Japan’s Relationship with Portuguese-Speaking Africa: Considering the Future of Brazil–Japan Cooperation

Abstract

Japan and Brazil have built a partnership not only in bilateral and multilateral framework but also in triangular cooperation. In recent years, the term FOIP (Free and Open Indo–Pacific) has been used as the philosophy of Japanese diplomacy. FOIP vision means to achieve peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and African region. Brazil itself is not a direct region for FOIP. But considering the African region is included in FOIP, and for Brazil, Africa is a continent historically and strategically important, Japan’s diplomatic concept, FOIP is not irrelevant to Brazil. To think about the future of Japan–Brazil relations, it is necessary to consider Japan’s African diplomacy in the era of FOIP in order to compare it with Brazil’s African diplomacy. In this article we will especially focus on the Portuguese-speaking African countries. The structure of the article is as follows. First, regarding Japan’s diplomacy with Africa, the philosophy and achievements of TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development) started under the initiative of Japanese government since 1993 will be explained. In considering the future cooperation between Japan and Brazil in Africa, it is also necessary to understand Brazil’s African diplomacy. To that ends, the second part of the article will be the Brazilian diplomatic relations with Africa from the postwar period to the present day. In contrast to the active relations with Africa during the Lula governments, some major setbacks can be seen in the current Bolsonaro administration’s diplomatic relations with Africa. After the characteristics of Japan and Brazil’s diplomacy with Africa have been clarified, in the third part of this article, we will inquire the possibility of further cooperation of Japan and Brazil while looking back on the history and achievements of triangular cooperation between Japan–Brazil, and African countries, especially Mozambique. And we will put some comments as a concluding remark.

1 Introduction

“Brazil is an important partner of Japan” is a phrase that Japan often uses about its relationship with Brazil. The Cerrado project in the 1970s, the ProSavana project (agricultural development cooperation by Japan, Brazil, and Mozambique), and the United Nations Security Council Reform proposed by Japan, Brazil, India, and Germany (G4) are examples, respectively, of bilateral cooperation, triangular cooperation, and multilateral cooperation (or cooperation about the global agenda) involving both countries. Japan has partnered with Brazil at various levels for a long time.

Currently, Japan puts the Free and Open Indo–Pacific (FOIP) concept at the center of diplomacy. The FOIP aims to achieve peace, stability, and prosperity by regarding the Indian and Pacific Oceans as essential for the stability and prosperity of the international community and the two continents facing them, Asia and Africa, as “free and open” as international public goods. Japan is looking to expand cooperation with countries worldwide, including Brazil, to support Japan’s vision.

Countries on the African continent facing the Indian Ocean are also covered by the FOIP initiative, especially Mozambique, where Japan and Brazil cooperated in triangular cooperation to date. Portuguese-speaking Africa (PALOP, in Portuguese, African Countries of Portuguese Official Language)—Mozambique, Angola, Cabo Verde, Guiné-Bissau e São Tomé and Príncipe—is Brazil’s partner in South–South cooperation. According to the Brazilian International Cooperation Agency (ABC, in Portuguese, Agência Brasileira de Cooperação), from 1989 to 2019, the total number of Brazilian technical cooperation projects to PALOP (and Timor-Leste) was 571 cases, totaling $52.8 million. The most significant projects and amount invested are in Mozambique, with 146 cases and $12.7 million¹ (Ministério das Relações Exeriores 2021 p. 34).

In early January 2021, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi (at that time) visited Latin America and Africa, including Brazil. During his visit to Brazil, he wrote an article for the local Japanese community’s newspaper Nikkey Shimbun, where he stated:

As changes in the balance of power in the international society, including Latin America, are accelerating and becoming more complex, maintaining and strengthening a free and open international order based on the rule of law is becoming increasingly important. For that reason, international cooperation is necessary. Many Latin American countries share the basic values of the rule of law, freedom, democracy, human rights, etc., with Japan. (Motegi 2021)

Although the terms “FOIP” and “the geographical concept of Indo–Pacific” was not used in this article, it should be noted that the words “free and open” have been incorporated.

Although Brazil does not border the Indian Ocean or the Pacific Ocean, Japan’s idea of FOIP is relevant to Brazil if it considers a relationship with a country like Mozambique. Given future Japan–Brazil relations, it is first necessary to consider Japan’s African diplomacy in the FOIP concept era to compare it with Brazil’s African diplomacy.

To this end, first in this article, Japan’s diplomacy in Africa will be explained, emphasizing Lusophone Africa, including Mozambique. Special attention will be given to the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), an international conference initiated by the Japanese in 1993. Next, Brazil’s diplomacy in Africa will be presented to understand the convergence of agendas and perspectives of Japan and Brazil interacting with each other in Portuguese-speaking Africa. It will be asked, for example, what are the possibilities for Japan to propose innovative dynamics and techniques through triangular cooperation with Brazil in Africa. These factors will be used to understand Japan and Brazil’s success and relative difficulties, in occupying spaces in Africa, particularly through triangular cooperation. The conclusions will summarize the most impressive results of Japan–Africa and Brazil–Africa relations in the last decade, which will help take stock and consider the future of Japan–Brazil triangular cooperation in Africa.

2 Japan’s African Diplomacy²

2.1 The African Development Conference (TICAD): A Turning Point

Adem (2018) had divided the history of Japan’s African diplomacy into five periods since 1961, when the Division of Africa was founded at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, namely: 1961–1972 (Cold War), 1973–1992 (oil crisis), 1993–2006 (TICAD), 2007–2013 (expansion of China’s presence), and after 2014 (the second Abe administration).³ In 1974, under the second Cabinet of Kakuei Tanaka, Japan’s foreign minister entered the African continent for the first time. At that time, foreign minister Toshio Kimura visited four African countries, including Nigeria. The first visit to Africa as Prime Minister of Japan was in 2001 by Yoshiro Mori. He visited Kenya and Nigeria. After that, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Ghana and Ethiopia in 2006, but since then, no Japanese leader has visited Africa at the prime minister’s level until 2013.⁴

TICAD is an international conference led by Japan and jointly held by the United Nations, UNDP, the World Bank, and the African Union Commission. TICAD VII was held in Yokohama in 2019. The eighth conference will be held in Tunisia in 2022. The first was held in Japan once every five years until the second (1998), the third (2003), and the fourth (2008). Since then, the fifth (2013), sixth (2016), and seventh (2019) have been held once every three years, hosted by Japan and Africa in turn. The sixth (2016) was TICAD’s first event in Africa (Nairobi, Kenya).

France held an international conference on African development, such as TICAD, in 1990, earlier than Japan. Following France, Japan’s TICAD was held in 1993, followed by China, the EU in 2000, India and Turkey in 2008, Arab countries in 2010, the United States in 2014, and Russia in 2019 (Devermont 2019, p. 2).⁵ Regarding why Japan started TICAD in the early 1990s, Luhari and his colleagues emphasized that Japan’s African diplomacy has changed significantly after the end of the Cold War (Luhari and Kumumba-Kasongo 2016, p. 208).

In the roundtable prior to TICAD VI held by the journal of the Foreign Ministry Gaikou (July 2016), three experts on African studies⁶ agreed that, as the international community’s interest in Africa has declined rapidly since the end of the Cold War, it was significant that Japan had led initiatives like TICAD to regain the international community’s interest in Africa, which had suffered from civil war and refugee problems. In addition, Japanese companies’ interest in Africa was still low until around the third TICAD (2003). After that, the private sectors gradually started to show their desire to do business and trade with African nations around the fourth and fifth times, and so on (Endo et al. 2016, p. 34). Table 5.1 shows the characteristics of TICAD from the first to the fifth (1993–2013). The number of participating countries and individual participants are increasing with each round. The sixth and seventh sessions will be described later in this chapter.

Table 5.1 Transition of TICAD Conference (1st to 5th)

2.2 Relationship Between Portuguese-Speaking Africa and Japan

2.2.1 Prime Minister Abe’s Visit to Mozambique in 2014

As mentioned above, Japan’s Diplomacy in Africa was considered a watershed in 1993. Also, for Portuguese-speaking African countries, Japan’s diplomacy has begun virtually around TICAD after a diplomatic vacuum that has continued for a while since establishing diplomatic relations. Particularly, based on TICAD’s three pillars highlighted in TICAD III (2003), “human-centered development,” “poverty reduction through economic growth,” and “peacebuilding,” Japanese relations with Mozambique and Angola were activated, followed by relations with the other three Portuguese-speaking African countries—Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe (Carvalho 2015, p. 57).

The history of diplomatic relations between Japan and Portuguese-speaking African countries backed to the 1970s, when each country became independent from Portugal, beginning in 1974 with Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe in 1975, Angola in 1976, and Mozambique in 1977. The Embassy of Japan was established in the 2000s, first in Mozambique in 2000, Angola in 2005, and the other three countries under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Embassies in Senegal and Gabon (Guinea-Bissau has been under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Embassy in China since 2003). The Office of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), one of the key actors in the economic cooperation of Japan, was established in Mozambique in 2003 and Angola in 2007. As for TICAD, Cabo Verde, Angola, and Mozambique have participated since the first TICAD in 1993 (Guinea-Bissau was suspended from TICADV).

Considering the relationship between Japan and Portuguese-speaking Africa, we should not underestimate the approval of Japan as an observer country in the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Nations (CPLP) in July 2014. The CPLP is a regional forum for cooperation between Portugal, Brazil, five Portuguese-speaking countries in Africa, Equatorial Guinea, and East Timor. It was primarily designed to solidify the position of Portuguese-speaking countries in the international community through political and diplomatic solidarity, incorporating various fields such as politics, economy, society, culture, and interpersonal exchanges, and spreading the Portuguese language around the world. Due to its inauguration in 1996, 2021 marked the 25th anniversary of the founding of the CPLP.

Prime Minister Abe, who made his first visit to Portugal as Japan’s incumbent prime minister in May 2014, announced Japan’s motivation to participate in the CPLP, and the observer status was unanimously approved at the CPLP Summit in July 2014. In July 2015 Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs visited Timor-Leste to attend the CPLP Ministerial Meeting, and, on that occasion, he had the opportunity to meet with the Foreign Minister of Mozambique. The Secretary-General of CPLP, Maria Silveira at that time, visited Japan in March 2017. Japan is said to regard the CPLP as “unique with a global influence.”

Prime Minister Abe visited Mozambique in January 2014 (he visited Oman, Cote d’Ivoire, and Ethiopia besides Mozambique). This was the first visit by a Japanese Prime Minister to Africa since 2008 and the first visit by a Japanese Prime Minister to Portuguese-speaking Africa, Mozambique.⁷ In a joint statement after the summit meeting, the two leaders confirmed that Japan and Mozambique would cooperate in four areas: (1) TICAD and bilateral relations in general, (2) economic fields, (3) economic cooperation, and (4) international fields, to build “win–win” relations under the “Friendship / AMIZADE” partnership.⁸ Specifically, over the following five years, they planned regular high-level policy dialogues (1), and the development of human resources of 300 people by the “Japan-Mozambique Natural Gas and Coal Development Initiative,” which was announced to develop natural resources and improve the business environment (2). Furthermore, in the subsequent five years, in addition to infrastructure development such as roads, ports, and energy and support for education and health, 70 billion yen of Official Development Assistance (ODA) would be provided for the development of the Nacala Corridor area (3).

Prime Minister Abe gave an opening speech at the Japan–Mozambique Investment Forum (attended by the two countries’ leaders and business community members). The following explains what Japan aims for in terms of relations with Mozambique (underlined by the author).

Mozambique is home to one of the largest natural gas fields in the world and one of the largest coking coal fields in Africa. I am firmly convinced that cooperation between Mozambique, blessed with an abundance of resources, and Japan, with its highly advanced technological capabilities, will, without any doubt, result in greater wealth for both nations. Bountiful resources and the wealth acquired through their use are Mozambique’s very own treasures. The benefits must be shared by the Mozambican people and mobilized to engender sustained growth and improvements in the people’s daily lives. If we combine Mozambique’s own efforts, including further improvements to the investment climate, with the support of Japan’s public and private sectors, we will be certain to build a relationship as partners that contribute to growth in both countries.⁹

In other words, the relationship between Japan and Mozambique would be mutually profitable. As a resource-rich country, Mozambique’s resources should be utilized to benefit the people, and Japanese private companies would be expected to be an actor in promoting relations between the two countries. This idea would generally be common to Japan’s attitude toward African diplomacy.

As of August 2021, four Portuguese-speaking African countries (Angola, Cabo Verde, Guiné-Bissau, São Tomé e Príncipe) other than Mozambique have not yet been visited by the Prime Minister of Japan. Although in May 2019, Foreign Minister Taro Kono (at that time) visited Angola, and the Foreign Minister’s visit was also featured in local newspapers. In August 2019, when TICAD VII was held, prime ministers or presidents from all four countries visited Japan, and 11 ministers, especially from Angola, visited Japan. There were also visit channels such as Japanese parliamentarians belonging to the Japan–AU Parliamentary Friendship League. After Prime Minister Abe’s visit in 2014, the foreign minister, deputy foreign minister, parliamentary vice-minister for foreign affairs, and others have visited Mozambique, and Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi (at that time) visited Mozambique in December 2020. Following the joint statement on Prime Minister Abe’s visit in 2014, a high-level policy dialogue took place¹⁰ (see Table 5.2).

Table 5.2 Visits to Mozambique by ministers and government dignitaries since 2014

2.2.2 Economic Cooperation

The Country Assistance Policy of Japan’s ODA is explained clearly in the National Development Cooperation Policy (formerly National Assistance Policy), formulated after analyzing the donor countries’ development plans and development issues. Regarding The Country Assistance Policy of each Portuguese-speaking Africa, Mozambique was formulated in 2013, Cabo Verde in 2014, Angola in 2017, and São Tomé e Príncipe in 2019.

Table 5.3 summarizes the basic goals (major targets) and priority areas (medium targets) of the four countries’ National Development Cooperation Policies and major Rolling Plan. In terms of infrastructure, Mozambique’s geopolitical importance (having foreign ports for land-based countries such as neighboring Zambia and Malawi) has allowed developing the economic infrastructure such as roads, bridges, ports, and electricity. Under the so-called “Nacala Corridor Development and Maintenance Program,” various forms of assistance, including grant aid, technical cooperation, and ODA loans, were implemented, including the Agriculture Development project (ProSAVANA) by Japan, Brazil, and Mozambique¹¹

Table 5.3 Japan’s ODA countries assistance policy and main rolling plan

To support Angola’s economic development and poverty reduction, economic and social infrastructure such as electricity, water and sewerage systems, and port facilities have been developed. For example, a power sector reform support program was formulated in 2015 through an ODA loan (23.64 billion yen). For projects related to economic infrastructure development for Cabo Verde (also ODA loan), plans for a transmission line system (6.186 billion yen until 2018), and the Santiago Island water supply system (15.292 billion yen while continuing as of 2021), were included. In Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, there are projects in food security, education, and health care. Guinea-Bissau, one of the world’s poorest countries, is involved in projects related to poverty reduction and improving people’s lives through the ODA grant.¹²

Regarding the amount of support, Table 5.4 summarizes each type of financial assistance from 2012 to 2016. Regarding São Tomé and Príncipe and Guinea-Bissau, ODA loan (yen loans) has not been provided due to the economic scale, and these two countries are mainly eligible for grant aid. ODA loans are in Cabo Verde, Angola, and Mozambique. It can be understood that the ODA loan is mainly provided for Mozambique, looking at recent data from 2010 to 2019 (Table 5.5).

Table 5.4 Japan’s ODA to PALOP countries (2012–2016, million yen)

Table 5.5 Japan’s ODA to Portuguese-speaking African Countries (2010–2019)

2.3 Japan’s Foreign Policy and Infrastructure Overseas Expansion Strategy and Africa

2.3.1 Free and Open Indo–Pacific (FOIP) Initiative and TICAD

Let us return to Japan’s African diplomacy in general focused on TICAD. The last two TICADs were held in 2016 (sixth) and 2019 (seventh). According to Endo et al. (2016), TICAD was initially held “for Africa,” but with each round, it strengthened its character as a “conference for Japan.” In other words, “the region of Africa has begun to have a clear meaning in Japan’s foreign policy” (Endo et al. 2016, p. 34). This is reflected in Prime Minister Abe’s inclusion of the FOIP initiative in his 2016 TICAD VI keynote speech, quoted below.

When you cross the seas of Asia and the Indian Ocean and come to Nairobi, you then understand very well that what connects Asia and Africa are the sea lanes. What will give stability and prosperity to the world is none other than the enormous liveliness brought forth through the union of two free and open oceans and two continents. Japan bears the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it prosperous. Japan wants to work together with you in Africa in order to make the seas that connect the two continents into peaceful seas that are governed by the rule of law. That is what we wish to do with you. The winds that traverse the ocean turn our eyes to the future. The supply chain is already building something quite like an enormous bridge between Asia and Africa, providing industrial wisdom. The population in Asia living in democracies is more numerous than that of any other region on earth. Asia has enjoyed growth on the basis of democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy that has taken root there. It is my wish that the self-confidence and sense of responsibility spawned there, as a result, come to envelop the entirety of Africa together with the gentle winds that blow here. Let us make this stretch that is from Asia to Africa a main artery for growth and prosperity. Let us advance together, Africa and Japan, sharing a common vision. The future abounds with blazes of bright colors. We are poised to hear the intense yet refreshing beat of the drums. My African friends, let us continue to walk forward together, believing in the potential that the future holds.¹³

In recent years, the term FOIP has been often used in international politics. According to Hiroshi Nakanishi, a professor at Kyoto University who specializes in international politics, it is now a “cliché of international politics” (Nakanishi 2018, p. 13).

Although it has been widely covered by the US Trump administration, Japan was the first to come up with the idea of a FOIP at the government level, and it was used in the keynote speech of TICAD VI of 2016. Also, according to Nakanishi, it can be said that the keynote speech quoted above expresses well the substance of the FOIP strategy in terms of the geographical concept of Indo–Pacific, the normative of free and open, and the economic vision of affluence and growth (Nakanishi 2018, p. 13).

The idea’s origin that led to FOIP dates back to the 1990s when the Cold War ended. This was the time when Japan rebuilt its relations with Asia and Africa. However, it is not unique to Japan but “resulted from the accumulation of policy executions of countries,” including Japan and the United States. These contents are briefly summarized as follows: (1) the formation of a wide-area economic regional zone that combines economic cooperation such as aid, investment, and technology transfer, based on a free-market economy, (2) maintaining and strengthening regional order or framework based on universal values led by the West such as the rule of law, liberal democracy, and human rights, and (3) preserving maritime security based on freedom of navigation covering the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean (Nakanishi 2018, p. 18).

In the Yokohama Declaration of TICAD VII three years later, the FOIP vision set out in the keynote speech of TICAD VI of 2016 was clearly stated: “We (that is, all countries, regions, institutions, etc. that participated in TICAD VII, including the African countries) will pay attention favorably.” While we cannot discuss the relationship between TICAD and FOIP further, it can be said that at least the meaning of Africa in Japan’s diplomatic strategy is more explicit than before. To embody the FOIP vision, Japan indicates “physical connectivity” through the development of high-quality infrastructures such as ports, railroads, roads, energy, and ICT, and “human connectivity” through human resource development, “institutional connectivity” by facilitating customs clearance.¹⁴ It should be noted that this connectivity concept includes the Nacala Corridor in Mozambique, where economic cooperation has been more common in the past (Table 5.6).

Table 5.6 Characteristics of the TICAD Conference (6th to 7th)

2.3.2 Promoting “Quality Infrastructure Investment” at TICAD

The term “quality infrastructure” is also a word Japan has frequently used in recent years, along with FOIP. The first time “quality infrastructure investment” was used was during TICAD VI. TICAD VI emphasized promoting high-quality infrastructure investment centered on three priority regions (East Africa Northern Corridor, Nacala Corridor, and West African Growth Circle) to implement “the G7 Ise–Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment” in Africa, and this was also the case at TICAD VII.

How does Japan use the idea of “quality” in diplomacy and development cooperation? First, “high-quality growth” should be explained. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2020), developing countries must achieve economic growth for self-sustaining development by achieving “high-quality growth.” The term “high-quality” involves two main aspects: “inclusiveness” and “resilience.” “Inclusiveness” stresses the importance that no one is left behind while being sustainable. Therefore, harmonization between society and the environment is required. “Resilience” through “high quality” means it can withstand the shocks of economic crises and natural disasters that developing countries often experience.

Infrastructure (economic and social) must be developed by being inclusive, resilient, and sustainable¹⁵ to achieve high-quality growth. In other words, it is necessary for developing countries to “develop quality infrastructure” that truly contributes to “high-quality growth” and supporting such infrastructure development is understood as one of the strength for Japan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2020, p. 28).

This Japanese idea of “quality” was shared at the 2016 Ise–Shima G7 Summit and approved as the G7 Ise–Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment¹⁶ The five-point quality infrastructure principles at the Ise–Shima G7 Summit were subsequently confirmed at another international conference and approved as the G20 Principles on Quality Infrastructure Investment at the G20 Osaka Summit in June 2019.¹⁷ Besides, in June 2021, at the G7 meeting held in Cornwall, England, an agreement was reached to establish a framework to support infrastructure construction for developing countries (Nihon Keizai Shimbun June 13, 2021). It is to say that infrastructure support and infrastructure development in developing countries are keywords not only in Japan but also in the international community.

3 Brazil’s African Diplomacy

Due to the Japan-Brazil relations in Africa, it is also necessary to consider Brazil’s African diplomacy. Throughout the 1950s, Brazil still maintained special ties with colonialist nations, such as Portugal, and showed itself to be distant from the process of liberation of African nations, having, however: (i) recognized the importance acquired by African and Asian nations on the international stage, (ii) created missions and established diplomatic relations with their governments and; (iii) supported ideas related to developmentalism in international forums.¹⁸

At that time, Brazilian foreign policy was clearly focused on Latin American regional interests, an option that led Brazil to play a secondary role in the decolonization process, limiting its support for the creation of diplomatic missions in Afro–Asian nations. The Brazilian departure from universal issues, combined with Brazil’s feeling of solidarity with Portugal, emphasized Brazilian action against colonialism being based, ultimately, on the principle of non-aggression and non-intervention, the latter affirmed in article 2, paragraph 7, of the UN Charter—which deals with the right of each people to dispose of themselves, the non-interference of third parties in the internal life of each State—when considering that Portugal did not have colonies, but overseas provinces, belonging to their own territory, with the right to defend them against new colonialisms.¹⁹

During the 1960s, and especially from the 1970s onwards, Brazil began to seek regionalization and the globalization of its international relations, especially given the difficulty obtaining public resources from developed countries, such as the United States, to finance industrial projects bilaterally. As a result of this new dynamic, Brazil began to position itself in favor of the self-determination of African peoples and sought to achieve a necessary reconciliation of anti-colonialism with the historical ties that linked it to Portugal. Between 1961 and 1964, with the solidification of the so-called independent foreign policy, the Brazilian alignment with the principle of non-intervention, the self-determination of peoples, the emancipation of peoples, and anti-colonialism was reinforced. It was also defended as the stimulus to the institutionalization of relations and collaboration between nations to overcome problems of raising the standard of living, promoting the population’s culture, and preserving the internal order of nations. In the case of Angola, the Brazilian government stated that it “was waiting for Portugal to accept the principle of self-determination and urged it to assume the leadership of the movement for Angola’s freedom and its transformation into an independent country friendly both to Portugal and Brazil”.²⁰

In the same period, on the one hand, Brazil’s relations with Asia became mostly multilateral, intending to build a common political agenda for developing countries in favor of a new international economic order. Brazilian relations in Asia were limited almost exclusively to relations with Japan in the commercial area. On the other hand, South–South cooperation was more deeply focused on Africa than Asia. According to Altemani de Oliveira, the so-called African policy was encouraged, which best “represented, as an emblem, the Brazilian involvement with the prospects of generating a new international economic order and with its Third World policy.”²¹

Brazil expanded the scope of its foreign policy and defended and supported the principle of self-determination. Economic development and peaceful international coexistence were intertwined to serve as a basis for the defense not only of Brazilian interests but of peoples who were at a disadvantage in North–South relations. This option allowed Brazil to participate more actively in the decolonization processes, especially during the debates held at the UN General Assembly. Objectives linked to the promotion of an increase in the market for Brazilian production also led to privileging the anti-colonialist discourse for Africa.

During Ernesto Geisel’s government (1974–1979), the strategy of diversifying partnerships made it possible to choose new ways of external relations, allowing Brazil to increase its presence in scenarios that had been little explored until then. In response to the demands of national development with Africa and the Far East, the Middle East, the Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America were reviewed and expanded, and later with Japan, China, and other countries in the South American continent.

Thus, in the 1970s, Brazil inaugurated systematic cooperation with West Africa and reinforced the importance of using the external sector to boost economic growth, with the State as the articulator of the production process.

In the 1980s, the Brazilian international presence deepened, mainly due to the international framework that led to the replacement of the Cold War by peaceful coexistence and the division of the world between developed and underdeveloped countries. The increase in the Brazilian presence in Africa (as well as in Asia) was perceived as linked to Brazil’s growing need to obtain new markets for its exports.

In this process of internationalization, Brazil abandoned the automatic alignment with Portugal and launched a policy with interest in (i) increasing South–South cooperation; (ii) ensuring that the principles of sovereignty and self-determination of States were respected; (iii) encouraging the economic independence of companies; and (iv) condemn colonialism and racial discrimination. Brazil, however, lacked the resources to expand South–South relations and conditioned its choices to the possibility of defending specific bilateral interests.

The difficulties faced by Brazilians and Africans, particularly generated by the external debt crises, imposed setbacks in projects previously developed by Brazil, although the inflection toward Africa was maintained, continuing to follow the general lines of previous conduct.

Political-diplomatic relations with Africa were also enhanced during the administration of President João Figueiredo (1979–1985). The visit of the Brazilian president to Africa had two values: the first, material and objective, which translated into the reciprocal recognition of the Brazilian commercial strategy for the continent. The second, symbolic, went back to the idea of the Atlantic identity that united the two “riverside” regions, with the political gesture of the visit of the first South American president.

Aside from the presence of President Figueiredo in Africa, the most important fact in Brazil’s African policy at that time was the ability shown by Brazilian foreign policy to articulate African diplomacy in order to face North American pressures for the construction of the South Atlantic Treaty Organization (OTAS)—collective security pact for the region along the lines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—and to propose, in its place, the creation of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone.

If under the Figueiredo government, Brazil–Africa trade reached the highest level in their shared history until then—with exports representing 9.3% of total Brazilian exports in 1984—under the Sarney government, this share dropped to approximately 4%. Despite the limits imposed by the negotiation of the external debt and the internal economic instability, the Sarney government continued to maintain an interest in Brazilian foreign policy in Africa.

Despite the establishment of democracy in Brazil in 1985 and the opening of new diplomatic fronts with the international and regional community, the worsening of the foreign debt issue, the resurgence of strong inflationary pressures, the moratorium decreed in 1987, and the beginning of the reduction of large projects from the Geisel era made it difficult to obtain positive balances in Brazil’s international relations.

Throughout the 1990s, Brazilian foreign policy toward Africa was marked by a gradual decrease in its strategic importance. Thus, Afro–Brazilian relations presented two main characteristics: (i) accelerated decline of exchanges, persisting, however, selective contacts aimed at meeting precise priorities and limited to a few countries, regions, and themes; (ii) gradual deconstruction of the culturalist discourse that had fueled commercial contact between Brazil and Africa; and (iii) emergence of more critical perceptions about the place of Africa in the formation of Brazilian nationality and the country’s international reintegration.²²

As a practical consequence of the change in the direction of Brazilian foreign policy toward Africa, there was a decreasing number of diplomats serving on the African continent (contrary to what had been happening with Europe and North and South America) and a decline in Brazilian trade with Africa. On the one hand, the transformation in Afro–Brazilian relations was attributed to African difficulties in facing deep economic, political, and social problems, with no trade options being created between the parties that would allow adaptations to the crisis context. On the other hand, from 1992 onward, Brazilian foreign policy favored the platino exchange, to the detriment of the hitherto priority partnership with Africa.²³

At the beginning of the Itamar Franco government (1993–1995), Chancellor Fernando Henrique Cardoso announced where to look for Brazil’s new priority partners: Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. The reasons for not only Latin America, but also Asia, being defined as a priority for Brazilian diplomacy, to the detriment of relations with the African continent, were related to the cooperative potential of the region in the field of science and technology and the growing market for exports and imports. The Brazilian interest in Asia was motivated by two reasons in particular: the first, of an economic nature, opened the prospect of association with an increasingly attractive region, thanks to the success of the economic and scientific-technological development model adopted by it; the second, of a political nature, met the Brazilian guidelines for autonomy and diversification of partnerships with countries that, many times, adopted positions similar to those of Brazil in multilateral forums.

During the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002), relations with Africa were adapted to the political strategies present in Brazilian foreign policy, which made partnerships with the African continent selective. The institutionalization of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) in 1996 and the rapprochement with post-apartheid South Africa were part of these selective formats of the partnership with Africa. However, the commercial area was the one that showed greater pragmatism in Brazilian foreign policy and boosted relations with the African continent in specific areas of trade and investment. Trade with Nigeria and Angola, concentrated in crude oil, stood out at that time (Mendonça and Faria 2015).

The selectivity in the relationship with Africa led to the closing of several Brazilian embassies in African countries, the reduction of the Brazilian government’s participation in prospecting investments in the continent, especially in civil construction, and a general retraction of the trade flow with Africa.

At the same time, the Brazilian government supported UN peacekeeping missions in Angola and Mozambique during the 1990s, reflecting the selectivity policy that incorporated Portuguese-speaking countries into Brazil’s international strategy.

The two terms of President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (2003–2010) brought changes in Brazilian policy toward Africa, especially through the inclusion of regions with no traditional link with Brazilian diplomacy. There was an apparent effort to expand the scope of action of Brazilian diplomacy on the African continent, even though most diplomatic and technical cooperation efforts continue to focus on Portuguese-speaking countries (PALOP) (Mendonça and Faria 2015).

The expansion and deepening of relations with Africa reflected the desire to diversify partnerships and expand Brazil’s bargaining power in the international system. In this context, both the pragmatic exercise of foreign policy in the face of the exhaustion of the vertical model of international insertion—which led to the reactivation of 19 new embassies in Africa—and the ideological aspect of solidary diplomacy helped to expand the Brazilian presence on the African continent. If, on the one hand, ethnic, historical, and cultural ties were no longer seen as sufficient to strengthen relations with Africa, on the other hand, the possibilities of trade, investment, and technical cooperation with African nations proved to be additional factors for attracting Brazilian attention and interest to the African continent. Lula made 32 trips to Africa during his two terms, visiting 21 African countries (Mendonça and Faria 2015).

With the government of Dilma Rousseff, which began in 2011, the space occupied by the African continent in Brazilian foreign policy was maintained. However, some adjustments were made due to several national and international challenges. Even though presidential diplomacy was less intense, cooperation, political, diplomatic, and commercial ties were strengthened (Oliveira and Mallmann 2020, p. 1).

During her term, President Dilma Rousseff attended the IBSA (forum which brings together India, Brazil, and South Africa) meeting in South Africa, visited Angola and Mozambique and designated Lula da Silva as Brazil’s official representative at the 17th African Union (AU) Summit, held in Equatorial Guinea (World Bank and IPEA 2011). Rousseff also promoted the creation of the “Africa Group” to link Brazilian investments and sales to local development programs and coordinate the activities of Brazilian companies.

A smaller number of cooperation projects with Africa during the Rousseff administration reflected both a context of international crisis and technical adjustments aimed at a better organization, planning, structuring of the programs developed, and the consolidation of initiatives launched previously. Despite internal and external difficulties, Rousseff continued with 61 cooperation projects with African countries initiated during the Lula government and started 156 others. In his second term (2015–2016), 16 new projects were created via ABC (Oliveira and Mallmann 2020).

In the Rousseff government’s trade relations with the African continent, the trade volume initially remained stable. However, in the second term of President Rousseff (2014–2016), Brazilian imports to Africa declined, reaching the worst result since 2009 (US$ 8 billion). The volume of bilateral trade was US$ 12.4 billion, the worst since 2005 (Oliveira and Mallmann 2020).

Michel Temer’s government brought about radical changes in Brazilian foreign policy for Africa, starting with emphasizing the “commercialist” discourse to the detriment of support for the political-developmental debate practiced until then. Presidential diplomacy and diplomatic ties were greatly diminished.

With Michel Temer in the presidency, the more commercial approach in relations with Africa contributed to the resumption of growth in Brazilian imports and the total volume of trade. However, the trade profile remained the same, with Brazil mainly exporting low value-added manufactures and importing mainly oil (which accounted for more than 80% of Brazilian imports from Africa from the Lula government to Temer).

The change in Brazilian policy toward Africa took place to the detriment of initiatives to bring together and strengthen the political and cultural ties of previous governments. Michel Temer has only been to Africa twice (in Cape Verde and South Africa in 2018). There were also few new projects and partnerships in technical cooperation (Oliveira and Mallmann 2020).

Under Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency, which began in 2019, relations with Africa have become even more distant due to the choice to realign alliances with developed countries, decrease strategic cooperation in the Global South, and reduce participation in multilateral forums. The disarticulation of Brazilian technical cooperation agendas, based on health, education, and poverty alleviation programs, has deepened even further under the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic (Francisco et al. 2020).

In May 2020, in a decree signed by President Bolsonaro, the closing of seven diplomatic representations in Africa and the Caribbean was announced, including the African ones in Freetown (Sierra Leone) and Monrovia (Liberia), which came to be exercised cumulatively by the Embassy in Accra, Ghana (Freire 2020).

Trade relations between Brazil and African countries also suffered huge setbacks since the beginning of the presidency of Jair Bolsonaro. In 2019, exports to Africa were $7.5 billion, the lowest in ten years. In these circumstances, whether due to the shrinkage of trade flows or the reduction in international technical cooperation agendas with African countries, some analysts pondered that Brazil is ceasing to be a reference of excellence in public policies for developing countries and is losing prominence in the Global South (Francisco et al. 2020).

4 Triangular Cooperation Between Japan and Brazil in Africa: Possibilities for Future Dynamics and Innovative Techniques

When relations between Brazil and Africa are experiencing great difficulties and an apparent retraction, we inquire about the possibilities for Japan and Brazil to increase relations with Africa in this last part of the chapter. We propose innovative dynamics and techniques through triangular cooperation with African countries based on their previous bilateral and multilateral experiences on the continent. Before that, we analyzed some of the joint actions between Brazil and Japan in Africa that marked their common history of past and present.

One of the most important aspects of bilateral relations between Brazil and Japan is development cooperation. Japan experienced remarkable economic development in the second half of the twentieth century and achieved the rank of the largest provider of ODA throughout the 1990s (Aragusuku 2014).

In the 1960s, Brazil received Japanese assistance in the form of loans to carry out several projects, such as the projects aimed at steel production in Minas Gerais, which gave rise to the company Usiminas; iron ore exploration in Carajás; pulp and paper production in Minas Gerais; and aluminum production in Pará. The Japanese–Brazilian Cooperation Project for the Development of the Cerrado (PRODECER) is considered a great success story in Brazil’s cooperation with Japan. PRODECER aimed both at making food production viable in the Brazilian Cerrado, such as soybeans, and at the socio-economic development of the local population. Thanks to this project initiated through a partnership with Japan, Brazil is now, according to Embrapa, the largest soybean producer globally, with a 2020/2021 crop of 135.409 million tons (Embrapa 2022).

Inspired by PRODECER, the Tripartite Program for the Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savanna in Mozambique (ProSavana) was announced in 2007, and the Memorandum between Brazil–Japan, and Mozambique was signed in 2009. The Complementary Agreement to the Cooperation Agreement was signed in 2010. The objective of ProSavana was to transform Mozambique’s savannas into fertile and food-producing lands and improve the living conditions of the population in the Nacala Corridor through sustainable and inclusive regional agricultural development. The modernization of agriculture was therefore seen as a way to increase productivity and diversify agricultural production and generate jobs through agricultural investments and the establishment of value chains (DW 2020). Even in the presence of many positive results from ProSavana, there was much criticism from members of civil society, who believed that the project would favor monocultures and exports rather than focusing on family farming. The end of ProSavana was announced in July 2020 by the government of Mozambique. Despite the closure of the project, Japan continues to invest in the Nacala Corridor, indicating that the region is a priority objective for Japan, including for the realization of trilateral projects (DW 2020).

Reflections on the results of joint projects, mainly PRODECER and ProSavana, have helped Brazil and Japan think about new ways of cooperation that could increase the social, economic, and environmental results of their joint projects and advance and deepen triangular cooperation with African countries. In this sense, it is worth noting that JICA is constantly creating working groups and promoting debates on triangular cooperation to identify opportunities for using Brazil and Japan’s resources and know-how, which could be applied in assisting other developing countries, including Africans.

In 2000 the two governments signed an agreement called the “Brazil–Japan Partnership Program (JBPP)” to further promote triangular cooperation. As partners on global issues, focusing on Latin America and Portuguese-speaking African countries, Brazil and Japan promoted cooperation in different areas, such as agriculture, health, and medical services, environment, and professional training. Since then, Technical Cooperation Projects in Third Countries have taken advantage of the fields of excellence in Japan and Brazil and combined investments and resources from the two countries (including experts and training).

In 2019, the Japanese government invited Brazilian representatives to participate in TICAD VII, which took place in Yokohama in August 2019, to create dialogue and cooperation with Africa and enhance and deepen the trilateral cooperation. As seen earlier in this chapter, TICAD is the main Japanese foreign policy initiative for Africa and seeks to emphasize economic cooperation, social development, and the promotion of security and peace. Brazilian representatives participated in thematic sessions on cooperation and agriculture; disaster risk reduction; education and human resource development; science, technology and innovation, and blue economy (Caçador 2019).

More recently, since the COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020, the implementation of the technical cooperation agenda between Brazil and Japan in Africa has become more complex. In general, the technical cooperation offered by Brazil in Angola has privileged the development of local capacities and the sharing of knowledge and experiences for the formulation and implementation of public policies and specific professional training actions. The trilateral projects maintained between Brazil, Angola, and Japan would normally include areas such as humanized childbirth care, training of professional training managers, water distribution systems, in collaboration with the Japanese cooperation agency (JICA), as well as the areas of sport and rights of people with disabilities, in collaboration with the CPLP (Embassy of Brazil in Luanda 2020).

The trilateral projects maintained between Brazil, Angola, and Japan are now suffering setbacks not only by the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic but also by the general distancing from Africa imposed by the political choices made by the Bolsonaro government.

5 Conclusions

As of 2019, few Japanese companies have expanded into five Portuguese-speaking Africa. There are 563 companies in Africa, of which ten are in Angola, twelve in Mozambique, one in Guinea-Bissau, one in São Tomé and Príncipe, and none in Cabo Verde.²⁴ It can be said that the relationship between Japan and Portuguese-speaking Africa other than Angola and Mozambique is still based on ODA. Mozambique is subject to the idea of “connectivity” under the FOIP initiative, and Japan’s commitment will be expected to increase.

As shown in TICAD II, Japan’s African diplomacy emphasizes the idea of partnership and self-help efforts (ownership). Japan’s relations with Portuguese-speaking Africa will be continued while taking great care of its links with Portuguese-speaking regional organizations such as CPLP, in which Brazil and Portugal are participating.

As presented previously, Japan’s cooperation with Africa has been marked by enormous success in recent decades, despite the difficulties and challenges faced. Thus, when major setbacks in Brazilian foreign policy toward Africa became all too visible in its most diverse aspects, triangular cooperation with Japan revealed itself as a fundamental way out for the maintenance of agendas considered historically relevant to all African countries involved. This is especially true for Portuguese-speaking African countries and for the expansion and innovation of joint activities in areas considered fundamental in post-pandemic future.

Only concerted policies between African countries and better governance within countries can eliminate opportunistic attitudes, avoid exploitation of weaker states, and attract policies from cooperating countries with greater consideration for African values and needs.

Notes

• 1. Ministério das Relações Exteriores (2021).

• 2. Hideo Oda, a leading expert in African studies in Japan, pointed out the “physical and psychological distance” in the relationship between Japan and Africa.

• 3. The word inside the parenthesis is a keyword described by the author to understand Japan’s African diplomacy in each era.

• 4. Prime Minister Taro Aso (then), who had spent two years in Sierra Leone during his childhood, did not visit any African nations during his administration (Adem 2018, p. 9).

• 5. Devermont (2019).

• 6. Mitsugu Endo (Professor, The University of Tokyo), Junzo Fujita (Ambassador for TICAD, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Keiichi Shirato (Senior Researcher, Mitsui & Co., Ltd. Strategic Research Institute).

• 7. In the summer of 2014, Prime Minister Abe visited five Latin American countries, including Brazil and Mexico, and gave a “joint speech.”

• 8. It is a Portuguese word for friendship, but it is a combination of the underlined parts of Japão–Mozambique Iniciativa para Dinamizar e Acelerar o Desenvolvimento.

• 9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2014).

• 10. Besides TICAD, the president of Mozambique also visited Japan in 2017. Government officials continued to come and go between the two countries.

• 11. According to JETRO, financial support from major donor countries such as the IMF was frozen due to the discovery of the “non-disclosure debt problem” of the Mozambique government in 2016, and JICA’s new loan aid project was suspended (Matsunaga and Takahashi 2020).

• 12. When writing this paper, a Country Assistance Policy for Guinea-Bissau has not been formulated, but a Rolling Plan has been issued. After the 2003 coup d’etat, Japan did not approve of the government, and economic cooperation was suspended except for some aid through international organizations. Normalization of relations between the two countries was restored in 2006, economic cooperation was resumed in 2007, and after the resumption, poverty reduction is a priority field, and support is provided mainly in basic living needs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2011).

• 13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016a).

• 14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (n.d.).

• 15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2020, p. 28).

• 16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2016b).

• 17. Ministry of Finance of Japan (2019).

• 18. See Cervo and Bueno (2002, pp. 300–301).

• 19. See Cervo and Magalhães (2000, p. 293).

• 20. See Cervo and Bueno (2002, p. 309).

• 21. Oliveira (2004, p. 11).

• 22. Saraiva (1996, p. 217).

• 23. Saraiva (1996, p. 217).

• 24. African Business Partners (2019). The top five destinations of Japanese companies are South Africa (141 companies), Kenya (64 companies), Egypt (52 companies), Morocco (49 companies), and Nigeria (34 companies).