Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between international trade in environmental goods and environmental regulation in the presence of lobbying. We assume an open economy consisting of two countries and two polluting sectors subject to environmental taxation. Thus, we have an environmental goods industry sector supplying pollution abatement goods and services. The pollution abatement goods and services are assumed to be internationally traded, and this is the only industrial interaction between the two countries. Pollution affects consumers in both countries. The impact of lobbying on a politically optimal pollution abatement subsidy is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of the environmental lobby group.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Bernheim DB, Whinston MD (1986) Menu auctions, resource allocation and economic influence. Q J Econ 101:1–32
Canton J (2008) Redealing the cards: how an environmental goods industry modifies the political economy of environmental taxes. Resour Energy Econ 30:195–215
Canton J (2009) Environmentalists’ behavior and environmental policies. In: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers
Canton J, Soubeyran A, Stahn H (2008) Environmental taxation and vertical cournot oligopolies: how eco-industries matter. Environ Resource Econ 40(3):369–382
Canton J, David M, Sinclair-Desgagné B (2012) Environmental regulation and horizontal mergers in the eco-industry. Strategic Behav Environ 2(2):107–132
Conconi P (2003) Green lobbies and transboundary pollution in large open economy. J Int Econ 59:399–422
David M, Sinclair-Desgagné B (2005) Environmental regulation and the eco-industry. J Regul Econ 28(2):141–155
David M, Sinclair-Desgagné B (2010) Pollution abatement subsidies and the environmental goods industry. Environ Resource Econ 45(2):271–282
David M, Nimubona A-D, Sinclair-Desgagné B (2008) Environmental taxation and the structure of the eco-industry. In: CIRANO working papers
Fredriksson PG (1997) The political economy of pollution taxes in a small open economy. J Environ Econ Manag 33:44–58
Grossman GM, Helpman E (1994) Protection for sale. Am Econ Rev 84:833–850
Nimubona A-D, Sinclair-Desgagné B (2013) The Pigouvian tax rule in the presence of an eco-industry. Econ Bull 33(1):747–752
Olson M (1965) The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Maezuru, M. (2022). International Trade in Environmental Goods and Environmental Regulation in the Presence of Lobbying. In: Kawano, M., Kourtit, K., Nijkamp, P., Higano, Y. (eds) Theory and History in Regional Perspective. New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, vol 56. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6695-7_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6695-7_17
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-16-6694-0
Online ISBN: 978-981-16-6695-7
eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)