1 Introduction

East Asia1 is currently one of the most dynamic centers in the global economy, which, according to many, confirms the rise of the Pacific Century (Tellis 2010; Kurlantzick 2011; Haass 2013). However, Asia was not as attractive in the 1960s and 1970s. It was instead a region marked by conflict, liberation wars, ideological conflicts, and economic underdevelopment, with the notable exception of Japan.

Also notable was the presence of the United States, engaged in a policy of containment of the Soviet Union (USSR). This policy allowed for consensus in political and academic circles that the US was, and still is, a regional player due to its role in maintaining regional security as well as its political, strategic, economic, and financial interests in the region.

In this setting, two facts marked the Brazil–Japan relationship through time. First, Southeast Asia is the most natural region for Japan to access basic products and to begin and maintain its process of economic recovery. The region would also be a space for “regional leadership,” i.e., “a leader directing its followers’ behavior toward collective goals set by the leader” (Terada 2001, p. 197).

Second, the US’s presence in Asia constrained in part Japan’s ability to reestablish a political power that was compatible to its economic power. Subsequently, Japan witnessed the emergence of a new player in the region competing for influence and power: China.

Furthermore, Southeast Asia only achieved stability after it contained conflicts stemming from border disputes and ideological issues. This happened with the creation of ASEAN2 (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in 1967, initially with five members, due to the continuing instability in Indochina. Therefore, we must consider the hypothesis that the commercial relationship between Brazil and Japan, which started in the mid-1950s, was induced by Japan’s difficult relations with Southeast Asia.

The series of embarrassments in Eastern Asia, the border conflicts in Southeast Asia, historic resentments in the region due to Japan’s imperialist past, as well as the climate of insecurity caused by the presence of Communist China and its later competitive, economic, and political rise can explain the rationale behind the rapprochement and the deepening ties with Brazil. This rapprochement was strengthened by economic complementarity, mutual benefits, and the presence and resourcefulness of the Japanese community in the country.

Despite having at times assumed more independent stances in its foreign policy, Japan never rejected its alliance with the US, even when pursuing its economic interests (Horisaka 2006, p. 150). In this respect, Japan’s economic cooperation with Brazil was always endorsed by the US, as it was interested in Japan’s economic recovery to counter the victory of the Chinese Communist Party and the Korean War.

It can therefore be observed that, given the changing roles of the US and China through time, Japan began to see the need to broaden its economic, political, and strategic ties with countries outside the Eastern Asian region.

Brazil had in turn been under the influence of the US since the end of World War II, a situation that was militarily institutionalized by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947), and legally and politically institutionalized with the creation of the Organization of American States (1948). Since there was no economic consensus, due to conflicting interests, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), linked to the United Nations system, was implemented in 1948.

Brazil’s goal to continue its (automatic) strategic alliance with the United States in the post-war period clashed with the US’s foreign policy turn, when it took responsibility for international security, opposing the USSR and denying Latin America financial resources to boost economic development. Brazil thus aimed to diversify and universalize its foreign partnerships. This strategy became economically viable after the mid-1950s, when the recovery of Japan and Germany began to bear fruits, allowing for commercial relations and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows; it became even more significant after Japan became an economic superpower.

This chapter aims to reassess the Brazil–Japan relationship, with emphasis on the post-Cold War era, although briefly commenting on previous relations. To better comprehend its meaning and the mutual expectations, this reinterpretation focuses on strategies, characteristics and means of cooperation in the political, economic, commercial, and technological dimensions. While analyzing a possible strategic partnership, one must highlight the landmark moments as well as the circumstances that resulted in either broader or more limited bilateral ties.

At the beginning of this chapter, we will discuss the notion of strategic partnership and its application to the history of relations between Brazil and Japan during the Cold War. Then we will examine the first attempts to boost bilateral ties from the 1990s, focusing on the role of the Asian financial crisis in the rapprochement of the early 2000s, with milestones such as the formation of the G4 in 2004, the adoption of the Japanese system of Digital Television in 2006 and the commemoration of one hundred years of Japanese immigration to Brazil in 2008. Finally, we will discuss the efforts of the then Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe to strengthen the alliance after the global crisis of 2008, as well as the consequences of the growing Chinese influence in Latin America.

2 From an Economic Standpoint to a Political Perspective: Basis for a Strategic Partnership?

Japan, under the Yoshida Doctrine and with the US military alliance as a foreign policy cornerstone, aimed to maximize its economic presence abroad. While emphasizing the need for economic recovery, Japan was always careful not to mix politics and economy, which allowed it to establish economic ties with Cuba even after the 1959 revolution and with China well before the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972.

For better understanding, Matsushita (1994, 1998) divides Japanese diplomacy toward Latin America during the Cold War into three distinct periods, based on Japan’s international position.3 His division assumes that there are three types of countries, organized by their level of influence on relevant international issues. One extreme is the influential countries which can impose their values on others, formulate international economic policies, and are called “makers.” The other extreme is countries who must accept international decisions without taking part on the decision-making process, the “takers.” The middle space is occupied by countries that are not powerful or fragile; they are called “shakers.”

From Japan’s surrender until 1960, it remained tightly bound to the US’s sphere of influence, functioning as a taker. In the 1960s, due to the economic recovery, it improved its international stance. It gained limited capacity to exert influence, making it a shaker, but not a maker. The shift from shaker to economic maker happened when it was included as a member of the G7 (1975).

Hence, Japan initially functioned as a taker while it was suffering the consequences of its defeat in the Pacific Front and the demographic problems caused by the return of citizens from the Manchuria region and the Korean Peninsula. Japan therefore turned to Latin America to reopen migration flows. Subsequently, already a shaker benefiting from economic recovery, interest in migration was abandoned, but the interests in Latin America as a consumer market for industrial products and a source of natural resources grew.

Finally, backed by its economic and technological capabilities, during the 1980s, Nakasone aimed to transform Japan into an international player with a political role that was compatible to its economic power, and was able to employ its military capabilities as a legitimate instrument of state power (Hook 1996, p. 70).

Therefore, by the end of the Cold War, Japan was a highly sophisticated manufacturer of technologically advanced arms with an arsenal similar to the main global powers that included nuclear technology (Oliveira 2019). It was also involved in a scientific and technological cooperation with the United States and its military resources and innovative technology meant that it played a meaningful role in international security. Its constraints were determined by technology, not politics (Vogel 1992, pp. 56–57).

Matsushita (1998, pp. 148–149) claims that this quest for political influence suggests that Japan abandoned the political separation between politics and economy in diplomacy, recognizing that international economic issues are intrinsic to politics.

In this regard, the Brazil–Japan bilateral relationship can also be interpreted as part of Japan’s strategy to reduce dependence on the American market, especially since the 1960s (Matsushita 1998; Tsunekawa 1998). Brazil took a similar stance by launching an “Independent Foreign Policy” under President Jânio Quadros’s government (1961), in a quest for autonomy and diversified multilateral policy, motivated by the country’s concrete interests.

We must also point out that Brazilian Foreign Policy was formulating a concept of dual foreign policy. One stemmed from its historical and traditional ties to the West; the other, from the set of deficiencies that united it to other countries in an unfavorable position in the International System. However, the dual policy approach did not entail the need to choose between different alternatives. On the contrary, they were complimentary motions that pointed to an attempt to diminish dependence on the US.

It must also be pointed out that the first period of Brazilian Foreign Policy’s universalization coincides with the moment when new economic powers, especially Germany and Japan, were searching for ways to redefine their foreign policy, also aiming to diminish their dependence on the US. In this regard, we can assume that Brazil’s position benefited from the fiercer competition between developed countries.

It is interesting that these economic superpowers (Germany and Japan) supported the Third World’s demands for a New International Economic Order, sponsoring conferences in the North–South Dialog. Germany regarded Brazil as a moderate ally in these negotiations. In this regard, in March 1978, it claimed that “Brazil should serve as a bridge in the creation of a new world order.” In 1976, Ernesto Geisel rejected the Japanese Prime Minister’s suggestion to function as a mediator between North and South, arguing that “in reality, Brazil is in the group of underdeveloped countries … it cannot become a mediator simply because it is so much a part of that group” (Hurrell 2013, pp. 287–297).

It is based on these premises that the present work aims to question whether the strategic partnership between Brazil and Japan is real or an illusion.

Abreu (2008) dismisses the concept of strategic partnership by arguing that “few terms have been used in such imprecise, incorrect or abusive manner as strategic partnership, especially when it comes to establishing priorities.” By naming Brazil specifically, the author argues that “the proliferation of priorities means the absence of priorities. When all partners are strategic, none of them are.”

We differ from this understanding, arguing that Brazil has a vast array of interests, combined with severely limited resources, which force the country to maintain political guidelines when diversifying partnerships, creating interdependences, or universalizing foreign policy. In this conflict between interests and available resources, selective universalism becomes more preeminent. Although contradictory, Brazil aimed to uphold a universalist perspective while, at the same time, establishing different pragmatic, non-exclusionary alliances, and partnerships, to promote its interests. According to Lessa (1998, p. 37), “the idea of a strategic partnership is investigated in order to clarify interactions that allow for substantial gains in an international scenario marked by narrowing margins for decision-making.”

It must be highlighted that what is crucial are the interests at stake, as Minister Azeredo da Silveira observed during a conference at the Brazilian National War College:

In a world of constant change there are no permanent agreements nor everlasting divergences. Under such conditions, there can be no automatic alignments, since the object of diplomatic action are not countries, but situations. What we must do in each moment is explore the spectrum of coincidence we have with other countries, aiming at the same time to reduce the areas of divergence or confrontation. This pragmatic attitude is the very essence of the diplomatic activity. (Fonseca 1998, p. 321)

The concept of partnership suggests prioritizing a certain bilateral relationship with political and economic relevance. The term “strategic” aims to distinguish those bilateral relationships as “more important” and define them as priority among multiple relationships.

Therefore, in the present case, both concepts apply. The first is due to historic experience, which conveys the relationship’s great political and economic relevance for the development strategy. This is because the relationship “demanded political support, political coordination, increase in capital flow, consumer markets, as well as scientific and technological cooperation.” The idea of strategic partnership derived from the universalist project, which is “the realization of efforts to diversify foreign partnerships, which gain relevance as instruments to attain larger margins for autonomous international action, essential for the implementation of the modernization strategy” (Lessa and Oliveira 2013, 9–10).

3 Phases of the Bilateral Relationship During the Cold War

The history of the Brazil–Japan relationship during the Cold War can be divided into three different periods with different emphases (Torres Filho 1996).

The first begins in the late 1950s, when a partnership based on economic complementarity is established. The second, during the 1970s, when the economic complementarity is resumed, but based on a political rapprochement with the common goal of reducing dependence on the international system. The third, a distancing phase, starts during the 1980s and occurred due to the debt crisis and the deepening of bilateral litigation as well as the loss of Brazil’s attractiveness, given Japan’s new status in the world as the main international creditor.

During the first phase, Japanese investments were clearly complementary to Brazil’s industrial structure. Brazil was a major supplier of raw materials and agricultural products, while Japan met Brazil’s need for basic industrial products and capital goods for its industrialization process. Japan’s goal was to ensure safe sources of raw materials and to secure its status as an exporter of manufactured goods.

During this period, we can list some economic cooperation initiatives such as Japan’s association to the construction project of a steel plant in the State of Minas Gerais, the transfer of textile industries, the construction of Ishibrás shipyards in Rio de Janeiro, and the Toyota factory in São Paulo. For Brazil, both Japanese and European investments, were crucial to resume the development project, given the difficulty obtaining resources from the US.

The second phase, during the 1970s, coincides with the golden years of the so-called Brazilian economic miracle, when Japan became an economic powerhouse and there was a sharp appreciation of the Yen, as a result of the Smithsonian Agreement and the suspension of convertibility of US dollars to gold.

During this period, Japan resumed, and then increased, its investments in Brazil, particularly toward the development of large energy- and natural resource-intensive projects, such as Cenibra (cellulose), Tubarão (steel industry), Albrás and Alunorte (aluminum). These all occurred in partnership with Companhia Vale do Rio Doce.

The most relevant project was PRODECER (Cerrado Development Program),4 aimed at developing soy production. For Japan, soy production in Brazil had a strategic purpose, as the country sought to defend itself from the US’s withholding of soy to Japan as a means of political and economic pressure. The speedy success of soy plantations turned Brazil, in a decade, into the second largest producer of soy worldwide.

For Hosono (2016), PRODECER is one of the main examples of international cooperation provided by Japan through Official Development Assistance (ODA). It works as a catalyst for the economic transformation of developing countries, supporting inclusive growth by making investments in infrastructure, technological innovation, human resources, and institution building. In Brazil, these actions resulted in the transformation of the Cerrado biome and, gradually, of Brazilian agriculture itself.

Hollerman (1988, pp. 17, 21) interprets this partnership as a strategy to reduce Japan’s dependence on the US, which, according to him, was conspiratorial and defiant in nature. “The Brazilian case is thus a model of Japanese strategy in challenging the United States through the aspirations of others. Japan’s policy of promoting a ‘horizontal division’ in the world economy is a euphemism for this strategy.” When the US decided in 1973 to use the soy market as a weapon against Japan, the foundations were laid for the investments on PRODECER. “According to a Japanese official who participated in his government’s decision to provide funds for the soybean Project, its purpose was to ‘keep the United States honest.’”

However, economic complementary began to decrease in the early 1980s, due in part to the diminished importance of ensuring the supply of raw materials. This happened because of an increase in supply and decrease in prices, as well as the acceleration of the Latin American economic crisis. As pointed out by Hamaguchi (2020), “Japan was unprepared to face debt defaults, interruption of joint projects and the downturn of local markets.”

Furthermore, the diminished importance of Latin America was reinforced by Japan’s economic reorientation toward China and Southeast Asia, especially after the sharp appreciation of the Yen against the dollar due to the 1985 Plaza Accord and subsequent reallocation of capital by Japanese companies (Schwartz 1991; Oliveira 1994; Uehara 2003; Fraga and Strachman 2013).

It must be pointed out that, despite the relative economic and commercial distancing, scientific cooperation between the countries, which was already a reality in the 1960s, not only continued but also allowed for the creation of a new modality, called triangular cooperation, which is especially present in Africa.

4 First Attempts to Resume the Relationship and the Importance of the Asian Crisis

Since the early 1990s, there has been a slight revival of Brazil’s relationship with Asia, albeit with considerable differences regarding previous periods. While Japan remained the main commercial partner and largest investor, it gradually lost ground to other competitors, and Japanese investments decreased considerably. Relations with China, South Korea, and ASEAN expanded significantly.

Japan remained either indifferent or distant from the process of privatization that took place in the Brazilian economy. As the US secured its position as Brazil’s main partner, Europe expanded its presence in key sectors, especially in the banking system and telecommunications. Spain became the fifth largest investor in the country, surpassing Japan.

Japan’s apathy toward Brazil stemmed first from a negative view of the country, which was coming from a period marked by high inflation rates and accumulated debt—despite its recovery in the 1990s—as well as the reduced activities of Japanese companies in Brazil. At the same time, Japanese companies had not yet recovered from the collapse of the bubble economy and were simply not prepared to expand their presence in the Brazilian market (Nishibayashi 2003, p. 210).

A crucial turning point for the rapprochement between Japan and Latin America was the Asian crisis of 1997–1998. This led to changes in Asia’s foreign policy strategy, as well as its perception of Latin America (Mols 2005).

It became an accepted notion that the crisis had broken out due to the commercial conflict between Japan and the US, regardless of financial issues. Since the crisis directly affected the Asian economy, countries were more aware of the need to organize in some type of regional mechanism that could act consistently in defense of regional interests on the international level. The creation of ASEAN+3 (ASEAN + Japan, China, and South Korea), without the participation of any members from outside the region, meant the recognition of East Asia as a region, a fact that Bergsten (2000) interpreted as the world being divided into three different blocs.

Furthermore, despite the increasing number of initiatives for Latin America, there remained a certain distrust regarding the region, which was considered unstable, as shown by the Mexican financial crisis in early 1995. However, the Asian crisis led the continent to reassess its views on Latin America and realize the need for closer relations between them. This, combined with the fear that a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) would make it more difficult for Asia to access the American market, allowed for the creation of the Forum for East Asia–Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC).5 Japan played a crucial role in the development of FEALAC by promoting the first meetings, with funds from the Japan Special Fund at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

Thus, the response to the crisis not only addressed specific issues for Asia, but it also introduced a third bloc in the redefinition of the International Order and System. A third bloc that thus far had one major competitor (Japan) but would soon boast a second claimant to regional and international power: China.

The effects of the crisis on commerce and the economy were not as positive for the Brazil–Japan relationship as they were on the political realm. Trade flows, which had begun to increase in the first half of the decade, were affected by the downturn of imports as well as the halt of FDI. Only in the early years of the twenty-first century, after China’s accession to the WTO, was there a significant increase in trade flows between the two regions.

Japan’s renewed interest in regionalism forced it to adopt a soft balancing strategy aiming to contain China’s growing influence. A more aggressive strategy, based on an alliance with the US, would be impossible since China’s economy was already crucial for Japan’s prosperity. Besides, China’s growth strategy is based on soft power (Sohn 2010). Okamoto (2009, p. 34) argues that “improving the relationship between Japan and Asia cannot be at the expense of the close ties between Japan and the US. They are perfectly compatible with one another.”

Asia and the US are, thus, the main and most important priorities for Japan’s foreign policy. Although Latin America is not a priority for Japan, there is growing interest in the region because of the changes in East Asia, especially the economic and political rise of China.

For Tsunekawa (2010), Japan drastically changed its view on Latin America in the past 10–15 years. After dealing with political and economic instabilities, hyperinflation, military rule, and autocratic regimes, and under strong influence from the US, the region became much more independent and politically democratic, with a much more stable and prosperous economy. But Latin America was not the only region going through changes. East Asia also changed, especially in terms of the economy, with China and other countries expanding their capacities and reducing Japan’s predominance. In a nutshell, according to Tsunekawa (2010) “Japan was compelled to reassess its relationship with Latin America”.

An alternative view is that, since after the 1980s crisis, Asia and South America remained distant and China filled the gap, forcing Japan to take a more proactive stance in its relationship with Brazil and South America (Hamaguchi 2020).

Economic relations between Asia and Latin America, previously dominated by Japan, became more diversified, forcing Japan to adjust its relationship with the region. Therefore, Japan’s renewed interest in Brazil can be ascribed, on the one hand, to changes in the Asian economy, due to its growing dependence on the Chinese market, and, on the other, to the fact that (emerging) countries from the South gained more political and economic relevance.

4.1 Perspectives of Reapprochement of Brazil and Japan in the Twenty-First Century

Keindanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) and CNI (Brazilian National Confederation of Industry), coordinators of the Brazil–Japan Economic Cooperation Committee, intending to revitalize the bilateral economic relationship, launched in 2000 a document called Brazil–Japan: Alliance for the 21st Century, pointing out bottlenecks and strategies to bring the countries closer.

At that time Brazil and Japan had decided to strengthen the partnership via triangular cooperation, with the signature of the Japan–Brazil Partnership Program (JBPP), which became an intergovernmental legal framework. It must be noted that, for both Brazil and Japan, fomenting international cooperation is a foreign policy tool (Uehara 2010; Aragusuku 2011).

Declarations by Japanese public figures made clear that there were high hopes for rekindling the Brazil–Japan relationship. “During the 80s and 90s, due to economic circumstances in both countries, the relationship stagnated, but we can feel it revive nowadays.” He added that the 100th Anniversary of Japanese Immigration in Brazil (2008) would be an opportunity “to reflect upon the construction of a new Japan–Brazil relationship, looking at the next hundred years, and not just as an occasion to remember the past” (Ishida 2005). Or the fact that “major Japanese colonies in Brazil serve as a basis for an economic rapprochement between these two countries […] and the recovery of the Japanese economy [shows that] the time has come for a new phase of economic rapprochement between the two countries” (Suzuki 2005).

In the first years of the twenty-first century, neither Brazil nor Japan were priorities for each other’s foreign policy. Brazil was too involved in the political, strategic and economic consolidation of South America, as well as its deeper ties with emerging powers (IBSA, BRICS) while Japan aimed to strengthen ties with the US and the European Union, and to reorganize East Asia as a means to diminish China’s regional influence (the proposal of the East Asia Community, reintroducing external players like India, Australia and New Zealand).

In line with the change of Brazil’s image abroad, after a meeting in March 2003, right after the inauguration of President Lula, the Japanese section of the Brazil–Japan Economic Cooperation Committee stated that “the new government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has solid economic and trade policies, regarded as positive both in Brazil and abroad, besides valuing efforts to attract foreign investments” (Horisaka 2016a, pp. 85–86).

Horisaka points out that, in this 2003 meeting, due to the advance in the FTAA negotiations, and the MERCOSUR–EU Free Trade Agreement, the possibility of a trade agreement between Brazil and Japan was suggested.

In the 2005 meeting, on Lula’s visit to Japan, a study group on the EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement) was created, prompted by a myriad of factors, such as the mutual visits, Digital TV, and the acquisition of Embraer6 aircraft by Japan Airlines in 2007 (Horisaka 2016a, p. 88).

It is not possible to pinpoint which individual factor was responsible for the rapprochement between Japan and Brazil. In actuality, many factors are responsible for the event, besides the need to avoid a very ubiquitous presence of China that might thwart Japan’s freedom of action. However, as acts of good will from both parts on the intent to improve the bilateral relationship, three initiatives, in three different dimensions, can be highlighted: (i) the constitution of the G4 in 2004; (ii) the adoption of the Japanese Digital TV system in 2006; and (iii) the celebration of one hundred years of Japanese immigration in Brazil in 2008 (Cavalcante 2015).

Even though the intention to form a new and renewed United Nations Security Council had been on the diplomatic agenda since the early 1990s, the G4 acquired a formal political dimension, more assertive and official “with the proposal by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi” (Amorim 2005). The proposal, which included Germany, Japan–Brazil, and India, was highly symbolic, as it encompassed two developed and two developing (or emerging) countries, representing different regions of the world (Europe, East Asia–Latin America, and South Asia).7

The initiative was important because it proved that the bilateral relationship between Brazil and Japan was no longer limited to economic, commercial, and financial interests, or simply international cooperation, but also encompassed the political dimension, i.e., a joint venture in the quest to redefine the International System and Order. Japan’s recognition of Brazil’s role in future international negotiations on the restructuring of the commercial and financial orders, as well as the participation on coalitions of developing countries (UNASUR, IBSA, BRICS) was implied.

The process to digitalize the terrestrial television signal started during the Collor Government, but peaked during the Lula Government, with the launch of SBDTV (Brazilian Digital Television System), and the option (2006) to use the Japanese technology ISDB-T (Integrated Services Digital Broadcasting Terrestrial) instead of the European or North American standards (Ogasavara and Masiero 2010, pp. 185–186; Carvalho and Carvalho 2012).

Besides the undeniable technological quality of the Japanese standard, other factors influenced Brazil’s decision, such as the possibility to (i) take part in the technological adjustments necessary for the reality of undeveloped countries; (ii) the installation of a semiconductor fabrication plant in the country; and (iii) the possibility of increasing its presence in other countries, especially in South America.

Therefore, Brazil’s adoption of the Japanese standard for Digital TV, besides being “a symbol of this new bilateral relationship we can call the partnership of the twenty-first century” (Otta 2007), also became a symbol of technological cooperation between Brazil and Japan as it was reshaped with resources developed in Brazilian research centers and universities which were provided in the agreement signed with the Japanese government. Therefore, with technological innovations developed in Brazil, the Japanese standard became a Japanese–Brazilian standard, and was a clear example of technological collaboration (Oliveira 2009; Cavalcante 2015).

The Japanese–Brazilian standard was developed by integrating the technical basis of the Japanese system with Brazilian standards of digital compression of audio and video. Technologies developed by the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro and Federal University of Paraíba were used, with emphasis on Ginga, the open-source national middleware platform (a software that translates what the user wants into the system and exchanges information between the application, the operating system and the device’s electronic component) (IPEA 2018, p. 159; Vieira 2018).

Hitherto only available in Japanese–Brazilian and Japanese representatives became committed to promoting a standard that was adequate to the reality in Latin America, as Ginga was “internationally recognized as one of four digital television standards worldwide by the ITU (International Telecommunication Union)” (Carvalho and Carvalho 2012, p. 3).

After the Japanese–Brazilian system had been implemented in South America (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), Japanese–Brazilian delegations endeavored to implement them in Central America (Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras), Asia (Philippines, Maldives, and Sri Lanka), and Botswana in Africa (IPEA 2018, p. 159). The Brazilian and Japanese governments provided technical cooperation to the countries that adopted the standard. In March 2019, Angola also adopted the Japanese–Brazilian standard (Cufuna 2020). As pointed out by Ken Shimanouchi, when developing digital TV technology based on the Japanese system, Brazil was triggering “another important aspect of this cooperation: collaboration with third countries” (Otta 2007).

Another expectation attached to the definition of the Digital TV standard was the condition that a semiconductor fabrication plant be built in the country. When this was suggested, the North American delegation withdrew from the negotiations, especially because the investment proposal (US$ 150 million in total) was much lower than that of other competitors (US$ 400 million from the Europeans and US$ 500 million from the Japanese), although none of them ensured the installation of a plant.

Even after Decree 558 (September 2006) earmarked resources from the Funding Authority for Studies and Projects for research and development in the field of semiconductors,8 the government did not receive any concrete proposal on the installation of a semiconductor fabrication plant in Brazil. The terms of installation signed by the Brazilian and Japanese governments (June 2006) did not ensure a semiconductor fabrication plant, but only hinted at a possible cooperation on the electronic industry: “the Japanese Government will cooperate for the development of the semiconductor industry […] to attract investments from semiconductor manufacturers in Brazil” (Cruz 2008).

During the celebration of one hundred years of Japanese immigration in Brazil (2008), Itamaraty mentioned the installation of the semiconductor fabrication plant, but the response was clear that the Japanese government “cannot do anything about these investments, as they depend on the decisions of private companies” (Marin 2008).

The Brazilian government’s emphasis on the celebration of one hundred years of Japanese immigration, as well as the visit of Crown Prince Naruhito to Brazil in June, taking part in the official ceremonies, was proof of both parts’ unequivocal interest to use the commemorations as an opportunity to resume and expand the bilateral relationship. The term used by ambassador Ken Shimanouchi (2009) conveyed the mutual interest by saying: “to put it in other words, this is the ‘rediscovery’ of Brazil.” In this regard, the Centennial celebrations were a valuable opportunity to “remodel the traditional relationship between Japan and Brazil, with new characteristics in terms of diversity and quality.”

Shimanouchi also mentioned the role of “the largest Nikkei community outside Japan,” or the “special bond” built through national projects such as Usiminas, Albrás, the development of the Cerrado biome, between the 1960s and 80s.

Although not emblematic, the bilateral rapprochement in the energy sector was also significant during this period. This comprised both biofuels and petroleum. Mitsui, although not intending to produce ethanol, showed interest in its logistics, transportation and distribution in Brazilian and Japanese territories; Mitsubishi looked for opportunities to buy private plants to produce ethanol in the country; Marubeni inquired about the possibility to develop a project to produce irrigated sugarcane in the State of Maranhão; Itochu announced that it was interested in the production, commercialization, and logistics of ethanol fuel. The government signed agreements with Japan for cooperation in this field, and it advanced talks to invest US$ 1.2 billion in research, production, and distribution of ethanol fuel. The preliminary project to use funds from Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) provided for R$ 680 million in projects for the manufacturing of sugarcane into ethanol and biofuels, R$ 520 million in direct investments to manufacturers, and R$ 86 million in research.9

In its strategic plan, Petrobras included the goal of surpassing the US as the world leader in biofuels sales by 2011, with national production of ethanol and biodiesel. To reach this goal, it started the Japanese company Nipaku, in partnership with the state company Nippon Alcohol Hanbai, to commercialize Brazilian ethanol in Japan and Asia (Caldas 2007).

For US$ 50 million, Petrobras bought 87.5% of the shares of the Japanese refinery Nansei Sekiyu, which belonged to the North American group ExxonMobil, while the other 12.5% belonged to Sumitomo. Petrobras also planned to invest US$ 885 million to modernize the refinery and sell oil derivatives in Japan and other Asian countries and to use the refinery’s storage capacity to sell fuels, including ethanol, to neighboring countries, such as Korea and China (Agência Estado 2007).

The signing of JBPP (March 2000) was a big incentive to expand triangular cooperation provided by the two countries in Africa, allowing Brazil to play the role of a partner with similar responsibilities to those of Japan instead of just acting as a recipient. Thus, the “Brazil–Angola–Japan project: Building Capabilities at the Josina Machel Hospital” was one of the program’s first projects. Seen as a test case of triangular cooperation, and presenting satisfactory results, it made the ProForsa, or HSPSP (Angola Health System Performance Strengthening Project) possible; this project was considered more ambitious (Sakaguchi and Veiga 2010; Cavalcante 2015, p. 81).

The most emblematic cooperation project was the Prosavana (Triangular Cooperation Program for agricultural development of Mozambique’s tropical savannah), signed in 2009, with the participation of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), the JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) and the Mozambique Agrarian investigation Institute, among others.

ProSavana was inspired and tried to reproduce the success of PRODECER. The main goal was to improve the research capacity and technology transfer to develop and implement productive projects in the field of commercial and family agriculture. However, critics pointed out that the project favored Vale (coal exports through the port of Nacala-a-Velha) and Odebrecht (construction works to turn the air base of Nacala into an international airport). But the main criticism regarded the lack of transparency, as they excluded peasant organizations and civil society representatives in Mozambique (Cavalcante 2015, pp. 94–96). This is the primary concern with projects based on the PRODECER model, which had been implemented in an uninhabited area with exceptionally large land properties; it was incompatible with the Mozambican territory, which featured small farms with high demographic density.10

4.2 Difficulties Caused by Crises and Abe’s Efforts to Strengthen the Partnership “Together”

There were two major obstacles to creating closer ties between the two countries at the end of the 2000s. First, the global financial crisis of 2008, which hit developed countries especially hard and affected both imports and investments, causing a negative impact on Japan’s relationship with Brazil.

The other major obstacle, also caused by the crisis, directly affected the political and strategic dimension. It forced Japan to focus on regional issues in East Asia, but also created incentives for a rapprochement with Brazil both economically and politically.

As the environment in East Asia became more unstable and China’s power and influence grew more assertive, Japan sought to play a more hegemonic role in the region and, in view of its nuclear vulnerability, strengthened its military alliance with the US and expanded defense and military security cooperation with some ASEAN members (Emmers 2018, p. 362).

However, with difficulty trusting the US’s commitment to safeguarding security in the region and considering the growing certainty of China’s rise not only economically, but also politically and strategically, Japan was forced to expand partnerships outside the region. Reelected in December 2012, Shinzo Abe stated that he had come back to rejuvenate11 Japan, to overcome the long period of economic stagnation after the global financial crisis of 2008, and to restore national pride and power (Inoguchi 2014, p. 102).

With the prestige he obtained after the initial success of the economic project, Abe introduced the doctrine of “proactive pacifism,” a clear demonstration of the changes he would affect during his mandate. One particularly meaningful change was the substitution of the economic model controlled by the bureaucracy, who made the decisions, for a stronger political leadership (Horisaka 2016a, p. 83).

Therefore, in 2014, during Abe’s visit, the Brazil–Japan relationship was elevated to the level of Global Strategic Partnership. There was the establishment of an annual Brazil–Japan Dialog between Foreign Ministers, to discuss political, strategic, and economic issues. President Dilma highlighted that Japan was Brazil’s most traditional partner in Asia and recognized the key role it played in international economic and political issues (Brasil 2014).

It is obvious that Abe’s intention, two weeks after Xi Jinping’s visit to Brazil, was to redefine relations with Brazil (and Latin America) after China had become Brazil’s largest commercial partner in 2009 and had been increasing investments in the country. By recalling Japan’s historic presence and the partnership between the two countries, he proposed to “expand relations further, to grow together, to contribute together and inspire together.” For Saccomandi (2014), Abe’s declaration referred to the fact that Japan proposed common development, while China prioritized its own.

In practice, Japan was proposing new guidelines to strengthen the relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean, based on “Together”, namely “Progress together” (strengthen economic connections through global chains of value and quality infrastructure); “Lead together” (strengthen value connections through common ground and political dialog); and “Inspire together” (strengthen knowledge connections to face challenges through innovation) (Japan 2014).

Even if the brief time frame between the visits was a coincidence, they had the same motivations and were attracted by Brazil’s economic, commercial, and political assets. The strategies were, however, different. Both were interested in energy investment deals, while Japan was also seeking support for its candidacy to a non-permanent member seat at the Security Council in 2015. While China could offer its consumer market and an abundance of resources for investment, Japan was betting on the untapped potential of the ethnically Japanese population in Brazil, as well as political values such as democracy (Ford 2014).

As a highly symbolic gesture that expressed Japan’s interest in Brazil, Abe launched the global cultural center “Japan House,” aiming to value Japan in the international community, mixing soft power with commercial interests (Farnsworth 2017). It must be noted that the first Japan House was inaugurated in São Paulo, in May 2017, followed by London in June 2018, and Los Angeles in August 2018.

Aware of the difficulty, or even the impossibility, of competing with China and its ambitious Belt and Roads Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Acharya 2017, pp. 277–278), Japan began emphasizing the quality of its investments over their quantity, implicitly contrasting its standards of engagement in the Latin American economy with China’s (Farnsworth 2017).

As was pointed out before, the debt crisis of the 1980s had a negative effect on the economic and trade relationship, but not on technical cooperation, which even allowed for the emergence of triangular cooperation. In this regard, Japan’s new guidelines (“Together”) reinforced the principles of triangular cooperation as an instrument for the development of recipient countries, but also as an instrument to strengthen strategic partnerships and increase its presence on the world stage. Objectively, they reinforce the Brazil–Japan partnership and improve both countries’ international image.

Triangular cooperation with Brazil is a priority for Japan, since “it views Brazil as a major emerging country that can transfer know-how to other developing countries, and a major emerging country with which it shares similar political characteristics.” Furthermore, Japan does not even consider the possibility of a similar cooperation with China, as they are competing for international influence (Inoue and Vaz 2012, p. 523).

Hamaguchi and Murakami (2014, p. 165) claim that Japan’s slow population decline jeopardizes the future of the industry and economic growth in the country, which forces them to transfer production abroad. However, the globalization of Japan’s industry is highly concentrated in East Asia, and it does not successfully advance in other promising markets. The authors argue that “with its high level of manufacturing technology, the Japanese industry still keeps high potential to grow if it innovates strategy for globalization” and that “Latin America presents fertile unexplored opportunities in this direction.”

Horisaka (2016b, p. 170) also highlights the tendency of population decline and argues that “looking for opportunities in the foreign market is inevitable for Japanese companies”; he adds that “Brazil is a strong candidate for this purpose.”

The lack of integration in Latin America, without much trade of intermediate goods, is an obstacle for designing a strategy in the region. For example, Mexico’s production is still dependent on the supply of parts from East Asia, which makes it more profitable to export directly to the US instead of assembling items in Mexico, as it is cheaper to acquire parts (Hamaguchi and Murakami 2014, p. 174).

Even so, the population with medium income has been growing, and with it the consumption of high-tech products, which stimulate innovations that help meet the demand. “The recent adaptation of the Japanese Digital TV system by most LACs based on Japan–Brazil technological cooperation is a good example” (Hamaguchi and Murakami 2014, pp. 175–176).

It is interesting that, during the 1970s, when Japanese investments in Brazil peaked, criticisms were the same. Horisaka (1990) pointed out the following hindrances to the larger flow of Japanese capital into Brazil during the 1980s: (i) the fact that the market had stagnated and needed to be made more dynamic by increasing the population’s purchasing power (social, land, education and tax reforms); (ii) the need for more industrial linkages in the regional market; and (iii) closer economic ties with the US. In general, Horisaka pointed out the need to expand markets, which meant that along with the Brazilian market, the Latin American and North American markets were of interest.

Given that Japan’s diagnosis in the 1970s was real, as rated by Horisaka, but it did not become a reality for the lack of a broader and more stable market, we can argue with a certain level of confidence that Asia’s current tendency to allocate FDI in Brazil’s manufacturing sector is a result of a broader market assessment, as well as the existence of a specialized workforce and a stable political and economic environment. That is why, in the early years of the 2010s, there was a clear investment tendency, not only from China, but also Japan and Korea, in the country’s manufacturing and service industries.12

Besides the tendency to transfer production to Brazil–Japan also shows constant interest in forming closer ties by signing an EPA. According to Horisaka (2016a, pp. 87–93), after the EPA study group of 2005, the High-Level Group Brazil–Japan was created in 2007. After five meetings, in 2015, it presented the report Brazil–Japan: Roadmap for an Economic Partnership Agreement, with a large array of subjects to be debated that could build broader economic ties than a free trade area. Recognizing the difficulties of such a task, especially when considering the embarrassments caused by MERCOSUR’s customs union, Horisaka pointed out that the report “is an achievement of Keindanren and CNI’s business diplomacy”.13

While Japan resumed its economic growth and left the deflation period behind, thanks to a series of economic policies Shinzo Abe implemented after coming to power in 2012 (Abenomics), growing tensions in Brazil, together with the serious recession that began in 2015, brought the negotiations to a halt. Nevertheless, the opposition of the industrial sectors in Brazil and Argentina, fearful of the Japanese competition, cannot be omitted (Olmos 2007).

5 Conclusion

The history and motivations for the bilateral relationship between Brazil and Japan show the reality of a shared mutual interest, which can be called a partnership, albeit prone to crises led by circumstances.

First, although neither Brazil nor Japan was each other’s first option to establish a migration flow, random factors created the conditions for Brazil to become the country with the largest Japanese population outside Japan.14 This was not a decisive factor, but it provided a “symbolic tie between the two countries” (Uehara 2013, p. 145). Ninomiya (2016, pp. 159–161), for example, argues that the bilateral relationship is founded on the “human bond” created by the Japanese who migrated to Brazil, as well as the presence of dekasegi Brazilian citizens.

Second, the economic and financial complementarity enabled them to contribute to each other’s national development projects. This complementarity suffered setbacks during the 1980s due in part to the acceleration of the economic crisis in Latin America, but also to Japan’s economic reorientation toward China and Southeast Asia. This was especially true after the appreciation of the Yen against the dollar, with the Plaza Accord in 1985 and the subsequent reallocation of capital from Japanese companies.

Third, and despite the growing conflict between the US and Japan in the 1990s, in the so-called dispute between the Asian and Western economies, Japan was interested in a rapprochement with Latin America, and Brazil in particular. An emblematic example of this interest is the ongoing partnership in providing triangular cooperation; a concrete example of such partnership was the role Japan played in financing the first meetings of the recently institutionalized FEALAC.

Fourth, the will for closer ties between Asia and Latin America is evident. The starting point for this is the initiatives aiming at institutionalizing a high-level political rapprochement and implementing programs and plans to create closer economic, political, and cultural ties between the two regions. Koizumi’s visit in 2004, and Abe’s in 2014 convey these favorable circumstances to elevate the bilateral relationship to the level of a Global Strategic Partnership.

Besides Brazil’s traditional attractiveness, for Japan the partnership also conveys ongoing changes in East Asia, or even in the International System. On the one hand, it prevented the American continent from closing in on itself as a free trade area; on the other, it minimized embarrassments or dependence because of the roles China increasingly played as both a regional and global power.

Notes

  1. 1.

    The concept of East Asia has been used since the end of the Cold War, more specifically after the Asian crisis, indicating the tendency to combine countries from Northeast Asia (China, Japan, and the Korean Peninsula) with those of Southeast Asia (Brunei, Cambodia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam).

  2. 2.

    Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are the original members of the ASEAN, created in 1967. Brunei was admitted in 1984; Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1996, and Cambodia in 1999.

  3. 3.

    Matsushita used the model developed by Krasner (1978) and modified by Pempel (1983).

  4. 4.

    PRODECER I began in 1979 and received US$ 60 million. PRODECER II began in 1985 and received US$ 375 million in investments. PRODECER III received investments of US$ 138 million from 1995 to 2002, 60% of which came from the Japanese government. For more detailed accounts, see Dantas (2019) and Hosono et al. (2019).

  5. 5.

    As a basic proposal, this initiative was aimed at institutionalizing a high-level political rapprochement and implementing programs and plans to deepen economic, political, and cultural ties between the two regions. The inaugural meeting took place in September 1999, in Singapore (Meeting of High Officials).

  6. 6.

    “Embraer sells US$ 3,1 bi to Lufthansa and JAL,” Folha de São Paulo, June 19, 2007.

  7. 7.

    Its negative result will not be analyzed here, as it goes beyond the scope of the article.

  8. 8.

    The entirety of the decree can be accessed at: http://www.convergenciadigital.com.br/inf/portaria_558.pdf.

  9. 9.

    “Ethanol attracts a wave of Japanese investments.” Valor Econômico, July 3, 2006. Available at https://jornalcana.com.br/etanol-atrai-onda-de-aportes-japoneses/; “Ethanol: the world wants it. Brazil has it.” Exame, June 15, 2006. Available at https://doczz.com.br/doc/754613/etanol-o-mundo-quer.-o-brasil-tem.

  10. 10.

    Informal conversation with Nobuaki Hamaguchi in September 2018.

  11. 11.

    A response to the effects of the global financial crisis of 2008 and the Triple Disaster of March 11, 2011 (earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster) which deeply affected the population and the government.

  12. 12.

    These were ideas partly discussed by Oliveira (2014).

  13. 13.

    This series of negotiations around the EPA is based on Horisaka (2016a, pp. 87–93).

  14. 14.

    Two factors were crucial. The first, as a result of immigration, and as demanded by the Brazilian government, was that families, and no single individuals, migrated into the country; second, the fact that there was not a strong anti-Japanese sentiment in the country.