Keywords

Over the four phases of the strategic development of the South China Sea (SCS) disputes from 1990 to 2020, this chapter analyzes the creation and changes of institutional strategies of the following ASEAN/ASEAN-led institutions: (1) ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, (2) ASEAN Regional Forum, (3) ASEAN Summit, (4) ASEAN–China dialogues, (5) East Asia Summit, and (6) ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting/ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus.

4.1 ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM)

Established in 1967, the AMM is today still the original core institution of ASEAN. The founding members of ASEAN were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, and the AMM was the only ASEAN institution where the foreign ministers of these five states met annually and developed ASEAN’s institutional and functional framework over time.

The AMM’s original objective was stipulated in the ASEAN Declaration (also known as the Bangkok Declaration) of 1967: to ensure that Southeast Asian states had “a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region,” including “their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation” (ASEAN Secretariat, 1967). Although the means to ensure internal and external security was not clearly specified in the declaration, the AMM aimed to achieve it through dialogues and nurturing confidence among the various states’ ministers. In short, the AMM functioned as a foreign ministers’ club, where the five ministers informally and frankly discussed issues in Southeast Asia and beyond.

The AMM underwent a structural change in 1999, when it implemented “retreats” before the actual meeting. According to Thuzar and Hoang (2018), the retreat served as a forum where foreign ministers could informally discuss issues that affected the association and Southeast Asia. After Singapore Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar first organized such an informal meeting to discuss ASEAN’s institutional credibility and the future development of member states in 1999, the retreat was institutionalized in 2001, to be held at the beginning of the year (ASEAN Secretariat, 2001a). During the retreat, the AMM would set the most important issue of the year, often providing a press statement at the end of the meeting.

However, these developments did not mean that the ASEAN member states were able to unite politically and economically. There was disagreement on many issues, but the AMM’s political process created opportunities for member states to come together, discuss issues, and find a way to facilitate cooperation and avoid conflict. ASEAN’s institutional norms, or the “ASEAN Way,” such as the principles of non-interference, informal consultation, and consensus decision-making, were useful for these purposes (Acharya, 2014; Koga, 2010).

Further, the internal dynamics of ASEAN began to change, particularly from the end of the Cold War. There were two concurrent trends. One was the expansion of ASEAN membership which renewed ASEAN diplomacy toward external actors. Vietnam joined ASEAN on July 28, 1995, Laos and Myanmar on July 23, 1997, and Cambodia on April 30, 1999. Including these Southeast Asian states laid the foundation for achieving ASEAN’s initial goal, which was to nurture a Southeast Asian community and regional autonomy, but at the same time, the increase in member states made decision-making more difficult given its consensus-based process. Second, the AMM incorporated security agendas, institutionalized the ASEAN Summit, and established the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on the basis of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC).

With these institutional developments, the AMM began to discuss the SCS disputes from 1992. This chapter examines the AMM’s role and institutional strategies in managing the SCS disputes during four periods: 1990–2002, 2003–2012, 2013–2016, and 2017–2020.

4.1.1 1990–2002: Formulating Institutional Balancing

The AMM was the only core institution that was able to respond to SCS incidents from 1990 to 1994, when the ARF was established. Yet, the AMM was diplomatically cautious not to be entrapped by individual territorial disputes. For example, when Vietnam and China had naval skirmishes near Johnson South Reef in the Spratlys in March 1988, it did not issue any statement on the matter. However, the incident created security concerns over the future of regional stability in Southeast Asia. Indonesia therefore initiated the “Workshop Process on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea” in 1990 outside the ASEAN framework, inviting all claimant parties including Taiwan, as a Track-2 forum where government officials participated in a private capacity (Song, 2010). At this point, the AMM did not attempt to formulate an institutional strategy on the SCS issue.

However, this posture changed in February 1992, when China enacted the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.” Given China’s military behavior in the SCS in 1988, its creation of a legal framework to justify its maritime boundaries, and its eagerness to conduct energy exploration in the SCS, the AMM responded by adopting the “ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea.” The declaration emphasized the importance of peaceful resolution, self-restraint, potential areas of cooperation in the SCS, principles stipulated in ASEAN’s 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), and efforts to create “a code of international conduct” in the SCS (ASEAN Secretariat, 1992b).

As no serious incident between ASEAN claimant states and China had occurred then, the declaration aimed to be a preventive measure for ASEAN by inviting “all parties concerned to subscribe to this Declaration of principles” (ASEAN Secretariat, 1992b). Accordingly, the AMM leaned toward institutional balancing based on the 1992 declaration as it did not solicit the input of non-ASEAN claimant states while publicizing its principles internationally. The 1992 communiqué also indicated that the AMM had urged all concerned parties to adopt the principles stipulated in the TAC (ASEAN Secretariat, 1992c). To get claimant states to abide by the principles of the declaration, ASEAN encouraged them to join Indonesia’s Track-2 workshop (ASEAN Secretariat, 1993a, 1994).

The AMM’s inclination toward institutional balancing notwithstanding, the situation did not significantly improve in 1993 and 1994. China did not adopt the 1992 declaration, while tensions among the claimant states began to rise. In fact, the Philippines discovered China’s newly erected facilities on Mischief Reef in February 1995 that was China’s first attempt to assert itself in the SCS against an ASEAN claimant state. This alarmed ASEAN members because they feared that China’s encroachment might continue further south, which would affect stability in Southeast Asia. Consequently, ASEAN swiftly responded by issuing a firmer statement regarding the SCS issue—“Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Recent Developments in the South China Sea.” This statement employed stronger language, such as “serious concern” over “the recent development in the Mischief Reef” (ASEAN Secretariat, 1995a). Although the statement did not name China, it was obvious that the AMM was worried about China’s gradual encroachment as it specified Mischief Reef. The AMM also reiterated the importance of complying with the principles stipulated in the 1992 declaration. This move by the AMM is a clear example of institutional balancing as it attempted to inform the international community about the recent SCS developments. ASEAN explicitly requested China to follow the principles that ASEAN had adopted in 1992, stating that the AMM “encouraged all parties concerned to reaffirm their commitment to the principles contained in the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea” (ASEAN Secretariat, 1995b).

ASEAN’s signaling saw some success. Vietnam, which had been ready to assume ASEAN membership, supported the statement, and the United States expressed serious concern about developments in the SCS (see Chapter 3). Diplomatically, China proposed a multilateral discussion with ASEAN claimant states, while the Philippines and China agreed to conclude a bilateral code of conduct (COC). However, these positive movements neither stopped claimant states from engaging in skirmishes on the ground nor drew sufficient attention from the United States for maritime stability in the SCS.

From 1996 to 2002, the AMM not only relied on institutional balancing but also proposed conducting institutional co-option. Facing difficulty in maintaining the status quo with institutional balancing, the AMM proposed a “regional code of conduct” in the SCS, which would facilitate confidence-building and mutual understanding among the claimant states (ASEAN Secretariat, 1996a). After China ratified UNCLOS in May 1996, this proposal was seen as a starting point to resolve the disputes peacefully and legally. That said, the COC negotiations needed to include not only ASEAN member states, but also regional claimant parties, including Taiwan; the AMM thus attempted to find a suitable avenue for conducting the institutional co-option. Yet, the AMM also faced difficulty dealing with Taiwan as it was not recognized as a sovereign state by ASEAN member states and China. As a result, the proposal did not gain diplomatic traction for two years.

In 1999, the AMM revived the idea for a COC and kickstarted dialogue on it. After ASEAN and China held a summit in December 1997 amid the Asian Financial Crisis, and with the ASEAN Summit’s endorsement of the proposal in 1998, diplomatic traction for a COC emerged. The drafts were prepared by Vietnam and the Philippines, excluding Taiwan (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998, 1999; see Chapter 3), but the AMM thus became a facilitator for more substantial discussions at the ASEAN–China level rather than being the core avenue for crafting the COC. Nonetheless, it still reiterated the importance of principles endorsed by the 1992 ASEAN Declaration, including self-restraint, respect for international law, particularly UNCLOS, and peaceful settlement through bilateral and multilateral dialogues (ASEAN Secretariat, 1996a, 1997a, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001a, 2002a). In this sense, the AMM maintained institutional balancing as a strategic option in case the ASEAN–China COC negotiations collapsed. Eventually, despite disagreements over the COC, the 2002 ASEAN–China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting issued the DOC and promised to continue the COC discussions. At this point, the AMM was no longer the core institution for discussing the COC, although it monitored the progress of SCS dialogues and did not discount conducting institutional balancing.

4.1.2 2003–2012: Limitations of the AMM’s Institutional Balancing

The DOC provided a good reference point for monitoring and evaluating the progress of the SCS dispute resolution by ASEAN and China. From 2003 to 2011, the AMM regarded the DOC as “an important step toward a Code of Conduct” in the SCS and “a milestone document between ASEAN and China.” It signaled a strong commitment to peaceful resolution, self-restraint, confidence-building, and international law such as UNCLOS (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003a, 2004b, 2005a, 2006, 2007a, 2008c, 2009a, 2010a, 2011b). As ASEAN–China forums had become the core institutional avenue for the COC negotiations, the AMM’s role was to monitor developments in the SCS and to ensure that basic principles were abided by parties concerned through its joint communiqué. It helped endorse new initiatives by other ASEAN-led institutions, such as the ASEAN–China Joint Working Group and the Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) on the Implementation of DOC in 2005 that facilitated the creation of the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004b, 2005a, 2008c).

From 2003 to 2008, the SCS situation was relatively stable while the COC negotiation process was slow. Despite several skirmishes on the ground, the claimant states did not take a drastic approach to alter the status quo. This was partly because China, the Philippines, and Vietnam had nurtured a cooperative atmosphere by agreeing to a joint SCS exploration project—the joint marine seismic undertaking—in 2005 (see Chapter 3). As the AMM’s primary strategy was institutional balancing, which became active in times of contention, the relatively positive trend in the SCS resulted in institutional inertia, and thus joint communiqués issued during this period were rather similar.

The SCS situation, however, began to deteriorate from 2008 due to a series of events. These included the submission of claimant states’ baseline claims report to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf; the Philippines’ domestic legal procedures to safeguard its territories in the SCS; China’s dispatch of coastguard ships; and the 2009 Impeccable incident (see Chapter 3). The AMM’s reaction was slow and did not explicitly express concern about the situation until 2011. This was because, while tensions had risen among particular states, such as between China and Vietnam as well as China and the Philippines, the situation was not decisive enough for the AMM to reach a consensus to bring up the worsening developments in the SCS.

Even though the AMM finally responded by expressing “serious concern” about the situation in 2011 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2011b), it was unable to form a unified front to put diplomatic pressure on claimant states to comply with the DOC or to push forth the establishment of a COC, which was planned to be implemented in 2012. In addition, in the context of rising US–China rivalry over the SCS, Indonesia, the 2011 ASEAN chair, raised concerns about the potential intensification of external interference. Consequently, the AMM extensively discussed the SCS situation in the 2011 AMM communiqué compared with previous statements and endorsed two proposals to defuse the maritime tension: Indonesia’s proposal to optimize a Track-2 mechanism and the Philippine’s proposal to create a “Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation (ZoPFFC)” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2011b; see Chapter 3). Since the United States was already involved in the SCS issue, the AMM’s institutional balancing to internationalize the issue was no longer as effective, but it kept drawing international attention.

In 2012, when the Philippines and China engaged in a confrontation over Scarborough Shoal, the AMM had the opportunity to effectively re-activate institutional balancing against China. However, disunity among ASEAN members prevented them from reaching consensus on a joint communiqué, the main point of contention stemming from 2012 ASEAN Chair Cambodia’s strong opposition to the Philippines’ demand to mention the Scarborough Shoal incident in the statement. The dissent resulted in the AMM’s failure to issue a joint communiqué for the first time in ASEAN’s history. This also illustrates the increasing difficulty of the AMM in conducting effective institutional balancing, even though the AMM was meant to be the secure diplomatic avenue where external actors could not directly intervene in the issue or pressure member states. Institutional strategy could only be employed with the consensus of ASEAN members, but the membership expansion in the 1990s—to include Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam—made this more difficult due to the collective action problem that came with divergent national interests. Therefore, the AMM’s 2012 failure to issue a communiqué reflected negatively on ASEAN as it was perceived to be unable to handle the disputes effectively (Chou et al., 2016).

In order to counter this negative perception, Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa communicated with the other ASEAN foreign ministers and led the AMM to issue the “Statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on ASEAN’s Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012b). The statement reiterated the six principles and objectives: (1) full implementation of the DOC, (2) adherence to the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC, (3) early conclusion of the COC, (4) full respect for international law including UNCLOS, (5) self-restraint and non-use of force, and (6) peaceful resolution of the disputes. Although the statement did not produce anything new, it provided institutional reassurance that the non-issuance of the 2012 communiqué did not mean the neglect of principles regarding the SCS upon which ASEAN member states had long agreed. Nevertheless, the 2012 incident sheds light on the diplomatic limitations of the AMM in conducting institutional balancing.

4.1.3 2013–2016: The AMM’s New Modus Operandi

Having receded from its role as the core institution for dealing with the SCS disputes and for formulating the COC and faced with difficulty conducting institutional balancing, the AMM was confronted with a loss of raison d'être in terms of the SCS dispute management. In this context, the AMM’s lesson from the 2012 incident was that its institutional balancing should not explicitly target a particular state by using the name-and-shame tactic, as this was difficult to attain consensus from the member states. Rather, as part of institutional balancing, the AMM’s focus was to monitor the situation, reiterate the principles, and internationalize the issue more actively if ASEAN needed greater support from the international community.

Leveraging its limited diplomatic resources, the AMM expressed concern over the SCS matter and described its subtle political posture in greater detail to draw international attention (ASEAN Secretariat, 2013a). In fact, there were two notable changes after the 2012 incident. First, information dissemination via the AMM communiqué had become consistently more detailed since 2014. Although updates were rather ad-hoc in the past, the AMM’s descriptions on SCS developments had become more structured, comprising recent events, past joint documents, agreed principles, political postures, and new initiatives. Specifically, information regarding the SOM on the Implementation of the DOC and the ASEAN–China Joint Working Group as well as new proposals by member states were discussed extensively. For example, AMM communiqués touched on the Philippines’ Triple Action Plan, the establishment of a hotline between ASEAN member states and China, and the adoption of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in the SCS (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014b, 2015b, 2016d).Footnote 1

Second, the AMM found means to express concern about the SCS situation. Prior to 2015, it was difficult to reach consensus on how to describe the SCS situation among the member states in the joint communiqué. For example, while the AMM successfully issued the “ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Current Developments in the South China Sea,” in 2014, its description was quite vague, expressing only “serious concerns” over “ongoing developments” without specifying any details (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014b). From 2015, however, the AMM started specifying subjects, such as “some Ministers,” who expressed “serious concerns” about the escalation of activities including land reclamation (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015b, 2016d). In doing so, the AMM could disseminate information that might not have necessarily reached consensus but was important for regional security, so as to internationalize the issue, which was an important part of institutional balancing.

Nonetheless, limitations persisted. The AMM still could not discuss highly sensitive issues, particularly when it faced direct or indirect external pressure. For example, although ASEAN discussed the importance of intensifying consultations and the COC negotiation process at the beginning of 2016, it did not mention the expected outcome of the SCS Arbitral Tribunal (ASEAN Secretariat, 2016c). Additionally, ASEAN attempted to issue a media statement after the Special ASEAN–China Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in June 2016 which unequivocally expressed the AMM’s “serious concerns” over the SCS situation, emphasizing “peaceful resolution… including full respect for legal and diplomatic processes” and “non-militarization” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2016c). But the media statement was retracted due to pressure from China and internal disunity (see Chapter 3). Moreover, when the Arbitral Tribunal issued the award in July 2016 ruling overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines, the AMM could not even mention the ruling in its communiqué issued in the same month (ASEAN Secretariat, 2016d). Although the award indeed applied to the bilateral dispute between China and the Philippines, with the AMM’s consistent emphasis on the importance of international law and UNCLOS, which was the basis of the arbitration, the international community had expected that ASEAN would still touch on the ruling in some way despite China’s implicit and explicit diplomatic pressure.

4.1.4 2017–2020: The AMM in a Fallback Position

From 2017, the AMM continued to monitor the SCS situation and encourage the early conclusion of the COC since ASEAN viewed China’s renewed commitment in 2016 to discuss the COC positively. Although the process remained slow, the AMM embraced the positive trend as there was perceived progress, such as the adoption of the COC’s Single Draft Negotiating Text (SDNT) in 2018 and the conclusion of the first reading of the SDNT in 2019. During this period, the AMM functioned as a key internal forum where ASEAN foreign ministers could exchange views without external participants.

In addition, the AMM began to issue a press statement annually from 2016 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2016a, 2018b, 2019a, 2020a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, 2017). Descriptions of the SCS issue remained similar to those in AMM communiqués, but this practice enabled the AMM to monitor the SCS situation more frequently and closely. The AMM thus became ASEAN’s fallback in terms of conducting institutional balancing. Its “check and balance” mechanism through monitoring and signaling still existed. The AMM also began using the term, “non-militarization,” in its communiqué from 2017 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017c, 2018c, 2019d, 2020e), which became a criterion for assessing the SCS situation on the ground. Additionally, the AMM became a diplomatic tool for disseminating the contents of ASEAN’s internal discussions and for expressing institutional concerns to the international community.

4.1.5 Conclusion

The AMM’s institutional strategy—institutional balancing—has been consistent since the mid-1990s when ASEAN began discussing the SCS disputes and its management despite the developments that shaped the expected and actual balance of power in the region. The consistency in strategy is mainly due to it being the core ASEAN institution that maintains the exclusivity of Southeast Asian states, preventing external actors from direct intervention. Its institutional importance was more valued in the 1990s when there were only a few multilateral institutions that attempted to manage the SCS disputes.

However, the AMM faced two significant setbacks after the 1990s. First, ASEAN’s membership expansion made it difficult for the AMM to reach consensus on the SCS issue. Except for Vietnam, three new members, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, do not have territorial claims in the SCS, and therefore they tend to avoid any diplomatic complications with China. Second, China did not easily accept guidelines set by the AMM. In the COC negotiations, China was dissatisfied with the ASEAN process and perceived that ASEAN was ganging up against it because the initial consultations had been conducted only among ASEAN member states (see Chapter 3). As such, the main negotiation platform shifted from the AMM to China–ASEAN dialogues. This shift gradually occurred after ASEAN and China discussed the SCS issue in 1998.

The AMM’s diplomatic role in the SCS issue had changed while its institutional strategy remained the same. As the consultation and negotiation process became more systematized between ASEAN and China, the AMM no longer played a leading role. However, the AMM remained as a fallback for ASEAN to express its institutional position to counter any diplomatic and military threat toward its member states.

4.2 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

The ARF was established in 1994 following the decision of the AMM and the ASEAN-PMC in July 1993. Given the rising strategic uncertainty in the Asia–Pacific region caused by the end of the Cold War and the regional flashpoints, including the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the SCS, regional states sought to create a forum where they could have security-related dialogues to nurture mutual trust and confidence so as to prevent miscalculations, misperceptions, and tensions from rising. Particularly, the regional great powers—China, Japan, and the United States—were important participants as they could be potential adversaries in the post-Cold War regional order in East Asia.

Given ASEAN’s experience in operationalizing multilateralism in Southeast Asia and its fear of diplomatic marginalization by the great powers, ASEAN took the lead, positioning itself as a neutral player, in establishing the ARF. The basic objectives of the ARF were two-fold: (1) “to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern”; and (2) “to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia–Pacific region” (ARF Unit, 2021). The ARF issued a concept paper in 1995 that envisioned its institutional evolution in three stages: confidence-building measures (CBMs), preventive diplomacy mechanisms, and conflict resolution mechanisms (later changed to “elaboration of approaches to conflicts” in 1995 upon China’s request soon after the concept paper was issued) (ARF Unit, 1995a, 1995b). By 2021, the ARF had 26 member states and one organization, the European Union (EU), including all ASEAN member states and China.

Although its institutional development has been slow and it has yet to progress to the second stage as of 2021, the ARF has consistently discussed regional security issues, including the SCS disputes (Emmers & Tan, 2009). In fact, the ARF’s real functionality evolved into a tool for ASEAN’s institutional strategy—institutional hedging—deviating from its planned traditional-security mechanism, such as preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. ASEAN member states have used the ARF to place the SCS issue on the regional agenda for discussion with external great powers, particularly the EU, Japan, and the United States.

This chapter examines the ARF’s institutional strategy vis-à-vis the SCS issue during four periods: 1994–2002, 2003–2012, 2013–2016, and 2017–2020.

4.2.1 1994–2002: CBMs as Potential Institutional Hedging

At its inception, the ARF did not have any particular institutional strategy toward the SCS matter because there was neither firm consensus nor sufficient strategic consultations among the ASEAN member states. At the inaugural ARF, Philippine Foreign Secretary Roberto Romulo expressed the Philippines’ desire for peaceful settlement and for China’s endorsement of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration (Earl, 1994). Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam also indicated that the ARF would inevitably discuss the SCS issue and communicate each claimant state’s position, while multilateral discussions should be conducted and facilitate the joint development of resources, along the lines of the 1992 declaration (Kassim, 1994). Indonesia was also eager to discuss the territorial disputes including safety of navigation, while Singapore was hesitant to do so as it might provoke China (Kassim, 1994; Martelino-Reyes, 1994).

On the other hand, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen attempted to reassure ASEAN members that China did not have any hegemonic intentions by indicating that there were no Chinese military forces on foreign soil, and insisting on its preference to facilitate joint exploration and to resolve the territorial disputes bilaterally (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 1994; Xinhua, 1994a). The United States remained low-key—Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott stated that it would not take a position on the territorial disputes and that it endorsed peaceful settlement (Xinhua, 1994b). Consequently, the 1994 ARF chairman’s statement did not mention the SCS at all, and instead indicated “maritime security issues” as a potential agenda (ARF Unit, 1994).

From 1995 to 1998, the ARF’s role in the SCS issue—institutional hedging—gradually became clear as it attempted to strike a balance between claimant states’ differences. This was possible because each member state made compromises. For example, China agreed in 1995 to hold bilateral and multilateral talks with ASEAN member states, potentially through the ARF, to use international law as a dispute management tool, including UNCLOS, and to facilitate joint exploration and development. Also, as US Secretary of State Warren Christopher clarified that freedom of navigation in the SCS was a national interest, China assured the United States and other regional states that freedom of navigation in the SCS would be ensured (Cruz, 1995; Rahil, 1995). ASEAN emphasized the importance of discussing the disputes but was careful not to provoke China by discussing sensitive issues in a closed-door setting (Rahil, 1995). Accordingly, the ARF’s role in the SCS disputes began to emerge over time.

In this context, the ARF became a tool for ASEAN’s institutional hedging. This is because the forum could potentially lead China to accept ASEAN’s institutional norms through the TAC and the 1992 declaration, while building confidence among member states as the dialogue could facilitate cooperative activities in the sea diplomatically, economically, and militarily. In doing so, the SCS issue could also be internationalized because the forum publicized discussions on the SCS situation with external actors such as Japan and the United States.

In fact, when China declared its maritime territorial borders near the Paracel Islands in 1996, ASEAN members, particularly Vietnam, protested against it at the ARF by pointing out its legal inconsistency with UNCLOS, which drew US attention and gained its support at the forum (Baker, 1996; Richardson, 1996). Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Shen Guofang insisted that there was “no tension” in the SCS and stated that the ARF should not be a forum for negotiations (JEN, 1996; Morella, 1996). As a result, the 1996 ARF chairman’s statement only emphasized the importance of international law (ARF Unit, 1996), and this Chinese stance continued. However, at the 1997 ARF, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright advocated the importance and consistency of international law in managing territorial disputes (Albright, 1997). Philippine Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon, Jr. also asserted that self-restraint was not enough to maintain the status quo in the SCS (Baker, 1996). This raised the possibility of having guidelines or a COC, but ASEAN aimed to draw China into a code based on ASEAN norms.

China explicitly resisted ASEAN’s institutional hedging. After witnessing the slow institutional progress of the ARF caused by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhang Qiyue stated in 1999 that multilateral talks at the ARF would likely complicate the disputes and that China would not participate in the ARF’s discussion on the COC that was proposed and drafted by ASEAN member states (Rahil, 1999). In fact, as Zhang indicated, China considered the ASEAN–China PMC rather than the ARF as the core platform for discussing the SCS disputes mainly because it feared the further internationalization of the issue (Rahil, 1999). Although ASEAN member states still discussed pursuing a COC at the ARF in 1999, ASEAN had shifted the main discussion platform from the ARF to the ASEAN–China SOM (Abbugao, 1999; see ASEAN–China dialogues section in this chapter). From 1997, the ARF chairman’s statement merely updated the SCS situation, only briefly touching on the status of discussions between ASEAN and China (ARF Unit, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002).

That said, the ARF could still function as ASEAN’s tool for institutional hedging because its institutional setting had not been altered, and ASEAN could discuss the principles of international maritime law to which ASEAN members adhered.

4.2.2 2003–2012: Attempted Enhancement of Institutional Hedging

After the 2002 DOC was adopted, the ARF became relatively quiet on the SCS issue. This was because, from 2001, the ARF mainly focused on international counterterrorism efforts, and there was relative maritime stability in the SCS in the 2000s (see Chapter 3). As the chairman’s statements from 2003 to 2009 indicate, the ARF consistently reiterated four important factors: (1) importance of the DOC, (2) progress of ASEAN–China cooperation, such as the establishment of the ASEAN–China SOM on the Implementation of the DOC and the ASEAN–China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC, (3) eventual adoption of a COC, and (4) continued self-restraint and respect for international law including UNCLOS (ARF Unit, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009; ASEAN Secretariat, 2003b). There were no negative accounts of the SCS situation in these chairman’s statements; instead, the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy often indicated the “positive trends” of the SCS issue (ASEAN Secretariat, 2007b, 2008b).Footnote 2

Nevertheless, as the SCS situation gradually worsened after 2009, the ARF functioned as institutional hedging against China (see Chapter 3). This development was triggered by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the 2010 ARF. She discussed the SCS issue extensively at the forum, asserting that the United States had “a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea” (US Department of State, 2010a; see Chapter 3). Given the increasing tensions in the SCS, the US statement was backed by 12 members, including Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the EU, which implied their concern regarding China’s behavior (Landler, 2010; US Department of State, 2010). While the statement did not depart significantly from her predecessor Madeleine Albright’s position, Clinton added that the United States explicitly opposed the threat or use of force and was “prepared to facilitate initiatives and confidence-building measures” consistent with the 2002 DOC (US Department of State, 2010). Since China viewed this statement as third-party interference in the maritime disputes, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi warned the United States not to “internationalize” the disputes as it would likely complicate the issue (AFP, 2010a).

Admittedly, the SCS issue had been discussed at the ARF since the 1990s, and it was always possible for ASEAN to use the ARF as institutional hedging vis-à-vis China by emphasizing international and ASEAN maritime norms and by drawing the attention of regional powers. However, the worsening of the SCS situation compelled ASEAN claimant states to use the ARF more actively to restrain China’s behavior and triggered the extensive discussion on the SCS led by the United States.

To be sure, the ARF’s institutional hedging did not result in any institutional change. It did not add any new mechanism to manage the territorial disputes or advance its institutional function from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy. On the contrary, even after the contentious discussion at the 2010 ARF, the chairman’s statement did not indicate any negative trend in the SCS (ARF Unit, 2010; MOFA, 2011a). This institutional trend continued even in 2012 despite the Scarborough Shoal incident in which China defied the 2011 Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC (ARF Unit, 2012; see Chapter 3). China persistently refused to discuss the SCS disputes at the ARF because, according to Foreign Minister Yang, freedom of navigation and the territorial disputes were two separate issues—the former had been ensured and the latter needed to be dealt with by the parties concerned (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2011). He also added in 2012 that China had “ample historical and legal evidence” for its sovereignty in the Spratly Islands and adjacent waters, insisting that peaceful negotiations between the claimant states should be the priority as UNCLOS did not have the authority to determine state territories (States News Service, 2011). The ARF thus formally took a low-key approach to the SCS issue.

In this sense, the ARF became the diplomatic avenue for ASEAN to informally conduct institutional hedging. The 2010 US statement opened a window of opportunity for member states to discuss the SCS issue more extensively at the ARF despite China’s opposition, yet the SCS was not a regular official agenda. As the situation grew visibly tense with bilateral military tensions heightening rapidly, the United States continued to informally kick off the SCS discussion at the ARF. This was followed by US allies and partners in the region, including Australia and Japan, as they explicitly emphasized the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012 (Australian Government News, 2011; JEN, 2012a; MOFA, 2010, 2011b; States News Service, 2012b).

4.2.3 2013–2016: Fragmenting Institutional Hedging

After the Scarborough Shoal incident, the external great powers’ willingness to continue the SCS discussion was an encouraging sign for ASEAN member states, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, because it provided an opportunity for them to more explicitly check China’s assertive behavior. The United States continued to assert the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for international law including UNCLOS. At the 2013 ARF, US Secretary of State John Kerry pointed out the importance of arbitration, alluding to the Philippines’ initiation of arbitral proceedings against China regarding their territorial claims (SDDP, 2013). Since ASEAN had declared support for international maritime law, these moves also functioned as institutional hedging.

On the other hand, the external powers’ SCS discussions were continually rebutted by China, which further internationalized the issue. In 2013, for instance, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi discussed China’s position extensively in response to the Philippines’ accusation of China’s occupation of Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. Wang’s argument was based on the assumption that the Spratly Islands were under China’s sovereignty and that it was “fully [justifiable] for China to [respond to external states’] provocative activities” (Xinhua, 2013). Extending this logic, China stated that given that international law had no authority to determine territorial borders, bilateral negotiations between the parties concerned should be the only legitimate means to resolve the disputes (Xinhua, 2013). This rebuttal was useful for understanding China’s position in the SCS disputes; however, since this interpretation was not shared by both the claimant and non-claimant states, the latter of which had stakes in freedom of navigation and overflight in the SCS, this point continued to be a source of debate at the ARF, and this was equivalent to consolidating the internationalization of the issue.

The United States was also encouraged to raise the SCS issue at the ARF because of the diplomatic signals that it received from ASEAN. Following the release of the AMM statement on SCS developments in 2014, the United States proposed a “voluntary freeze” to maintain the status quo in the SCS, and this encouraged claimant states’ self-restraint in the context of escalated interstate tensions (States News Service, 2014). The intention of the proposal was partly similar to the early harvest measures of the COC—it was not practical for China and ASEAN to wait out such a long diplomatic process to its conclusion (States News Service, 2014). The Philippines also agreed to maintain the status quo and proposed the Triple Action Plan comprising voluntary freeze, implementation of the DOC, and arbitration (ST, 2014). Further, at the 2014 ARF, Japan raised three principles on the rule of law at sea: (1) “states shall make and clarify their claims based on international law,” (2) “states shall refrain from unilateral actions which could increase tensions,” and (3) “states shall seek to settle disputes by peaceful means” (MOFA, 2014c). These proposals resonated with each other and created a soft coalition vis-à-vis China’s position, making the most of the external powers’ support of the principles of international law and ASEAN norms.

Nevertheless, China rejected these proposals. Wang reiterated China’s diplomatic position, arguing that the heightened tensions in the SCS had been exaggerated by some states and that such proposals would disrupt the COC negotiations (Daily The Pak Banker, 2014). Also, there was no clear consensus at the ARF with regard to these proposals (Ismail, 2014b). According to ASEAN Secretary-General Le Luong Minh, ASEAN member states did not discuss the US proposal as they had their own ideas for preventing provocative behavior such as land reclamation (Gallucci, 2014). Given China’s clear refusal to make the ARF a diplomatic forum for discussing the SCS issue and ASEAN member states’ divergent reactions to the external actors’ proposals, institutional hedging could not be effectively conducted as it did not serve the strategic interests of all ASEAN member states. Instead, diplomatic rows between the United States and China at the ARF continued. The United States accused China of disrupting the status quo by land reclamation and militarization while China insisted that the situation was stable and criticized the United States for interfering in the territorial disputes (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, 2015; The Japan Times, 2015).

In 2015, for the very first time, the contentious debates over the SCS were incorporated in the ARF chairman’s statement: “[The ARF] took note of the serious concerns expressed by some Ministers over the recent and on-going developments in the area, including land reclamation which have resulted in the erosion of trust and confidence amongst parties, and may undermine peace, security and stability in the South China Sea” (ARF Unit, 2015). The ARF was able to do this by indicating that there were “some” ministers who expressed serious concerns as the AMM did (see AMM section in this chapter).

In 2016, when the SCS Arbitral Tribunal issued the award, the ARF became the platform for member states to discuss it. External powers, including the United States, Japan, and Australia, supported the award and discussed its legal importance within and beyond the ARF as the award was final and binding in accordance with UNCLOS (Nikkei Asian Review, 2016a). However, because of the potential intensification of interstate tensions between China and the claimant states, the United States took a cautious approach not to castigate China (States News Service, 2016). ASEAN member states also did not hold a monolithic view on the arbitral award, illustrated by Cambodia’s opposition to mentioning it (Nikkei Asian Review, 2016a). As a result, the chairman’s statement, though indicating some ministers’ concerns as it did in 2015, did not discuss the award (ARF Unit, 2016).

Given this, while the ARF had become a tool for ASEAN’s institutional hedging, ASEAN itself lacked a unified stance vis-à-vis the SCS disputes while external actors proposed new norms and rules. Consequently, ASEAN could not effectively leverage the ARF to constrain China by its rules. While the ARF could further internationalize the issue by information-sharing, it became increasingly difficult to pursue effective institutional hedging because of the internal disunity among ASEAN member states.

4.2.4 2017–2020: Weakening Institutional Hedging

The ARF faced two diplomatic distractions between 2017 and 2020 that made it difficult to consolidate institutional hedging: China’s firm refusal of the award and the emergence of US–North Korea tension. First, China rejected the SCS arbitral award soon after it was issued—on July 13, 2016, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin stated that the award was “just a piece of waste paper” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, 2016). This strong stance from China created a diplomatic division between those that preferred a cautious approach to dealing with the award at the ARF and those that did not. As a result, it became increasingly difficult for ASEAN to form a unified posture at the ARF. Second, between 2017 and 2019, there was growing military tension between the United States and North Korea as well as a sudden diplomatic rapprochement through the 2018 North Korea–United States Singapore Summit and the 2019 equivalent in Hanoi. Comparing the agenda priority of North Korea with that of the SCS, a US State Department official indicated that North Korea was a more immediate and direct national security concern (SDDP, 2019a). As the United States shifted its strategic focus away from the SCS, it became more difficult for ASEAN to expect consistent commitment on the issue from the United States.

Consequently, ASEAN member states did not push for the arbitral award to be discussed at the ARF, and instead used the forum to communicate SCS developments. Since the ASEAN–China cooperation in 2016 had generated diplomatic traction for the COC negotiations, along with the adoption of CUES and the establishment of a bilateral hotline between China and ASEAN foreign ministries in 2017, the general trend of the SCS situation was regarded as positive. The ARF chairman’s statements from 2017 to 2019 also stated that ASEAN and China welcomed improved maritime cooperation (ARF Unit, 2017, 2018, 2019). By mid-2019, the first reading of the COC was completed, after which ASEAN and China moved on to the second reading. However, debates remained over whether the COC should be legally binding as China still objected to that, while the SCS situation was not entirely stable (CNA, 2017). Several ASEAN members, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, were still concerned about the ongoing land reclamation in the Paracels, as China continued its assertive behavior, including harassment against Vietnam’s oil and gas operations as well as the deployment of ballistic missile tests in the sea in 2019 (AFP, 2017; Japan Economic Newswire, 2019; SCMP, 2017; TendersInfo, 2018; Yong, 2019). Therefore, the situation was similar to the 2000s, when there was progress in terms of cooperation but the situation on the ground was not completely stable and US commitment was not clear.

In 2020, the situation changed drastically with the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic and the intensification of US–China great-power rivalry. The ARF was not convened in-person but through teleconference, which made it difficult for member states to conduct informal diplomacy. In addition, as US–North Korea relations had not seen any progress, the United States shifted its strategic focus to China and intensified its diplomatic confrontation toward China over the SCS disputes. Although US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi did not attend the 2020 ARF, an intense diplomatic row occurred just before the forum: The United States castigated China over its claims to offshore resources in the SCS and the harassment of regional states by conducting military exercises, intruding into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, and colliding with Philippine vessels, describing the actions as “completely unlawful.” Meanwhile, China accused the United States of interfering in the SCS disputes, disrupting the COC process, and militarizing the sea by sending aircraft carriers (CE Noticias Financieras English, 2020; ST, 2020).

In this context, ASEAN member states softly advocated its regional autonomy at the ARF by avoiding being entrapped in the great-power rivalry. For example, Malaysian Foreign Minister Hishammuddin Hussein insisted that Southeast Asia needed to “remain the master of its own destiny with the sole aim and purpose of ensuring peace and stability in [the] region,” while Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi stated the importance of the ARF as the platform to “forge cooperation among [member] states in addressing the ever increasingly complex challenges in the region” (Indonesia Tribune, 2020; Malaysia General News, 2020). Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr. expressed ASEAN’s imperative to proceed with the second reading of the COC despite the pandemic in order to promote stability in the SCS, to which ARF member states agreed (ARF Unit, 2020; PDI, 2020). Even some ASEAN member states that had been seriously concerned about China’s behavior in the SCS remained cautious discussing the 2016 arbitral award at the ARF, as the SCS situation had a mixture of negative and positive trends. The negative trends included fishery and coastguard intrusions in disputed areas and the slow progress of the COC negotiations due to the pandemic. The ARF did not function effectively in terms of institutional hedging; instead, it returned to being the forum for CBMs among member states, similar to the ARF’s role during the 1990s.

4.2.5 Conclusion

The ARF was a tool for institutional hedging for ASEAN. Before an ASEANs–China framework for creating the COC emerged in the late 1990, the ARF had attempted to use the principles of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the SCS to constrain China’s behavior. After the 2002 DOC was adopted, the ARF became an avenue for advocating international rules, particularly UNCLOS, to maintain the SCS stability. Using regional and international rules, the ARF became a useful tool for ASEAN to pursue institutional hedging.

However, the ARF’s institutional hedging was not always effective for two reasons. First, ASEAN was not necessarily in consensus about the rules it needed. For example, the 2016 arbitral award was not rejected, but it was also not openly endorsed by all ASEAN members. This disunity made it difficult to determine norms and rules. Second, the intensification of the US–China great-power rivalry over the SCS risked the loss of ASEAN’s strategic autonomy and shrank the room for the pursuit of its own strategy. Although the great powers’ diplomatic support for ASEAN rules and norms would help strengthen ASEAN’s institutional hedging, when their rivalry intensified, ASEAN would likely lose its autonomy, as illustrated by the US–China rivalry in 2020, and be unable to conduct institutional hedging effectively.

In this sense, the basic strategic utility of the ARF fell into monitoring and information dissemination to external actors, while its core institutional strategy, institutional hedging, could only be conducted under specific diplomatic conditions—namely, ASEAN unity and controlled great-power rivalry. Because its institutional strategy is neither always effective nor activated, the ARF’s role became a supporting one in the SCS disputes.

4.3 ASEAN Summit

The ASEAN Summit was first convened in 1976, one year before the 10th anniversary of ASEAN, and the meeting saw the conclusion of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (commonly known as the Bali Concord I) and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), ASEAN’s very first treaty. While the Bali Concord I was a political document that spelled out the guidelines of ASEAN cooperation and envisioned its institutional development, the TAC was a COC for member states, including the principles of non-interference, non-threat or use of force, and state sovereignty (Koga, 2014). Although the ASEAN Summit was an important organ, it was essentially an ad-hoc forum that was held only three times during the Cold War era—in 1976, 1977, and 1987. During this period, the SCS issue was not on the agenda of the ASEAN Summit.

In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War brought about new diplomatic momentum, and the ASEAN Summit’s structure evolved significantly in two ways. First, the 1992 ASEAN Summit formally included political and security issues in its agenda (ASEAN Secretariat, 1992a). While not all sensitive security issues, such as strictly bilateral territorial disputes without significant regional strategic implications, were on the agenda, this change allowed ASEAN to raise and discuss security issues in ASEAN-related forums. Second, the frequency of the summit increased exponentially. From 1995 to 2007, the summit was held annually except for 2006 and 2008. The 2006 ASEAN chair/host, the Philippines, was dealing with a strong typhoon season that year, and the 2008 ASEAN chair/host, Thailand, was undergoing a domestic political crisis. After the ASEAN Charter came into force in 2008, the ASEAN Summit was formally institutionalized to be held twice annually.

According to the Charter, the ASEAN Summit is “the supreme policy-making body of ASEAN” and would be convened as “special or ad hoc meetings” whenever necessary (ASEAN Secretariat, 2008a). Its functions entail “deliberat[ing], provid[ing] policy guidance and tak[ing] decisions on key issues pertaining to the realisation of the objectives of ASEAN, important matters of interests to Member States and all issues referred to it by the ASEAN Coordinating Council, the ASEAN Community Councils and ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2008a). Technically, as stipulated in Article 20 of the ASEAN Charter, the ASEAN Summit is empowered to make a decision when consensus cannot be reached or if there is a serious breach of the Charter. However, given that the ASEAN Summit comprises the heads of member states, it is difficult to do so because the members who oppose reaching consensus or who violate the Charter are involved in the summit itself.Footnote 3 In this sense, as with other international organizations, the ASEAN Summit’s power is still limited.

While the ASEAN Summit is the pinnacle of ASEAN’s decision-making apparatus, it still faces diplomatic limitations when discussing the SCS issue. This is because the matter involves a third party, China. The summit can only make a decision after consulting with China, and therefore its role is likely confined to approving or disapproving the points of discussion at ASEAN–China dialogues. Still, the ASEAN Summit has enough political power to make suggestions and shape international perceptions with its statements. As such, ASEAN leaders need to carefully consider the recommendations that ASEAN–China dialogues provide and craft its statement and declaration in a way such that they do not downplay the SCS issue excessively or provoke China unnecessarily.

In this context, this chapter examines the ASEAN Summit’s role and institutional strategy in managing the SCS disputes during four periods: 1992–2002, 2003–2012, 2013–2016, and 2017–2020.

4.3.1 1992–2002: Limited Institutional Balancing

The ASEAN Summit’s role in managing the SCS disputes from 1992 to 2001 was extremely limited. This is because the summit did not pay much attention to the issue, given the plethora of intra-Southeast Asian matters, ranging from ASEAN membership expansion to the building of new institutions including the ARF. Furthermore, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis had a great impact on the summit’s capacity to manage regional issues. In this sense, the ASEAN Summit’s role was essentially to monitor and authorize the AMM’s policy on the SCS issue, although nine summit meetings were held between 1992 and 2002 and the most of summit documents touched on the SCS issue.

The 1996 chairman’s statement emphasized the early resolution of the territorial disputes by highlighting the TAC, 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the SCS, and international law, including UNCLOS, while the 1999 statement endorsed the creation of a regional COC that the AMM had drafted (see AMM section in this chapter; ASEAN Secretariat, 1996b). Therefore, the ASEAN Summit during the 1990s engaged in limited institutional balancing—it consolidated the same strategic posture of the AMM by endorsing the latter’s decisions vis-à-vis China. Nevertheless, as there were still disagreements among ASEAN member states and between ASEAN and China with regard to the negotiation process and contents of the draft COC, this strategic posture dissipated in 2001 (see AMM section in this chapter). The 2001 statement merely emphasized the importance of dialogue and consultation to resolve the issue while the 2002 statement only indicated that the summit “witnessed” the signing of the DOC.

4.3.2 2003–2012: Failed Enhancement of Institutional Balancing

The ASEAN Summit’s institutional strategy was never concretely consolidated during the 1990, but after the DOC was created, the summit tried to conduct institutional balancing by emphasizing the importance of the TAC. Since China showed interest in signing the TAC to improve overall relations with ASEAN and to facilitate East Asia-oriented cooperative frameworks such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), it was a good opportunity for ASEAN to include China in ASEAN-led principles, rules, and norms (e.g., Ba, 2009; Goh, 2007/2008). China eventually signed the TAC in 2003, and ASEAN thus gained a tool to constrain China’s behavior in the disputed SCS territories by assuring member states that China would be bound by the treaty. In 2004, the ASEAN Summit regarded the TAC as a “code of conduct governing relations between countries in the region for the promotion of peace and stability in the region” in conjunction with the DOC (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004d). Also, as ASEAN leaders envisioned the eventual conclusion of a COC in the SCS, the ASEAN Summit reassured that the COC would be consistent with the TAC and the DOC (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003f). In doing so, the ASEAN Summit conducted institutional balancing.

Nevertheless, the COC was not touched on at the ASEAN Summit from 2003 to 2010. This was because ASEAN and China had already set up and activated the ASEAN–China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC (see ASEAN–China dialogues section in this chapter). Given that the DOC only stipulated principles in the SCS, the working group began to consider tangible means to implement the declaration. Furthermore, ASEAN’s institutional focus had shifted more toward intra-ASEAN cooperation as illustrated by the 2003 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, or the Bali Concord II, which proposed the establishment of three ASEAN communities—security community (later revised as political-security community), economic community, and sociocultural community—as well as by the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003f, 2007d). Considering that the SCS situation had become relatively stable after the DOC was created, there was no immediate concern for the ASEAN Summit to take action (see Chapter 3).

After the SCS situation grew tense in the second half of 2010, the ASEAN Summit more acutely realized the limitations of the TAC, which did not necessarily constrain claimant states’ behavior, particularly that of China. Since then, the TAC had been emphasized as a general principle of interstate relations in Southeast Asia and was no longer placed in the same paragraph in the chairman’s statement which discussed the SCS issue. Rather, from the 17th ASEAN Summit in October 2010, ASEAN highlighted the principles of international law including UNCLOS, instead of the TAC, and the summit reintroduced the creation of a COC as the endpoint of the DOC implementation (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010c).

From 2011, the ASEAN Summit began to have the SCS issue as a regular agenda item, with the category, “South China Sea,” in the chairman’s statement, except for the 2013–2015 summits when the ASEAN chairs were Brunei, Myanmar, and Malaysia (ASEAN Secretariat, 2011a). However, despite the deteriorating situation, the ASEAN Summit emphasized the importance of “continuing positive engagement of ASEAN–China [emphasis added]” for the effective implementation of the DOC and the creation of a COC (ASEAN Secretariat, 2011a). This diplomatic posture did not change with the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident, when tensions rose not only with China but also among ASEAN member states, particularly between the Philippines and Cambodia (see AMM section in this chapter). The only major move that the ASEAN Summit made was to call for “self-restraint” and the avoidance of activities that would “complicate and escalate disputes” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012e). During this period, the ASEAN Summit maintained institutional balancing, yet given the changed strategic environment in the SCS, the summit was unable to enhance its strategy, although it could still internationalize the SCS issue using its chairman’s statements.

4.3.3 2013–2016: Dilemma Over Institutional Balancing

The ASEAN Summit remained relatively dormant from 2013 to 2016 because the main decision-making apparatus for the COC was the ASEAN–China forums. There was only so much that the ASEAN Summit could do in terms of resolving the disputes without a draft COC. This was reflected in the ASEAN Summit’s chairman’s statements from 2013 to 2016, which only emphasized “collective commitment” to peaceful resolution through the principles of international law including UNCLOS, “full and effective implementation” of the DOC, and the early conclusion of a COC.Footnote 4 In order to accelerate the COC negotiation process, the ASEAN Summit endorsed the commencement of ASEAN–China formal consultations on the COC in 2013 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2013d).

In the meantime, during this period, diplomatic tensions between the Philippines and China rose rapidly; in 2013, the Philippines commenced arbitral proceedings against China on the SCS territorial claims. The ASEAN Summit also reacted by issuing several strong statements calling for the non-use or threat of force and self-restraint while advocating an “early harvest” of the COC. The latter meant that ASEAN and China would be able to start implementing part of the COC that had been agreed upon before formalizing the code (ASEAN Secretariat, 2013d). From 2014 to 2015, when naval tensions between Vietnam and China heightened, the ASEAN Summit expressed “serious concerns” or “concerns” about the SCS developments for the first time and requested all parties involved to avoid activities that would complicate the situation (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014a, 2014c, 2015a, 2015d, 2016g).

However, these acts of institutional balancing by the ASEAN Summit were essentially limited as there were always qualifiers on these statements. Most notably, even after the arbitral award had been issued, the ASEAN Summit, as the supreme decision-making apparatus of ASEAN, decided not to discuss or mention the award at all despite its repeated emphasis over the years on the principles of international law that formed the very basis of the SCS Arbitral Tribunal.

4.3.4 2017–2020: Supporting Role Through Institutional Balancing

From 2017 to 2020, the ASEAN Summit’s role essentially remained the same. This is mainly because, in response to the 2016 arbitral award, China began to adopt a more cooperative posture toward ASEAN although it rejected the ruling in its white paper issued on July 13, 2016 (see Chapter 3). In 2017, for example, ASEAN and China operationalized the “Guidelines for Hotline Communications among Senior Officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of China and ASEAN Member States” in case of maritime emergencies as well as CUES (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017a). Moreover, ASEAN and China had decided to complete the framework for the COC by mid-2017, which was implemented on time and progressed to substantial negotiations (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017a, 2017e).

These positive trends temporarily alleviated political tensions among ASEAN leaders, particularly those who were still concerned with SCS developments including land reclamation, such as Vietnam and the Philippines, and those who were not, like Cambodia and Laos. This was because these developments did not force them to seriously consider the activation of institutional balancing at the summit level for the time being. Also, to show that not all ASEAN members shared the same concerns, the summit chairman’s statements began to state, “We took note of concerns expressed by some Leaders [emphases added],” instead of using the word “share [emphasis added]” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017a, 2018a). However, this could still function as institutional balancing, albeit minimally, by disseminating developments of the SCS situation to the international community.

The COC negotiations made progress from 2017 to 2019 with the creation of the framework and the SDNT, and subsequently the completion of the first reading of the SDNT. With these positive trends, the SCS matter became subsumed into the more general regional and global issues in the chairman’s statements from 2018, signaling that the SCS disputes did not wholly define ASEAN–China relations.Footnote 5 The ASEAN Summit monitored the situation and, from 2017 to 2019, repeatedly welcomed “improving cooperation [or relations] between China and ASEAN” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017a, 2017e, 2018a, 2018e, 2019b, 2019f, 2020c). Furthermore, although the pandemic outbreak in 2020 placed a new challenge on the situation—it was difficult to hold face-to-face discussions and the second reading of the SDNT was postponed—the ASEAN Summit remained optimistic, highlighting the importance of ASEAN–China cooperation while noting concerns raised by some leaders regarding the SCS situation (ASEAN Secretariat, 2020c).

4.3.5 Conclusion

The ASEAN Summit’s institutional strategy has been consistently based on institutional balancing. Because it is the core of ASEAN’s institutional structure, it is difficult to alter the institutional design, and therefore its institutional strategy remained stable. That said, its diplomatic role in the SCS disputes is generally limited to whether ASEAN leaders endorsed the proposals that other ASEAN-led institutions submitted or highlighted. Given the same institutional structure, the summit has been closely aligned with the AMM. Moreover, the summit’s standalone statements and decisions on the SCS disputes would have a significant impact on ASEAN–China overall relations, whether such statements and decisions are positive or negative, and thus the summit is cautious and generally plays a supportive role for other ASEAN-led institutions.

Admittedly, all this does not mean that the ASEAN Summit would not play a significant role in shaping the SCS strategic environment. It is ultimately the highest authority for making institutional decisions, and its institutional balancing can be activated once ASEAN leaders share common threat perceptions on the SCS situation. However, the 2016 SCS arbitral award created fundamental divisions in ASEAN leaders’ perspectives, and consequently the ASEAN Summit has retained a relatively marginal role in managing the SCS disputes unless new developments, such as the conclusion of a COC, emerge.

4.4 ASEAN–China Dialogues

ASEAN–China dialogue relations were established in 1991 soon after the end of the Cold War. Prior to 1991, ASEAN did not have any diplomatic framework with China even through the ASEAN-PMC, which aimed to build “closer, constructive and complementary relationship[s]” and devised the system of “dialogue partners” (ASEAN Secretariat, 1977; Nishimura, 2017).Footnote 6 ASEAN began interactions after two member states—Indonesia and Singapore—normalized diplomatic relations with China in 1990. From then on, ASEAN attempted to build trust through dialogues—focusing on functional cooperation such as trade as well as science and technology (Ong, 2007). In 1993, the dialogue relations elevated into a “consultative relationship” based on “equality, mutual benefit and common development without prejudice to bilateral relations between China and the member states of ASEAN” (ASEAN Secretariat, 1993b). Through these CBMs, China became a full dialogue partner along with India and Russia in July 1996 and began participating in the ASEAN-PMC, which was usually organized back-to-back with the AMM (ASEAN Secretariat, 1996a).

Since 1997, the ASEAN–China dialogue agenda has broadened to include security issues such as the SCS disputes. In 1997, an ASEAN–China informal summit was held to ensure the continual improvement of not only ASEAN–China relations but also bilateral relations between individual ASEAN member states and China. ASEAN and China held an informal summit annually until 1999, and this was formalized in 2000. In October 2003, China became the first external state to adopt the TAC, which strengthened bilateral relationships, resulting in the conclusion of the ASEAN–China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003d, 2003e). While China had been skeptical about multilateral diplomacy, including ASEAN, in the early 1990s, its participation in the ARF facilitated active engagement with other ASEAN-led institutions such as the ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the EAS, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), which further deepened their relationship.

To be sure, the ASEAN-PMC framework was not structured in a formal way even during the 1990s and 2000s. Meetings with ASEAN dialogue partners were not regularly organized or recorded, and despite the existence of the system, the framework remained largely informal. Furthermore, because of the proliferation of regional institutions in Asia–Pacific, such as the ARF and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation, the ASEAN-PMC struggled to find its raison d'être as new institutions started covering the agenda that the PMC had discussed, including transnational and political issues in Asia (e.g., US Department of State, 2001). However, the ASEAN-PMC provided ASEAN with a quasi-exclusive bilateral forum with its dialogue partners, and it became formalized and structured after the ASEAN Charter was enacted in 2008. Currently, bilateral dialogues are held at various levels, ranging from SOMs to ministerial meetings to the summit. In this context, ASEAN–China dialogues have become particularly useful for discussing SCS developments directly relating to China and ASEAN claimant states.

This chapter examines the role and institutional strategy of ASEAN–China dialogues—including the summit, ministerial meetings, and SOMs—during four periods: 1991–2002, 2003–2012, 2013–2016, and 2017–2020.

4.4.1 1991–2002: From CBMs to Institutional Hedging to Institutional Co-option

ASEAN’s institutional strategy through ASEAN–China dialogues was not clearly set during the 1990s. This was mainly because at the beginning of the 1990s, ASEAN did not have a formal communication channel with China. Given the rising strategic uncertainty in Asia–Pacific at the end of the Cold War, where the rise of China and the disengagement of the United States would have a significant security impact on Southeast Asia, ASEAN started to create forums to engage with China rather than balancing against it. As an initial CBM, Malaysia, the 1991 ASEAN chair, invited China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to the 24th AMM as a guest (ASEAN Secretariat, 2020b). Through informal bilateral dialogues, ASEAN–China relations steadily elevated to “consultative relationship” in 1993 and then to “dialogue partner” in 1996. Nevertheless, both were not yet ready to discuss security issues in depth, including the SCS matter, despite the intensification of territorial disputes, and ASEAN–China dialogues were mainly used as CBMs, focusing on non-contentious issues.

It was in this context that the inaugural ASEAN–China Summit was held in 1997, which touched on the SCS issue for the first time in an ASEAN–China meeting. The summit chairman’s statement stipulated that “[t]he parties concerned agreed to resolve their disputes in the South China Sea through friendly consultations and negotiations in accordance with universally recognized international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea” (ASEAN Secretariat, 1997b). Given that China had repeatedly resisted the internationalization of the disputes, this statement indicated an opportunity for ASEAN to discuss the issue with China multilaterally (AFP, 1998).

From 1998 to 2001, ASEAN and China held a formal and informal annual summit, where the SCS issue was on the agenda consistently. Particularly, by 1999, ASEAN and China had agreed to a peaceful resolution through negotiation and consultation and were discussing a potential COC (see Chapter 3; AFP, 1998; MOFA, 1999). In this context, ASEAN attempted to conduct institutional hedging by framing the discussions with its own declarations and documents, including the 1992 Declaration on the SCS and the 1995 Joint Statement. ASEAN even attempted to preemptively create its own COC to enhance the effectiveness of institutional hedging. In this way, ASEAN could have made the most of its own COC to frame the COC discussions with China. Nevertheless, among ASEAN member states there were disagreements on issues such as the COC’s geographical scope (see Chapter 3). Accordingly, ASEAN–China dialogues faced difficulty proceeding with the COC negotiations even though both sides agreed with certain principles in general, such as peaceful resolution through dialogue and consultation and no new occupation or construction of structures (ASEAN Secretariat, 2001b; Bernama, 1999). Furthermore, the COC discussion occurred at several ASEAN-led forums, including ASEAN–China dialogues, the AMM, and the ARF, which created confusion about which venue would play the main role.

As such, ASEAN missed an opportunity to effectively conduct institutional hedging through ASEAN–China dialogues. If ASEAN had been able to create its own COC in the SCS swiftly, that could have been the negotiation basis for discussing the COC with China. However, because of ASEAN’s internal dissonance and China’s rapid involvement in the discussion, the COC discussion was not framed as one between ASEAN and China, but between individual ASEAN member states and China. Thus, ASEAN–China dialogues instead began to conduct institutional co-option through the creation of a COC.

The 2002 DOC became a milestone SCS document, created by ASEAN and China to navigate state behavior. Although the document fell short of formulating a legally binding COC because of divergent interests among the claimant states, it was the first step to nurturing regional norms for maintaining stability in the SCS. Therefore, it was largely regarded as a CBM document; by engaging China on nurturing norms based on the DOC, ASEAN had conducted institutional co-option.

4.4.2 2003–2012: Weakening Effectiveness of Institutional Co-option and Hedging

The 2002 DOC opened a new window of opportunity for ASEAN to pursue institutional hedging based on the TAC. This was possible because China had shown willingness to sign the TAC in 2002 and acceded to it in 2003, rather than insisting only on its “five principles of peaceful co-existence” (e.g., ASEAN Secretariat, 1997b). Indeed, China began to engage ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions more actively after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis as it attempted to nurture East Asian regionalism for East Asian states through the APT, which did not include external major powers, particularly the United States (Koga, 2021). As a result, China’s diplomatic posture toward ASEAN became increasingly positive, resulting in the adoption of the 2002 Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues and the conclusion of the 2003 ASEAN–China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002b, 2003d).

China attempted to differentiate itself from other major powers by publicly subscribing to the ASEAN rules and norms that those powers were hesitant to accept. For example, it was not only the TAC, but also the Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), that China expressed its intention to sign as the first Nuclear Weapon State in 2002 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002c). Because of the potential geographical implications for China’s nuclear strategy in the SCS and the unwillingness of other nuclear-weapon states to sign the treaty, China did not immediately accede to the SEANWFZ but showed its amicable posture while continuing discussions with ASEAN. The display of political will on China’s part bodes well for ASEAN–China relations (NTI, 2020). Ultimately, China’s ratification of the TAC in 2003 was a clear positive sign to ASEAN because China had essentially agreed that it would refrain from the use or threat of force in the SCS and pursue a peaceful resolution of the disputes in accordance with the TAC principles.

Given this trend, ASEAN expected relative stability in the SCS and focused on the incremental, but effective, implementation of the DOC which would lead to the eventual conclusion of the COC (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003f, 2004a). At this point, there was no clear demarcation between the DOC and the COC, but the assumption was that the COC would be a legally binding document, not just a political one without legally enforceable mechanisms. To this end, ASEAN and China formed several working-level dialogues to implement the DOC. The most notable ones were the SOM on the Implementation of the DOC (SOM-DOC)—an initiative by ASEAN’s and China’s foreign ministers—and the ASEAN–China Joint Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC (ACJWG) to monitor the implementation process, both of which were formed in 2004 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004c). Convened in December 2004, the SOM-DOC in turn recommended the establishment of the ACJWG (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004f). Comprising registered experts and eminent persons, the ACJWG aimed to establish “concrete cooperative activities” based on the DOC to facilitate mutual understanding and trust, specifically in the fields of maritime environmental protection, marine scientific research, safety in navigation and communications at sea, search-and-rescue operations, and combating transnational crime (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004f, 2004g). In other words, the ACJWG functioned as a CBM and a norm-setting mechanism on functional cooperation in the SCS. Since these norms could be based on the TAC, ASEAN continued to conduct institutional co-option while leaving the option open for institutional hedging by emphasizing the importance of the TAC.

Despite the establishment of these mechanisms, however, the implementation process was delayed significantly between late 2005 and early 2010. For example, it was decided that the ACJWG would occur at least twice a year, and its first meeting was held in August 2005 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004e, 2005b). However, there were only three meetings between August 2005 and March 2010, while the SOM-DOC was also relatively inactive (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010a). Furthermore, ASEAN–China Summits and PMCs during this period remained silent on the progress of the DOC implementation, even at ASEAN–China anniversary events such as the 2006 summit commemorating the 15th anniversary of ASEAN–China dialogue relations (ASEAN Secretariat, 2007c, 2008d, 2009b, 2009c; Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Jamaica, 2006).

There are two reasons for this silence. First, the SCS situation between 2005 and 2007 was clearly more stable than before, which did not draw much international and regional attention, while other pressing issues, such as counterterrorism and the ASEAN Charter, became more salient matters for ASEAN. In addition, given that both ASEAN and China had agreed to take an incremental approach to implementing the DOC, the delay was not necessarily negative. Several ASEAN member states, namely the Philippines and Vietnam, were negotiating a potential joint exploration project in the SCS, which was generally regarded as a positive sign for SCS stability (see Chapter 3). Second, the deterioration of the SCS situation from 2007 was gradual, and ASEAN did not consider the situation to be immediately alarming. The trilateral project involving China, the Philippines, and Vietnam—the joint marine seismic undertaking—was not proceeding smoothly, but this did not translate into major skirmishes. Rather, tensions rose in 2009 when Malaysia and Vietnam jointly submitted their claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and when the USNS Impeccable incident occurred (see Chapter 3). Given these regional circumstances, ASEAN could not effectively conduct institutional co-option during this period, while the TAC itself was also not effective enough to constrain claimant states’ behavior.

As US–China diplomatic and naval tensions climbed from 2009, ASEAN doubled down on its institutional co-option efforts by revitalizing ASEAN–China dialogues on the SCS in 2010. In April 2010, the ACJWG was convened, while the foreign ministers of ASEAN and China also attempted to resume the SOM-DOC (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010b). Moreover, in the context of intensifying US–China great-power rivalry over the SCS, the ASEAN–China Summit in October 2010 highlighted the need for greater consultation between the two, resulting in the SOM-DOC’s creation of the “Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC” in 2011, which was soon endorsed by both parties’ foreign ministers (ASEAN Secretariat, 2010d, 2011c, 2011d).

The 2011 guidelines were basically a summary of past ASEAN–China agreements. The guidelines included the promotion of joint cooperative activities, a step-by-step approach to implementing the DOC, active consultation through dialogues, and the creation of a COC based on consensus. There were few unique features in the guidelines—one new recommendation was that the progress of the agreed activities and projects would be reported to the ASEAN–China PMC annually. However, despite the 20th anniversary of ASEAN–China dialogue relations in 2011, there was no real progress on both the DOC implementation and the COC discussion (ASEAN Secretariat, 2011e).

This negative trend became more apparent in 2012, when China–Philippines relations deteriorated due to the Scarborough Shoal incident, and ASEAN disunity was revealed by the non-issuance of that year’s AMM joint communiqué (see Chapter 3). As a result, ASEAN–China dialogue was paralyzed. The year 2012 marked the DOC’s 10th anniversary, yet there was no substantial discussion on the COC but merely a reiteration of the importance of the effective and full implementation of the DOC at the PMC and SOM levels (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012a, 2012c). The anniversary workshop was organized in November 2012, but the co-hosts were China and Cambodia, both of which avoided discussing specific incidents relating to the SCS, and the workshop only generally emphasized the enhancement of the ASEAN–China strategic partnership, deflecting attention away from the SCS disputes (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012d). Likewise, the ASEAN–China Summit on November 19, 2012 issued a joint statement on the 10th anniversary of the DOC but did not add substantially to the progress of the COC negotiations (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012f).

Therefore, there was a growing gap between diplomatic agreement and the SCS situation on the ground after 2009. At this point, the ASEAN–China dialogue faced considerable difficulty managing the SCS disputes because its institutional co-option and potential institutional hedging efforts had become ineffective.

4.4.3 2013–2016: Revitalizing Institutional Co-option

The year 2013 was the 10th anniversary of the ASEAN–China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, another occasion that provided an opportunity to promote their cooperation in the SCS. Given the 2012 SCS debacle that had affected ASEAN unity, ASEAN made significant efforts to accelerate its consultation with China on the COC creation, including leveraging the SOM-DOC and ACJWG platforms, which had been dormant for a long time. Foreign ministers of ASEAN and China agreed to start official consultation on the COC and considered the establishment of supportive mechanisms including an Eminent Persons and Experts Group (ASEAN Secretariat, 2013b). These illustrate ASEAN member states’ increasing concerns over its institutional viability on the SCS issue. Consequently, the COC consultation started in September 2013, while tangible cooperation mechanisms were sought to manage maritime tensions and accidents, such as setting up hotlines of communication (ASEAN Secretariat, 2013c). At this point, the most important objective was the early conclusion of the COC to regulate claimant states’ behavior more concretely and maintain the status quo until peaceful negotiations for the territorial disputes were completed.

Such a political ambition was hard to achieve in the short term, and thus ASEAN began to take a two-pronged process which China also accepted: COC negotiations and early harvest measures. Discussed at the SOM-DOC and the ACJWG, early harvest measures included the creation of a bilateral hotline between the foreign ministries of ASEAN member states and China as well as a tabletop exercise on search and rescue (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014d). In this way, while negotiating a COC, ASEAN and China were able to promote CBMs and maintain a line of communication with regard to the SCS situation. By 2016, the SOM-DOC announced that ASEAN and China had adopted a hotline for maritime emergencies and were discussing the potential adoption of CUES in the SCS, and that the COC discussion had progressed based on two papers, “List of Elements of the Possible Outline of a COC” and “List of Crucial and Complex Issues” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2016b). To be sure, as with other political documents between China and ASEAN, these agreements did not prevent local skirmishes on the ground, as illustrated by the China–Philippines tension over Second Thomas Shoal in 2013 and the China–Vietnam skirmishes over hydrocarbon drilling in 2014. Yet, this institutional co-option promoted China and ASEAN onto the next phase to discuss the COC framework in 2015 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015c).

In July 2016, the SCS Arbitral Tribunal’s award was issued, ruling overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines. Based on international law, the award was “final and binding,” but as with other ASEAN-led institutions, ASEAN–China dialogues could not discuss it because of China’s strong opposition (ASEAN Secretariat, 2016f). ASEAN-led institutions were based on consensus decision-making, and it was almost impossible for China to agree to any statement that would weaken its maritime claims in the SCS. Furthermore, as shown by the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident, there were also differing perspectives on the award among ASEAN member states.

Instead, foreign ministers of ASEAN and China issued a joint statement on the DOC in July 2016 that reiterated the 2011 Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC (ASEAN Secretariat, 2016e). Also, rather than paying attention to those differences, ASEAN–China dialogues generally focused on the progress of functional cooperation, particularly the activation of the inter-foreign ministry hotline and the formal application of CUES. Meanwhile, the ASEAN–China Summit clarified two important timelines—for the implementation of early harvest measures and the completion of consultation on the COC outline by the first half of 2017 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2016h, 2016i). By focusing on institutional co-option, ASEAN and China made some diplomatic progress by sacrificing an opportunity for ASEAN to conduct institutional hedging using the 2016 arbitral award. Pursuing institutional hedging with the arbitral award would highly likely be counter-productive without concrete political and material support from the international community, particularly the United States and other regional great powers in East Asia. As a result, ASEAN did not take the risk.

4.4.4 2017–2020: Consolidating Institutional Co-option

ASEAN’s institutional co-option through meetings to achieve the early conclusion of a COC and early harvest measures continued from 2017 to 2020. In May 2017, both the SOM-DOC and the ACJWG overviewed the progress of the inter-foreign ministries hotline and the application of CUES; exchanged their views on functional maritime cooperation, including marine environmental protection and safety of navigation in the SCS; and completed discussions on the draft COC framework (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017b). Subsequently, the ASEAN–China PMC endorsed the outcomes of the SOM-DOC and tasked senior officials to begin substantive consultation on the COC (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017d). At the ASEAN–China Summit, leaders reemphasized the positive steps made by both sides and endorsed the activities of the SOM-DOC and the ACJWG, resulting in the issuance of the declaration on the marine environmental protection (ASEAN Secretariat, 2017f).

Substantial discussions on the COC led to the creation of the SDNT at the SOM-DOC in 2018 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2018d). The SDNT was a draft document of proposed ideas and positions of China and ASEAN member states which would form the basis of the COC (Thayer, 2018). The SDNT was endorsed by both the ASEAN–China PMC and Summit in 2018, with the aim of completing the first reading by 2019 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2018f). In fact, the first reading was completed in mid-2019, where each state’s position was streamlined in the document, and the ASEAN–China PMC decided to commence the second reading, aiming to complete the COC in 2021 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2019c, 2019e).

Due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, face-to-face ASEAN–China dialogues were not able to be convened, which hampered progress on the COC negotiations. The ASEAN–China PMC and Summit were held in the second half of 2020, and the PMC reiterated that the COC would be “consistent with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS, within a mutually-agreed timeline” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2020b, 2020d, 2020f). Nonetheless, negotiations were significantly delayed.

4.4.5 Conclusion

ASEAN–China dialogues at various levels—senior officials, foreign ministers, and summit—have become the most important ASEAN-led institutions in managing the SCS disputes. Their role was not to deter a potential aggressor or to punish a norm violator; rather, the role had evolved from being a CBM to norm creation through institutional co-option.

During the 1990s, the end of the Cold War altered the strategic landscape in the SCS. As China had not been fully incorporated into the global and regional systems, ASEAN member states, particularly Indonesia and Singapore, were concerned about strategic uncertainty caused by China’s rise. In this setting, ASEAN–China dialogues functioned as CBMs, which turned out to be effective after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. While ASEAN used its own declarations and statements as a basis for the COC creation, which could work as institutional hedging, this strategy changed over time as China resisted such a negotiation process. At the same time, ASEAN also realized that its members had disagreements and that bilateral discussions with China were necessary for effective negotiation. The COC negotiation process from the late 1990s was not necessarily smooth, but it resulted in the creation of a political document in 2002—the DOC.

During the mid-2000s, the stable strategic balance in the SCS nurtured a diplomatic atmosphere in which ASEAN–China dialogues created new institutional mechanisms—the SOM-DOC and the ACJWG—to fully and effectively implement the DOC. However, the stability also indicated that there was no new immediate threat, and thus the implementation of the DOC and the creation of a COC were not prioritized. Paradoxically, ASEAN–China dialogues had not created diplomatic urgency for the resolution of the territorial disputes until the surge of skirmishes in the SCS in around 2008. This eventually led to the deteriorating SCS situation in 2012, when the Philippines and China confronted diplomatically and militarily over the Scarborough Shoal incident.

The 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident triggered new diplomatic momentum to push forward the COC creation. As it was clear that it would take a long time, ASEAN and China agreed in 2013 to facilitate a two-pronged process—COC negotiations and early harvest measures—which would take place over the next few years. Consequently, ASEAN–China dialogues established the inter-foreign ministry hotline and the adoption of CUES in the SCS. At this point, ASEAN’s institutional strategy through ASEAN–China dialogues was still institutional co-option because ASEAN could not dominate rule- or norm-making at the dialogues. This was clearly illustrated by the aftermath of the 2016 arbitral award, where ASEAN had no choice but to engage with China despite the award because ASEAN could not unite on the SCS issue. As ASEAN double-downed on institutional co-option, COC negotiations from 2017 to 2020 made progress—the first reading of the SDNT was completed in 2019, kickstarting the second reading, and the COC was planned to conclude by 2021. Nevertheless, the envisioned timeline was disrupted due to the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak.

Given these historical developments, institutional co-option was essentially the only option for ASEAN in ASEAN–China dialogues. ASEAN was structurally limited because even if it was united in its position against China in the SCS disputes, China would be able to reject the accusations and stop negotiations because of ASEAN’s consensus decision-making process. Also, the dialogues were the most direct institutional framework between ASEAN and China that ASEAN could utilize vis-à-vis a particular great power. Losing this framework would not only create strategic antagonism between ASEAN and China, but also exacerbate ASEAN disunity given the member states’ divergent diplomatic postures toward China. Therefore, despite the deteriorating SCS situation on the ground, ASEAN did not stop engaging China through ASEAN–China frameworks.

At the same time, every time there was an expected change in the strategic balance in the SCS, the ASEAN–China dialogue framework gained diplomatic momentum to facilitate functional cooperation and COC negotiations. Moreover, considering that China has not canceled ASEAN–China dialogues despite the increasing tensions with several claimant states, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, the dialogues serve as a consistent line of communication and a negotiating table which have gained strategic utility for ASEAN member states.

4.5 East Asia Summit (EAS)

Established in 2005, the EAS currently has 18 member states: the 10 ASEAN member states, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. Its institutional lineage dates back to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s proposal in 1990 to create the “East Asian Economic Group,” comprising ASEAN members, China, Japan, and South Korea, and excluding the United States, which strongly opposed it. Eventually, this group formed the institutional basis of the APT in 1997 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2008a). When the APT Summit was officially convened for the first time in 1999, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung initiated the academically oriented “East Asia Vision Group” (EAVG) to envision potential areas of cooperation among APT members. After the EAVG report was issued in 2000 recommending the nurturing of an “East Asian community,” the APT formed another study group, “East Asia Study Group” (EASG), largely comprising government officials, to implement the EAVG’s recommendations. In both the 2001 EAVG and 2002 EASG reports, one of the most important recommendations was to elevate the APT to an “East Asian Summit” as a long-term measure for facilitating the APT’s regional community-building efforts (East Asia Study Group, 2002; East Asia Vision Group, 2001).

The proposed summit was to be a regional forum that ensured equal participation among member states unlike the existing regional forums in East Asia that were predominantly led by ASEAN. To this end, long-term CBMs were necessary to negate strategic rivalry among member states, particularly China and Japan. However, China and Malaysia attempted to accelerate the process of establishing such a summit in East Asia. While both sought greater regional autonomy from the United States and the West, there were also growing concerns about China’s rising diplomatic clout among several APT members such as Indonesia and Japan (Koga, 2021). To avoid a potentially negative impact, those APT members attempted to dilute China’s excessive influence by retaining ASEAN centrality and expanding the membership to other regional democratic states—Australia, India, and New Zealand (Koga, 2021). Consequently, the EAS included these three democratic states while remaining an ASEAN-centered regional framework.

In short, the EAS was the result of political compromises among APT member states, and the original purpose of upgrading the APT was lost in the process. Both frameworks could coexist: While the EAS would play a “significant role in community building” in East Asia, the APT would “continue to be the main vehicle in achieving [East Asian cooperation and community-building efforts]” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d). Nevertheless, since the institutional division of labor was not clearly articulated, the EAS’s role remained vague initially and began to focus on non-controversial cooperative agendas among the member states.

The vague institutional role of the EAS also meant that it was flexible enough to modify its agenda and modality over time. Indeed, its membership expanded again in 2011, including Russia and the United States, covering two of the most influential regional powers in Asia–Pacific (Koga, 2018, pp. 61–69). This section examines the institutional strategy of the EAS during three periods: 2005–2012, 2013–2016, and 2017–2020.

4.5.1 2005–2012: Toward Institutional Hedging

The EAS initially focused only on non-controversial, cooperative agendas and avoided discussing contentious issues in East Asia, including the SCS disputes. While the summit indicated that it discussed “issues of strategic importance to the East Asian region,” the agendas were confined to non-traditional security issues such as poverty eradication, energy, education, finance, the avian influenza, and natural-disaster mitigation, with the exception of North Korea’s nuclear development (EAS Unit, 2007). Among these, the EAS identified five priority areas for cooperation in facilitating regional community-building efforts: energy and environment, finance, education, natural-disaster management, and pandemic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 2012). In July 2009, an EAS foreign ministers’ informal consultation was held which discussed regional political and security issues, such as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and Myanmar’s democratization process but did not touch on the SCS disputes (EAS Unit, 2009). China persistently avoided discussing the SCS issue at the EAS, and thus the EAS from 2005 to 2009 remained a non-controversial cooperative framework in East Asia (e.g., States News Service, 2009).

However, this institutional trend changed in 2010 when some ASEAN member states, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, began raising concerns about China’s behavior in the SCS. In the context of the ARF debates between China and the United States over the SCS disputes, EAS foreign ministers also emphasized the importance of maritime security while welcoming the establishment of the ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAS Unit, 2010a). Moreover, the expansion of EAS membership to include Russia and the United States was discussed and agreed to among EAS members, with US involvement in the EAS becoming more visible in 2010. Most notably, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who was present at the 2010 EAS as a guest of the chair, Vietnam, began to proactively raise the issue of maritime security (US Department of State, 2010). While some ASEAN member states, such as Indonesia, were cautious about raising the SCS issue in a contentious way, most of the regional states, including Australia and Japan, also expressed concerns about the SCS situation in 2010 (AFP, 2010b; JEN, 2010b). Eventually, Clinton reiterated the US position on the SCS issue and mentioned the positive sign of progress in the ASEAN–China discussions for creating a legally binding COC in the SCS (AFP, 2010c). Although this did not necessarily reflect the 2010 EAS chairman’s statement, it opened a small window of opportunity for the EAS to discuss the SCS issue (EAS Unit, 2010b).

Because of its inclusion of the United States, the EAS became another avenue for discussing the SCS issue from 2011. The EAS informal foreign ministers’ meeting was formalized as the EAS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (EAS-FMM), whose inaugural meeting saw the participation of Clinton. She raised the SCS issue in the context of maritime security despite China’s soft opposition, explicitly highlighting the importance of transparency to make territorial claims “publicly and specifically known” for an eventual resolution (Lee, 2011; US Department of State, 2011a). This proactive US stance encouraged EAS member states to discuss the SCS issue more openly at the summit held in November 2011. China reiterated that the SCS solution ought to be sought bilaterally and among the parties directly concerned, and it supported Cambodia’s diplomatic posture, which was compatible with China’s (Hille & Deutsch, 2011; Xinhua, 2011). However, the United States persistently discussed the SCS issue at the EAS because of US national interests—that is, to ensure freedom of navigation and overflight in accordance with international law (The White House, 2011). Emphasizing that the territorial disputes were not an EAS matter, the United States considered it necessary to discuss the shared maritime principles at the leaders’ summit (Fair Disclosure Wire, 2011; The White House, 2011).

Given the rising concerns among some ASEAN member states and US willingness to discuss maritime security at the EAS, including the SCS issue, 16 of the 18 member states touched on maritime security at the EAS retreat, most of which also discussed the SCS disputes (The American Presidency Project, 2011). The chairman’s statement did not specifically mention the SCS, but indicated important principles, such as freedom of navigation, as well as leveraging existing frameworks, including the ASEAN Maritime Forum, to address maritime challenges (EAS Unit, 2011a).

Also, partly as the United States wanted to transform the EAS into a premier “political and security” forum to tackle regional security challenges in Asia–Pacific, the EAS gained diplomatic momentum to issue the “Declaration of the EAS on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations” in 2011 (Clinton, 2011; The White House, 2011). This declaration stipulates that “the international law of the sea contains crucial norms that contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region” and that the EAS principles include “respect for international law,” “renunciation of the threat of force or use of force,” and “settlement of differences and disputes by peaceful means,” which were fundamentally compatible with ASEAN’s TAC (EAS Unit, 2011b). As such, the EAS used the existing ASEAN institutional norms to constrain member states’ behavior and thus began to conduct institutional hedging.

This tendency became more visible in 2012 because of the Scarborough Shoal incident. Despite the 2011 EAS declaration, tensions between claimant states, particularly China and the Philippines, rose quickly. State Secretary Clinton then used the EAS-FMM to reiterate US position on maritime security but expressed concern about the SCS situation without naming Scarborough Shoal (Federal News Service, 2012). Furthermore, Clinton advocated that resolving complex territorial issues only through bilateral negotiations was “a recipe for confusion and even confrontation” (Federal News Service, 2012). This was because the issue was not only territorial but also concerned the “conduct in disputed areas and… acceptable methods of resolving disputes,” which needed to be discussed multilaterally (States News Service, 2012a). Consequently, the 2012 EAS-FMM chairman’s statement reaffirmed the importance of peaceful resolution and the implementation of the DOC, mentioning the SCS issue for the first time in the EAS’s history (EAS Unit, 2012a).

The EAS also discussed the SCS situation in November 2012. The summit chairman’s statement reiterated the general principles of behavior on the SCS issue in the context of maritime security (EAS Unit, 2012b). Of course, there was pushback from China and Cambodia. China stated that it would reject any attempt to exaggerate maritime tensions, while Cambodia attempted to block the tabling of the SCS issue by stating that ASEAN had reached consensus not to “internationalize” the SCS disputes (AFP, 2012a, 2012b; Xinhua, 2012). However, this was soon denied by Philippine President Benigno Aquino. The Philippines did not agree with the statement and stated that it would act in accordance with its national interests, if necessary (AFP, 2012c). Also, given the maritime tensions, China, Japan, and other member states inevitably raised the issue (JEN, 2012b; States News Service, 2012c).

As the United States repeatedly highlighted, the SCS issue was discussed as a reminder of the principles of state behavior in the maritime domain, not to resolve the territorial disputes. The existing international law was the instrument that the EAS member states could refer to, and with US assistance, some ASEAN member states attempted to constrain China’s assertive behavior despite the resistance of other members such as Cambodia. Therefore, this period shows the development of the institutional strategy adopted by the EAS—institutional hedging.

4.5.2 2013–2016: Fall of Institutional Hedging

The formal inclusion of the United States in 2011 made it possible for ASEAN to utilize the EAS as a tool for institutional hedging. In fact, the United States was more open to continually discussing the SCS issue at the EAS-FMM and the EAS despite China’s opposition, emphasizing the importance of international law, including UNCLOS, for maritime stability. By 2013, the SCS had become an important agenda at the EAS, although maritime security had yet to be included as a priority area for cooperation (EAS Unit, 2012b). In July 2013, US Secretary of State John Kerry envisioned that the EAS would play a “key role in settling and enforcing norms and rules” for regional stability, including maritime security, and thus the United States showed its intention to support the EAS as the “region’s primary institution for political and strategic issues” that “should play a lead role in shaping the future of the Asia–Pacific” (US Department of State, 2013). With this declared US commitment, the strategic value of the EAS for institutional hedging increased. Some ASEAN member states, particularly the Philippines, welcomed US commitment, while others strengthened their positions to advocate the primacy of UNCLOS and peaceful settlement (Malaysia General News, 2013; Targeted News Service, 2013).

Nevertheless, diplomatic momentum to consolidate the EAS was thwarted because of the absence of US President Barack Obama at the summit held in October 2013. ASEAN member states were not diplomatically offended because they understood that Obama needed to be in the United States to manage the partial “shutdown” of the US government. Although the United States sent State Secretary Kerry, who, together with Japan, continued to advocate the need for a legally binding COC, Obama’s absence led to doubts on whether the United States would be able to maintain its commitment to the EAS and the SCS issue (Hurst, 2013). On the other hand, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang reiterated China’s position while stating that the SCS situation was stable, freedom of navigation was never affected, and the issue should not be “internationalized” (Kyodo, 2013; ST, 2013). As such, the EAS had yet to produce a joint statement regarding the SCS.

Amid the still-heightened SCS tensions in 2014, the EAS-FMM became one of the focal points for member states to propose ideas for maritime stability. At the meeting, Kerry proposed to freeze any “provocative” action in the SCS to maintain the status quo, which China rejected, as it considered this to be external interference (Deutsche Welle Asia, 2014). The United States also emphasized the need to clarify each claimant states’ claims and suggested the use of an Arbitral Tribunal (US Department of State, 2014). In this connection, Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio shared a similar diplomatic position, proposing peaceful settlement through the “three principles” of rule of law at sea: “(i) making and clarifying claims based on international law, (ii) not using force or coercion in trying to drive their claims, and (iii) seeking to settle disputes by peaceful means,” which Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzo discussed at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2014 (MOFA, 2014a, 2014b). For its part, China proposed accelerating the COC discussions, which ASEAN welcomed (Ismail, 2014a).

That said, these proposals were not clearly reached official agreements, and thus discussions were carried over to the summit in November 2014. At the EAS, most member states raised the SCS issue, with Japan and the United States urging China and ASEAN to expedite the conclusion of a legally binding COC, to which China also agreed (Kyodo, 2014; Zhao & Zhao, 2014). At the same time, China proposed a “dual-track approach,” whereby specific disputes would be directly handled by the parties concerned while SCS stability would be maintained by China and ASEAN (Xinhua, 2014). This proposal aimed to prevent external powers, such as Japan and the United States, from influencing the COC, which the United States sought to do. As a result, there remained differences among member states’ perspectives on the stabilization of the SCS situation, and none of the proposals reached consensus at the EAS. The chairman’s statement thus only reconfirmed existing agreements such as the guidelines for implementing the DOC (EAS Unit, 2014).

In 2015, US State Secretary Kerry accused China at the EAS-FMM of hindering freedom of navigation and overflight in the SCS because of China’s warning against US military aircrafts, its land reclamation, and its construction of “facilities for military purposes.” Thus, Kerry again proposed a freeze on any provocative action (CNA, 2015; SDDP, 2015; US Fed News, 2015). However, this diplomatic maneuver was not particularly effective as the SCS issue was not stipulated in the chairman’s statement, which only reiterated the fundamental principles of maritime stability, such as respect for international law and peaceful settlement (EAS Unit, 2015a). China later responded that US FONOPs conducted by B-52 bombers and the USS Lassen were “a political provocation” and “illegal” incursions that tested “China’s response” (International Business Times News, 2015; JEN, 2015b).

Concerns about the SCS situation were also raised at the EAS in November 2015 by some members including Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam (Kenny, 2015). According to Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun, only Cambodia, Laos, and Russia did not touch on the SCS issue (Oki & Ikeda, 2015). Indeed, these continual efforts were an opportunity to advance EAS measures for responding to the SCS tensions. First, the 2015 EAS concluded the “Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation.” Although this statement did not explicitly discuss the disputes, it included not only all the principles that had been emphasized in ASEAN documents, such as self-restraint, peaceful resolution, respect for sovereignty, adherence to international law, including UNCLOS, but also the potential incorporation of existing international rules such as CUES and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (EAS Unit, 2015b). In this way, the EAS expanded the use of relevant formal and informal international rules to regulate state behavior, including that of China.

Second, the chairman’s statement included Chinese President Xi Jinping’s statement that China had no intention to “pursue militarization in the South China Sea” (EAS Unit, 2015a). Although the statement was made during Xi’s visit to the United States in September 2015, it was incorporated into the chairman’s statement as it was China’s behavioral promise regarding the SCS. These achievements reflected most of the member states’ concerns about the SCS situation (MOFA, 2015). The Philippines attempted to include its arbitral case against China, but it was not able to do so (Legal Monitor Worldwide, 2015). Meanwhile, China made a five-point proposal to maintain SCS stability, which included non-interference from external actors on the issue, but it was not accepted by all EAS members (China Daily, 2015). With these two points, institutional hedging through the EAS was clearly conducted.

The diplomatic tug-of-war between China and the United States in shaping maritime norms and rules in the EAS drastically changed in 2016 when the SCS Arbitral Tribunal's award was issued, ruling overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines. Australia, Japan, the United States, and Vietnam openly supported the award (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, 2016; MOFA, 2016; ST, 2016; US Department of State, 2016). Philippine Foreign Minister Perfecto Yasay Jr. also confidently sought a unified position in ASEAN vis-à-vis the arbitral award by requesting the issuance of a statement (Torres, 2016). It could be argued that Yasay’s confidence stemmed partly from ASEAN’s longstanding respect for international law, particularly UNCLOS, and because the arbitral ruling was issued under UNCLOS, Yasay thought that ASEAN would support it. However, the initial reactions of other EAS member states were somewhat restrained. In fact, according to Agence France-Presse, Cambodia opposed a joint statement on the award, which prevented consensus, and thus the EAS-FMM chairman’s statement did not discuss it (EAS Unit, 2016a; Tan, 2016). China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi insisted that the award was not binding as it was influenced by “foreign forces”; instead, he urged to focus on ASEAN–China bilateral talks (EFE Newswire, 2016). Therefore, the 2016 EAS-FMM illustrated the diplomatic divisions among ASEAN member states’ perspectives on the arbitral award. Indeed, the degree of the member states’ support for the award was not entirely clear.

While the Philippines did not discard the award, it attempted to maintain a low-key response on it and to find a non-confrontational way to manage the SCS disputes with China, including holding bilateral dialogues (Zee News, 2016). Also, US Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes indicated that the United States would not focus on the award at the EAS (Voice of America, 2016), yet President Obama mentioned it at the EAS along with Japan’s Prime Minister Abe. In response, Premier Li reiterated China’s stance of rejecting the award and emphasized the ongoing COC discussions and the application of CUES (Jiji Press, 2016; Joshi & Gomez, 2016; Xinhua, 2016). As Japan and the United States were reportedly the only two states that mentioned the arbitral award at the EAS, China later described the move as “self-isolation” (China Daily, 2016). Most ASEAN member states, such as Brunei and Malaysia, took a more general stance on the SCS issue, which highlighted the positive development of ASEAN–China cooperation (Brunei News Gazette, 2016; Malaysia General News, 2016). Consequently, the ruling was excluded even from the chairman’s statement (EAS Unit, 2016b).

During this period, ASEAN had a great opportunity to activate institutional hedging through the EAS given the United States and its allies’ strong support for discussing the SCS disputes. Furthermore, the arbitral award could be utilized to strengthen ASEAN’s position regarding maritime norms and rules in the SCS and to constrain China’s assertive behavior. However, ASEAN member states were divided—some members took a more cautious approach, which made it difficult for the United States to openly push forth the compliance of the award against China at the EAS (Nikkei Asian Review, 2016b). As a result, institutional hedging through the EAS had become ineffective due to ASEAN disunity.

4.5.3 2017–2020: Debilitating Institutional Hedging

The intensification of US–China rivalry within the EAS, and ASEAN’s general avoidance of being entrapped in great-power politics, led the EAS to deviate from institutional hedging. Furthermore, the change in US administration from Obama to Donald Trump made a large impact on the institutional legitimacy of the EAS. In contrast to Obama’s willingness to participate in the EAS and show US commitment to East Asia, Trump clearly displayed unwillingness to make an official visit to East Asia and did not attend the summit from 2017 to 2020. In 2017, although he had decided to attend the EAS, Trump left the venue before the meeting started because of the delay. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s diplomatic marginalization of the EAS was apparent as the United States sent lower-ranking officials to the summit—Vice President Mike Pence in 2018 and National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien in 2019 and 2020. As a result, the strategic utility of the EAS was significantly reduced during this period.

That said, US stance on the SCS issue had not changed, and the United States continually advocated freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, non-use of force, and respect for international law including UNCLOS (US Department of State, 2017). In 2018, for example, State Secretary Mike Pompeo at the EAS-FMM was unprecedentedly assertive and openly condemned China’s behavior, raising concerns about China’s military deployment in the SCS which reneged on President Xi’s promise not to militarize the SCS (Ghosh, 2018). At the EAS, Vice President Pence explicitly said, “China’s militarization and territorial expansion in the South China Sea is illegal and dangerous” (US Mission to ASEAN, 2018). In 2019, just before the EAS, National Security Advisor O’Brien provided a “non-paper” to ASEAN to “protest China’s expansive and unlawful maritime claims” in the SCS. At the EAS, he openly criticized China for preventing ASEAN claimant states from exploring natural resources in the SCS (AFP, 2019; Jiji Press Ticker Service, 2019; The Bangkok Post, 2019). The United States had become more critical of China’s behavior and claims in the SCS. With this strong US posture, US allies, particularly Japan, also expressed “serious concern” over China’s large-scale creation of outposts in the SCS and called for respect for the 2016 arbitral award (MOFA, 2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b, 2020a, 2020b; Roy, 2020).

In response, China insisted that ASEAN and China had made steady progress in the mitigation of SCS tensions since 2016. In 2017, China expressed satisfaction that the COC framework had been adopted (Zhou & Zhou, 2017; ASEAN Tribune, 2017). Although the United States argued that the framework was only an outline of the COC and continued to call for its rapid conclusion, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued that the SCS situation was stable as the COC negotiations were underway and thus the United States should not intervene and should respect the progress that China and ASEAN had made (US Department of State, 2017; Xinhua, 2017). This line of argument was echoed by Premier Li at the EAS, who attributed the maritime stability to China’s vital national interest in securing the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the SCS (Thai News Service, 2017, 2020). Its rationale was questionable as China’s assertive behavior had largely remained the same—conducting militarization. However, Wang stated in 2018 that the main driver of militarization in the SCS was the United States because it provided strategic weapons to regional states and that China only attempted to defend itself against such threats (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, 2018). In addition, by publicly declaring its aim to complete the COC negotiations within three years, China attempted to prevent external actors from diplomatically intervening in the SCS issue at the EAS, emphasizing non-interference by “outsiders.”Footnote 7

In this intensified strategic rivalry, ASEAN became defensive at the EAS as it aimed to maintain ASEAN centrality. Some ASEAN member states began to gradually shift this diplomatic emphasis at the EAS—from advocating international law to mitigating the strategic rivalry. For example, although the Philippines had gained the legal advantages to reject China’s excessive claims in the SCS with the 2016 arbitral ruling, it sought alternative means to mitigate tensions with China in the SCS. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte mentioned just before the EAS in 2017 that the SCS was “better left untouched” as it could lead to a “violent confrontation,” highlighting the ongoing relative stability in the SCS after 2016 (Manila Bulletin, 2017; PDI, 2017). Duterte also highlighted the importance of “negotiations and fair compromises” for the conclusion of the COC (Manila Bulletin, 2019). In 2018, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad also focused on the ongoing developments rather than the 2016 ruling, warning China and the United States not to dispatch warships to the SCS, which had caused military and diplomatic tensions (The New Zealand Herald, 2018). When the United States place stronger diplomatic pressure on China at the EAS-FMM in 2020, stating that China’s claims were “unlawful” and asking ASEAN member states to follow the United States to impose economic sanctions on Chinese companies that built infrastructure in the SCS, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi stated that ASEAN should avoid “get[ting] caught up in the rivalry between major powers” (see Chapter 3; Federal Government Documents and Publications, 2020; States News Service, 2020).

Even after the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, US–China strategic rivalry continued to intensify. As such strategic competition drew more attention from the international community, ASEAN grew increasingly concerned about the potential diplomatic marginalization and the entrapment of great-power politics. Therefore, ASEAN attempted to mitigate the rivalry by focusing more on the potential areas of cooperation in the SCS. This was largely reflected in the EAS chairman’s statements from 2017 to 2020, which were not drastically different from previous statements. They welcomed the positive developments of the progress in the COC negotiations and of agreements such as CUES and the hotline between foreign ministries, while stipulating some member states’ concerns about the SCS situation (EAS Unit, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020). In this sense, ASEAN’s use of the EAS as a tool for institutional hedging was put on the back-burner during this period.

4.5.4 Conclusion

The EAS was the one of the most dynamic institutions among the ASEAN-led mechanisms in managing the SCS disputes. At its inception in 2005, the EAS was seen as the product of compromise among member states, which did not expect the institution to play a role in managing strategic issues including the SCS disputes. It focused solely on non-traditional security issues that could facilitate regional cooperation. However, this trend changed when the United States became a member of the EAS in 2011, a few years after the SCS situation had deteriorated.

The Obama administration was willing to table and discuss potentially controversial issues at the EAS because it envisioned the summit to “become the premier forum for dealing with regional political and security issues, from maritime security to nonproliferation to disaster response” (US Department of State, 2011b). As a result, this created diplomatic momentum for the United States to discuss the SCS disputes, which was followed by many other member states. Those member states particularly emphasized the importance of existing international rules and norms, including UNCLOS, and attempted to constrain the behaviors of China and other claimant states. This institutional posture was reflected by the 2011 Declaration on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations. The EAS was thus shifting toward institutional hedging.

However, the EAS deviated from its strategy of institutional hedging after 2016. This was paradoxical, considering China’s weakening legal stance and the United States and ASEAN’s advocacy for international law. Moreover, the EAS’s institutional development as a premier strategic forum continued steadily, albeit slowly (Cook, 2020, p. 132). In 2015, for example, the EAS adopted the Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation and the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the 10th Anniversary of the EAS. In 2020, it issued the Ha Noi Declaration on the 15th Anniversary of the EAS, which aimed to enhance regional cooperation. However, these did not translate into an enhancement of EAS’s institutional hedging. This was because China’s strong rejection of the 2016 arbitral award indicated that diplomatic confrontation would exacerbate the SCS situation, particularly when US commitment to ASEAN and the SCS issue was uncertain. Moreover, ASEAN member states were also wary about taking a firm position on the award, which weakened the functionality of institutional hedging. As a result, the EAS lost the diplomatic momentum to function as a tool for institutional hedging between 2017 and 2020.

4.6 ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus)

The ADMM was formed in 2006 to support the establishment of the ASEAN Security Community (ASC; later renamed ASEAN Political-Security Community) (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003c, 2004e; Sukma, 2003). Through a series of concept papers, the ADMM evolved into one of the most highly institutionalized organizations in ASEAN along with the ADMM-Plus in 2010. The origin of the ADMM can be traced to 2004 when the ASEAN Special SOM was held to realize the ASC as stipulated by the 2003 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, or Bali Concord II (ADMM Unit, 2006a).

There were two main means for pursuing this broad objective: by facilitating intra-ASEAN defense cooperation, and by strengthening ASEAN defense links with external actors (ADMM Unit, 2006a). The former aimed to strengthen functional cooperation in defense-related fields by recognizing the ADMM as the apex of ASEAN defense-related frameworks, while the latter attempted to enhance peace and stability in Asia–Pacific as well as to facilitate capacity-building for ASEAN member states with external assistance. ASEAN also emphasized ASEAN centrality by stating that “ASEAN shall be in the driver’s seat in the ADMM’s interactions with ASEAN’s friends and Dialogue Partners [emphasis added]” (ADMM Unit, 2006a). As a result, the concept paper for the ADMM’s establishment set out four main objectives:

  1. a.

    To promote regional peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation in defence and security;

  2. b.

    To give guidance to existing senior defence and military officials dialogue and cooperation in the field of defence and security within ASEAN and between ASEAN and dialogue partners;

  3. c.

    To promote mutual trust and confidence through greater understanding of defence and security challenges as well as enhancement of transparency and openness; and

  4. d.

    To contribute to the establishment of an ASEAN Security Community (ASC) as stipulated in the Bali Concord II and to promote the implementation of the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) on ASC [emphasis added] (ADMM Unit, 2006a).

The ADMM is structured to link to the ASEAN Summit by holding an annual meeting “prior to or back to back with” the summit, while the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM) plays the main coordination role (ADMM Unit, 2007c). Through this mechanism, the ADMM focuses on intra-ASEAN functional cooperation, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, cooperation with civil society organizations on non-traditional security issues, and peacekeeping operations.

In the meantime, the ADMM sought to establish the ADMM-Plus to strengthen its defense ties with external actors. From 2007, the ADMM issued several concept papers, clarifying that the purpose of the ADMM-Plus was “to bring expertise, perspectives and resources from extra-regional countries to bear on shared security challenges” and to build the capacities of ASEAN member states to realize the ASC while nurturing confidence for peace and stability in the region (ADMM Unit, 2007a). ASEAN reassured that the ADMM was the core institution in charge of ASEAN’s defense cooperation, and ASEAN centrality was almost always stressed in its official statements (e.g., ADMM Unit, 2007a). Established in 2010, the ADMM-Plus comprises the 10 ASEAN member states, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. Membership was essentially open, with three requirements: (1) full-fledged dialogue partnership status with ASEAN; (2) significant interactions with ASEAN defense establishments; and (3) ability to work with the ADMM for capacity-building. Membership also required the ADMM’s consensual approval first, followed by that of ADMM-Plus countries (ADMM Unit, 2009a, 2010c). To support ASEAN’s defense capacity and ensure regional peace and stability, the ADMM-Plus established Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) in 2011 to facilitate practical cooperation among member states, such as joint military training and exercises in the fields of maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, military medicine, and peacekeeping (ADMM Unit, 2011a). The ADMM-Plus was initially held once in three years from 2010 to 2013, but as the demand for defense diplomacy increased, its frequency increased to once in two years in 2013 and to annually in 2017 (ADMM Unit, 2010a, 2012a, 2017b).

In short, the ADMM’s initial objective was to create defense-related norms and rules among ASEAN member states to enhance regional peace and stability, while the objective of the ADMM-Plus was to facilitate practical cooperation as a CBM as well as the capacity-building of ASEAN for regional peace and stability (Koga, 2018, pp. 61–69). Against this backdrop, this chapter examines the institutional strategies of the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus during three periods: 2006–2012, 2013–2016, and 2017–2020.

4.6.1 2006–2012: Toward Institutional Balancing

The ADMM was a tool for intra-ASEAN institutional co-option, focusing on defense-oriented functional cooperation, and thus the ADMM did not discuss controversial issues during its formative years. In fact, ADMM joint statements from 2006 to 2010 did not touch on the SCS issue or even maritime security while reiterating the importance of maintaining ASEAN principles and norms (ADMM Unit, 2006b, 2007d, 2009b, 2010b). Admittedly, since the ADMM’s institutional design was evolutionary, its action plans, principles, and rules were created after its establishment and subject to change (ADMM Unit, 2007b, 2007c, 2010a, 2010c). In addition, the establishment of the ADMM-Plus was discussed as early as 2006. However, the ADMM took a cautious approach in order to concretely ensure ASEAN centrality and the means to receive defense assistance from external actors (ADMM Unit, 2007a, 2009a). The ADMM waited until its member states reached consensus on the establishment of the ADMM-Plus “at a pace comfortable to all” (ADMM Unit, 2009a). Therefore, from 2006 to 2010, the ADMM’s institutional strategy was confined to institutional co-option among member states and there was no engagement with external actors.

This institutional trend changed after the US–China diplomatic row at the ARF in July 2010, and the ADMM started incorporating political issues into its agenda. Further, under Vietnam’s chairpersonship, which was concerned about the gradual intensification of the SCS disputes, the ADMM-Plus was formally established in October 2010 (Goldman, 2010). Vietnamese Deputy Defense Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh assured that the ADMM-Plus would discuss general security issues, without specifying the SCS (Xinhua, 2010). While some member states, including Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, the United States, and Vietnam, raised the SCS issue at the inaugural ADMM-Plus, which led to China accusing Vietnam of internationalizing the matter, its joint statement did not mention maritime issues (JEN, 2010a; The Nikkei Weekly, 2010). Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu strongly opposed bringing the SCS issue to “any international and multilateral arena,” with Defense Minister Liang Guanglie echoing Ma’s stance (States News Service, 2010; Storey, 2010). Given China’s strong opposition, the joint declaration remained silent on the SCS issue, while its chairman’s statement touched on it (ADMM Unit, 2010d, 2010e). Also, the ADMM aimed to make the ADMM-Plus a framework where the US defense secretary and Chinese defense minister could meet face-to-face and participate in practical cooperation rather than discuss regional disputes, at least for the time being (ADMM Unit, 2010e; JEN, 2010a; Ministry of Defence, Singapore, 2010).

On the other hand, the United States did not agree entirely with such an institutional development plan. Defense Secretary Robert Gates expressed US desire to create multilateral rules and norms for managing the SCS issue (US Department of Defense, 2011). In 2012, succeeding Defense Secretary Leon Panetta requested greater frequency of the ADMM-Plus in the context of the changing strategic environment in East Asia, particularly after the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident (US Department of Defense, 2012). For its part, China reemphasized that the role of the ADMM-Plus should remain as the promotion of practical cooperation between ASEAN and its dialogue partners (Oorjitham, 2012). Thus, at this initial stage, the ADMM-Plus functioned as institutional co-option although disagreements impeded the creation of a common set of defense norms and rules in the SCS.

This contrasted with the ADMM, which began discussing the SCS issue from 2011. The 2011 joint statement incorporated a general statement on the SCS which other ASEAN-led institutions had stipulated, such as the importance of the full implementation of the DOC, freedom of navigation and overflight in the SCS, respect for international law including UNCLOS, and the conclusion of the COC in the SCS (ADMM Unit, 2011c). Even in 2012, when Cambodia was the ASEAN chair, the ADMM joint statement reiterated the same principles for the SCS (ADMM Unit, 2012b). Although the three-year work program of the ADMM, from 2008 to 2010, discussed the DOC implementation and COC creation, which were also repeated in the subsequent three-year program from 2011 to 2013, the inclusion of the SCS issue in the ADMM joint statements was significant in shaping the characteristics of the framework (ADMM Unit, 2007b, 2011b). Clearly, the ADMM disseminated the SCS issue to the international and regional audience and thus functioned as institutional balancing vis-à-vis China.

4.6.2 2013–2016: ADMM’s Institutional Balancing and ADMM-Plus’ Institutional Co-option

The ADMM’s institutional balancing had become more visible since the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident, followed by the AMM diplomatic fiasco (see Chapter 3 and AMM section in this chapter). Given that one of the original purposes of the ADMM was to consolidate regional peace and stability, the intensification of the SCS disputes became a major security concern. In 2013, the ADMM reiterated the important principles that ASEAN had long highlighted for maintaining maritime stability in the SCS (ADMM Unit, 2013a). This created diplomatic momentum to consistently incorporate the SCS issue in ADMM declarations.

Further, beyond merely highlighting agreed principles, the ADMM began to conduct more explicit institutional balancing from 2014 by calling for appropriate state behavior in the SCS. For example, it requested all parties “to exercise self-restraint and non-use of force, as well as refrain from taking actions that would further escalate tension” in 2014 and to “[u]ndertake practical measures such as protocol of interaction and direct communication channels to reduce vulnerability to miscalculations and to avoid misunderstanding and undesirable incidents at sea” in 2015 (ADMM Unit, 2014c, 2015b). These resulted in the establishment of a Direct Communications Link (DCL) between ASEAN member states in 2014 (ADMM Unit, 2014b). In 2016, the ADMM went a step further to not only advocate compliance with international protocols such as CUES, but also to create new regional protocols to avoid misunderstanding and miscommunication (ADMM Unit, 2016).

In fact, the creation of maritime rules and norms had been discussed as early as 2013. That year, Brunei proposed to establish bilateral hotlines, emphasizing the importance of channels of communication to deescalate tensions and reduce miscalculations in the SCS (Parameswaran, 2015; Singapore Government News, 2013). Vietnam also proposed a “no first use of force” agreement for further confidence-building first among ASEAN member states before moving to the wider region (Chow, 2013). As such, ASEAN’s rule-making efforts were conducted among ASEAN defense ministers, not with external actors. This was reflected by Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein’s statement that ASEAN needed to be united and to become a stabilizing force in the region including the SCS (Malaysia General News, 2014).

In the meantime, the ADMM explored possible institutional strategies for the ADMM-Plus. Although the ADMM had set up the principles and rules of the ADMM-Plus prior to the latter’s establishment and increased its frequency from once every three years to two years and then annually, its strategic function was not concretely determined. Nonetheless, the most likely institutional strategy was institutional co-option. This was because its mechanism officially focused on defense-related functional cooperation for non-traditional security issues by establishing EWGs in 2011 for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, military medicine, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping operations (ADMM Unit, 2011a). The EWG mechanism ensured the facilitation of functional cooperation among ADMM-Plus member states through military exercises and training, providing opportunities to nurture formal or informal norms and rules in the maritime domain.

However, the United States was eager to discuss the SCS issue at the ADMM-Plus, which impelled some of the member states to state their basic strategic posture. Given that the ADMM-Plus had an EWG on maritime security, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel expressed concerns about the heightening tensions in the SCS and indicated willingness to focus on maritime security issues at the 2013 ADMM-Plus (Federal News Service, 2013). This contrasted starkly with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s statement that the SCS was stable and that there were no concerns about freedom of navigation (Voice of America, 2013). The 2013 ADMM-Plus chairman’s statement mentioned the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the SCS in accordance with basic principles and international law including UNCLOS (ADMM Unit, 2013c). Nevertheless, because of the disagreement over the assessment of the SCS situation, there was no specific statement focusing on the SCS in the joint statement although it described maritime cooperation on non-traditional security challenges (ADMM Unit, 2013b). The pattern of interaction among ADMM-Plus members thus nurtured its institutional characteristics: Discussions on the SCS situation would never become a substantial part of the institutional agenda because its focus was on practical cooperation.

This trend shifted in 2015. As the international media expected a discussion on the SCS issue at the 2015 ADMM-Plus, China reiterated that the defense meeting was not an appropriate avenue for discussing contentious issues including the SCS disputes and opposed the internationalization of the disputes (Tiezzi, 2015). As a result, China rejected any statement in the ADMM-Plus joint declaration which touched on the matter. According to one report, China rejected the proposed statement, “the commitment of ASEAN member states and China to the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and looking forward to the early conclusion of the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea,” although a similar line was included in the joint declarations of other meetings such as the ARF (JEN, 2015a). The United States insisted that the declaration should include the statement, with Defense Secretary Ashton Carter asserting that the status quo was not maintained because of the “intensive and aggressive reclamation of features” in the SCS (US Department of Defense, 2015; Yonhap News Agency, 2015). Disagreements persisted, and the ADMM-Plus was unable to issue a joint declaration that year, which broke the emerging ADMM-Plus routine. Malaysian Foreign Minister Hishammuddin downplayed the importance of the ADMM-Plus joint declaration, which was partly true because there was no institutional custom of issuing a joint statement at each meeting (Lee & Hariz, 2015; Tan, 2015; Tang, 2015). In fact, the chairman’s statement adopted an almost identical line about the SCS issue (ADMM Unit, 2015c). Nevertheless, this indicated the great-power rivalry affecting the outcome of the defense forum.

Therefore, during this period, the ADMM began conducting institutional balancing, signaling the importance of the SCS disputes to the regional and international audience by providing updates on the situation. At the same time, the ADMM showed efforts to create partial rules and norms for maritime stability, such as the DCL and CUES, to illustrate ASEAN’s unity. Furthermore, it was proposed to extend these norms and rules beyond ASEAN member states, which would potentially become a source of institutional hedging for the ADMM-Plus (e.g., Singapore Government News, 2016). On the other hand, the ADMM-Plus still faced disagreement among dialogue partners, particularly the United States and China, and therefore it would be difficult for the ADMM to fully conduct institutional co-option.

4.6.3 2017–2020: Institutional Hedging Through ADMM and ADMM-Plus

The ADMM continually conducted and consolidated its institutional balancing strategy after the SCS Arbitral Tribunal’s award was issued in 2016. The joint declarations from 2017 to 2020 became increasingly identical to those in other ASEAN-led institutions such as the AMM—informing the progress of the COC negotiations, request for self-restraint, and desire for peaceful resolution and the early conclusion of the COC (ADMM Unit, 2017e, 2018b, 2019c, 2020a).

While reiterating the importance of maritime principles and stability in the SCS, the ADMM also made further efforts to facilitate rule-making in the maritime domain. Most notably, in 2017, the ADMM adopted the concept paper for developing guidelines on air encounters between military aircraft. Proposed by Singapore, the guidelines aimed to complement existing international rules and norms including those of the International Civil Aviation Organization as well as CUES (ADMM Unit, 2017a). In the same year, the ADMM also issued a concept paper on guidelines for maritime interaction, proposed by the Philippines, the objectives of which included “establish[ing] comprehensive and feasible maritime conflict management measures” (ADMM Unit, 2017c).

These rule-making efforts developed into more concrete measures in 2018 and 2019. The Guidelines for Air Military Encounters (GAME) were instituted in 2018, which set non-binding rules of engagement in the air, complementing UNCLOS and CUES (ADMM Unit, 2018a). The Guidelines for Maritime Interaction were created in the following year, which codified existing maritime-oriented rules and norms such as UNCLOS, CUES, GAME, and the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (ADMM Unit, 2019a).

All these developments contributed to the ADMM’s focus on ASEAN unity, which was crucial for maintaining ASEAN centrality. Given the divergences in the SCS situation assessment and in perspectives on rules and norms among ADMM-Plus members, the ADMM focused on its internal cohesion by nurturing informal norms relating to the SCS. Detaching these norms from the COC discussions enabled it to discuss and formulate maritime guidelines, which could contribute to shaping the COC. In this sense, the ADMM actively engaged in institutional balancing while creating a source for institutional hedging.

On the other hand, the ADMM-Plus shifted its strategic posture on the SCS issue. The chairman’s statements from 2017 to 2020 discussed the challenging situation in the SCS, respect for international law, full implementation of the DOC, and the early conclusion of the COC (ADMM Unit, 2017f, 2018c, 2019d, 2020b). The ADMM-Plus also resumed issuing joint statements from 2018, although this was not necessarily a regular practice. Particularly, the 2018 joint statement discussed regional maritime security, extensively using terms and phrases relating to the SCS which had been included in the statements of various ASEAN-led institutions, such as “self-restraint” and “respect for principles of international law, including UNCLOS” (ADMM Unit, 2018d). Moreover, ADMM-Plus states agreed in principle to explore ways to incorporate ADMM-initiated norms, such as ASEAN Direct Communications Infrastructure (ADI; formerly DCL) and GAME, into ADMM-Plus guidelines (ADMM Unit, 2018d). More practically, ADMM-Plus members issued a concept paper on the ADI to extend it to the ADMM-Plus, and this was eventually adopted in 2021 (ADMM Unit, 2019b, 2021a, 2021b). In this sense, the ADMM utilized the ADMM-Plus framework to conduct institutional hedging by introducing the rules and norms it created.

The ADMM-Plus could undertake institutional restructuration because of the fluidity of its format and norms. As the US–China rivalry intensified, the ADMM-Plus was likely to become another forum for great-power competition unless the ADMM maintained a united front. Most illustratively, from 2011, there was a proliferation of ADMM+1 meetings with regional powers, particularly China, Japan, and the United States, and in 2014, the ADMM issued additional protocol on the ADMM-Plus to designate such engagements as “informal” (ADMM Unit, 2014a). However, as this trend continued despite the new protocol, the ADMM established new rules and principles for informal ADMM+1 meetings. For example, ADMM+1 could not take place in a year when the ADMM-Plus was held; a maximum of two such meetings could be held annually; and the decision to hold these meetings would be decided based on consensus among ADMM members.Footnote 8 After the ADMM-Plus became an annual event in 2017, the principles for ADMM+1 also changed, and the ADMM became the only authority to convene such a meeting when deemed necessary (ADMM Unit, 2017d). This trend indicates that major powers competed to strengthen their defense ties with ASEAN, conducting a wedge strategy; in response, the ADMM sought to prevent the ADMM-Plus from being entrapped in the great-power rivalry by creating basic principles for ADMM+1. The guidelines ensured that the ADMM controlled the ADMM-Plus so as to maintain ASEAN centrality.

This is well illustrated by several ASEAN member states continuing to explicitly express concerns about the impact of the intensifying US–China rivalry in the SCS through ASEAN-led institutions. In 2018, for example, Defense Minister Mohamad Sabu stated that Malaysia insisted on maintaining the SCS as a “free zone” from great-power military competition (Malaysia General News, 2018). Also, Vietnam’s Defense Minister Ngo Xuan Lich mentioned in 2019 that ASEAN needed to consolidate its unity against great-power rivalry in the SCS (Philippine News Agency, 2019). As Defense Secretary Mark Esper’s statement at the 2019 ADMM-Plus indicates, the United States demanded ASEAN member states to take an explicit stance on their sovereign rights in the SCS (Reyes, 2019). However, as doing so would entrap ASEAN in great-power politics, they were hesitant to do so collectively. Instead, the ADMM-Plus gradually incorporated ADMM defense-related norms and rules, with the aim of regulating member states’ behavior in the SCS.

4.6.4 Conclusion

The ADMM has arguably been the most dynamic ASEAN-led institution. But as with most security institutions, its institutional strategy was not clear at its inception. Also, it did not touch on the SCS issue until 2011. Since the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident, however, the ADMM had begun to conduct institutional balancing more explicitly by constantly monitoring and discussing developments in the SCS and emphasizing the general principles of maritime law. At the same time, particularly after the issuance of the arbitral award, the ADMM started to incorporate international maritime norms, such as CUES, to show ASEAN unity in regulating its member states’ behavior in the SCS. This trend continued, and the ADMM also became an avenue for creating new regional norms, which could contribute to shaping the COC.

Likewise, the institutional utility of the ADMM-Plus was not initially clear at the outset. Because of US–China rivalry over the SCS disputes, the ADMM-Plus had difficulty directly stating the SCS issue in its joint declaration, as illustrated by the 2015 meeting. On the other hand, given its emphasis on functional cooperation through EWGs, the ADMM-Plus attempted to nurture maritime norms without directly focusing on the SCS. As the great-power competition intensified, particularly after 2012, the ADMM-Plus made several institutional changes to provide the forum for regional great powers more frequently while maintaining ASEAN centrality. This was aimed at institutional co-option, so that the great powers could find a common ground to mitigate tensions in the SCS. Nevertheless, from 2017, the ADMM began extending its maritime rules and norms to the ADMM-Plus, some of which were adopted, such as the ADI. Therefore, the ADMM-Plus had evolved into a tool for institutional hedging, while continually conducting institutional co-option.

The ADMM and the ADMM-Plus have thus evolved over time, taking on different institutional strategies. After 2016, however, there was a clear strategic link between them as the ADMM-Plus adopted principles that the ADMM had created. While their institutional strategies might change in the future, the ADMM and the ADMM-Plus are thus far the best-coordinated institutions among ASEAN-led institutions.