Abstract
This chapter presents the theory and concept of this book. Related theories include the Long Tail theory, Mechanism Design theory and Path Dependence theory. The related concepts include rural long tail public service, the imbalance of rural long tail public service, and the correction mechanism of rural long tail public service. Based on the Long Tail theory, rural public services can be divided into two categories. One is comprised of the head public services represented by infrastructure construction, the social security system, basic education and health. This kind of rural public service has strong universality, wide demand, high homogeneity, concentrated distribution, scale effect and scope economy in supply. These characteristics are in line with the spillover characteristics of public goods. The other category is the rural long tail public demand, which has the characteristics of individuality, dispersion, heterogeneity and concealment. These characteristics make it difficult to meet the scale effect in the supply; rural long tail public demand also has information disadvantages in terms of demand identification.
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Luo, J. (2021). Theory and Concept. In: Rural Long Tail Public Service and the Correction Mechanism. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4023-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4023-0_2
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