chinese were killed in the Nanjing Incident. For Japanese historians, objective and scientific historical records themselves are of decisive significance, and it is the finding of more accurate facts about the past that is considered to be true historiography. In addition, “in Japanese society, China’s pressure for approving the official historical view is seen as an act of power to suppress the scientific attitude aiming to search for truth.” (Kobayashi and Nakanishi 2010, p. 298).

That is to say, what China requests from Japan is the sharing of “recognition.” In contrast, what Japan demands is the empirical, “scientific” stance. In the current uncompromising situation, a direction showed by some Japanese historians is to “to go beyond the traditional rigid framework of ‘shared recognition’ and ‘positive science’ and to create a history combining both positivism and large interpretive frameworks as a joint academic act shared by Japan and China.”Footnote 4 However, the problem is that to what extent such a compromise plan can be achieved. The legitimacy of the Communist Party’s one-party dictatorship is demanded by history. In such a situation, as the Japanese side clearly recognizes, China “needs to modify its traditional culture that seeks historical justification of political legitimacy and create an open culture.”Footnote 5 In this sense, the process of creating “reconciliation,” as the precondition of SDGs, is also a process of creating the “open culture.”

We need solid efforts. The first step is to share historical materials. Many facts cannot be clarified with historical materials of one country alone, so the active use of historical materials in other countries is essential. One of the reasons for the historical disputes between Japan and China is that historical truth is not sharable. The sharing of historical truth must be based on the sharing of historical materials. However, hindered by the policies of historical materials (archives) management, sharing historical materials is difficult. Based on the limited conditions, seeking the sharing of historical materials and truth is the first condition for “doing history.”

The second difficulty that historical dialogue faces is the problem of “emotional memory.” “Historical perception” in each country can be divided into a “people’s history” intruded by “emotional memory” and an “academic history” based on objective, scientific historical records. Of course, as I said before, in the “academic history,” there is a difference between the emphasis on “positivism” (Japan) and the prioritization of “large interpretive frameworks” (China), and the compromise between them itself is a big issue. This issue can only be resolved through dialogue and joint research by historians. Needless to say, the “people’s history” that contains much “emotional memory” has a more complex structure than the “intellectual history.”

The constituting elements of each country’s “people’s history” do not need to be the same. Using China’s case, they can be classified as follows: the “family historical narrative” told in family since childhood, the “societal historical heritage” widely conveyed among people in general, the “people’s historical memory” widely penetrated in school education and other situations, and the “national historical view” that secures the regime legitimacy.

The first layer of China’s “national history” is the “family historical narrative.” Many people have been taught “family history” by grandparents and parents since childhood. For example, for the “postwar generation” who were born during the 1950s and 1960s, the starting point of the education of the “War of Resistance history” they received was the family history told by their grandparents and parents. The family historical narrative is connected with the historical narrative inherited in society and the historical memory that unifies the people, shaping the form of historical perception.

The ruling power of the dominant “national historical view” varies in strength as times change. On the one hand, when its ruling power is weak, other constituting elements of the “people’s history” are in a state of “a hundred flowers blossoming,” and the distance between “academic historical studies” and politics is maintained, showing a flourishing phenomenon of “a hundred schools contending.” On the other hand, when the dominance of the “national historical view” becomes strong, other components of the “people’s history” decline, and “academic historical studies” fall silent.

Although we understand that there must be a line between “academic historical studies” and “people’s history” that is intruded by “emotional memory,” in recent years, “understanding people’s emotion in the historical past” has been entering the scope of historical studies (Frevert 2018, p. 213). Until quite recently, Ute Frevert pointed out that Japanese scholars did not give attention to the topic of historicizing emotion (Ibid., p. 7) However, we should not forget that 20 years ago, Japanese and Chinese scholars had a heated discussion on emotional memory. In the discussion on the “knowledge community” held by Japanese and Chinese scholars, Sun Ge, a Chinese scholar, raised the issue of “emotional memory” related to the Sino-Japanese War. The issue posed by Sun Ge is the meaning of sticking to historical documents regarding the situation of damage including the number of victims of the Nanjing Massacre, for which accurate statistics are almost impossible to obtain. Sun Ge asked, when historical studies is satisfied with the investigation of historical documents but completely ignores, or eventually turns hostile to people’s emotional memory, where does its “absolute legitimacy” come from? (Sun 2000, p. 167). The problem here is about “historical materials” and “memory” in historiography. According to Sun Ge, the posture that sticks to the number of victims in the Nanjing Massacre is the basic academic principle that emphasizes so-called “objective truthfulness.” The opposite side of this principle is the “emotion of live human beings.” However, in the pursuit of “objective truthfulness,” we have lost emotional memory. As a result, it takes the tension and complexity out of history and turns historiography into a dead knowledge that can be replaced by statistics.

Regarding the danger of the “dead knowledge” argued by Sun Ge, Mizoguchi Yuzu from Japan discussed in the following way. “In dead historiography, only historical materials that are preserved in some forms are counted as historical materials. The reality that is moving in tandem with the facts in historical materials—let alone emotional memory—is excluded from historical materials. One’s own ‘conscientious’ attitude in science that is overly concerned with 300,000 as a number not only erases emotional memory from history, but also becomes an act of complicity in the de-historicization of the incident.” (Mizoguchi 2000, p. 128) The “act of complicity” mentioned here is an expression adopted with the intention of using the ambiguity of the complex political figure of “300,000,” “fictionalizing” the Nanjing Massacre, and further fabricating the “aggression” of China. Mizoguchi Yuzu emphasized the method of historicizing the Nanjing Massacre and the importance of “live historiography.” That is to say,

“In live historiography, the presence of emotional memory is accepted as the present tense of history. We realize that the complexity of the Nanjing Massacre lies not only in the historical facts about the past, but also in the multilayered nature of the structure where emotional memory exists ‘to the present day.’ We realize how to historicize the duet of emotional memory and historical facts, and how to historicize the Nanjing Massacre.” (Mizoguchi 2000).

Sun Ge also pointed out the problem of Chinese intellectuals regarding emotional memory. Emotional memory must be transformed into thought resources for the Chinese people, rather than “victims’ anger.” By doing so, for the first time, the unfortunate history of Japan and China will be emancipated from being “China’s thing” and “Japan’s thing,” and will become “the world history shared of us and other nations.” (Sun 2000, p. 170).

This dialogue between Japan and China was the first attempt by Chinese intellectuals to confront the weakness of their historical perception with the keyword “emotional memory.” What we should not forget here is that “emotional memory” is often disseminated in society mixed with ex-post “emotions” and established in the form of collective memory without verification by historiography. The “ambiguity” of memory should not be incorporated into historiography. When historians “historicize” these “emotional memories” based on the procedures of historiography, “doing history” and contributing to “reconciliation studies” make them function as tools for reconciliation, rather than creating new sources of conflict.

3.2 Excluding “Politics” that Invades the Realm of “History”

The second methodology that should be explored by historiography to contribute to SDGs is how to exclude “politics” that invades the realm of “history.” It is a recurring phenomenon that political and diplomatic issues are connected with “history,” and “history” is used as a catalyst to amplify conflicts. Needless to say, the present is an extension of the past. However, each political and diplomatic issue has its direct causes and historical and social background. It is the work of bureaucrats and politicians to investigate the direct causes and find out the ways to compromise and resolve the issues. It is scholars’ responsibility to provide academic interpretations of the historical and social background. Scholars’ interpretations can provide references for bureaucrats and politicians to make value judgements and policy decisions. However, when bureaucrats and politicians take away the right of interpretation from scholars to strengthen their own positions, it not only violates academic independence, but also complicates the issues and leads to the amplification of conflict and hate. Protecting “history” as an academic discipline from politics/diplomacy and bringing back “history” from politics/diplomacy is a way of “doing history.” In other words, historians, depending on situations, must draw a clear boundary line between “history” and politics/diplomacy. In the environment where these boundary lines are protected, historians may engage in dialogue between the present and the past, and through “historicizing” not only the “past” but also “emotion” and “memory,” create the wisdom necessary for “reconciliation studies.”

However, it is not easy to draw such a boundary line between “politics” and “history.” Especially in China where the political system and cultural traditions are different from those of Japan, it is extremely difficult for historians to gain academic independence. The state-dominant historical view, determined by politics, is extremely unstable. Therefore, a crucial step in drawing the boundary line is to seek and establish an academic historical view that is independent from the national historical view, while maintaining the strained relations with politics and public opinion.

Since 1949, historical interpretations have been frequently revised based on the Party-state’s political judgements. The right of historical interpretation is controlled by the regime, rather than intellectuals (historians) who lead the academic community.

Since the 1980s, China’s “national historical view” has been repainted many times. At the beginning of the shift from the politics centered on class struggle to the modernization routine, the previously dominant “revolutionary historical view” was relativized, and the “modernization historical view” was introduced into the field of education. The assessment of the Self-Strengthening Movement and the “Westernization Group” was significantly changed. The “reform and opening up” in the modern history, called “Western affairs,” was reevaluated as a phenomenon that contributed to China’s modernization. In the 1980s, sending students to study overseas also became regularized. The Chinese young people who studied in Japan all expressed strong interest in Japan’s modernization since the Meiji Restoration. In the previous world history education, modern Japanese history was narrated as a history of “militarization,” but since the 1980s, the policies that led to Japan’s modernization had gained increased attention.

However, the change in the national historical view is limited. Since abandoning the revolutionary historical view means denying the regime legitimacy, no decisive change takes place in the national historical view, the “revolutionary historical view.”

In contrast, the “civilization historical view” and the “Republican historical review” were on the rise among historians. The Boxer Rebellion, previously regarded as an anti-imperialist revolutionary movement, was interpreted as an anti-civilization and anti-humanity riot. The “Republican era,” from 1912 to 1949, was separated from the revolutionary history and portrayed as the main axis of modern Chinese history. Consequentially, the “Republican fever” emerged, and the legitimacy of the Communist Party that overthrew the Republic of China (ROC) was questioned. The diversification of historical views significantly influenced the Chinese people’s perception of the present situation. If the Communist Party-centered history is transformed into the ROC-centered history, the narratives of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1949 will also be changed. The Chinese leadership that places top priority on regime stability cannot afford to overlook this situation. The revival of the revolution-centered historical view is unavoidable. However, the complete return to the historical view of the Maoist era is outdated. Therefore, the officialdom must seek the possibility of historical interpretations according to China’s traditional views of the state, the world, and values.

In this way, 40 years after the modernization historical view started to be used to understand history, today’s China is once again dominated by the “revolutionary historical view” mixed with “traditional historical view.” During the 40 years, although Chinese historians have tried to rebuild historical views to engage in global dialogue, the return of the revolutionary historical view shows the instability of China’s historical interpretations. It also indicates the difficulty of clarifying the boundary line between history and politics. However, with the expansion of intellectuals’ influence and the popularization of the internet, the “free air” fostered mainly by intellectuals has begun to permeate Chinese society. There is a growing desire among the people to interpret history according to the real picture of the past. We should pay attention to how the national historical view and academic historical view, which maintain a strained relationship, will be affected.

In any case, to establish “reconciliation studies,” we must first aim to build the academic history. As can be seen from what I said earlier, it is difficult to build such a historical view within one country, and the construction the knowledge community in East Asia is much needed. The prerequisite for historical reconciliation in East Asia is the independence of academic studies and the stability of historical views. To create such a situation, it is extremely meaningful for intellectuals to have conversations and construct knowledge networks and knowledge platforms.

3.3 The Construction of the Historians’ Community

The third methodology that historiography can contribute to SDGs is the method of constructing a historians’ community. To construct this community, the four processes—dialogue, understanding, compromise, and construction—are required. The difficult process among them is perhaps the first, “dialogue”. This is an age in which historians are expected to become conversational researchers.

For more than two decades, the dialogue on the “issue of historical perception” between the three East Asian countries produced various outcomes. Among the historical dialogue between Japan and China, the most notable one was the joint research conducted from 2006 to 2008. When Prime Minster Abe visited China in October 2006, the Japanese and Chinese leaders agreed to launch the joint history research program by experts from both countries within the year. From December 2006 to December 2008, a total of four plenary sessions were held. In January 2010, the papers in their original languages were presented by the committee members from both countries. And in September 2010, the translated papers were presented. This was the first attempt in the history of Sino-Japanese relations, and its meaning was significant.

The “dialogue” between academicians from different countries can be understood at two levels. The first is that scholars directly exchange opinions and conduct joint research by using venues such as workshops and conferences. The second is to use research outcomes as media to continuously engage in indirect dialogue with other parties. Although the number of times of the Japan–China joint research is small, the direct dialogue between historical researchers made great progress. In recent years, such dialogue has taken various forms, deepened mutual understanding, and increased the possibility of compromise.

However, as can be seen from the research report on the modern history part of the joint research, on the one hand, the Japanese side completed the research with little reference to the research outcomes and historical materials of the Chinese side. On the other hand, China’s research report used a great number of historical materials and research outcomes provided by the Japanese side. In other words, although various differences exist in the historical interpretations of the two countries, the study of the modern history of Sino-Japanese relations heavily relies on Japan’s historical materials and existing literature. In such a situation, it is not easy to let Japanese scholars recognize the necessity of having dialogue with China’s research outcomes. The Chinese side uses Japan’s historical materials when necessary, but the dialogue with historical materials does not always make sufficient progress.

One of the missions of historiography to contribute to reconciliation, which is essential for the SDGs, is to build the “knowledge community” among scholars across national borders. To build such a community, in the “joint research,” it is important to increase the communication among researchers who work on national histories and so far have little dialogue with each other, and to train researchers who can have dialogue on each other’s historical materials and research outcomes.

In the 1990s, Japanese universities changed the name of the “national history” discipline to “Japanese history,” in response to the internationalization of universities. The following passage from the introduction article of the Japanese history major at Kyoto University indicates the changes in Japan’s “national history” education.

Japanese history is an academic field that seeks to clarify the society and culture as a whole that was born in the Japanese archipelago and has changed over time… Of course, the Japanese history major has accepted many international students, and Japanese history is a foreign history for them, so we do not only study ‘Japanese history for the Japanese people.’ In addition, Japanese society and culture do not exist in isolation. Its relationship with the Eastern and Western regions is also an important research topic. Considering such things, we would like you to rethink the meaning of studying Japanese history at Japanese universities.

However, at about the same time when “national history” was changed to “Japanese history” in Japan, China established the Institute of Contemporary China Studies in 1990 and began to compile The History of the People’s Republic of China and publish historical materials. In line with it, the concept of “national history” became more often used. This move was in contrast to Japan which stopped using “national history.” Certainly, in China, “national history” is sometimes used to emphasize its difference from “the Party’s history.” On the other hand, “history” textbooks were made by integrating “Chinese history” and “world history” and used in education. It is necessary to examine the possibility of writing a common “history” for East Asia while searching for the knowledge community.

In recent years, with the internationalization of universities, the dialogue between “national history” and “world history” in our own countries seems to have made great progress. This is also the result of accepting a large number of international students and preparing an education guidance system for them. Recently we have frequently heard the expressions such as “Japan in the world” and “China in the world”. However, Japanese studies in China is still developing, and few Chinese scholars who study “national history” can conduct dialogue with Japanese “national history.” “National history” scholars on both sides are in dialogue through translated historical materials and research outcomes. The dialogue is extremely insufficient to construct the community.

To make the dialogue on “national history” more substantial, it is important to promote exchanges among current researchers and, in the meantime, to prepare an environment in which a full-fledged dialogue on national history can take place in 10 or 20 years. As the number of international students is increasing, researchers on both sides should create a cooperative environment, and train Chinese history scholars who are familiar with Japanese language and culture and Japanese history scholars who know the languages and social cultures of China and other Asian countries well. Meanwhile, we must strengthen the cooperative environment for the development of Japanese studies in China.

One of the legacies left by the dialogue of the “knowledge community” held 20 years ago is that the Chinese participants demonstrated their position of “public intellectuals” independent from politics and the state to the Japanese side. In recent years, China’s “public intellectuals” (usually abbreviated to “gongzhi”) have become a well-established concept with the nuances of being intellectuals “outside the system.” For more than two decades now, they have been known as a force that strongly advocates China’s institutional change and cultural reconstruction. 20 years ago, Mizogochi Yuzu captured this trend and explained as follows:

“Through the movement of the knowledge community, we got to know the existence of China’s critical intellectuals. However, unfortunately many Japanese scholars who study China are too fragmented in their specialties and lack the conditions to understand such intellectuals’ activities. Rather, especially since Tiananmen, many people have limited their vision of China based on stereotypical perception frameworks to make sweeping generalizations, such as institutional oppression and a lack of democracy and freedom. As learned from the movement of the knowledge community, the reality is that in today’s China, and within the system, they are creating their own democratic space while collaborating with the system, resisting it, and sometimes slipping through cracks (Mizoguchi et al. 2005, p. 562).

Mizogochi’s explanation implied the possibility of the East Asian intellectual (historians’) community. Furthermore, he came to the assessment that the basic conditions for this community were being created. In the dialogue on the “knowledge community,” China’s critical intellectuals (public intellectuals) communicated with intellectuals from Japan and South Korea where academic and speech freedom is institutionally guaranteed. It was successful enough to inspire participants to embrace the dream of the knowledge community. In the dialogue, the discussion over the issue of war responsibility unfolded. As the Chinese side reflected, “Chinese intellectuals have remained largely unaware of Japanese intellectuals’ reflection on the historical responsibility of the war and the price paid for assuming the responsibility for no more war. The capacity to notice it was lacking.” (Sun 2000, p. 159) Once again, the Chinese side became aware of the responsibility for the “fully hostile” image of Japan existing among the Chinese people. Both sides treated the progress of thinking about the issue as a measuring stick for whether or not real dialogue between Chinese and Japanese intellectuals could be held.

However, after 20 years, we are still searching for the historians’ community in East Asia. The political and academic environment for Chinese intellectuals has become much less free compared to 20 years ago. The psychological distance and differences in research perspectives between Japanese and Chinese historians, which was once close, seem to have widened again. The participants in the dialogue 20 years ago optimistically underestimated the impact of the differences in political systems and social conditions on the formation of the knowledge community. It is not easy for nations with different systems to construct the knowledge community. Reconciliation between peoples without the knowledge community is hard. If “reconciliation studies” is a field that also covers the methods of reconciliation between nations with different systems, it must begin with how to build a common space of knowledge and historians’ community under the conditions of different systems. Therefore, historical dialogue and building historians’ community between nations with significant differences is the process of “doing history” and constructing “reconciliation studies.”

4 The Three Stages and Research Topics of Historical Reconciliation

4.1 The Stagnation of “Intellectual Reconciliation” as the Catalyst

When looking back the postwar Sino-Japanese reconciliation, it is worth noting that there were three stages. The first stage was inter-governmental reconciliation. After the war, while considering the balance with domestic politics, the Japanese government sought a path of national reconciliation to break away from the shackles of the history of war and colonial rule. In 1952, Japan and the ROC government in Taiwan signed the Treaty of Peace. It pointed out “any problem arising between the Republic of China and Japan as a result of the existence of a state of war shall be settled,” but did not mention the issue of war responsibility and only announced the end of the state of war. The Korea-Japan Treaty signed in 1965 also did not express remorse for the colonial rule.

Regarding Sino-Japanese relations, initially, one of the reasons that Japan made peace and established diplomatic relations with the ROC in Taiwan, rather than the PRC on the mainland, was its wariness and dislike of the socialist political system. However, when Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei visited China in 1972, he claimed that socialism is not a monolith, and “the Japanese people have gradually learned that the Chinese Communist Party is socialist, but it does not invade.” (Takeuchi 1993, p. 227) And he decided to normalize Japan’s relations with the PRC. For the Japanese people at that time, China was regarded as a neighboring country that was deeply connected to Japan historically and culturally, rather than a “socialist” country. In addition, the presence of the Soviet Union, a powerful communist state, also diluted China’s communist image. Above all, since China and the Soviet Union were fiercely hostile to each other back then, for Japan which had the Northern Territories issue with the Soviet Union, China was a partner having the common enemy. The historical ties played a role in the diplomatic normalization between Japan and China, but strategic thinking on both sides also worked. Certainly, it cannot be denied that the rapid proximity between the US and China, symbolized by President Nixon’s visit to China, backed the Sino-Japanese diplomatic normalization.

In the sense, the Japan–China Joint Communique released in September 1972 included the following expression: “Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.” China also declared that “in the interest of the friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, it renounces its demand for war reparation from Japan.” Therefore, the two countries did not stop at the legal reconciliation, but had the intention to reach the psychological and emotional reconciliation between the peoples. For a time, there was a widespread sense of relief that the Sino-Japanese historical reconciliation was achieved with the Joint Communique and the diplomatic normalization. However, as the history until today shows, the Joint Communique was only the beginning of a reconciliation process with no end in sight.

The second stage was the reconciliation at the people’s level. In the era when people were forced to worship and obey the first generation of the revolution, such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the intention of the government-led strategic reconciliation spread to the people’s level in a top-down fashion. During the 1970s and 1980s, Japan and China entered an unprecedented honeymoon period. At that time, even the first history textbook issue in 1982 and Prime Minister Nakasone’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine in 1985 could not stop the warm current of Sino-Japanese reconciliation that permeated the societies. According to the Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy released by the Prime Minister’s Office on March 15, 1987, when asked which of the four countries—the US, the Soviet Union, China, and South Korea—they felt closest to, most Japanese respondents chose China (68.6%). It was followed by the US (67.5%), South Korea (39.7%), and the Soviet Union (8.9%). What many Japanese who felt close to China had in common was the sense of historical and cultural closeness and the sense of redemption as the perpetrator of the war. In addition, the Japanese who agreed to support China’s modernization policy had the expectation that if China became modernized, the gap of values between these two countries would be narrowed.

However, the problems that existed between Japan and China would not go away because of the diplomatic normalization and the subsequent tentative people’s reconciliation. Although the difference between the two countries in the interpretations of the modern and contemporary history came to the surface, the perception gap was concealed by the sophisticated political decision of Mao and Zhou. In particular, the Senkaku Islands issue, which could set back the negotiations on the diplomatic normalization, was shelved. In the negotiation process, there was almost no space for “intellectuals” (researchers) to intervene. The leaders of both countries showed no interest in shaping a consensus supported by academic knowledge.

Nevertheless, the three East Asian countries pushed forward with the process of historical reconciliation. In October 1998, President Kim Dae-jung officially visited Japan as a State Guest. As a result of the meeting with Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo, the two leaders agreed “to raise to a higher dimension the close, friendly and cooperative relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea which have been built since the normalization of their relations in 1965 so as to build a new Japan-Republic of Korea partnership towards the twenty-first century.” In the Joint Declaration, Prime Minister Obuchi “regarded in a spirit of humility the fact of history that Japan caused, during a certain period in the past, tremendous damage and suffering to the people of the Republic of Korea through its colonial rule, and expressed his deep remorse and heartfelt apology for this fact.” In response to it, President Kim “accepted with sincerity this statement of Prime Minister Obuchi's recognition of history and expressed his appreciation for it. He also expressed his view that the present calls upon both countries to overcome their unfortunate history and to build a future-oriented relationship based on reconciliation as well as good-neighborly and friendly cooperation.”Footnote 6

In November of the same year, President Jiang Zemin visited Japan as a State Guest. Japan and China released the Japan–China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development, and tried to settle the history problem in accordance with the Japan-South Korea Joint Declaration. The Japan–China Joint Declaration stated, “Japan and China share a history of friendly exchanges spanning more than 2000 years, as well as a common cultural background, and that it is the common desire of the peoples of the two countries to continue this tradition of friendship and to further develop mutually beneficial cooperation.” (Kazankai 2008, p. 457).

Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro also tried to put an end to the history problem in Sino-Japanese relations with his own logic. Koizumi, who called himself an “advocate for Japan–China friendship,” visited Yasukuni Shrine six times in total, every year during his tenure. After the first, in October 2001, Koizumi made a one-day trip to China and visited the Museum of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression near the Marco Polo Bridge in the suburb of Beijing. Koizumi expressed his “heartfelt apology and condolences” to Chinese victims and told the Chinese side that his visit to Yasukuni Shrine was not intended to glorify the history of the war of aggression. He attempted to create a new pattern of Sino-Japanese relations that separated diplomacy and history. However, the Chinese side suspended the summit diplomacy and opposed Koizumi. Sino-Japanese relations continued to be in a period of “cold politics and hot economy.”

What can be seen from the process of the establishment and upheaval of the intergovernmental reconciliation and the people-to-people reconciliation is that, without the functioning of the medium of “intellectual reconciliation,” the air of reconciliation diffused vaguely against the backdrop of China’s fast modernization. The prerequisite for sustaining the people-to-people reconciliation is to provide objective research and clear interpretations of history, but without sharing such research outcomes, the two countries put much effort into producing a friendly mood. Now we realize that the problem between Japan and China has been covered by short-term strategic requests and the prevailing atmosphere of Sino-Japanese friendship among the people, but the “shared knowledge” that is essential for stabilizing the relationship has yet to be established. The government-led joint history research mentioned before was one attempt to pursue the “shared knowledge”. The joint research has been promoted and the results have been made public between Japan and Korea since 2002, and between Japan and China since 2006. Although the two joint research programs were significant events for historical reconciliation of East Asia, it is regrettable that their impacts have not reached the people’s level of reconciliation.

In other words, the third stage of Sino-Japanese reconciliation, “intellectual reconciliation,” has yet to really begin.

4.2 The Specific Content of the Third Stage

If the third stage of historical reconciliation is “intellectual reconciliation,” the establishment of “reconciliation studies” is essential. The three methodologies of historiography contributing to “reconciliation studies” were discussed as before. Now it is necessary to sort out the “history problem” that should be researched based on the three methodologies.

Here we can divide the so-called “history problem” into three groups. The first group is the issues left by the war that are waiting to be resolved. In China, they are called “unresolved historical issues.” Specifically, it includes the abandoned chemical weapons issue, the comfort women issue, the former civilian workers issue, the forced immigration issue, and the issue of Japanese left behind in China.

To deal with the abandoned chemical weapons issue, the Prime Minister’s Office (now the Cabinet Office) established the Abandoned Chemical Weapons Office in April 1999. China also established the Abandoned Chemical Weapons Office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defense as a cooperative organization. However, due to the limitation of historical materials and political-diplomatic reasons, there has not been enough research on this issue from a historical perspective.

The second group is the problems that arise from the difference between historical facts and historical interpretations. The representative ones include the issue of Japan’s colonial rule in Korea and Taiwan, the authenticity of the Tanaka Memorial, the Fifteen-Year War theory, the causes of the Sino-Japanese War, the number of victims of the Nanjing Massacre, and the reality and historical assessment of the regimes of occupation. There is a wide gap between Japanese and Chinese historians over the interpretations of these facts of the past. Sometimes the issues of historical interpretations are turned into political issues, directly affecting the relationship between the two countries.

For example, many issues have yet to be elucidated regarding the regimes of occupation. In the 1930s, many regimes of occupations, backed by Japan’s military power, were established in China. While China calls these regimes as “false regimes,” Japanese historians strongly maintain that historical studies should exclude subjective value judgements and elucidate the complex multifaceted nature of the regimes of occupation, and this is the mission of historiography. We should be prepared for a long road ahead in the dialogue in East Asia on historical interpretations.

The third problem is the integration of history and political/diplomatic issues, such as the issues of the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima, the issue of prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and the textbook issue. Although these issues have both historical and political/diplomatic sides, it is the responsibility for academic history to exclude political forces and study these issues in an academic way. It is expected that research outcomes will be used to provide an academic basis for reconciliation.

5 “Reconciliation Studies” and “Neo-new Historiography” that Contribute to SDGs

As discussed in this article, historiography must provide the three methodologies for “reconciliation studies” seeking reconciliation between nations and peoples and the formation of global partnership. The methodologies are new historical methods, the method of separating history and politics, and the method of constructing the historians’ community. These methodologies required for historiography are also responsive to the changing time environment surrounding historiography.

In recent years, the popularization of historiography, accompanying the digitalization of historical documents and the expansion of material opening via the internet, has attracted much attention. Besides historical researchers and experts, former “consumers” historiography have become “producers,” who use readily available documents and promote them on the internet to influence historians and public opinion. The scope of historiography and the perspective from which history is perceived have broadened, contributing greatly to the development of our studies. Meanwhile, discourses that do not follow source criticism as the procedures of historiography spread widely, making the work of verifying the truth about the past more difficult.

In addition, the diversification of historical materials is developing rapidly. With the addition of subjective emotional memory to historiography, for which objective materials should have decisive meaning, the way history is written is beginning to change. History, which has been portrayed using the state and society as the starting point, like the “history of emotion,” started from a concern for the “individual” and set up themes such as how human emotions cast their shadows on the times. In recent years, an enormous amount of oral history has been accumulated. The “history” told by individuals, which cannot be found in so-called “objective materials,” is uncovering the multiple aspects and depth of the facts about the past. Especially in countries where academic freedom is restricted, it is not uncommon for oral history to be even closer to the truth than “objective materials.”

In addition, the effectiveness of global history has been recognized by many people. Akira Iriye emphasizes that the pursuit of memories and identities across national borders, shared memories, shared pasts, and shared transnational identities is an issue related to the way of life of modern people living in the age of globalization, which means “a culturally interrelated world.” According to him, the shared identity of the three East Asian countries must be based on the shared understanding of the past, including “Japanese imperialism and its aggression, as well as the resistance against (or the cooperation with) Japan in China and Korea.” (Hosoya et al. 2004, pp. 424–425).

However, the formation of a regionally shared memory and identity is a difficult process. Therefore, “specific domestic groups share their memories with similar groups in other countries, forming transnational collective memories. Even though such transnational collective memories compete with each other, a global public memory is likely to be shaped.” (Ibid., p. 409).

In other words, today’s historiography is encountering drastic changes in the age of “popularization,” “diversification,” and “globalization.” Historiography that cannot respond to such changes obviously cannot contribute to “reconciliation studies,” and the vitality of historiography itself will decline.

6 Concluding Remarks

120 years ago, in 1902, Liang Qichao, a Chinese thinker, called for a revolution against the 2000 years of dynasty-centered way of historical writings and advocated a “new historiography.” (Liang 2008).

According to Liang Qichao, among the various disciplines commonly used in the West today, China’s only unique thing is historiography. Historiography is the greatest and most important of all studies. It is the model for the people and the source of patriotism. Historiography brought about the development of nationalism and the continuous progress of civilization in European countries.

However, what were the reasons that the merits of historiography failed to disseminate to the people? Liang Qichao pointed out four pathogens, such as “knowing dynasties but not nations,” “knowing individuals but not groups.” To eliminate these pathogens, Liang Qichao called for the “historiographical revolution.”

Since then, the Xinhai Revolution, the Republican era, and the PRC era have been recorded by the “new historiography,” which treats China’s “nation” and “groups” (society) as the subjects. “Patriotism” has become the central topic of historiography. In the nation-centered historical writings, the differences and conflicts with other nations are emphasized. In the society-centered historical writings, the emotions and experiences of unnamed individuals are eliminated. The highlight of “patriotism” has made reconciliation with enemy states difficult. Using Liang Qichao’s style, historiography tainted by patriotism is “knowing the nation but not the world,” “knowing groups but not individuals.” In the age of globalization when people around the world must work together to deal with common challenges, global histories with the intention to create “global citizens” are essential. Therefore, reviewing the “new historiography” advocated by Liang Qichao and creating a “neo-new historiography” that is compatible with the age of globalization and can contribute to “reconciliation studies” and the sustainable global partnership should not be a task for China alone.

The attempt to construct a global history in dialogue is an effort to break the feeling of entrapment of historiography. Meanwhile, the “neo-new historiography” contributing to “reconciliation studies” and SDGs is a future-oriented historiography that fuses people’s history and academic history, balances positivist historiography and macroscopic historiography, mutually confirms emotional memory and objective historical materials, and excludes political forces from intervening in academic studies. Obviously, such a historiography will be co-created by historians around the world.