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Sri Lanka Amid Sino-Indian Himalayan Rivalry

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Crossing the Himalayas

Part of the book series: Contributions to International Relations ((CIR))

Abstract

This chapter analyzes the Sino-Indian competition and its impacts on Sri Lanka, as well as Sri Lanka’s response to the power rivalry between China and India. It deems that Sri Lanka gain economic benefits from Sino-Indian competition on one hand, and encounters geopolitical and security challenges on the other side. It concludes that Sri Lanka has successfully balanced its ties between China and India, and predicates that Sri Lanka will have to be more cautious in dealing with both India and China in order not to become a playground for their power struggle.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    C. Attanayake. (2017). China in Sri Lanka. Chisinau: Lambert Academic Publishing, p. 7.

  2. 2.

    T. K. Premadasa. (2007, October 20). Sri Lanka China trade relations. Asian Tribune. http://www.asiantribune.com/node/7893.

  3. 3.

    Ashok Mehta. (2010). Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict: how Eelam War IV was won. Manekshaw Paper. (22). The Centre for Land Warfare Studies.

    http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items10/LTTEReview%20of%20Eelam%20War%20IV.pdf.

  4. 4.

    Kelegama, Saman. (2014). China-Sri Lanka economic relations: an overview. China Report 50(2), pp. 131–149; Fernando, Shiran. (2018). Economic relations between Sri Lanka and China. In George I. H. Cooke ed. Sixty years of China-Sri Lanka relations (1957–2017). Colombo: Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies, pp. 77–94.

  5. 5.

    In May 2013, when the President Mahinda Rajapaksa visited China, a decision was made by the two leaders to embark on a FTA between the two countries by early 2014. The Sirisena-Wickremesinghe coalition government that came into power was keen in signing the FTA, yet the negotiation was taking time. As of November 2017 six rounds of negotiations were completed.

  6. 6.

    Calculated from the Annual Reports of Board of Investment between 2012 and 2017.

  7. 7.

    Annual Report 2019. Central Bank of Sri Lanka. (2020). https://www.cbsl.gov.lk/en/publications/economic-and-financial-reports/annual-reports/annual-report-2019.

  8. 8.

    T. Sen. (2014, September 23). Silk road diplomacy-twists, turns and distorted history. Yale Global. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/silk-road-diplomacy-twists-turns-and-distorted-history.

  9. 9.

    Sukjoon Yoon. (2015). Implications of Xi Jinping’s “true maritime power”: its context, significance, and impact on the region. Naval War College Review. 68(3), p. 43.

  10. 10.

    Ibid., 41.

  11. 11.

    Our bulldozers, our rule. The Economist. (2016, July 2).

    http://www.economist.com/news/china/21701505-chinas-foreign-policy-could-reshape-good-part-world-economy-our-bulldozers-our-rules.

  12. 12.

    Ananth Krishnan. (2014, February 14). China moots ‘maritime silk road’. The Hindu. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/china-moots-maritime-silk-road/article5690288.ece.

  13. 13.

    The new silk road. The Economist. (2015, September 10).

    http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21663326-chinas-latest-wave-globalisers-will-enrich-their-countryand-world-new-silk-road.

  14. 14.

    Ben Simpfendorfer. (2015, June 15). What does China’s silk road policy mean in practice. Forbes. http://www.forbes.com/sites/bensimpfendorfer/2015/06/15/chinas-silk-road-policy-implications/#7f96830b1128.

  15. 15.

    Meeting Asia’s infrastructure needs. Asia Development Bank. (2017, February). https://www.adb.org/publications/asia-infrastructure-needs.

  16. 16.

    David F. Gordon, Haoyu Tong and Tabatha Anderson. (2020, September). Beyond the myths-towards a realistic assessment of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: the development-finance dimension. IISS. https://ispmyanmarchinadesk.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/BRI-Report-Two-Beyond-the-Myths-Towards-a-Realistic-Assessment-of-Chinas-Belt-and-Road-Initiative.pdf.

  17. 17.

    China’s plan to build maritime silk road backed by Sri Lanka. Business Standard. (2014, February 13). http://www.business-standard.com/article/international/china-s-plan-to-build-maritime-silk-road-backed-by-sri-lanka-114021300924_1.html.

  18. 18.

    Sri Lanka backs China’s one road, one belt plan. Daily Times. (2016, April 16). http://dailytimes.com.pk/business/17-Apr-16/sri-lanka-backs-chinas-one-road-one-belt-plan.

  19. 19.

    Maldives (equivalent of 15% of GDP) and Pakistan (16%) and in Southeast Asia like Cambodia (40%) and Laos (117%).

  20. 20.

    Ganeshan Wignaraja, Dinusha Panditaratne, Pabasara Kannangara, and Divya Hundlani. (2020, March 24). Chinese investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka. Chatham House, p. 5. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/03/chinese-investment-and-bri-sri-lanka.

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    National highways. Road Development Authority, Sri Lanka. (2020). http://www.rda.gov.lk/source/rda_roads.htm.

  23. 23.

    Chulanee Attanayake. (2018, December 20). Mattala: attracting business to a lonely airport. ISAS Working Paper. (314). https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/314-mattala-attracting-business-into-a-lonely-airport/.

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    Ganeshan Wignaraja, Dinusha Panditaratne, Pabasara Kannangara, and Divya Hundlani. (2020, March 24). Chinese investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka. Chatham House, p. 10. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/03/chinese-investment-and-bri-sri-lanka.

  26. 26.

    Tilak Siyambalapitiya. (2018, April 2). Power sector in a shambles: three years of meddling. Ceylon-Ananda. http://ceylon-ananda.com/power-sector-in-a-shambles-three-years-of-meddling/.

  27. 27.

    Statistical digest 2018. Ceylon Electricity Board. (2019). https://ceb.lk/front_img/img_reports/1601877736Statistical_Digest_2019_Web_Version.pdf.

  28. 28.

    Port of Hambantota. Sri Lanka Port Authority. (2016). https://www.flandersinvestmentandtrade.com/export/sites/trade/files/trade_proposals/Port%20of%20Hambantota%20RFP.pdf.

  29. 29.

    Ibid.

  30. 30.

    Yasiru Ranaraja. (2020, January 21). Is Hambantota international port better off with China?. Sea Trade Maritime News. https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/opinions-analysis/hambantota-international-port-better-china.

  31. 31.

    Indika Sakalasooriya. (2017, January 17). Hambantota port sale in perspective. Daily Mirror. http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/Hambantota-Port-sale-in-perspective-122278.html.

  32. 32.

    Thorne, D. and Spevack, B. (2017). Harbored ambitions: how China’s port investments are strategically reshaping the Indo-Pacific. Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Defense Studies, p. 47.

  33. 33.

    Ganeshan Wignaraja, Dinusha Panditaratne, Pabasara Kannangara, and Divya Hundlani. (2020, March 24). Chinese investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka. Chatham House, p. 9. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/03/chinese-investment-and-bri-sri-lanka.

  34. 34.

    Colombo port, 11th best connected in the world. Sunday Observe. (2019, January 6). http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2019/01/06/business/%E2%80%98colombo-port-11th-best-connected-world%E2%80%99.

  35. 35.

    CICT handles 40 pct of volumes at Colombo port in 2019. Xinhua Net. (2020, January 17).

    http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/01/c_138671409.htm.

  36. 36.

    Ganeshan Wignaraja, Dinusha Panditaratne, Pabasara Kannangara, and Divya Hundlani. (2020, March 24). Chinese investment and the BRI in Sri Lanka. Chatham House, p. 9. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/03/chinese-investment-and-bri-sri-lanka.

  37. 37.

    Colombo port, 11th best connected in the world. Sunday Observe. (2019, January 6). http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2019/01/06/business/%E2%80%98colombo-port-11th-best-connected-world%E2%80%99.

  38. 38.

    CICT handles 40 pct of volumes at Colombo port in 2019. Xinhua Net. (2020, January 17).

    http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/01/c_138671409.htm.

  39. 39.

    Port city SEZ: a catalyst for modern services in Sri Lanka. Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute. (2020, June 4), p. 13. https://lki.lk/publication/port-city-sez-a-catalyst-for-modern-services-in-sri-lanka/.

  40. 40.

    Ibid.

  41. 41.

    Ibid.

  42. 42.

    Economic impact assessment of port city Colombo. PwC. (2020, February 11). https://www.portcitycolombo.lk/downloads/port-city-colombo-economic-impact-assessment-report.pdf.

  43. 43.

    Mahinda Chinthana vision for the future: the development policy framework. Ministry of Finance and Planning Sri Lanka, pp. 90–91.

  44. 44.

    Sri Lanka reverses $300 m China housing deal. Nikkei Asian Review. (2019, October 19).

    https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Sri-Lanka-reverses-300m-China-housing-deal.

  45. 45.

    Yasiru Ranaraja. (2020, January 21). Is Hambantota international port better off with China?. Sea Trade Maritime News. https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/opinions-analysis/hambantota-international-port-better-china.

  46. 46.

    Zulfick Farzan. (2020, November 15). HIP’s aggressive marketing on RORO operations pays dividends-Covid not withstanding. News 1st. https://www.newsfirst.lk/2020/11/15/hips-aggressive-marketing-on-roro-operations-pays-dividends-covid-not-withstanding/.

  47. 47.

    Harshita Kanodia. (2020, December 25). India’s SAGAR policy in the Indian Ocean region. Diplomatist. https://diplomatist.com/2020/12/25/indias-sagar-policy-in-the-indian-ocean-region/.

  48. 48.

    K V. Kesavan. (2020, February 14). India’s ‘act east’ policy and regional cooperation. Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-act-east-policy-and-regional-cooperation-61375/.

  49. 49.

    Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury. (2015, April 17). India plans cotton, ancient maritime routes to counter China’s ambitions. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/india-plans-cotton-ancient-maritime-routes-to-counter-chinas-ambitions/articleshow/46952190.cms?from=mdr.

  50. 50.

    Zhiqun Zhu. (2018, March 14). Can the Quad counter China’s belt and road initiative?. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/can-the-quad-counter-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/.

  51. 51.

    Ibid.

  52. 52.

    Dermawan, Rifki. (2021, March 18). Is the Quad’s revival a threat to ASEAN?. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/is-the-quads-revival-a-threat-to-asean/.

  53. 53.

    Bhadrakumar, M. K. (2020, October 2). US, India seek to press Sri Lanka into the Quad. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2020/10/us-india-seek-to-press-sri-lanka-into-the-quad/.

  54. 54.

    Brahma Chellaney. (2017, December 21). China’s creditor imperialism. The Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/12/21/commentary/world-commentary/chinas-creditor-imperialism/; The ‘new great game’: China’s debt-trap diplomacy. European Foundation for South Asian Studies. https://www.efsas.org/publications/study-papers/the-new-great-game-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy/.

  55. 55.

    Dushni Weerakoon and Sisira Jayasuriya. (2019, February 28). Sri Lanka’s debt problem isn’t made in China. East Asia Forum. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/02/28/sri-lankas-debt-problem-isnt-made-in-china/.

  56. 56.

    Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri. (2020, August). Debunking the myth of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’. Chatham House, p. 4. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/08/debunking-myth-debt-trap-diplomacy.

  57. 57.

    Gopal Suri. (2017). China’s expanding military maritime footprints in the Indian Ocean region (IOR): India’s response. New Delhi: Pentagon Press/Vivekananda International Foundation. https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/china-s-expanding-military-maritime-footprint-in-the-indian-ocean-region-india-s-response_0.pdf; China may deploy aircraft carrier in Indian Ocean region, says navy commander. The Times of India. (2020, January 6). https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/china-may-deploy-aircraft-carrier-in-ior-says-navy-commander/articleshow/73113710.cms.

  58. 58.

    Menon, Shivshankar. (2016). Choices: inside the making of India s foreign policy. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, p. 96.

  59. 59.

    Jayadev Ranade. (2012, July 13). China crowding Indian influence out of Sri Lanka. National Defense and Aerospace Power, Issue Brief, p.3. https://capsindia.org/files/documents/ISSUE-BRIEF_54_CHINA-CROWDING-INDIAN-INFLUENCE-OUT-OF-SRILANKA_13-July-2012.pdf.

  60. 60.

    South Asia Analysis Group. (2015, April 11). Sri Lanka: China’s listening post in Indian Ocean -oped. Eurasia Review. www.eurasiareview.com/11042015-sri-lanka-chinas-listening-post-in-indian-ocean-oped/.

  61. 61.

    China’s reach has grown; so should the Island chains. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. (2018). https://amti.csis.org/chinas-reachgrown-island-chains/.

  62. 62.

    Vijay Sakhuja. (2015). Chinese submarines in Sri Lanka unnerve India: next stop Pakistan?. China Brief. 15(11), pp. 15–18; PTI. (2018, October 11). Sri Lanka rejects US claims, says no Chinese military base at port. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/sri-lanka-rejects-us-claims-says-no-chinese-military-base-at-port/articleshow/66163389.cms.

  63. 63.

    Dinesh Weerakkody. (2018, May 22). SL-China relations: the great silk road needs to pick up speed. Daily Mirror. https://www.dailymirror.lk/Features/SL-China-relations-The-Great-Silk-Road-needs-to-pick-up-speed/185-150214.

  64. 64.

    Helwig, Nadia Schadlow, Brayden. (2020, July 1). Protecting undersea cables must be made a national security priority. Defense News. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/07/01/protecting-undersea-cables-must-be-made-a-national-security-priority/.

  65. 65.

    Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan. (2021, January 2). Countering Chinese assertiveness: India’s changing posture in the Indian Ocean. ORF. https://www.orfonline.org/research/countering-chinese-assertiveness-indias-changing-posture-indian-ocean/.

  66. 66.

    Ibid.

  67. 67.

    India hosts Japan, Australia, US in naval exercise Malabar 2020. U.S. Navy. www.navy.mil/Press-Office/News-Stories/Article/2402780/india-hosts-japan-australia-us-in-naval-exercise-malabar-2020/.

  68. 68.

    Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri. (2020, August). Debunking the myth of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’. Chatham House, p. 25. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/08/debunking-myth-debt-trap-diplomacy.

  69. 69.

    Since 2016, there has been seven naval ships visited Hambantota of which all are from the US and Japanese navies. See: Dinusha Panditaratne. (2019, July 25). Dr. Dinusha Panditaratne on China’s commercial and military presence in the Indian Ocean: a perspective from Sri Lanka. Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute. https://lki.lk/publication/dr-dinusha-panditaratne-on-chinas-commercial-and-military-presence-in-the-indian-ocean-a-perspective-from-sri-lanka/.

  70. 70.

    FP Staff. (2020, October 19). Indian, Sri Lankan navies begin slinex 2020: three-day exercise to highlight ‘growing congruence’ between two countries-India news. First Post. http://www.firstpost.com/india/indian-sri-lankan-navies-begin-slinex-2020-three-day-exercise-to-highlight-growing-congruence-between-two-countries-8929921.html; PTI. (2019, March 27). India, Sri Lanka hold joint military drill to boost counter-terror cooperation. The Economic Times. http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-sri-lanka-hold-joint-military-drill-to-boost-counter-terror-cooperation/articleshow/68597835.cms?from=mdr; Kumar, Anish. (2021, April 2). India to join Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka in military drills. Asianet Newsable. http://newsable.asianetnews.com/india-defence/india-to-join-bangladesh-bhutan-sri-lanka-in-military-drills-vpn-qqxsse.

  71. 71.

    Siddiqui, Huma. (2021, March 4). Trilateral NSA secretariat to keep the Chinese dragon at Bay; IAF chief visits Sri Lanka. The Financial Express. www.financialexpress.com/defence/trilateral-nsa-secretariat-to-keep-the-chinese-dragon-at-bay-iaf-chief-visits-sri-lanka/2206262/.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore

    Chulanee Attanayake

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  1. National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China

    Nian Peng

  2. Sichuan University of Science and Engineering, Zigong, China

    Ghulam Ali

  3. Sichuan University, Chengdu, China

    Yi Zhang

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Attanayake, C. (2022). Sri Lanka Amid Sino-Indian Himalayan Rivalry. In: Peng, N., Ali, G., Zhang, Y. (eds) Crossing the Himalayas. Contributions to International Relations. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-5808-2_8

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