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The Philippine Claim to Bajo De Masinloc in the Context of the South China Sea Dispute

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Abstract

The Philippine claim to Bajo de Masinloc, otherwise referred to as Scarborough Shoal, finds solid basis in international law. The territorial claim of the Philippines over Bajo de Masinloc is strong relative to the claim of China as well as with respect to the principles on the acquisition of territory in international law, in particular, on the basis of effective occupation. The sovereign rights and jurisdiction asserted by the Philippines over the maritime entitlements of the features in Bajo de Masinloc are founded on principles of international law and consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which both the Philippines and China have signed and ratified. This paper aims to examine the Philippine claim over Bajo de Masinloc particularly focusing on the 2012 standoff between the Philippines and China and the arbitration case filed by the Philippines against China over the West Philippine Sea.

Senior Lecturer at the School of Law, University of Wollongong. LL.B/B.A. cum laude (Philippines), LL.M. (Dalhousie), Ph.D. (Wollongong). The author is grateful to Professors Jay Batongbacal, Aileen Baviera, and Diane Desierto for their helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not represent the official position of the Philippine Government. This paper was originally published in the Journal of East Asia and International Law in 2013. It has not been revised or updated and it does not include events or information after 2013.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This paper adopts the Philippine name of Scarborough Shoal, which is Bajo de Masinloc. This paper treats China and Taiwan as one claimant and assumes that their positions over the Bajo de Masinloc are identical.

  2. 2.

    R. Jennings, TheAcquisition ofTerritory inInternationalLaw6 (1963). See also S. Sharma, TerritorialAcquisition,Disputes, andInternationalLaw 188 (1997); H. Kelsen, Principles ofInternationalLaw 225 (2003); S. Oda, FiftyYears of theLaw of theSea 22–27 (2003).

  3. 3.

    United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter UNCLOS), signed on Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 UNTS 3, [1994] ATS 31, 21 ILM 1261 (1982). The Philippines and China ratified UNCLOS on May 8, 1984 and June 7, 1996.

  4. 4.

    Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippine position on Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) and the waters within its vicinity, Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, Apr. 18, 2012.

  5. 5.

    Republic of the Philippines, Department of Foreign Affairs, Notification and Statement of Claim, Manila ¶ 10, (Jan. 22, 2013).

  6. 6.

    Three colonial treaties define the Philippine territorial boundaries: (1) Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.T. 343; (2) Cession of Outlying Islands of Philippines, U.S.-Spain, Nov. 7, 1900, U.S.T. 345; (3) Boundaries, Philippines and North Borneo, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 2, 1930, U.S.T. 856. For materials that discuss the Philippine Treaty Limits, please see L. Bautista, The Historical Context and Legal Basis of the Philippine Treaty Limits, 10 AsianPacificL. Pol’yJ. 1–31 (2008); L. Bautista, Philippine Boundaries: Internal Tensions, Colonial Baggage, Ambivalent Conformity, 16 J. SoutheastAsianStud. 35–54 (2011); L. Bautista, The Legal Status of the Philippine Treaty Limits in International Law, 1 AegeanRev.L. Sea &MaritimeL. 111–139 (2010); L. Bautista, The Historical Background, Geographical Extent and Legal Bases of the Philippine Territorial Water Claim, 8 J.Comp.AsianDev. 365–395 (2009); L. Bautista, The Philippine Treaty Limits and Territorial Water Claim in International Law, 5 Soc.Sci.Diliman 107–127 (2007).

  7. 7.

    UNCLOS arts. 56 (1)(a) & 77(1). It is also entitled to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea under Article 121(3) of UNCLOS, where the Philippines exercises full sovereignty and jurisdiction as provided for in Article 2 of UNCLOS.

  8. 8.

    Supra note 4.

  9. 9.

    J.Arreglado,Kalayaan:Historical,Legal andPoliticalBackground (1982); H. Yorac, The Philippine Claim to the Spratly Islands Group, 58 PhilippineL. J. 172 (1983).

  10. 10.

    L. Bautista, Thinking Outside the Box: The South China Sea Issue and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Options, Limitations and Prospects), 81 PhilippineL. J. 699–700 (2007).

  11. 11.

    UNCLOS arts. 122–123.

  12. 12.

    Z. Gao & B. Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status and Implications, Am.J. Int’lL. 99 (2013).

  13. 13.

    Z. Keyuan,Law of theSea inEastAsia:Issues andProspects 47 (2005).

  14. 14.

    A. Baviera & J. Batongbacal, The West Philippine Sea: The Territorial and Maritime Jurisdiction Disputes from a Filipino Perspective - A Primer, The Asian Center and Institute for Maritime Affairs and the Law of the Sea, University of the Philippines, at 5 (2013), available athttp://filomenitamongaya.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/UP_Primer-on-the-West-Philippine-Sea_April-2013_0.pdf (last visited on Oct. 6, 2013).

  15. 15.

    Supra note 4.

  16. 16.

    C. Rahman & M. Tsamenyi, A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in the South China Sea, 41 OceanDev. &Int’lL.316–321 (2010).

  17. 17.

    C. Schofield, Dangerous ground: A Geopolitical Overview of the South China Sea, in Security andInternationalPolitics in theSouthChinaSea:Towards a cooperative management regime 18–19 (S. Bateman & R. Emmers eds., 2009).

  18. 18.

    S. Raine &C. LeMiere, RegionalDisorder:TheSouthChinaSeaDisputes 74–75 (2013).

  19. 19.

    N. Owen & C. Schofield, Disputed South China Sea hydrocarbons in perspective, 36 MarinePol’y 09–822 (2012).

  20. 20.

    Id. at 815.

  21. 21.

    Id.

  22. 22.

    South China Sea, United States Energy Information Administration, (Feb. 7, 2013), available athttp://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf (last visited on Sept. 1, 2013).

  23. 23.

    F. Bonnet, Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal, Irasec’s Discussion Papers No.14, 7 (2012).

  24. 24.

    A. Baviera & J. Batongbacal, The West Philippine Sea: The Territorial and Maritime Jurisdiction Disputes from a Filipino Perspective - A Primer, The Asian Center and Institute for Maritime Affairs and the Law of the Sea, University of the Philippines, at 28 (2013), available athttp://philippinesintheworld.org/sites/default/files/FINAL_West%20Phil%20Sea%20Primer_UP%20%2815%20July%202013%29.pdf (last visited on Oct. 6, 2013).

  25. 25.

    Id.

  26. 26.

    Id.

  27. 27.

    Supra note 23, at 5.

  28. 28.

    For Chinese position over the South China Sea dispute, see Junwu Pan, Territorial Dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea: A Chinese Lawyer’s Perspective, 5 J.EastAsia &Int’lL. 215–221 (2012).

  29. 29.

    Id. at 4.

  30. 30.

    Id. at 6.

  31. 31.

    Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone art. 3.

  32. 32.

    Id. art. 4.

  33. 33.

    Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act art. 2.

  34. 34.

    Republic Act No. 9522, An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to define the Archipelagic Baseline of the Philippines and for other Purposes, Mar. 10, 2009.

  35. 35.

    Supra note 32. See also Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea (1996).

  36. 36.

    US Department of State, Straight Baseline Claim: China, Limits in the Seas, No. 117 (Jul. 9, 1996), available athttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/57692.pdf (last visited on Nov. 9, 2013). For the international criticism, see Hyunsoo Kim, China’s Basepoints and Baselines under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Critical Analysis, 6 J. EastAsia &Int’l L. 135–153 (2013).

  37. 37.

    See Preliminary Information Indicative of the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf beyond 200 Nautical Miles of the People’s Republic of China (translation), May 11, 2009, ¶ 10, available athttp://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/chn2009preliminaryinformation_english.pdf (last visited on Sept. 30, 2013).

  38. 38.

    This system of straight baselines is extensive and applies not only to Taiwan’s main islands but also Pratas Island and the Macclesfied Bank. A comprehensive and critical analysis of this claim is provided by the US Deparment of State. See US Department of State, Taiwan’s Maritime Claims, Limits in the Seas No. 127 (Nov. 15, 2005), available athttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/57674.pdf (last visited on Sept. 30, 2013).

  39. 39.

    For a detailed treatment of Taiwan’s maritime claims, see K. Wang, The ROC’s Maritime Claims and Practices with Special Reference to the South China Sea, 41 OceanDev. &Int’lL. 237–252 (2010).

  40. 40.

    L. Bautista, The Legal Status of the Philippine Treaty Limits in International Law,” 1 AegeanRev.L. Sea &MaritimeL. 111–139 (2010).

  41. 41.

    Presidential Decree No. 1599, Jun. 11, 1978.

  42. 42.

    Presidential Proclamation No. 370, Mar. 20, 1968.

  43. 43.

    The Philippines and Taiwan also share overlapping EEZ claims to the north of the Philippines and south of Taiwan, having both proclaimed EEZs which extend 200 nm from the baselines. See V. Prescott &C. Schofield, TheMaritimePoliticalBoundaries of theWorld 434 (2005).

  44. 44.

    J. Shen, China’s Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands: A Historical Perspective, 1 ChineseJ.Int’lL. 94 (2002).

  45. 45.

    Hungdau Chiu & Choon Ho Park, Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, 3 OceanDev. &Int’lL. 1 (1975); B. Murphy, Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands and International Law, 1 Ocean &CoastalL. J. 187 & 191 (1995).

  46. 46.

    It must be clarified that the Philippines consistently maintains it has sovereignty over Mischief Reef. For details, see D. Zha and M. Valencia, Mischief Reef: Geopolitics and implications, 31 J. Contemp.SoutheastAsia 86–103 (2001).

  47. 47.

    China incorporates the claim of Taiwan into its own because China does not recognize Taiwan as an independent state separate from the PRC. See M. Bennett, The People’s Republic of China and the Use of International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute, 28 Stan.J. Int’lL. 425 & 448 (1992).

  48. 48.

    For details, see Gao & Jia, supra note 12, at 98–123; Micheal Sheng-ti Gau, The U-Shaped Line and a Categorization of the Ocean Disputes in the South China Sea, 43 OceanDev. &Int’lL. 57–69 (2012); Z. Keyuan, China’s U-Shaped Line in the South China Sea Revisited, 43 OceanDev. &Int’lL. 18–34 (2012); M. Miyoshi, China’s “U-Shaped Line” Claim in the South China Sea: Any Validity Under International Law?, 43 OceanDev. &Int’lL 1–17 (2012); Nguyen Dang Thang & Hong Thao Nguyen, China’s Nine Dotted Lines in the South China Sea: The 2011 Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Between the Philippines and China, 43 OceanDev. &Int’lL. 35–56 (2012).

  49. 49.

    Official Chinese sources have always depicted the line as a discontinuous. See, e.g., CLCS, Communication by China, (May 9, 2009), available athttp://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf (last visited on Oct. 30, 2013).

  50. 50.

    L. Jinming & L. Dexia, The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note, 34 OceanDev. &Int’lL. 287–295 (2003). It is worth noting that the map was originally issued by the Republic of China (Taiwan) and included 11 rather than nine dashes.

  51. 51.

    Hong Thao Nguyen, Vietnam’s Position on the Sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratlys: Its Maritime Claims, 5 J.EastAsia &Int’lL. 204–207 (2012).

  52. 52.

    CLCS, China Communication (May 7, 2009), available athttp://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf (last visited on Oct. 30, 2013).

  53. 53.

    CLCS, Joint Submission by Malaysia and Vietnam (May 6, 2009), available athttp://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm (last visited on Oct. 30, 2013).

  54. 54.

    CLCS, Vietnam Communication (May 8, 2009), available athttp://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/vnm_chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf (last visited on Oct. 30, 2013); CLCS, Malaysia Communication (May 20, 2013) available athttp://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/mys_re_chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf (last visited on Oct. 30, 2013).

  55. 55.

    For details, see H. Yorac, The Philippine Claim to the Spratly Islands Group, 58 PhilippineL. J. 172 (1983); R. Severino,Where in theWorld is thePhilippines:Debating itsNationalTerritory 69–74 (2011).

  56. 56.

    Presidential Decree No. 1596 (June 11, 1978), available athttp://www.lawphil.net/statutes/presdecs/pd1978/pd_1596_1978.html (last visited on Oct. 30, 2013).

  57. 57.

    Presidential Decree No. 1599 (June 11, 1978), available athttp://www.lawphil.net/statutes/presdecs/pd1978/pd_1599_1978.html (last visited on Oct. 30, 2013).

  58. 58.

    Supra note 5.

  59. 59.

    Id.

  60. 60.

    Id.

  61. 61.

    Id.

  62. 62.

    Id.

  63. 63.

    Supra note 4.

  64. 64.

    Supra note 5.

  65. 65.

    Id.

  66. 66.

    Supra note 6, ¶ 20.

  67. 67.

    Id.

  68. 68.

    Id. ¶ 31.

  69. 69.

    Id.

  70. 70.

    Id.

  71. 71.

    Supra note 26, at 29.

  72. 72.

    C. Santamaria, Ancient maps support PH claim over Scarborough, Rappler (Jun. 27, 2012), available athttp://www.rappler.com/nation/7655-ancient-maps-support-ph-claim-over-scarborough (last visited on Sept. 15, 2013).

  73. 73.

    Id.

  74. 74.

    See Em Esber Blog 2, available athttp://jibraelangel2blog.blogspot.com.au/2012/07/three-hundred-years-of-philippine-maps.html (last visited on Sept. 15, 2013).

  75. 75.

    See 1774 map of the Philippine Islands.jpg, Wikipedia, available athttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:1774_map_of_the_Philippine_Islands.jpg (last visited on Nov. 8, 2013).

  76. 76.

    Supra note 24, at 4; Supra note 4.

  77. 77.

    Supra note 23.

  78. 78.

    Presidential Decree 1596 s. 1.

  79. 79.

    H. Yorac, The Philippine Claim to the Spratly Islands Group, 58 PhilippineL. J. 173 (1983).

  80. 80.

    Supra note 67.

  81. 81.

    Supra note 4.

  82. 82.

    Administrative Order No. 29, Naming the West Philippine Sea of the Republic of the Philippines, and for other Purposes, Sept. 5, 2012, §1.

  83. 83.

    Republic Act No. 9522, §2(b).

  84. 84.

    Supra note 24, at 32.

  85. 85.

    Id. at 35–36.

  86. 86.

    Supra note 23, at 10–12.

  87. 87.

    Id.

  88. 88.

    Id.

  89. 89.

    Id.

  90. 90.

    Supra note 4.

  91. 91.

    Id.

  92. 92.

    Id.

  93. 93.

    Supra note 24, at 33.

  94. 94.

    Supra note 72.

  95. 95.

    Administrative Order No. 29 (2012).

  96. 96.

    Supra note 4.

  97. 97.

    Supra note 24, at 33.

  98. 98.

    B. Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53 DukeL. J. 1787 (2004).

  99. 99.

    M. Shaw,InternationalLaw 511 (2008).

  100. 100.

    See Island of Palmas case (Neth. v. U.S.), Award of the Arbitration, 2 R.I.A.A. 829 & 840 (1928); Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Nor. v. Den.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), No. 53, 46 (Apr. 5); Clipperton Island case, 26 Am.J. Int’lL. 390 (1932); Minquiers and Ecrehos (France v. U.K.), Judgment, 1953, I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17).

  101. 101.

    D. Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 27 British.Y.B. Int’lL. 342 (1950).

  102. 102.

    UNCLOS chs. II, V & VI.

  103. 103.

    Supra note 4.

  104. 104.

    Supra note 4.

  105. 105.

    UNCLOS arts. 56 & 77; chs. V & VII.

  106. 106.

    The issue of the validity of China’s claim over the South China Sea deserves longer treatment beyond the scope of this paper, for recent academic literature critical of the Chinese position. See Nguyen, supra note 51, at 205–207; A. Carpio, The Rule of Law in the West Philippine Sea Dispute, Institute for Maritime and Ocean Affairs (Aug. 29, 2013), available athttp://www.imoa.ph/speech-the-rule-of-law-in-the-west-philippine-sea-dispute (last visited on Sept. 1, 2013).

  107. 107.

    Z. Keyuan,Law of theSea inEastAsia:IssuesAndProspects 173 (2005). It reads: “It may be difficult for China to assert that there is a general acquiescence on the part of third states to its historic rights in the South China Sea…”.

  108. 108.

    M. Valencia,J. Van Dyke &N.Ludwig,Sharing theResources of theSouthChinaSea 24 (1997). See also E. Franckx & M. Benatar, Dots and Lines in the South China Sea: Insights from the Law of Map Evidence, 2 AsianJ. Int’lL. 113–115 (2012); M. Malik, Historical Fiction: China’s South China Sea Claims, WorldAff. 83–90 (May–June 2013); M. Malik, A Legal Assessment of China’s Historic Claims in the South China Sea, 5 AustralianJ. Maritime &Ocean ff. 28–36 (2013); F. Dupuy & P. Dupuy, A Legal Analysis of China’s Historic Rights Claim in the South China Sea, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 124–141 (2013).

  109. 109.

    I. Brownlie,Principles ofPublicInternationalLaw 158 (7th ed. 2008). The Philippines in its Note Verbale of April 5, 2011 to the CLCS invokes the principle that “the land dominates the sea” to strongly challenge the validity of the nine-dotted line. CLCS, The Philippines Note Verbale No. 000228 (Apr. 5, 2011), available athttp://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/phl_re_chn_2011.pdf (last visited on Sept. 1, 2013).

  110. 110.

    At the 17th ASEAN Regional Forum (“ARF”) Meeting in Hanoi on July 23, 2010, US Secretary Hilary Clinton stated that: “Consistent with customary international law, legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features.".

  111. 111.

    North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. ¶ 96 (Feb. 26).

  112. 112.

    Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. § 133 (Dec. 18).

  113. 113.

    This reiterates the statement of the arbitral tribunal in the 1909 Grisbådarna case that “the maritime territory is essentially an appurtenance of a land territory.” See Grisbådarna Maritime Frontier (Nor. v. Swed.), Award of the Arbitration, 11 R.I.A.A. 155 & 159. Thus, as the court stated in the Continental Shelf case, “the coast of the territory of the State is the decisive factor for title to submarine areas adjacent to it.” See Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. 61 (Feb. 24). For other cases which affirm the principle that the land dominates the sea, see, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment 1969 I.C.J. ¶ 96 (Feb. 26); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. ¶ 185 (Mar. 16). For other cases that affirmed this principle, see B. Kwiatkowska,Decisions of theWorldCourtRelevant to theUN Convention on theLaw of theSea:A ReferenceGuide2–3 (2002).

  114. 114.

    The question of historic waters is governed by customary international law. The few UNCLOS provisions which deal with historic title and historic bays do not contemplate nor support the extent and nature of the Chinese claim over the South China Sea based on the “nine-dashed line.” See UNCLOS arts. 10(6), 15 & 298 (1).

  115. 115.

    UNCLOS art. 15.

  116. 116.

    See Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, including Historic Bays, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/143, reprinted in [1962] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n; C. Symmons,HistoricWaters in theLaw of theSea:A ModernRe-appraisal 139–160 (2007); M. Strohl,TheInternationalLaw ofBays (1963);M. Clark,HistoricBays andWaters:A Regime ofRecentBeginnings andContinuedUsage (1994); F. Goldie, Historic Bays in International Law - An Impressionistic Overview, 11 SyrJ. Int’lL and Com271 (1984).

  117. 117.

    UNCLOS art. 121(2).

  118. 118.

    Supra note 43, at 434.

  119. 119.

    K. Dawnay, The Scarborough Shoal Standoff, Current Intelligence (May 17 2012), available athttp://www.currentintelligence.net/analysis/2012/5/17/the-scarborough-shoal-standoff.html (last visited on Sept. 30, 2013).

  120. 120.

    See Scarborough Shoal Standoff: A Timeline, Philippine Daily Inquirer (May 9, 2012), available athttp://globalnation.inquirer.net/36003/scarborough-shoal-standoff-a-historicaltimeline (last visited on Sept. 30, 2013).

  121. 121.

    T. Santos, PH, Chinese naval vessels in Scarborough Shoal standoff, Philippine Daily Inquirer (Apr. 11, 2012) available athttp://globalnation.inquirer.net/32341/ph-chinese-naval-vessels-in-scarborough-shoal-standoff (last visited on Sept. 19, 2013).

  122. 122.

    R. de Castro, China’s Realpolitik Approach in the South China Sea Dispute: The Case of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff, Managing Tensions in the South China Sea Conference, Center for Strategic and International Studies (2013), at 5; Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Philippines Asserts Sovereignty over Panatag (Scarborough) Shoal, Official Gazette (2012), available athttp://www.gov.ph/2012/04/11/philippines-asserts-sovereignty-over-panatag-scarborough-shoal/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2013).

  123. 123.

    Supra note 24, at 5.

  124. 124.

    C. Thayer, Standoff in the South China Sea: Scarborough Shoal standoff Reveals Blunt Edge of China’s Peaceful Rise, YaleGlobal (Jun. 12, 2012), available athttp://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/standoff-south-china-sea (last visited on Sept. 18, 2013).

  125. 125.

    de Castro,supra note 121, at 7; Supra note 23.

  126. 126.

    E. Bower, China reveals its hand on ASEAN in Phnom Penh, East Asia Forum (Jul. 28, 2012), available athttp://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/28/china-reveals-its-hand-on-asean-in-phnom-penh (last visited on Sept. 18, 2013).

  127. 127.

    Agence France-Presse, Philippines says it finds more Chinese blocks on reef, Interaksyon, Sept. 4, 2013, available athttp://www.interaksyon.com/article/70057/philippines-says-it-finds-more-chinese-blocks-on-reef (last visited on Sept. 18, 2013).

  128. 128.

    Id. See also L. Dalangin-Fernandez, Philippines to File Another Diplomatic Protest vs China over Scarborough Structures, InterAksyon,Sept. 5, 2013, available athttp://www.interaksyon.com/article/70097/philippines-to-file-another-diplomatic-protest-vs-china-over-scarborough-structures (last visited on Sept. 28, 2013).

  129. 129.

    M. Mogato & B. Blanchard, Manila Accuses China of Sea Violation, Beijing Says Wants Peace, Reuters, (Sept. 3 2013), available athttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/03/us-china-seas-idUSBRE98207G20130903 (last visited on Sept. 30, 2013).

  130. 130.

    Id.

  131. 131.

    Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea ¶ 5.

  132. 132.

    Supra note 5.

  133. 133.

    PCA, The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China, available athttp://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1529 (last visited on Sept. 30, 2013).

  134. 134.

    PCA, Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China: Arbitral Tribunal Establishes Rules of Procedure and Initial Timetable, Press Release, Aug. 27, 2013.

  135. 135.

    Id.

  136. 136.

    Supra note 5, ¶ 2.

  137. 137.

    Id. ¶¶ 4 & 14.

  138. 138.

    Id. ¶¶ 14 & 19.

  139. 139.

    Id. ¶¶ 22 & 23.

  140. 140.

    Id. ¶ 31.

  141. 141.

    Id. ¶ 20.

  142. 142.

    Id. ¶ 24.

  143. 143.

    Id.

  144. 144.

    UNCLOS art. 286. UNCLOS includes consent in its text. This is clear from the provisions of 74, 83, 186–191, 226, 264–265, 279–299, 309, 318. Annexes V, VI, VII, VIII. Article 309, on reservations and exceptions, provides that: “No reservations or exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles of this Convention.” For details, see N. Klein, Dispute settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (2005); A.O. Adede, The system for settlement of disputes under the United Nations convention on the Law of theSea: aDraftingHistory and aCommentary (1987).

  145. 145.

    Article 310 of UNCLOS allows States and entities to make declarations or statements regarding its application at the time of signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention, which do not purport to exclude or modify the legal effect of the provisions of the Convention. Article 287 provides that States and entities, when signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention, or at any time thereafter, may make declarations specifying the forums for the settlement of disputes which they accept. In addition, Article 298 allows States and entities to declare that they exclude the application of the compulsory binding procedures for the settlement of disputes under the Convention in respect of certain specified categories kinds of disputes.

  146. 146.

    Supra note 5, ¶¶ 8 & 25–30; UNCLOS arts. 279 & 283(1).

  147. 147.

    UNCLOS art. 281(1).

  148. 148.

    Id. art. 286.

  149. 149.

    Id. art. 287(1).

  150. 150.

    Id. art. 287(5).

  151. 151.

    Id. art. 287(5).

  152. 152.

    Id. pt. XV, § 3.

  153. 153.

    United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Declaration made after ratification: China (Aug. 25, 2006), available athttp://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm (last visited on Sept. 30, 2013).

  154. 154.

    Supra note 5, ¶ 8.

  155. 155.

    Supra note 5, ¶ 7.

  156. 156.

    Id. ¶40.

  157. 157.

    Id. ¶ 6.

  158. 158.

    Id. ¶ 41.

  159. 159.

    L. Bautista and C. Schofield, Philippine-China Border Relations: Cautious Engagement amidst Enduring Tensions, in Beijing’sPower andChina’sBorders:TwentyNeighbors inAsia 235–249 (B. Elleman et al. eds., 2012).

  160. 160.

    NongHong,UNCLOSandOceanDisputeSettlement:Law andPolitics in theSouthChinaSea 54(2012). See also supra note 10; Yann-huei Song & S. Tønnesson, The Impact of the Law of the Sea Convention on Conflict and Conflict Management in the South China Sea, 44 OceanDev.In’tlL. 235–269 (2013).

  161. 161.

    UNCLOS art. 286.

  162. 162.

    The Republic of the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs, Notification and Statement of Claim to the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, Manila on January 22, 2013.

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Annex 1

Annex 1

Thirteen Specific Reliefs that the Philippines requests the Arbitral Tribunal.Footnote 162

  1. 1.

    Declares that China’s rights in regard to maritime areas in the South China Sea, like the rights of the Philippines, are those that are established by UNCLOS, and consist of its rights to a Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone under Part II of the Convention, to an EEZ under Part V, and to a Continental Shelf under Part VI;

  2. 2.

    Declares that China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea based on its so-called “nine dash line” are contrary to UNCLOS and invalid;

  3. 3.

    Requires China to bring its domestic legislation into conformity with its obligations under UNCLOS;

  4. 4.

    Declares that Mischief Reef and McKennan Reef are submerged features that form part of the Continental Shelf of the Philippines under Part VI of the Convention, and that China’s occupation of and construction activities on them violate the sovereign rights of the Philippines;

  5. 5.

    Requires that China end its occupation of and activities on Mischief Reef and McKenna Reef;

  6. 6.

    Declares that Gave Reef and Subi Reef are submerged features in the South China Sea that are not above sea level at high tide, are not islands under the Convention, and are not located on China’s Continental Shelf, and that China’s occupation of and construction activities on these features are unlawful;

  7. 7.

    Requires China to terminate its occupation of and activities on Gaven Reef and Subi Reef;

  8. 8.

    Declares that Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef ad Fiery Cross Reef are submerged features that are below sea level at high tide, except that each has small protrusions that remain above water at high tide, which are “rocks” under Article 121(3) of the Convention and which therefore generate entitlements only to a Territorial Sea no broader than 12 M; and that China has unlawfully claimed entitlements beyond 12 M from these features;

  9. 9.

    Requires that China refrain from preventing Philippine vessels from exploiting in a sustainable manner the living resources in the waters adjacent to Scarborough Shoal and Johnson Reef, and from undertaking other activities inconsistent with the Convention at or in the vicinity of these features;

  10. 10.

    Declares that the Philippines is entitled under UNCLOS to a 12 M Territorial Sea, a 200 M EEZ, and a Continental Shelf under Parts II, V, and VI of UNCLOS, measured from its archipelagic baselines;

  11. 11.

    Declares that China has unlawfully claimed and has unlawfully exploited the living and non-living and non-living resources in the Philippines’ EEZ and Continental Shelf and has unlawfully prevented the Philippines from exploiting living and non-living resources within its EEZ and CS;

  12. 12.

    Declares that China has unlawfully interfered with the exercise by the Philippines of its rights to navigation and other rights under the Convention in areas within and beyond 200 M of the Philippines’ archipelagic baselines; and

  13. 13.

    Requires that China desist from these unlawful activities

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Bautista, L.B. (2022). The Philippine Claim to Bajo De Masinloc in the Context of the South China Sea Dispute. In: Lee, E.Y.J. (eds) ASEAN International Law. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3195-5_15

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