This chapter is divided in two sections, both dealing with political philosophy from a libertarian perspective. In section 1, we maintain that statism cannot logically be defended in theory, while anarchism can be. We attempt to buttress both of these claims in this essay. Our main contention is that the statists’ defense of the state is based not on sound theory nor practical evidence, but on a belief structured as an a priori truth. We attempt to show why this is wrong.
What are the specifics? We deny that there are any “market failures” which require statism to overcome and ameliorate. We maintain that taxation is indeed a violation of private property rights and cannot be justified either deontologically or pragmatically. The theory that regards tax payments as club dues is unwarranted. Without taxes, there can be no such thing as government.
As an alternative, there would be, of course, institutions that provide typical public sector services, such as armies, courts, police, but this, too, would be anarchy, of the anarcho-capitalist variety. Moreover, there is presently a state of anarchism between the some 200 nations of the world, in the absence of any over-riding world government. But this situation of anarchy between countries is vastly preferable to an all-encompassing world government. Even an inveterate statist would pause before calling for an end to this anarchistic situation.
Also, secession is justified as an implication of free association. If a person is forced to associate with others against his will, this constitutes a rights violation. However, we take secession to its logical end point: to the individual level. That means, at least potentially, seven billion plus nations, one for each of us. That, in turn, would be equivalent to anarchism. Statists assume that it is inconceivable that a government should not exist. Hopefully, the present essay will enable them to look at the issue via a different perspective.
In Section 2, we try to respond to several criticisms of the Anarcho-Capitalist position. We do so by analyzing Professor Robert T. Miller’s (Abstract, Stetson Law Rev 49: 93, 2019) critique of our perspective. This author offers two main criticisms of our views (Futerman and Block, Stetson Law Rev 49: 73, 2019). He first charges that our “doctrines implausibly assume that the transaction costs of allocating goods and services by means of the market will virtually always be lower than those of allocating goods and services by means of government regulation” (Miller, supra note 303). And second, “[W]hen extreme libertarians make strong normative claims . . . they are implicitly adopting some moral system or other . . . ” (Id.). However, “when these suppressed premises are stated in full, they either become implausible or they no longer support the very strong conclusions extreme libertarians assert”(Id.).
This section of the chapter is an attempt to defend our perspective against these criticisms offered by Miller. By so doing, we are responding to criticisms against Anarcho-Capitalism articulated by many others, too, and thus supplying a stronger foundation for this theory.
I define anarchist society as one where there is no legal possibility for coercive aggression against the person or property of any individual. Anarchists oppose the State because it has its very being in such aggression, namely, the expropriation of private property through taxation, the coercive exclusion of other providers of defense service from its territory, and all of the other depredations and coercions that are built upon these twin foci of invasions of individual rights.
Murray Rothbard (2016)
This section of the present chapter is based on our paper Futerman, Alan G., and Block, Walter E. 2019. “The Fallacy of A Priori Statism.” Stetson Law Review, Vol. 49, pp. 73-91. Available at https://www2.stetson.edu/law-review/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/3.-49.1-FutermanBlock.pdf (last visited May 8, 2021).
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The a priori is knowledge that is absolutely “independent of all experience.” Id. at 136, quoted in Bruce Russell, A Priori Justification and Knowledge, Stan. Encyclopedia Phil. (May 19, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/apriori/.
See Binswanger (2013).
See Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332, 333 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining the statist belief in absolute power of government).
For limited government libertarians, or “minarchists”—as opposed to “statists,” who want a totalitarian organization, or widespread interventionism—the only legitimate function of government is to protect from violence those in its geographical area. To this end, the only proper institutions are defensive armies to quell attack from abroad, police to do so against domestic criminals, and courts to determine guilt or innocence. See generally Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 162 (1974) or Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged 1075 (50th Anniversary ed., Signet 1996) (1957).
This is the idea we will try to defend in the present essay.
But not totally ignored. Interventionists such as Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Samuelson, and Paul Krugman will readily concede that no government is perfect. See Paul Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory Analysis 12 (1948), Krugman (2014), Stiglitz (2008). However, the very strong presumption of these writers is that on the rare occasions when the state does err, these errors almost always result from doing too little, not too much, and in the latter case, the solution is not to pull back, but to improve efficiency in intervention.
Interventionists such as Paul Samuelson consider that the state must get involved in instances where the market apparently fails. See Samuelson, supra note 210, at 40–41.
See Marshall and Cole (2017).
See Niemietz (2017). Further, Noam Chomsky once described the idea “that the society created by Lenin and Trotsky and moulded [sic] further by Stalin . . . has some relation to socialism” as a “fantasy”. Owen Jones recently wrote that “A socialist society . . . doesn’t exist yet, but one day it must.” Stephen Resnick, a professor of—oddly enough—economics, said: “We can’t concede the end of communism. Communism hasn’t been tried on a society-wide basis.” Id.
Ludwig von Mises, Human Action—A Treatise on Economics 312 (The Ludwig von Mises Institute 1998) (1940) [hereinafter von Mises, Human Action]; Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis 527 (J. Kahane trans., Yale Univ. Press 1951) (1922), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Socialism%20An%20Economic%20and%20Sociological%20Analysis_3.pdf [hereinafter von Mises, Socialism].
von Mises, Socialism, supra note 214, at 532.
Faith, Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/faith (last updated Jun. 16, 2017).
“Everything in the State, nothing against the State, nothing outside the State”; is Benito Mussolini’s perspective on this matter. Quoted in Rifkind (2012).
See also Stearns (1994) (explaining how “through the ‘nirvana fallacy,’ scholars erroneously compare real-world institutions with some abstract or ideal institution, even if the institution has never existed or . . . has been proven impossible to devise”).
Id. See also McCloskey (1963) (explaining that critics of the organic theory “argue that if the state is an organism, it is therefore both ontologically higher and more valuable than its parts”).
See McCloskey, supra note 224, at 311 (analogizing the state to an organism that can develop its ideas through select individuals with power).
See Niemietz, supra note 213.
von Mises, Human Action, supra note 214, at 648.
It is sometimes claimed that psychoanalysis or Freudianism, too, is an a priori system. It is, to the extent that all critics are dismissed as having mental diseases. If so, then it would be impossible to logically refute this system of psychology; thus, it, too, would be held on an a priori basis, as a tautology. Id. at 35. For the avid Freudian, to deny this viewpoint, or denigrate, is to engage in irrationality.
See Murray (2011).
Even though statists never present themselves in this way, they nevertheless implicitly resort to this methodology. See Murray N. Rothbard, In Defense of “Extreme Apriorism” (1957), reprinted in Economic Controversies 103, 107 (2011), https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Economic%20Controversies_2.pdf.
See Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Austrian Rationalism in the Age of the Decline of Positivism, in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property 347, 348 (2d. ed.1993), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Economics%20and%20Ethics%20of%20Private%20Property%20Studies%20in%20Political%20Economy%20and%20Philosophy_3.pdf; Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Economic Science and the Austrian Method 8–9 (1995), https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Economic%20Science%20and%20the%20Austrian%20Method_3.pdf; Ludwig von Mises, Theory and History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution 104 (Ludwig von Mises Institute 2007) (1957), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Theory%20and%20History%20An%20Interpretation%20of%20Social%20and%20Economic%20Evolution_1.pdf; von Mises, Human Action, supra note 214, at 32; Murray N. Rothbard, Lange, Mises and Praxeology: The Retreat from Marxism (1971), reprinted in Economic Controversies 801, 806 (Ludwig von Mises Institute 2011), https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Economic%20Controversies_2.pdf; Murray N. Rothbard, Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics (1976), reprinted in Economic Controversies 59, 59 (Ludwig von Mises Institute 2011), https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Economic%20Controversies_2.pdf; Murray N. Rothbard, Praxeology as the Method of the Social Sciences (1973), reprinted in Economic Controversies 29, 33 (Ludwig von Mises Institute 2011), https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Economic%20Controversies_2.pdf; Rothbard, Praxeology, Value Judgments, and Public Policy, supra note 229, at 92; Rothbard, In Defense of “Extreme Apriorism,” supra note 230, at 107; Murray N. Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State with Power and Market 649 (2d ed. 2009), https://mises.org/sites/default/files/Man,%20Economy,%20and%20State,%20with%20Power%20and%20Market_2.pdf; George A. Selgin, Praxeology and Understanding: An Analysis of the Controversy in Austrian Economics 15 (Ludwig von Mises Institute 1990) (1988), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Praxeology%20and%20Understanding%20An%20Analysis%20of%20the%20Controversy%20in%20Austrian%20Economics_3.pdf; Batemarco (1985); Block (1999); Fox (1992); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, On Praxeology and the Praxeological Foundation of Epistemology and Ethics, in The Meaning of Ludwig von Mises 134, 151 (Jeffrey M. Herbener ed., 1992); Hülsmann (1999); Mario J. Rizzo, Praxeology and Econometrics: A Critique of Positivist Economics, in New Directions in Austrian Economics 40, 49 (Louis M. Spadaro ed., Institute for Humane Studies 1978), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/New%20Directions%20in%20Austrian%20Economics_2.pdf; Murray N. Rothbard, Praxeology and the Method of Economics (1973), reprinted in 18 Austrian Economics: A Reader 55, 76–79 (Richard M. Ebeling ed., 1991); Wiśniewski (2014); Block (1973, 1980); Hoppe (1989); Thorsten Polleit, Mises’s Apriorism Against Relativism in Economics, Mises Institute (Apr. 25, 2008), https://mises.org/library/misess-apriorism-against-relativism-economics; Thorsten Polleit, True Knowledge from A Priori Theory, Mises Institute (Jun. 8, 2011), https://mises.org/library/true-knowledge-priori-theory.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 89.
Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure (1958), reprinted in The Theory of Market Failure: A Critical Examination 35, 48 (Tyler Cowen ed., 1988).
von Mises, Socialism, supra note 214, at 362.
Id. at 184. See also Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State Power, supra note 231, at 1306–08 (explaining free market in terms of human morality).
See Charles Murray, Losing Ground: American Social Policy from 1950–1980, at 124 (1984).
Murray N. Rothbard, The Mystery of Banking 186 (2d ed. 2008), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Mystery%20of%20Banking_2.pdf (for instance, using the Bank of England as an example of “how the Central Bank . . . had generated and perpetuated . . . inflations and contractions, and how it had borne the primary responsibility for unsound money and for booms and busts”).
See Walter E. Block, The Privatization of Roads and Highways: Human and Economic Factors 170 (2009), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/The%20Privatization%20of%20Roads%20and%20Highways_2.pdf (arguing that “competition between private highway owners would reduce the motor vehicle death rate”).
See Charles W. Baird, Rent Control: The Perennial Folly 54–55 (1980); R. W. Grant, Rent Control and the War against the Poor: Ideology, the Poor and the Role of Political Force # (1989); Block et al. (1998); Block (2002); Milton Friedman & George J. Stigler, Roofs or Ceilings?: The Current Housing Problem (1946), reprinted in Rent Control: Myths and Realities 87, 102 (Walter Block & Edgar Olsen eds., 1981), http://www.walterblock.com/wp-content/uploads/publications/RentControlMythsRealities.pdf; Grampp (1950); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Repercussions of Rent Restrictions (1930), reprinted in Rent Control: Myths and Realities 169, 175 (Walter Block & Edgar Olsen eds., 1981), http://www.walterblock.com/wp-content/uploads/publications/RentControlMythsRealities.pdf; Gary Galles, Rent Control Makes for Good Politics and Bad Economics, Mises (Apr. 10, 2017), https://mises.org/blog/rent-control-makes-good-politics-and-bad-economics.
See Michael Goldberg et al., Zoning: Its Costs and Relevance for the 1980s, at 40–41 (Walter Block ed., 1980), https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/zoning-costs-and-relevance-for-the-1980s.pdf; Bernard H. Siegan, Land Use Without Zoning 95–96 (1972); Walter E. Block, Private Urban Planning and Free Enterprise, in Cities and Private Planning: Property Rights, Entrepreneurship and Transaction Costs 93, 96–97 (David Emanuel Andersson & Stefano Moroni eds., 2014); Siegan (1970).
See Murray N. Rothbard, Rethinking The ‘80s (1992), reprinted in Making Economic Sense 103, 104 (2d ed. 2006), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Making%20Economic%20Sense_3.pdf; Murray N. Rothbard, Michael R. Milken vs. The Power Elite (1989), reprinted in Making Economic Sense 181, 182 (2d ed. 2006), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Making%20Economic%20Sense_3.pdf; Llewellyn Rockwell, Michael R. Milken: Political Prisoner?, in The Economics of Liberty 70, 104 (Llewellyn H. Rockwell ed., 1990), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/The%20Economics%20of%20Liberty_2.pdf; Norman Barry, The Logic and Morality of Takeovers: Do Corporate Takeovers Deserve Their Reviled Status?, FEE (July 1, 2000), https://fee.org/articles/the-logic-and-morality-of-takeovers/.
A corporate raider is defined as:
A person or business that attempts to take control of a corporation, against its wishes, by buying its stock and replacing its management, often for the purpose of selling off its assets.
Corporate Raider, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
See von Mises, Socialism, supra note 214, at 211; Ayn Rand, War and Peace, 1 Objectivist Newsletter 44, 44 (1962).
See von Mises, Socialism, supra note 214, at 135–36.
See Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, supra note 214, at 13. This axiom is that from which economic laws are ultimately derived in the Austrian tradition. See also Chap. 1.
Murray N. Rothbard, War, Peace, and the State, in The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of Security 65, 66 (Hans-Hermann Hoppe ed., 2003), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Myth%20of%20National%20Defense%2C%20The%20Essays%20on%20the%20Theory%20and%20History%20of%20Security%20Production_3.pdf. See also Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty 51–52 (New York Univ. Press 1998) (1982), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty_0.pdf.
See Rothbard, War, Peace, and the State, supra note 250, at 66.
See Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, supra note 250, at 77.
See Laurence M. Vance, The Simplicity of Libertarianism, Future of Freedom, June 2015, at 15, 19, https://www.fff.org/explore-freedom/article/the-simplicity-of-libertarianism/.
On libertarian punishment theory, see Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 363–73 (1981), http://skepdic.ru/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Nozick.pdf; Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, supra note 250, at 88; William Barnett II, Walter E. Block & Gene Callahan, The Paradox of Coase as a Defender of Free Markets, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 1075, 1090 (2005); Walter E. Block, Austrian Law and Economics: The Contributions of Adolf Reinach and Murray Rothbard on Law, Economics, and Praxeology, 7 Q. J. Austrian Econ. 69, 75 (2004); Walter E. Block, Berman on Blackmail: Taking Motives Fervently, 3 Fla. St. U. Bus. Rev. 57, 70 (2003); Walter E. Block, Libertarian Punishment Theory: Working for, and Donating to, the State, 1 Libr. Papers, art. no. 17, at 1, (2009); Walter E. Block, Libertarianism vs. Objectivism; A Response to Peter Schwartz, 26 Reason Papers 39, 50–51 (2003); Walter E. Block, Market Inalienability Once Again: Reply to Radin, 22 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 37, 38 (1999); Walter E. Block, Radical Libertarianism: Applying Libertarian Principles to Dealing with the Unjust Government, Part II, 28 Reason Papers 85, 129 (2006); Walter E. Block, Reply to Frank van Dun’s “Natural Law and the Jurisprudence of Freedom,” 18 J. Libr. Stud. 65, 70 (2004); Walter E. Block, Toward a Libertarian Theory of Guilt & Punishment for the Crime of Statism, in Property, Freedom and Society: Essays in Honor of Hans-Hermann Hoppe 137, 141 (Jörg Guido Hülsmann & Stephan Kinsella eds., 2009), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Property%2C%20Freedom%2C%20and%20Society%20Essays%20in%20Honor%20of%20Hans-Hermann%20Hoppe_2.pdf; Anthony Gregory & Walter E. Block, On Immigration: Reply to Hoppe, 21 J. Libr. Stud. 25, 37 (2007), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/21_3_2.pdf; N. Stephan Kinsella, Punishment and Proportionality: The Estoppel Approach, 12 J. Libr. Stud. 51, 52 (1996), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/12_1_3_0.pdf; Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 The Monist 475, 476 (1968); Charles B. Olson, Law in Anarchy, 12 Libr. F., Nov.–Dec. 1979, at 1, 4, http://rothbard.altervista.org/articles/libertarian-forum/lf-12-6.pdf; Roy Whitehead & Walter E. Block, Taking the Assets of the Criminal to Compensate Victims of Violence: A Legal and Philosophical Approach, 5 J.L. Soc’y 229, 243 (2003); Walter E. Block, The Non-Aggression Axiom of Libertarianism, LewRockwell (February 17, 2003), http://archive.lewrockwell.com/block/block26.html; Marko Marjanovic, Least, Sufficient Force: Libertarian Theory of Defense, Voluntaryist Reader (Jan. 7, 2013), https://voluntaryistreader.wordpress.com/2013/01/07/least-sufficient-force-libertarian-theory-of-defense/.
For a rejection of this argument when applied to the United States, see Lysander Spooner, 6 No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority 12–17 (1870), http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/2194/Spooner_1485_Bk.pdf.
See The Theory of Market Failure: A Critical Examination (Tyler Cowen ed., 1988).
There are numerous others, but these are the most cited in the economics literature.
See generally Bryan Caplan, Externalities, Libr. Econ. & Liberty, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Externalities.html (last visited July 5, 2019).
See Walter E. Block, National Defense and the Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Clubs, in The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of Security Production 301, 305 (Hans-Hermann Hoppe ed., 2003), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Myth%20of%20National%20Defense%2C%20The%20Essays%20on%20the%20Theory%20and%20History%20of%20Security%20Production_3.pdf.
See Murray N. Rothbard, Airport Congestion: A Case of Market Failure?, in Making Economic Sense 192, 192–93 (2d ed. 2006), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Making%20Economic%20Sense_3.pdf; Brian Simpson, Markets Don’t Fail! 85 (2005); Walter E. Block, Was Milton Friedman a Socialist? Yes, 1 MEST J., Jan. 2013, at 11, 14, http://mest.meste.org/MEST_1_2013/_02.pdf; Jack High & Jerome Ellig, The Private Supply of Education: Some Historical Evidence, in The Theory of Market Failure: A Critical Examination 361, 361 (Tyler Cowen ed., 1988); Gil Guillory, What Are You Calling Failure?, Mises (May 5, 2005), http://www.mises.org/story/1806; D. W. MacKenzie, The Market Failure Myth, Mises (Aug. 26, 2002), https://mises.org/library/market-failure-myth; Christopher Westley, The Myth of Market Failure, Mises (Jun. 14, 2002), https://mises.org/library/myth-market-failure.
a mode of argumentation that seeks to establish a contention by deriving an absurdity from its denial, thus arguing that a thesis must be accepted because its rejection would be untenable. It is a style of reasoning that has been employed throughout the history of mathematics and philosophy from classical antiquity onwards.
Nicholas Rescher, Reductio ad Absurdum, Internet Encyclopedia of Phil., http://www.iep.utm.edu/reductio/ (last visited July 5, 2019).
For a refutation of this statist defense, see Walter E. Block, Public Goods and Externalities: The Case of Roads, 7 J. Libr. Stud. 1 (1983), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/7_1_1_0.pdf.
See Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, supra note 234, at 181–82.
E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 501 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“It holds that the sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public—such as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even esthetic pleasure.”).
See Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, supra note 250, at 56.
For a refutation of this argument as it concerns lighthouses, see William Barnett II & Walter E. Block, Coase and Bertrand on Lighthouses, 140 Pub. Choice 1, 11–12 (2009), http://www.walterblock.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/Coase-and-Bertrand-on-Lighthouses.pdf; William Barnett II & Walter E. Block, Coase and Van Zandt on Lighthouses, 35 Pub. Fin. Rev. 710, 729 (2007), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1091142107302182; Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. L. & Econ. 357, 359 (1974).
For a refutation of this argument as it concerns national defense, see Anthony de Jasay, Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study of the Public Goods Problem 166 (1989), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/jasay-social-contract-free-ride-a-study-of-the-public-goods-problem; Murray N. Rothbard, The Fallacy of the “Public Sector” (1961), reprinted in Economic Controversies 419, 426 (2011), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Economic%20Controversies_2.pdf; David Schmidtz, The Limits of Government: An Essay on the Public Goods Argument # (1991); Walter E. Block, National Defense and the Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Clubs, supra note 259, at 317; Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Fallacies of the Public Goods Theory and the Production of Security, 9 J. Libr. Stud. 27, 28 (1989), http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/9_1/9_1_2.pdf; Jeffrey Hummel, National Goods vs. Public Goods: Defense, Disarmament and Free Riders, 4 Rev. Austrian Econ. 88, 93–94 (1990), http://www.mises.org/journals/rae/pdf/rae4_1_4.pdf; E. C. Pasour, Jr., The Free Rider as a Basis for Government Intervention, 5 J. Libr. Stud. 453, 463 (1981), http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/5_4/5_4_6.pdf; Larry Sechrest, Privateering and National Defense: Naval Warfare for Private Profit (1999), reprinted in The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of Security Production 239, 239–40 (Hans-Hermann Hoppe ed., 2003), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Myth%20of%20National%20Defense%2C%20The%20Essays%20on%20the%20Theory%20and%20History%20of%20Security%20Production_3.pdf; Larry Sechrest, Privately Funded and Built U.S. Warships in the Quasi-War of 1797–1801, 12 Indep. Rev. 101 (2007); Larry Sechrest, Public Goods and Private Solutions in Maritime History, 7 Q. J. Austrian Econ. 3, 3 (2004), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/qjae7_2_1.pdf.
See Rothbard, The Fallacy of the “Public Sector,” supra note 268, at 178.
See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242–43 (1984) (reasoning that the State’s attempt “to reduce the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligopoly” was “a classic exercise of a State’s police powers”).
Murray N. Rothbard, Freedom, Inequality, Primitivism and the Division of Labor, Modern Age, Summer 1971, at 226, 237 (explaining that the primitive community was unhappy because of the perception that personal success was the result of exploitation of others).
For an extended refutation of the claim that large sized firms, with few or no competitors constitutes the market failure of monopoly, see DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS OF ANTITRUST (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1972); DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY: ANATOMY OF A POLICY FAILURE (New York: Wiley, 1982); DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST: THE CASE FOR REPEAL (Revised 2nd ed., Auburn AL: Mises Institute, 1999); DON ARMSTRONG, COMPETITION VS. MONOPOLY (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1982); Walter E. Block, Austrian Monopoly Theory – a Critique, 1 J. OF LIBERTARIAN S. 271–279 (1977); WALTER E. BLOCK, AMENDING THE COMBINES INVESTIGATION ACT (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1982); Walter E. Block, Total Repeal of Anti-trust Legislation: A Critique of Bork, Brozen and Posner, 8 REV. OF AUSTRIAN ECON. 35–70 (1994); Donald J. Boudreaux, Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Protectionist Roots of Antitrust, 6 REV. OF AUSTRIAN ECON. 81–96 (1992); Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Myth of Natural Monopoly, 9 REV. OF AUSTRIAN ECON. 43–58 (1996); Jack High High, Bork’s Paradox: Static vs Dynamic Efficiency in Antitrust Analysis, 3 CONTEMPORARY POL. ISSUES 21–34 (1984–1985); Fred McChesney, Antitrust and Regulation: Chicago’s Contradictory Views, 10 CATO JOURNAL (1991); Rothbard, Man, Economy, and State, supra note 234; William F. Shugart II, Don’t Revise the Clayton Act, Scrap It!, 6 CATO JOURNAL 925 (1987); Fred L. Smith, Jr., Why not Abolish Antitrust?, REGULATION 23 (Jan-Feb, 1983). On monopsony, a “monopoly” for buyers: Walter E. Block and William Barnett II, Monopsony Theory, 7(1/2) AMERICAN REVIEW OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 67–109 (June/December, 2009).
See Ludwig von Mises, Nation, State, and Economy: Contributions to the Politics and History of Our Time 60 (Leland B. Yaeger trans., N.Y. Univ. Press 1983) (1919), https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Nation%2C%20State%2C%20and%20Economy_3.pdf. E.g., Ian Bremmer, Not Just Catalonia: 3 More Places with Dreams of Independence, Time (Oct. 2, 2017), https://time.com/4963163/catalan-kurds-referendum-independence/ (reporting Biafra, Flanders, Donetsk, and Luhansk separatist movements); Clyde H. Farnsworth, Quebec, by Razor-Thin Margin, Votes “No” on Leaving Canada, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1995, at A1 (reporting Quebec’s referendum campaign to leave Canada); Parisa Hafezi & Tulay Karadeniz, Khamenei Says Iran, Turkey Must Act Against Kurish Secession: TV, Reuters (Oct. 4, 2017, 3:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iran-turkey/khamenei-says-iran-turkey-must-act-against-kurdish-secession-tv-idUSKBN1C91YW (reporting that Iran’s “Supreme Leader” said “Iran and Turkey should prevent Iraq’s Kurdistan region from declaring independence”); Raphael Minder, A Year After Catalonia Secession Vote, New Unrest and Still No Resolution, N.Y. Times (Oct. 1, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2OqHn9P (reporting Catalonia’s independence referendum).
The slave wishes not to associate with his master. Slavery is the preeminent example of the violation of the right of free association. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 638 (1980).
See Thomas Kleven, Why International Law Favors Emigration over Immigration, 33 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 69, 80 (2002) (“The starting point for a libertarian analysis is people’s freedom to choose with whom to associate.”).
See Rivka Weill, Secession and the Prevalence of Both Militant Democracy and Eternity Clauses, 40 Cardozo L. Rev. 905, 941 (2018) (“For example, the Bulgarian Constitution of 1991 grants freedom of association, but organizations’ activities ‘shall not be contrary to the country’s sovereignty and national integrity, or the unity of the nation.’”) (quoting Bulgaria’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2015, Constitute art. 44 § 2 (2018)).
Constitution of the Principality of Liechtenstein, Sept. 15, 2003, LR 101, art. 4, § 2, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/liechtenstein-constitution.pdf.
Whether to rejoin Canada, or to set up a small country of their own, a city-state as it were, it matters not which. But see Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 Yale J. Int’l L. 177, 181 (1991) (“Proponents of secession therefore face a very slippery slope in formulating a right to secede that does not open the door to complete anarchy.”).
Contra Jarret B. Wollstein, Arguments Against Anarchy, Mises (Feb. 9, 2010), https://mises.org/library/arguments-against-anarchy (“The belief that government is necessary to insure social order is a pure superstition . . . .”).
Anarchism means that there is no political jurisdiction authoritatively placed above two lower powers. Albania and Argentina, Brazil and Burundi, China and Chile, and every other nation on the face of the earth, are in a state of anarchism with each other, given that there is no government placed above them in existence, such as a World Government. If there were the latter, then this statement in the text would be false. Also, multilateral organisms and international organizations (such as the UN), are not a World Government. See also Oleg I. Titunov, The International Legal Personality of States: Problems and Solutions, 37 St. Louis U. L.J. 323, 330 (1993).
See Leland M. Goodrich, The Amount of World Organization Necessary and Possible, 55 Yale L. J. 950, 961 (1946). Moreover, international bodies, such as the United Nations, should not be regarded as the World Government we have in mind here, since although its member countries theoretically commit to following certain standards, they often do not follow these standards. Id. at 952. For example, the members of the U.N. commit to respecting “human rights,” but who are the members of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights? Egregious violators of rights, such as Saudi Arabia and Cuba. See Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global Government Networks, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1255, 1277 n.38 (2005) (reviewing Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (2004)) (explaining that human rights abusers have the greatest incentive to join the U.N. Commission on Human Rights). More importantly, no one is forcing Saudi Arabia to respect individual rights, so the U.N. is not a “government” that forces its members to act in a certain way. See Goodrich, supra, at 951–92 (explaining that the U.N. is “a voluntary association of sovereign states”).
See Duncan Whitmore, Is Libertarianism Utopian?, Mises (July 7, 2018), https://mises.org/wire/libertarianism-utopian (analyzing whether libertarianism is unachievable).
Paul Krugman, Opinion, Libertarian Fantasies, N.Y. Times (Aug. 9, 2014, 9:09 AM), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/libertarian-fantasies/. See also Paul Krugman, Opinion, Phosphorus and Freedom, N.Y. Times (Aug. 10, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1oAAn6o.
Gwartney, supra note 232, at vii. E.g., Michael Debow, The Politics of Good Intentions, 14 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 471, 471–72 (1994) (reviewing Dwight R. Lee & Richard B. McKenzie, Failure and Progress: The Bright Side of the Dismal Science (1993) (providing the Soviet bloc as the most extreme form of statism that is “universally regarded as a complete failure”).
E.g., John B. Judis, Anti-Statism in America, New Republic (Nov. 11, 2009), https://newrepublic.com/article/71077/anti-statism-america (explaining that Americans’ skepticism about statism can be traced back to at least 1955).
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 53 (Batoche Books. Ltd. 2001) (1859), https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/mill/liberty.pdf.
See, e.g., Michael Lind, The Question Libertarians Just Can’t Answer, Salon (June 4, 2013, 8:17 PM UTC), https://www.salon.com/2013/06/04/the_question_libertarians_just_cant_answer/ (questioning why “not a single country in the world in the early twenty-first century is organized along libertarian lines”).
See, e.g., David Boaz, A History of Libertarianism, Libertarianism (Jan. 15, 1997), https://www.libertarianism.org/publications/essays/history-libertarianism (explaining “the history of the movement for liberty, from Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu through the 20th century”).
Of course, there are millions, billions, maybe even trillions of voluntary transactions that take place throughout the world every day. See Gwartney, supra note 232, at 37.
Paradoxically, corruption and illegality, e.g., black markets, allows statist economies to function far better than would otherwise be the case. See Chris Matthews, When Corruption is Good for the Economy, Fortune (Aug. 7, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/08/07/corruption-economic-benefits/; Corruption and Development: Not What You Think?, Chris Blattman (Nov. 5, 2012), https://chrisblattman.com/2012/11/05/corruption-and-development-not-what-you-think/. Also, countries where relatively free market prices are a rarity internally, such as the former U.S.S.R., can still avail themselves of terms of trade and interest rates in the rest of the world. See von Mises, Socialism, supra note 214, at 586.
Douglass C. North, The Historical Evolution of Polities 4, ECONOMIC HISTORY 9411007 (University Library of Munich, Germany, Revised 14 Dec. 1994), https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/eh/papers/9411/9411007.pdf
JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN 98 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999–2000).
JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN 101 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999–2000).
LUDWIG VON MISES, LIBERALISM: IN THE CLASSICAL TRADITION 32–33 (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005) (1927).
A significant minority might well suffice, if these people were amongst the leaders of the society.
See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 36 (AHM Publ’g 1947) (1859). See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 35–36 (Batoche Books 2001) (1859).
Not to be confused with John Stuart Mill, despite the similarity of their last names, and, also, we aver, their political economic philosophies; that is, both ultimately embrace (to different degrees) statism.
See Mill, supra note 308, at 35–36.
Miller, supra note 303.
See Don Lloyd, Opportunity Cost, Comprehensive Definition?, Mises Wire (Apr. 12, 2004), https://mises.org/wire/opportunity-cost-comprehensive-definition. See also Chapter 1, supra.
For further comparisons on mail, see Douglas K. Adie, Monopoly Mail: Privatizing The United States Postal Service (1989) (discussing operational and innovation failures at the United States Postal Service); Wilton D. Alston, What Would Happen if the Post Office Had Competition?, Lew Rockwell (June 6, 2007), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2007/06/wilton-alston/the-postal-monopoly; Peter G. Klein, Economic Value and the Post Office, Mises Institute (Dec. 31, 2017), https://mises.org/power-market/economic-value-and-post-office; Thomas G. Moore, The Federal Postal Monopoly: History, Rationale, and Future, in Free the Mail: Ending the Postal Monopoly 61–72 (ed. Peter J. Ferrara ed., CATO Institute 1990); George Priest, The History of the Postal Monopoly in the United States, 18 J. L. & Econ. 33 (1975); Llewellyn H. Rockwell Jr., Can the Market Deliver Letters?, Mises Inst. (Dec. 17, 2002), https://mises.org/es/library/can-market-deliver-letters. For further discussion of the issue in the context of sanitation, see E. S. Savas, Refuse Collection: A Critical Review of the Evidence, 6 J. Urban Aff. 1 (1979); Lawrence H. White, Privatization of Municipally-Provided Services, 2 J. Libertarian Stud. 187 (1978). It is also difficult to uncover empirical studies where the reverse is true. Miller offers no examples of these “other situations” in which “the market has a . . . cost advantage.”
See Miller supra note 303, at 93, 94.
Id. Henceforth, all references to Miller unless otherwise indicated, will refer to this one essay of his.
See id. at 105–06.
See David Gordon, Yes, Taxation is Theft, Mises Wire (Nov. 15, 2019), https://mises.org/wire/yes-taxation-theft.
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 198 n.11 (Harper 1942).
See Murray N. Rothbard, Breaking Out of the Walrasian Box: The Cases of Schumpeter and Hansen, 1 Rev. of Austrian Econ. 97, 99–100 (1987).
Lysander Spooner, Treason: The Constitution of No Authority And A Letter To Thomas F. Bayard 17 (Pine Tree Press 1965) (1870).
Miller, supra note 303, at 94.
See Walter E. Block, Environmentalism and Economic Freedom: The Case for Private Property Rights, 17 J. Bus. Ethics 1887, 1895 (1998); Thomas DiLorenzo, Does Capitalism Cause Pollution?, 38 Contemporary Issues Series (Washington University: Center for the Study of American Business, 1990); Morton H. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law: 1780–1860 (Harvard Univ. Press 1977); Peter Lewin, Pollution Externalities: Social Cost and Strict Liability, 2 Cato J. 205 (1982); Murray N. Rothbard, Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution, 2 Cato J. 55 (1982), reprinted in Economics and the Environment: A Reconciliation 233–279279 (Walter E. Block ed., Fraser Inst. 1990).
See Block, supra note 325, at 1889–90.
See Miller, supra note 303, at 103.
See Block, supra note 325, at 1888–92.
See Id. at 1889.; see also Ryan McMaken, Property, Ownership, and Monopoly Police Forces, Mises Wire (Aug. 15, 2014), https://mises.org/wire/property-ownership-and-monopoly-police-forces.
See Murray N. Rothbard, What is the Free Market?, Mises Inst. (Nov. 4, 2019), https://mises.org/library/what-free-market.
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, And Utopia 163 (1974).
See Miller, supra note 303, at 95.
Miller, supra note 303, at 96.
See Block, supra note 325, at 1887; see also Ryan McMaken, Property, Ownership, and Monopoly Police Forces, Mises Wire (Aug. 15, 2014), https://mises.org/wire/property-ownership-and-monopoly-police-forces.
Miller, supra note 303, at 96.
Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 100 S.E. 207 (Ga. 2019).
See Rothbard, supra note 325 (citing Holman 100 S.E).
Miller, supra note 303, at 95 n.18.
There is also a wealth of literature on this matter which appears to have escaped Miller’s attention. See generally Holman 100 S.E., at 207; Bruce L. Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice Without the State (1990); Bruce L. Benson, Justice Without Government: The Merchant Courts of Medieval Europe and Their Modern Counterparts, in The Voluntary City: Choice, Community and Civil Society 127 (David T. Beito, Peter Gordon & Alexander Tabarrok, eds. 2009); Bruce L. Benson, The Enterprise of Customary Law, Mises Inst. (July 14, 2018), https://mises.org/library/enterprise-customary-law; Harold J. Berman and Felix J. Dasser, The ‘New’ Law Merchant and the ‘Old’: Sources, Content and Legitimacy, in Lex Mercatoria and Arbitration: A Discussion of the Law Merchant 21 (Thomas E. Carbonneau, ed., Juris Publ’g rev. ed. 1998) (1990); David Friedman, Private Creation and Enforcement of Law – A Historical Case, 8 J. Legal. Stud. 399 (1979); David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to Radical Capitalism (2d ed., 1989); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy – The god that failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, natural Order (2001); Daniel Popeo, Privatizing the Judiciary, FEE (Aug. 1, 1988), https://fee.org/articles/privatizing-the-judiciary/; David Osterfeld, Anarchism and the Public Goods Issue: Law, Courts and the Police, 9 J. Libertarian Stud. 47 (1989); Joseph R. Peden, Property Rights in Celtic Irish Law, 1 J. Libertarian Stud. 81 (1977); Murray N. Rothbard, For a New Liberty (Ludwig von Mises Instit. 2d ed. 2006) (1973) [hereinafter Rothbard, For a New Liberty]; Murray N. Rothbard, Free Market, Police, Courts, and Law, Reason, Mar. 1973, at 5; Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (1982) [hereinafter Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty]; Murray N. Rothbard, On Denationalizing the Courts, 2 Rothbard-Rockwell Report [pp. 304–306] (1991); Edward Stringham, Justice Without Government, 14 J. Libertarian Stud. 53 (1998–99); Morris Tannehill & Linda Tannehill, The Market for Liberty (Fox & Wilkes 3d ed. 1993) (1970); Morris Tannehill & Linda Tannehill, Arbitration of Disputes, Mises Inst. (July 1, 2001), https://mises.org/library/arbitration-disputes; Adam Thierer, Judgement Day: The Case for Alternative Dispute Resolution (1992); William C. Woolridge, Uncle Same the Monopoly Man (1970); Adam Young, Arbitration on Trial, Mises Inst. (July 17, 2002), https://mises.org/library/arbitration-trial.
Miller, supra note 303, at 94–95.
See Walter E. Block, All Government is Excessive: A Rejoinder to Dwight Lee’s ‘In Defense of Excessive Government,’ 16 J. Libertarian Stud. 35 (2002); see also The Theory of Market Failure: A Critical Examination (Tyler Cowen ed., 1988); Thomas DiLorenzo, A Note on the Canard of ‘Asymmetric Information’ as a Source of Market Failure, 14 Q. J. Austrian Econ. 249 (2011); The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of Security Production (Hans-Hermann Hope ed., Ludwig von Mises Inst. 2003); D. W. MacKenzie, The Market Failure Myth, Mises Institute (Aug. 26, 2002, 12:00 AM), https://mises.org/library/market-failure-myth; Murray N. Rothbard, Airport Congestion: A Case of Market Failure?, 3 The Free Market 3 (1985); Brian Simpson, Markets Don’t Fail (2005); Christopher Westley, The Myth of Market Failure, Mises Institute (June 14, 2002, 12:00 AM), https://mises.org/library/myth-market-failure; Thomas E. Woods Jr., Krugman Failure, Not Market Failure, Lew Rockwell (June 19, 2009), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2009/06/thomas-woods/krugman-failure-not-market-failure/; Thomas E. Woods Jr., Response to the ‘Market Failure’ Drones, Mises Institute (June 10, 2009, 12:00 AM), https://mises.org/library/response-market-failure-drones.
It is exceedingly rare for any of them to even acknowledge it, let alone respond to it.
See generally Walter E. Block, Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, 12 J. Libertarian Stud. 339 (1996); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Why Mises (and Not Hayek)?, Mises Inst. (Oct. 4, 2011, 1:00 PM), https://mises.org/library/why-mises-and-not-hayek; Walter E. Block, The Gold Standard: A Critique of Friedman, Mundell, Hayek, Greenspan, 25 Managerial Fin. 15 (1999) [hereinafter Block, The Gold Standard]; Walter E. Block, Fanatical, Not Reasonable: A Short Correspondence Between Walter E. Block and Milton Friedman , 20 J. Libertarian Stud. 61 (2006) [hereinafter Block, Fanatical, Not Reasonable]; Ronald Hamowy, Hayek’s Concept of Freedom: A Critique, 1 New Individualist Rev. 28 (1961) (reviewing Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (1960)); Rothbard, supra note 343; Murray N. Rothbard, 48 Non-Libertarian Positions Held By Friedrich Hayek, Econ. Pol’y J. (Jan. 2, 2014), https://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2014/01/48-non-libertarian-positions-held-by.html.
See generally William Barnett II & Walter E. Block, Coase and Van Zandt on Lighthouses, 35 Pub. Fin. Rev. 710 (2007) [hereinafter Barnett & Block, Coase and Van Zandt]; William Barnett II & Walter E. Block, Coase and Bertrand on Lighthouses, 140 Pub. Choice 1 (2009) [hereinafter Barnett & Block, Coase and Bertrand]; Walter E. Block, Coase and Demsetz on Private Property Rights, 1 J. Libertarian Stud. 111 (1977) [hereinafter Block, Coase and Demsetz on Private Property Rights]; Walter E. Block, Ethics, Efficiency, Coasean Property Rights and Psychic Income: A Reply to Demsetz, 8 Rev. Austrian Econ. 61 (1995); Walter E. Block, O.J.’s Defense: A Reductio Ad Absurdum of the Economics of Ronald Coase and Richard Posner, 3 Eur. J. L. & Econ. 265 (1996); Walter E. Block, Private Property Rights, Erroneous Interpretations, Morality and Economics: Reply to Demsetz, 3 Q. J. Austrian Econ. 63 (2000) [hereinafter Block, Private Property Rights]; Walter E. Block, Private Property Rights, Economic Freedom, and Professor Coase: A Critique of Friedman, McCloskey, Medema and Zorn, 26 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 923 (2003); Walter E. Block, Coase and Kelo: Ominous Parallels and Reply to Lott on Rothbard on Coase, 27 Whitter L. Rev. 997 (2006); Walter E. Block, A Response to Brooks’ Support of Demsetz on the Coase Theorem, 2 Dialogue (2010); Walter E. Block, Rejoinder to Brooks on Coase and Demsetz, 13 Q. J. Austrian Econ. 56 (2010); Walter E. Block, Rejoinder to Boettke on Coasean Economics and Communism, 5 Romanian Econ. & Bus. Rev. 9 (2010); Walter E. Block, William Barnett II & Gene Callahan, The Paradox of Coase as a Defender of Free Markets, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & Liberty 1075 (2005); Roy E. Cordato, Knowledge Problems and the Problem of Social Cost, 14 J. Hist. Econ. Thought 209 (1992); Roy E. Cardato, Welfare Economics and Externalities in an Open Ended Universe: A Modern Austrian Perspective (Kluwer, 1992); Roy E. Cordato, Market-Based Environmentalism and the Free Market: They’re Not the Same, 1 Indep. Rev. 371 (1997); Roy E. Cordato, Time Passage and the Economics of Coming to the Nuisance: Reassessing the Coasean Perspective, 20 Campbell L. Rev. 273 (1998); Roy E. Cordato, Chasing Phantoms in a Hollow Defense of Coase, 13 Rev. Austrian Econ. 193 (2000); Thomas DiLorenzo, When Did Ronald Coase Become the Ayatollah of Economic Theory?, Lew Rockwell (January 2, 2014), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2014/01/thomas-dilorenzo/the-beltarian-cult/; Glenn Fox, The Real Coase Theorems, 27 Cato J. 373 (2007); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Ethics and Economics of Private Property, Lew Rockwell (October 11, 2004), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2004/10/hans-hermann-hoppe/the-ethics-and-economics-of-private-property/; Michael Krauss, Tort Law, Moral Accountability, and Efficiency: Reflections on the Current Crisis, 2 J. Mkts & Mortality 114 (1999); Elisabeth Krecke, Law and the Market Order: An Austrian Critique of the Economic Analysis of Law, 7 J. Economistes & Etudes Humanes 19 (1996); Lewin, supra note 325; Rothbard, supra note 325; Edward Stringham & Mark D. White, Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Austrian and Kantian Perspectives, in Law And Economics: Alternative Approaches to Legal and Regulatory Issues 374 (Margaret Oppenheimer & Nicholas Mercuro eds., 2004); Timothy D. Terrell, Property Rights and Externality: The Ethics of the Austrian School, 2 J. Mkts. & Mortality (1999).
See generally Walter E. Block & David Gordon, Blackmail, Extortion and Free Speech: A Reply to Posner, Epstein, Nozick and Lindgren, 19 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 37 (1985); Walter E. Block, Toward a Libertarian Theory of Inalienability: A Critique of Rothbard, Barnett, Gordon, Smith, Kinsella and Epstein, 17 J. Libertarian Stud. 39 (2003); Walter E. Block & Richard Epstein, Block-Epstein Debate on Eminent Domain, Mises Inst. (May 14, 2004), https://mises.org/library/block-epstein-debate-eminent-domain; Walter E. Block & Richard Epstein, Debate on Eminent Domain, 1 N.Y.U. J. OF L. & Liberty 1144 (2005); Walter E. Block, Epstein on Alienation: A Rejoinder, 33 Int’l J. Soc. Econ. 241 (2006); Walter E. Block, In Defense of the Free Market, Barron’s (Feb. 4, 2012) (reviewing Richard A. Epstein, Design for Liberty: Private Property, Public Administration, and the Rule of Law (2011)).
Miller, supra note 303, 96–97.
See generally Walter E. Block, National Defense and the Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Clubs, in The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of Security Production 301 (Hans-Hermann Hoppe ed., Mises Inst. 2003); Cowen, supra note 256; Anthony de Jasay, Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study of the Public Goods Problem (1989); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Fallacies of the Public Goods Theory and the Production of Security, 9 J. Libertarian Stud. 27 (1989); Jeffrey Hummel, National Goods versus. Public Goods: Defense, Disarmament and Free Riders, 4 R. Austrian Econ. 88 (1990); E.C. Pasour, Jr., The Free Rider as a Basis for Government Intervention, 5 J. Libertarian Stud. 453 (1981); 2 Murray N. Rothbard, The Logic of Action: Applications and Criticism from the Austrian School (1997); David Schmidtz, The Limits of Government: An Essay on the Public Goods Argument (1991); Larry Sechrest, Privateering and National Defense: Naval Warfare for Private Profit, in The Myth of National Defense: Essays on the Theory and History of Security Production 239 (Hans-Hermann Hoppe ed., Mises Inst., 2003); Larry Sechrest, Public Goods and Private Solutions in Maritime History, 7 Q. J. Austrian Econ. 3 (2004); Larry Sechrest, Private Provision of Public Goods: Theoretical Issues and Some Examples from Maritime History, 2 ICFAI J. Pub. Fin. 45 (2004); Larry Sechrest, Privately Funded and Built U.S. Warships in the Quasi-War of 1797-1801, 12 Indep. Rev. 101 (2007).
Miller, supra note 303, at 97 n.22.
See supra note 350.
Miller, supra note 303, at 97 n.22.
See Alan G. Futerman, Hacia una Teoría de los Bienes Públicos como Bienes Políticos y el Rol Estatal, 11 Revista Procesos de Mercado [Spain] 217 (2014).
Scarcity is a subjective, relational concept, regarding the available quantity of means to achieve a certain set of ends. See Chapter 1.
In terms of commercial trade, that is. Air and ocean water are at present free goods. No one buys or sells them. However, if they both disappeared, life would disappear.
They are based on, in economics, the pernicious doctrine of “market failure.” Included here, in addition to so-called “public goods” would be externalities, monopoly, inequality, asymmetric information, etc. However, an exploration of all these concepts would take us too far off topic.
Paul Samuelson, Pure Theory of Public Expenditure and Taxation, in The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson 502 (in Public Economics: An Analysis of Public Production and Consumption and their Relations to the Private Sectors: Proceedings of a Conference held by the International Economic Association, J. Margolis and H. Guitton, eds. London: Macmillan.) (Massachusetts Institute of Technology: M.I.T. Press 1969 ).
Miller, supra note 303, at 98.
Miller, supra note 303, at 98–99.
Id. at 98.
See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
See Barnett & Block, Coase and Van Zandt, supra note 346; Barnett & Block, Coase and Bertrand, supra note 346.
Miller, supra note 303, at 100.
As opposed to the perfect competition model of neoclassical economics, which is the basis of Miller’s criticisms. He seems to be unaware that there is a systematic (Misesian-Austrian) refutation of that school of thought.
Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics 65 (4th ed., 1949).
Ludwig von Mises, Profit and Loss 8 (Ludwig von Mises Instit. 2008) (1952).
See Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (Yale Univ. Press 1962) (1922).
Rogelio T. Pontón, Ensayos Sobre la Teoría y La Realidad Económica [Argentina] 11, 107, (2014).
Osvaldo H. Schenone, ¿Cuántos precios relativos hay? Comentarios a Rogelio Pontón, (Nov. 2014) (unpublished commentary) (on file with authors).
This is so because if we say that there are NxN=N2 relative prices, there are N relative prices that are equal to one (given that these are relative prices for the same item, hence trivial, i.e., paa, the price of a in terms of a is still a. Therefore, the numbers of the main diagonal in the matrix are equal to 1). See Osvaldo H. Schenone, supra note 373.
And observe that this number is very low compared to any modern economy.
Mille, supra note 303, at 100.
Miller, supra note 303, at 101.
A small part of it mentioned herein.
Miller, supra note 303, at 102.
See, e.g., Walter E. Block, Homesteading, Ad Coelum, Owning Views and Forestalling, 3 The Social Sciences 96 (2008); Walter E. Block, A Collection of Essays on Libertarian Jurisprudence: Sunshine and Property Rights, 58 St. Louis Uni. L. J. 541 (2014); Walter E. Block & Matthew A. Block, Roads, Bridges, Sunlight and Private Property Rights, 7 J. Economistes & Etudes Humanes 351 (1996); Walter E. Block, Roads, Bridges, Sunlight and Private Property: Reply to Gordon Tullock, 8 J. Economistes & Etudes Humanes 315 (1998). But see Gordon Tullock, Comment on ‘Roads, Bridges, Sunlight and Private Property’, by Walter E. Block and Matthew A. Block, 7 J. Economistes & Etudes Humanes 589 (1996). This literature also offers a response to Miller’s objection that the ad coelum question has not been answered in FB: “[W]hen a man owns some land, does he own the airspace above the land?”
See generally Walter E. Block, Earning Happiness Through Homesteading Unowned Land: A Comment on ‘Buying Misery with Federal Land’ by Richard Stroup, 15 J. Soc. Pol. & Econ. Stud. 237 (1990); Walter E. Block, Homesteading City Streets; An Exercise in Managerial Theory, 5 Plan. & Mkts. 18 (2002); Walter E. Block, On Reparations to Blacks for Slavery, 3 Hum. Rts. Rev. 53 (2002); Walter E. Block & Michael R. Edelstein, Popsicle sticks and homesteading land for nature preserves, 7 Romanian Econ. & Bus. Rev. 7 (2012); Walter E. Block & Peter Lothian Nelson, Water Capitalism: The Case for Privatizing Oceans, Rivers, Lakes, and Acquifers (2015) [hereinafter Block & Nelson, Water Capitalism]; Walter E. Block & Guillermo Yeatts, The Economics and Ethics of Land Reform: A Critique of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace’s ‘Toward a Better Distribution of Land: The Challenge of Agrarian Reform,’ 15 J. Nat. L. Res. & Envtl. L.37 (1999–2000); Block & Epstein, supra note 347, Debate on Eminent Domain…; Per Bylund, Man and Matter: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Justification of Ownership in Land from the Basis of Self-Ownership (2005) (Master’s Thesis, Lund University) (on file with authors); Per Bylund, Man and Matter: How the Former Gains Ownership of the Latter, 4 Libertarian Papers 1 (2012); Hugo Grotius, Law of War and Peace (A.C. Campbell trans. 1814) (1625); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy (2004); Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Of Private, Common, and Public Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization, 3 Libertarian Papers 1 (2011); N. Stephan Kinsella, A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability, 17 J. Libertarian Stud. 11 (2003); N. Stephan Kinsella, How We Come to Own Ourselves, Mises Inst. (Sept. 7, 2006), https://mises.org/library/how-we-come-own-ourselves; N. Stephan Kinsella, What Libertarianism Is, Mises Inst. (Aug. 21, 2009), https://mises.org/library/what-libertarianism; N. Stephan Kinsella, What Libertarianism Is, in Property, Freedom and Society: Essays in Honor of Hans-Hermann Hoppe (Jörg Guido Hülsmann & Stephan Kinsella eds., 2009); N.Stephan Kinsella, Homesteading, Abandonment, and Unowned Land in the Civil Law, Mises Inst.(May 22, 2009), https://mises.org/wire/homesteading-abandonment-and-unowned-land-civil-law; John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent and End of Civil Government, in Social Contract 17 (E. Barker ed., 1962); Ellen Frankel Paul, Property Rights and Eminent Domain (Routledge 2008) (1987); Samuel Pufendorf, Natural Law and the Law of Nations Oxford Univ. Press 1927) (1672); Murray N. Rothbard, Confiscation and the Homestead Principle, 1 Libertarian F. 11 (1969); Rothbard, For a New Liberty, supra note 341.; Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, supra note 341; Michael S. Rozeff, Original Appropriation and Its Critics, Lew Rockwell (Sept. 1, 2005), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2005/09/michael-s-rozeff/original-appropriation-and-its-critics/; Carl Watner, The Proprietary Theory of Justice in the Libertarian Tradition, 6 J. Libertarian Stud. 289 (1982).
Miller, supra note 372, at 102.
For a discussion on ownership of liquids, underground or otherwise, see Block & Nelson, Water Capitalism, supra note 382.
Miller, supra note 303, at 104 (quoting Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967)).
See, e.g., Block, Coase and Demsetz on Private Property Rights, supra note 346; Harold Demsetz, Ethics and Efficiency in Property Rights Systems, in Time, Uncertainty and Disequilibrium: Exploration of Austrian Themes (Mario Rizzo, ed.) (Lexington Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co, 1979); Walter E. Block, Ethics, Efficiency, Coasean Property Rights and Psychic Income: A Reply to Demsetz, 8 Rev. Austrian Econ. 61 (1995); Harold Demsetz, Block’s Erroneous Interpretations, 10 Rev. Austrian Econ. 101 (1997); Walter E. Block, Private Property Rights, Erroneous Interpretations, Morality and Economics: Reply to Demsetz, 3 Q. J. Austrian Econ. 63 (2000).
See Block’s many criticisms of Coase. Ibid., plus:
Walter E. Block, On Ronald Coase as political economist, 43 RUTGERS LAW RECORD 117-132 (2015–2016); Barnett & Block, Coase and Van Zandt, supra note 346; Barnett & Block, Coase and Bertrand, supra note 346; Block, Coase and Demsetz on Private Property Rights…, supra note 346; Walter E. Block, O.J.’s Defense…, supra note 346; Walter E. Block, Private Property Rights, Economic Freedom, and Professor Coase…, supra note 346; Walter E. Block, Coase and Kelo…, supra note 346; Walter E. Block, A Response to Brooks’ Support of Demsetz…, supra note 346; Walter E. Block, Rejoinder to Brooks…, supra note 346; Walter E. Block, Rejoinder to Boettke…, supra note 346; Walter E. Block, Rejoinder to Bertrand on lighthouses, 6 ROMANIAN ECON. AND B. REV. 49–67 (2011); Walter E. Block, “The Dangerous Fanatic Ronald Coase, RIP”, Economic Policy Journal, (September 16, 2013), https://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2013/09/walter-block-on-dangerous-fanatic.html; Walter E. Block, William Barnett II & Gene Callahan, The Paradox of Coase…, supra note 346.
Miller, supra note 303, at 104–05.
Hey, if Miller can engage in such calculations, so can we. Who says we learn nothing from him?
Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, supra note 341, at 152; see also Walter E. Block, The Non-Aggression Axiom of Libertarianism, Lew Rockwell (Feb. 17, 2003), https://www.lewrockwell.com/2003/02/walter-e-block/turning-their-coats-for-the-state/.
And we do not say that is immoral per se.
Libertarianism is only relevant to the latter. It is a theory that attempts to explain just law; it is totally silent on private morality
Miller, supra note 303, at 106-07.
Cf. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, supra note 341 (a review of this work will show these authors’ similarities to Rothbard); see also Rothbard, For a New Liberty, supra note 341.
Miller, supra note 303, at 107.
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Futerman, A.G., Block, W.E. (2021). Political Philosophy. In: The Austro-Libertarian Point of View. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4691-1_6
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