On March 2, 2021, CCG hosted a dialogue between CCG President Huiyao Wang and Kerry Brown, Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of the Lau Institute at King’s College London.

Kerry Brown is one of the UK’s leading experts on China. He has a long-standing relationship with the country, having lived in Inner Mongolia from 1994 to 1996 and later serving as the first secretary at the British Embassy in Beijing during his career as a diplomat with the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Since then, Brown has held a number of senior positions in think tanks and academia and written almost 20 books on modern Chinese politics. His most recent book, China Through European Eyes: 800 Years of Cultural and Intellectual Encounter, looks at how European thinkers through history have viewed and understood China in relation to their own societies.

Before this dialogue, in November 2020, Kerry Brown joined a CCG webinar on globalization and China–Europe relations. He also contributed an essay to CCG’s 2021 book Consensus or Conflict? titled “Forging a Partnership Between China and the World in an Era of Division: Finding Common Ground in Climate Change and Health.”

Given Kerry’s deep knowledge of China and his extensive research on external perceptions of the country, he was ideally placed to share insights on the gulf of misunderstanding between China and the West that seemed to widen as the pandemic unfolded. Our conversation, which took place soon after the inauguration of President Biden and just before China’s annual Two Sessions and release of the 14th Five-Year Plan, covered factors shaping perceptions of China in the West, the challenges of understanding Chinese culture and history from the outside, and ways for China and the West to have a more productive dialogue. We started off our conversation by exploring Kerry’s recent research into how European enlightenment thinkers viewed China and how many of these views persist today.

Huiyao Wang: It seems we are at a crossroads. In the last 10 days, President Xi has announced that China has realized the goal of alleviating extreme property, meaning that almost 800 million people have been lifted out of poverty. China is about to have its “Two Sessions”—the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). At the NPC, China is going to launch its 14th Five-Year Plan for 2021–2025.

We also see a lot of changes internationally. We have a new US president, President Biden, who will pursue quite different policies than President Trump. For example, on multilateralism, President Biden is very keen to cooperate on climate change and other issues such as addressing the pandemic and supporting the World Health Organization (WHO). We heard President Biden speak at the Munich Security Conference about 10 days ago, saying that while China is a competitor, there are also areas where the US can collaborate with China.

So, it is a time of new beginnings at the start of a new Lunar New Year. We’d love to hear your thoughts on some key topics that you’ve been contemplating for a number of years. I know that your recent book looks at how the rest of the world has viewed China across history, and in particular, how Europeans have perceived China in the past 800 years. We’d love to hear more about your forthcoming work.

Kerry Brown: It’s an interesting time because normally each year I would go to China several times. In 2019, I was at the Schwartzman College [at Peking University] in October and November, went to see you and other partners, and I’d visit Shanghai and other places. For the last year, there’s been none of that kind of physical traveling to and from China.

So, it means that we have to make an extra effort to maintain dialogue, particularly because politics never stops changing. Politics doesn’t have to get on a plane and fly anywhere. Politics just happens wherever people are. Of course, the political context between China and the world has become much more complicated. Because of that, I started to wonder, has it always been that Europe and China have had a balanced but rather difficult relationship?

So, I went back further and kept on seeing quotes and works by great European thinkers like Leibniz, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Marx, Hegel, Max Weber, and Bertrand Russell, who actually went to China and lectured at Peking University in the early 1920s. And I went even further back to Matteo Ricci. I wondered whether there was kind of a “dual view” of China, sometimes really admiring China, sometimes really criticizing China. So, I pulled together the main works referring to China by the figures I just mentioned.

What struck me was that during the Enlightenment in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly during the eighteenth century, many great figures wrote in some detail about China. This included figures like Rousseau—one of the most important philosophers Europe ever produced, a real polyglot, a man of incredible abilities across a whole range of disciplines; Montesquieu, whose work The Spirit of the Laws was so influential to the foundation of American democracy and the American Constitution; and Voltaire, the ultimate skeptical liberal thinker, someone who still is quoted and read today.

Although these thinkers hadn’t been to China—of course, it wasn’t easy to get there then—they did have a very distinctive view of the country. Voltaire was very admiring and made comparisons between Europe and China, such as comparing the Qing court and Qing emperor to the kind of systems that existed in Europe, and felt that China’s secular system without a state religion was preferable. Leibniz was very much led by looking at evidence that came from China via the Jesuits. He was very close to many Jesuit scholars and read many of their works. He was really interested in what he called the Confucian system of governance. I really tried to look at what China presented to him. He wrote about how his position was not to make value judgments, but rather just to try to understand. In contrast, Montesquieu regarded China as a despotic and autocratic imperial system that was not at all attractive.

In a sense, these are three positions we still see today. It’s extraordinary that some 350 years later these very entrenched positions are still there […] European debate is divided between those who have a very critical view of China and regard China as a threat and those who are very admiring of China and what it’s done with its economy and its political system—the kind of view that is not really that critical. And then there are the ones in that middle space, which is shrinking, who feel that we have a lot to understand before we can make big judgments. I suppose that’s what universities are trying to do, but the politicization of universities has certainly increased and makes it more difficult.

I wrote [China Through European Eyes] because I wanted to know the historic roots of today. But today, I think it’s more difficult than ever to have a reasonable debate about China or with Chinese colleagues that is not misinterpreted or framed as something that has some political meaning, either pro- or anti-China. If I study science, does it make any sense to say that I’m “pro” or “anti” science? I’m just studying science, right? My job as a Sinologist is to study China. There are many aspects of China—its culture, history, politics, and geography. I don’t know what it means to say that I’m “pro” or “anti” China. I’m just interested in the facts that I see about China. I think that spirit is something we have to get back.

Huiyao Wang: Thank you, Kerry. China Through European Eyes is a fascinating book. It’s good to go back to these historical views of China and see how much has evolved and changed. It will be very stimulating for people in China and around the world to look at China from a historical perspective, but also to take a realistic look at modern China.

As you have said, China is something of a hybrid. For example, in the Chinese economy, the private sector accounts for about 60–70 percent, state-owned enterprises make up another 10–20 percent, and another 10–20 percent comes from multinationals investing in China. This mix seems to work well in China.

You have written how China is a hybrid made up of many different elements such as Marxism, capitalism, socialism, and Confucianism. Historically, religion has not been particularly strong in China. In addition, the polity has tended to be rather centralized due to the need to deal with various challenges such as floods, irrigating vast territories, and dealing with invaders from the North. These factors have been important in shaping Chinese history and culture over 5000 years and remain important to the country’s DNA today.

Next, what I would like to explore is how you see the gap between China and various different views of China around the world. Based on your observations, what do you think has contributed to this cognitive gap, and what could be improved or done to overcome it, both in China and in other countries?

Kerry Brown: I think that for Europeans and Americans, there are three things that are very new and very difficult to understand. The first is in modern history. I don’t think there’s ever been an appreciation of China as a strong and powerful country. Historically, since the nineteenth century, the era of colonization and the beginning of the humiliation of China, I think Western mindsets have tended to see China as a marginal place. China’s role as an ally in the Second World War was never really appreciated; China’s participation in the important post-war conferences was rather marginal, even though it had been one of the main allies for the Americans and British in the alliance against fascism. So, attaching this kind of marginality to China is in the European and American mindset.

Now, Europeans and Americans look at China—which has become much stronger economically, militarily, and politically—and the country is not marginal at all and is being restored to its place of historic importance. I think that digesting this shift is proving very difficult in the West as the attitude toward China that has been dominant for most of the post-war period is that it’s a place that is separate and not really part of the developed world. Now, China is entering that developed world with one-fifth of the global population and a significant middle class. This is a big change and I think people are not used to thinking of China as a major equal power. That’s the first problem.

The second issue is that we’ve never really thought of China as a global power. The consolidation of China’s land borders historically and after the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949 meant that China could be described as a land power. We’ve never really thought of China as a naval power but now we see that China has naval assets. I think China has more vessels than the US, though of course technologically, there are big differences. So, China now has power that can be projected way beyond its borders. It has a naval capacity and a cyber capacity. This is something new and I don’t think we have really got used to this idea yet. It has really occurred since the 1980s, with Admiral Liu Huaqing starting the process.

The third thing, which I think is the most difficult, is that the Western world has no idea of what it means to run a world or part of the world on “Chinese values.” This clash of values is the most difficult to deal with because of two problems. One is that, while we think we are certain about our own values as Europeans or Americans, in the last few years, there’s been confusion over what are our values actually are. We are divided in terms of our political values and when we talk about key terms like democracy, we often become more divided. Like the Trump presidency—does that represent true democracy or is it actually the opposite? There’s no denying that people [in the West] are very committed to their beliefs, but these beliefs can vary significantly.

The second problem is that there is a lack of understanding of what to make of Chinese values. Either there is a desire to say that these values are not important, or there is simply no desire to understand them at all. I think that the West has often invested a lot into not wanting to understand China. It’s like confirmation bias—you commit to a certain view, feel like you understand something, and no matter what evidence comes to you, you don’t want to change your mind. We all do this about certain things.

I think that [in the West] there is an assumption that Chinese values are problematic and in conflict with the West, a threat to the West. I have argued, as have a lot of other people including Elizabeth Perry and other distinguished scholars, that Chinese values are “hybrid.” Chinese culture and history have included many different kinds of ethical, philosophical, and religious views, from Confucianism to Daoism and contemporary belief systems. This has formed a very flexible worldview, one that I think is hard to immediately describe. I think that’s really one of the problems; that in the current political environment in Europe and America, there is a desire to have a simple term, a simple label, that you can then embrace or attack. But I think China isn’t a place that you can attach simple labels to.

There are some aspects of China, such as its work on poverty relief and climate change, that have been essential parts of a good dialogue with the rest of the world. There are other issues that have been much more problematic. So, it’s not that there’s complete agreement or disagreement. There is a broad range of complex issues that we take a different position on. I think it is difficult for people that have never really thought much about China or needed to understand the country, but now have to acquire this knowledge. For many of them, maybe there’s not a desire to acquire this knowledge. They just want to have an opinion, and then, of course, their opinion is what guides them.

I suppose the job of my colleagues and I is to try to convey that China has this very complex world view, different belief systems, maybe different attitudes, and that we have to understand them before we can then see what the problem is. Some of those attitudes and beliefs are probably pretty unproblematic and some of them may be more difficult and will take a lot of dialogue. But we won’t get very far if we don’t have that dialogue. I think that’s really what is lacking at the moment—a proper dialogue on what we do agree on and what we don’t agree on, and then most importantly, what we do about that disagreement.

Huiyao Wang: On the question of power, for much of the last 200 years, China has been relatively weak. Now, it is rapidly rising as a global power, a land power, and a maritime power. With respect to values, some still expect China to converge with the West rather than accepting it is just different.

Deng Xiaoping famously said, “It doesn’t matter if it’s a white cat or black cat as long as it catches mice.” I totally agree that China is a hybrid—we have market forces and elements of capitalism but we also have socialism with Chinese characteristics.

China has done many things right. President Xi recently announced that China has lifted 800 million people out of severe poverty. There are now around 1.3 billion people in the country that enjoy some kind of medical care coverage and over 1 billion people have some kind of social security, which probably makes China’s welfare system the largest in the world. Now, people are forecasting that China’s successful management of the pandemic will help to spur economic growth for many years to come. As scholars, both in and outside China, we need to examine what these trends mean for the future of the world. We should be willing to explore deep and complex questions, as things are not black and white.

Given that China contributes over one-third of global GDP growth, is the largest trading partner of 130 countries, and is a hub for global value chains, can China and the West find a way to peacefully coexist? Because otherwise, we’re going to face a devastating conflict or end up in the Thucydides Trap, as my friend Graham Allison has said many times.

I’m encouraged by your commitment to deep thought and really digging into these issues surrounding China’s rise in the world. In Western foreign policy discussions, China is often described as a “challenge.” But in one of your academic articles, you have written that the real challenge that China poses is one of “ontological complexity.” What do you mean by that?

Kerry Brown: I think what is common in thinking and talking about China is complexity. When you are with an alliance, there are similarities to build on—a common language, common religion, or some common belief system—which give you a foundation from which to move to more complicated areas. But for much of history, Chinese dynasties from the Han onwards had only very limited relationships with Europe. Europe itself was not and is not unified, so it is quite a complicated situation.

Politicians face great pressures and they have to make things seem straightforward and simple. They have to come up with messages to convey something, like Trump’s “Make America Great Again”—just four words. These messages get lots of people excited, even though you can argue about what they actually mean. But it is very hard to capture the China story in just a few words.

So, when I’m asked at events outside of China, how do I explain China and its rise in the world? It’s something that takes a lot of explanation. China is not a capitalist country, but it uses elements of capitalism. It’s a communist country, but one with a very specific form of communism shaped by the development of the communist party in China, which from the 1930s onwards was very distinctive under Mao Zedong. So, for many reasons, China is not an easy thing to convey in just a few words. You need an audience with quite a lot of knowledge. But many audiences don’t have that knowledge because they haven’t needed it until now. They may know some things about America, they may know some things about Europe, but they’ve never really had to think about China much because it’s always been remote from them.

I think this is particularly true for the UK. Apart from Hong Kong, over the last century, the UK’s historic links with China were mostly indirect. There hasn’t really been a great deal of interaction and knowledge built up. In the 1960s, the Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding was set up. [Its first chairman] Joseph Needham, a great scientific scholar, wrote Science and Civilization in China. I knew him very briefly at the end of the 1980s when I was a student at Keys [Gonville and Caius] College, Cambridge, where he was one of the fellows. But such figures were exceptional, they weren’t part of the mainstream at all. In many ways, people could do most of the things they wanted without any real knowledge of China at all. When I was growing up, China was not part of my world. I remember in September 1976, the day when I saw this elderly Chinese man on TV and it was announced that the leader of China, Mao Zedong, had died. That was the first time I’d seen news about China on TV.

So, it’s a dramatic change that now we have something like 150,000 Chinese students in universities in Britain. China is much more present. It’s the largest trading partner of Australia and it’s obviously a huge economic player. These things are all very new and happening very quickly. I think it was always going to be difficult to have a new player come along that appeared so quickly. On top of which, politically and culturally, this new player is very different to the ones that were dominant in the last 100–150 years.

There are three big differences [to deal with]: First, the new emergence of China as an important player. Second is China’s political difference to America and Europe. The third is cultural difference. So, we need to have three kinds of knowledge, which is very difficult.

Many people say that Australia has worked out a strategy toward China. I don’t think that is true. Australia has had extremely important economic links with China, there are 1.5 million Australians of Chinese heritage, and until recently, Australian universities had many Chinese students. But over the last 18 months, the relationship between Australia and China has really deteriorated. I’m not going to talk about whose fault that is, but I do think that Australia has some sensitive worries about its own identity. Is it an Asian country? Or is it just a European colony in Asia, which historically was the [main] idea and identity? I think those are really domestic issues and not so much about China, they’re more about the identity of Australians, who they think they are and where they think they belong.

[These issues] were always there. They were there when Japan was a dominant economy in the 1980s. When I lived in Australia in the early 1990s, it was Japan that was regarded as the problem. And Indonesia because it is so close to Australia. So, it seems to me that China has become the third of these “worrying neighbors” that Australia thinks is a threat, not just because of economic and political issues but also because of identity issues. I think [identity and values] is where the dialogue about China becomes the most difficult. In terms of economic structure and politics, we can certainly identify areas of concern that call for tough dialogue with our partners in China. Trade negotiations were never easy, but we need to have them and we know where we’re trying to get to.

What’s worried me in the last year is that underneath a lot of these valid concerns, which we should and will talk about, there is something that is much more about identity. This idea of China being a threat because it’s “not like us.” When you ask, what does it mean to be “not like us,” it creeps into areas such as China being ethnically or culturally different. [To some people it just seems] impossible for the world to have a dominant or even very prominent country that is not European or American.

The reason for this is not clearly economic and not clearly political. It’s about something else. It may be a small minority of people that think this way, but I do think it is an area that we have to be very concerned about. In Australia, Britain, and America, [racial issues] have always been a problem in thinking about China, and Asia generally. There are valid concerns, but they get mixed up with these more racial issues, which have become more vociferous under the Trump presidency. There are expressions of opinions, which I find sometimes to be purely based on this idea of race, which I find repugnant. It’s something that we have to condemn. But it’s [an idea] that still enjoys some space, which is a huge worry.

Huiyao Wang: I think you’ve outlined a profound challenge that China is facing. China wants a peaceful rise, but the rest of the world, particularly those in the West, often lack understanding of China—as a different culture with a different history and a different system. It is difficult to reconcile traditional views of China with how things are changing rapidly and China’s performance, especially economically.

So, it really falls to scholars, the think tank community, and policymakers to think about how we can have a new narrative to understand China. In China, we have a lot of work to do to develop a new narrative, but the same goes for the West.

China is developing so fast that it cannot be understood through a traditional lens. For example, China now has a billion smartphone users making their own decisions each day, such as where to go and what to buy, collectively forming a kind of “market democracy.” With all this modern communications technology, China is not like it was in the old days when things were very autocratic. Now, the general public and the leadership are well informed and engage in a kind of consultative democracy. For example, the formulation of the 14th Five-Year Plan involved many layers of discussions and roundtables. As many as a million suggestions and comments were solicited and the plan will be discussed and revised again at the upcoming Two Sessions.

It’s certainly a challenge to reconcile China’s values with those of the rest of the world. But if China contributes to the prosperity and development of humankind, can we not be a bit more tolerant of different systems? It’s clear we are not at the “end of history.” So, I think it is crucial that scholars from China and around the world can engage in more discussion and dialogue.

I know that from 1998 to 2005 you worked at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office as a diplomat, serving as first secretary at the British Embassy in Beijing. You also lived in the Inner Mongolia region of China from 1994 to 1996. So, you are truly a “China hand.” With your experience as a diplomat, scholar, and think tanker, how do see the challenge we have now? What gaps of understanding do you see, particularly in the area of foreign policy, between scholars in China and in the West? And how can we overcome these differences?

Kerry Brown: I guess there are two ways of acquiring knowledge. One is deliberately and the other is by accident. If I’ve gained knowledge about China, it’s been probably more by accident than design. I didn’t do Chinese as a student at Cambridge, I did English literature. I later developed interests in China, actually while living in Japan in 1991. I visited China, went to Beijing for a week and really felt, “wow, I want to know more about this place.” After that, I really concentrated on understanding the Chinese language and history, more modern history than imperial history. Since then, I’ve read as much as I could about the long narrative of Chinese history.

I guess the easy thing to say about improving the current situation is to say “education.” We need to have more education, certainly in British schools, about Chinese civilization and Chinese history. We need to have more people studying Chinese. We need to make China familiar. But the outcomes of this will probably be very difficult to assess—just because you know more about something or somewhere, doesn’t mean you’re going to have a better attitude toward it. After all, British views toward Europe are very complicated, and we know much more about Europe than we do about China. People may study French, German, or Italian at school, but it doesn’t necessarily mean they will have a very friendly view [of these countries]. They may end up having a less friendly view. So, we can’t just assume that education is going to be a perfect medicine.

I think it’s going to be a long period of adjustment. I don’t really think that the Thucydides Trap is the issue, this is a unique situation that we’ve never had before. America and China are two nuclear powers that will not use their ultimate weapons against each other, because that would mean mutual destruction. That really restrains what they can do to each other.

The second problem is that, unlike the Soviet Union, China is in some ways a capitalist actor. Its economy has strong elements that seem very similar to capitalism and it’s integrated into global finance and supply chains. For all the talk about decoupling, it is unlikely to happen. The attractiveness of the Chinese domestic market is going to be a very big incentive for companies, wherever they are from, to engage with China. We saw this last year with the drafting of an investment agreement between Europe and China. While Europe is increasingly arguing with China about human rights and other issues, it’s also agreeing on the framework for an investment agreement. There is an immediate conflict between what Europeans want; they want one thing [from China] but not the other, and they can’t pick them apart.

When you look at the complexity of these problems, I think the most you can say is that the worst outcome is unlikely—thankfully. It’s likely that issues like climate change are going to get more serious and so the pressure for China, Europe, and America to work together will get greater, out of self-interest, and that gives a pathway to find ways we can work together for the common good.

I also think that we are going to have to construct a language of disagreement so that for any argument, no one walks away with a complete victory, and no one walks away in complete defeat, or at least not often. Usually, it isn’t good for either side to be completely defeated, as they’ll likely be very resentful. What you want is an exchange. There are ways in which partners can talk to each other. We do this all the time—as people, as communities, and as institutions. We have dialogue, we agree, we disagree, and we reach some kind of midpoint. With China, that’s going to be a multi-layered discussion. We’re a long way into this discussion, but we’ve still got a long way to go.

What we’re looking for is a framework under which we can agree to disagree, I think that’s the important thing. The strange thing is, I think we are clear about where we can agree—we can agree on things like climate change, how to deal with global health issues, and sustainability. There’s a consensus, so with China, we’re dealing with a partner on those issues—and these are the big issues for human survival. But we’re going to need a way to deal with disagreements, which may be significant, but they are not to be important enough to jeopardize the future of humanity. [After all,] what could be more important than that?

I think this is the stage we’re in and it’s going to be a long stage, it won’t be sorted out easily. Henry, that means you and I are in a growing sector because there will be a golden age of diplomacy and dialogue. That’s good, but it doesn’t mean the dialogue will be easy. I think we just have to accept that. We shouldn’t try and accelerate things too much; we just have to deal with our disagreements step by step.

Huiyao Wang: You’ve really hit on some of the challenges that we are facing. I agree that we need more dialogue. Trying to really understand each other is a daunting task for scholars like us. For the international community watching a rapidly developing China, the question of how we can shape a new understanding and narrative while being able to agree to disagree is a key question. I hope we can talk and seek common ground despite our differences, as captured in the Chinese saying qiu tong cun yi.

Moving on to geopolitics and international relations, in President Biden’s speech to the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference, he spoke of the need to prepare for “strategic competition” with China. He didn’t use the word “rivalry” as President Trump had in the past. He described many challenges linked to China, but also areas like climate change and the pandemic where we can work together.

On the same day at the G7 summit, I was glad to see that President Biden pledged $2 billion of funding to support developing countries in fighting the pandemic, a similar pledge to that which President Xi made in May 2020. The two leaders also had a long telephone conversation on Chinese New Year’s Eve, so there seems to be some positive progress. How do you see the future of Sino-US relations, will trade remain a contentious issue? Will the US seek more to forge a Western alliance? At the Munich conference, I noticed that Chancellor Merkel and President Macron were not completely aligned with President Biden. Merkel said that we have to deal with but also work with China. President Macron stressed that strategically, the EU will be more independent as the US focuses more on the Indo-Pacific.

Recently, I noticed a report by the US Chamber of Commerce which said that the trade war could cost the US 1 percent of GDP and several hundred thousand jobs. So, what do you see for the next four years of this Biden administration? Economically, will they continue Trump’s policies? Politically, will there be a shift toward alliance-building? Because in terms of alliance-building, countries such as members of ASEAN may prefer not to take sides. Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Hsien Loong has said that they don’t want to take sides in containing China. How can we repair Sino-US relations so they become more constructive?

Kerry Brown: The tone of the new American president, compared to the previous one, is different and that will help. Often, the provocative and aggressive language Trump used created its own problems. The second thing, which is maybe underappreciated, is that Trump didn’t really delegate properly. He didn’t build a [proper] team around him and it was very unstable—it was really all about him deciding everything. Biden has a very competent team around him, like Secretary of State Blinken and others that are very experienced and capable. It seems that there will be much more of a team ethos, which should be helpful.

The third thing is that, although Europe and America are not going to be completely aligned, I think they are now speaking more to each other about China and working out their common points. That will probably be helpful because I think it’s good for America to realize that it cannot really promote a China policy on its own, it needs allies. That means that there will be more multilateralism and probably some of the more extreme ideas of the Trump era will disappear, there will be more moderation and nuance.

Fundamentally, the issue is most serious for America because it is currently the world’s biggest economy and China is competing with that. Psychologically, this is a huge moment; there will be a day, sometime in the next five to ten years, probably sooner rather than later, where we will wake up one morning and China will be the world’s biggest economy. This will be a historic moment—the first time in modern history that an Asian country has been number one, the first time in modern history when China has been economically number one, the first time in history when a Communist country has been number one. Symbolically, it will be incredibly difficult for America to know that they’re going to be number two, economically. Of course, in many other areas, they won’t be number two—militarily, or in terms of their alliances, they will still be number one. But I think it’s going to really have an impact on how they view themselves and their status is in the world. This will be a problem. America has a sense of self-esteem and pride, and because they will no longer economically be in the number one position, I think this will then feed a lot of other doubts.

For many years, we’ve wondered whether America is a declining power, and many times, we have [recognized] that it is still dominant in many areas, from economics to technology. The world’s biggest companies are mostly American. Military, if you add up the top five [nations after America] they are still not equal to America’s [military expenditure]. The US is still the most powerful country and is likely to be so for a long time.

However, this one indicator—[the decline of] America’s economic status—will be symptomatic of a larger shift and is feeding a lot of the anxiety in America. It’s not just about economic change, it will then mean a whole bunch of other changes. In effect, America will no longer be the richest country in the world. Sure, per capita [GDP] is totally different. China is still a middle-income country, basically a “moderately prosperous” country in per capita terms. But in total, China will be the richest country in the world, and this will be one of the key geopolitical moments of modern history, probably more significant than the collapse of the Soviet Union, probably more significant than any event since the Second World War.

It’s already starting to have an impact. China’s economic growth has been greater than America’s coming out of the pandemic. Every day [China] is getting closer to that target of [US total GDP]. I think when China is even closer to that target, there will be more political turbulence. When Japan was around two-thirds the size of the American economy in the late 1980s, there was already anxiety over how to deal with Japan. That problem passed and I think there’s a hope in America that the same will happen in China, that there will be some issue and China’s growth will fall, but at the moment we don’t see that. The pandemic has had some impact but the IMF forecasts that at least this year, China’s economy is likely to grow and continue to grow well. So, unless there is a total disaster, then I think that China is on this path to become the dominant economy, and the political implications of that are very profound.

Huiyao Wang: I think you’ve given a very accurate analysis of what we’re going to see in the next five to ten years. China is rising rapidly, both economically and politically, so how can the world, particularly the US, accept that? As you said, the US has been in the number one position for a hundred years now. But now, China has emerged and is poised to overtake the US to become the largest economy in the world. Psychologically, it will take a while probably to adjust.

At the same time, we also live in a world of shared challenges, such as overcoming the pandemic, that call for China, the US, the EU, and all other countries to work together. President Biden is committed to tackling climate change and needs to collaborate with China on that issue. Hopefully, as new risks and challenges emerge, our common interests can help unite humankind. I hope that we can set aside ideological differences and some of the biased views we hold toward each other and work on tackling the common threats we face.

After the Second World War, as the US forged a new international order, [in 1944] we had a “Bretton Woods moment” as we built the new system. Maybe the pandemic can spur a new “Bretton Woods moment” so that we can enhance global governance and the delivery of global public goods, addressing questions such as how we can fight future pandemics, or whether we can build some kind of global climate organization. Another key area is infrastructure, which is lacking in many countries, even the US. Could we, for example, upgrade the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank into a “World Infrastructure Investment Bank” through which China and the US could work together, along with the World Bank and other multilateral development banks? There is also scope for China and the US to work together through the Belt and Road to spur an infrastructure revolution to modernize the whole world. There are many common things to work on rather than fighting each other.

Moving on to Europe, which is in a unique position. How do you see China and the EU, which recently concluded the negotiation on the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with China? Commercial ties are important and China is the EU’s largest trading partner. Could the EU, which is an important ally of the US, play some kind of mediating role in China–US relations, such as participating in a trilateral summit between the EU, the US, and China. The EU shares many interests and a long history with the US but also has deep business ties with China. How do you see the new investment treaty and the future role of the EU with regards to China and the US?

Kerry Brown: One of the strange things is that in recent years, the EU, China, and America haven’t had a formal trilateral dialogue. They never really sit down with each other and talk about common issues; they may do it as part of the G20 or other forums, but as three separate entities, they don’t sit down and talk together.

Part of that is because I think that the Chinese and the Americans are very jealous of their relationship. They don’t want others to come in, they are the two great powers, so they are quite protective. I think the second reason is that the European Union has 27 member states. It is different to America and China, not a single sovereign entity but rather a kind of consortium. With the British leaving the European Union, which was unfortunate, we now see Europe consolidating again. For a while, it looked like Europe was really threatened as a project. [The EU] goes through ups and downs and is perpetually in crisis in a way, but you have to acknowledge that this consortium is helpful and does deal with some issues well. Investment protocols are probably one such issue. [The EU] is a good way to negotiate because of the size of the European investment and trade market.

If Europe, China, and America could talk to each other, it would be a very important global gathering. The EU and China have a high-level dialogue, China and the US have high-level exchanges, and the Europeans and the Americans have a dialogue on China. So, the one thing that’s missing is that they all get together. Is that possible? For issues like climate change and pandemics, it makes a lot of sense. Whether they’ll be able to find common cause is another matter. I think America still feels that it should be in charge of the relationship with China. It doesn’t mind if Europe agrees, but [the US] doesn’t like it so much when Europe disagrees [on China]. For China, I think there is a sense that [taking part in such a trilateral summit] would mean going into a meeting with two other participants that are against it. So, I don’t think that we’re quite at the moment where [China, the EU, and the US] will sit down together. On climate change there is common alignment; Biden has brought America back into the Paris agreement, Europe is committing to decarbonizing its economies, and China has committed to becoming carbon neutral before 2060.

I think these [climate] targets will become more ambitious and so this is a large area of potential collaboration. If America, Europe, and China agree on something in this area, it will have a huge impact—especially if you can bring India into it, then you’ve already covered a vast part of the world in terms of population, geography, and economy. Once that is in place, then others will likely follow. The potential leadership role of China, the EU, and the US is huge. I’m hopeful that [climate is an area] where real dialogue and collaboration with China can happen, which could lead to very beneficial outcomes for everyone.

Huiyao Wang: In the last two years, CCG has proposed the idea of a trilateral dialogue between China, the EU, and the US at the Munich Security Conference, particularly while China and the US have been locked in a fierce trade war and there are also tensions around issues such as the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and sanctions. When two large players quarrel, it is helpful to have a third party that can mediate and calm the situation. But instead, after this suggestion was made, actually, the EU and the US set up a dialogue on China without China participating.

I agree that we really need the US, China, and the EU to work together on issues like climate change and the pandemic. CCG has also suggested establishing a climate summit including the G7 members as well as China, India, and Russia. Together, these members would account for over half of the world population and include the six biggest carbon emitters. Somehow, we need to engineer a new Bretton Woods moment for our post-pandemic era, to forge new mechanisms. Existing institutions such as the G20 and United Nations are great, but we also need more focused and specialized institutions.

Since you are in the UK and live in London, I want to raise a question about Brexit. The UK has now separated from the EU but has also applied to join the Comprehensive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The UK still has a lot of influence and soft power. Joining the CPTPP and working more closely with China would allow the UK to look beyond the EU and realize the vision of a “Global Britain.” What do you think about the state of China–UK relations, particularly now there are a lot of disputes over issues like Hong Kong? Is it possible to reconcile these differences or even get back to the “Golden Age” of China–UK relations? As you said, the UK is the second-largest destination for Chinese students, with over 150,000–200,000 students studying in the UK, as well as tourism and many other areas of cooperation. So, what can be done to improve relations and what do you think about UK’s new role regarding cooperation with China, now and in the future?

Kerry Brown: It’s been a difficult year because of COVID-19 and an increasingly political fight. Part of the reason is that I think historically, when the Conservative Party has been in power, they have been maybe more confrontational with China, at least according to what I remember. Now they are the dominant party and there is a significant group within the Conservative Party that has created an organization called the China Research Group. They clearly see China as a very particular kind of problem and are keen to make that the way that we understand China–UK relations.

As I’ve said, historically, on the whole, China has not had a high-profile image in the UK, it’s been more marginal. Britain has not paid that much attention to China; its main interests have been in Europe and America. So, there’s a lack of understanding about what China is and what China should mean. Now, we have a lot of people who do talk about China, but mostly this is within the framework of COVID-19 and the political issues, such as where [the virus] came from, how it happened, and who is to blame. This has distorted the discussion on China in the UK and people have lost sight of the longer-term issues.

Many people now talking about China never had much of an opinion about it before, because it now suits their particular political interests. The populist politician Nigel Farage has suddenly started taking note of China. He is a nationalistic figure and was one of the main influences behind Britain leaving the European Union. I think that’s unfortunate; once someone with his kind of track record—of creating problems, divisions, resentment, and manipulation—becomes interested in an issue, it usually makes public debate more difficult. Despite that, I think that British people are pragmatic and there will be many opportunities to find spaces to work together. I think that we are more moderate in our approach.

We have many people trying to influence us now. Strange, slightly worrying figures like Clive Hamilton, an Australian academic who’s been making big claims about how China influences politics in the world. I think this kind of language does have some influence in the UK. But there are also voices that are more moderate and thoughtful. When I talk to politicians, I’m struck by the fact that while they may say one thing in public, in private, they are aware of the complexity of what they’re looking at, and they’re trying to find a road via which we can look after our interests despite the disagreements. I think we’re all trying to find that middle road; to look after our interests and acknowledge that we need to cooperate in certain key areas, [while also accepting] that there are other areas where we won’t be able to see eye to eye.

I think [British] politicians have not gone to the extremes of some in Australia or America. So far, there’s no very prominent public figure signed up to the idea of a huge “China threat.” But the issue is still developing and it’s something that we shouldn’t be complacent about. For my work, I’m not here to “convert” anyone. I just want to have the best possible debate about issues around China, the best understanding of what we think about China and what China means to the UK. I’m optimistic because in most surveys it seems that moderates and those who are more pragmatic outnumber those with more [extreme views].

I’m not saying that there aren’t things that we should be concerned about and that we should really focus on. But I do think that we need to be pragmatic. That’s something we can learn from the Chinese because I think in the last few decades the Chinese also have been pragmatic, and it seems to have worked in some areas for China. I hope that pragmatism can also work for us.

Huiyao Wang: Thanks, Kerry. A lot of our discussion has centered on the gap between China and the outside world and how to minimize it. But there are also significant gaps within countries. For example, in the US, the widening gap between rich and poor has contributed to the rise of populism and the election of President Trump. China also has issues with inequality, but the government has mobilized to eliminate extreme poverty and last week announced that nearly 100 million people have been lifted out of poverty in the last eight years.

In the US, President Biden wants to raise the minimum wage from $7.8 to 15 to help address poverty in the US. Sometimes, China is made a scapegoat for issues related to income inequality in the US. For example, some say that everything is now “Made in China.” But that doesn’t mean that China reaps all the profit from these goods. Actually, multinational corporations account for 40–50 percent of Chinese exports. For an Apple phone that sells for $1000 in the US, China makes maybe $50. In the last few decades, multinational corporations have made huge profits but probably haven’t made sufficient contributions to their home or host countries. More international cooperation is needed to build a form of global governance that ensures globalization can benefit all countries. This would probably help to quell populism in various parts of the world. What is your view of these issues?

Kerry Brown: I think China’s achievements in poverty alleviation should be better appreciated in the outside world […] In the last 40 years, a huge number of people have been lifted out of poverty in China. Whatever the reasons for that, it’s an achievement. I think we need to recognize that. This is why China is not a straightforward story. For all the things that people are very critical about, things that you should be critical about, there are also some things which are huge achievements that should be celebrated. Yet it’s not easy to say that sometimes because the narrative is always very negative, and you don’t get much coverage of those things which are much more positive.

What strikes me is that China’s achievements are something we can all learn from. One simple answer [to your question] is that we need to have a forum for learning, not just for dialogue but for learning, which is a two-way process. One mindset is that it’s always been America or Europe going to China to teach and to show how you do things. I think we now need some recognition that there are many issues on which China can teach the rest of the world and show how to do things. Building high-speed railways has been one huge achievement. Poverty alleviation is another. There’s green technology and various innovations in other areas. There are some areas where [this mutual learning process] won’t be possible, but there are other areas where I think we must learn from each other. The era of the “great learning” should start and it shouldn’t just be one way. It should be learning from people who have something to teach, and that includes China.