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Vietnam’s Position on the Sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratlys: Its Maritime Claims

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Abstract

The South China Sea has long been regarded as a major source of tension and instability in Pacific Asia. To clarify the position of claimants is a research task for creating the confidence building measures and promoting efforts to manage the possible conflicts in the region. The purpose of this article is to address the Vietnamese position on the sovereignty disputes over the Paracels and Spratlys, and maritime zones in the South China Sea. The Vietnamese position will be examined from three aspects: (1) the sovereignty of the Paracels and the Spratlys; (2) the maritime zones around these islands; and (3) the settlement of disputes in the South China Sea.

Faculty of Law, Vietnam National University, Hanoi. A.B. (Navy College of Bacu, ex-USSR), LL.M./Ph.D. (Paris I—Panteon-Sorbonne). The author would like to thank Mr. Duong Danh Huy, Nguyen Dang Thang, Vu Hai Dang, Pham Quang Tuan, Tran Van Thuy, Tran Truong Thuy, Pham Hoang Quan, for providing materials and linguistic assistance. The article reflects the author’s personal opinions rather than the official position of the Vietnamese Government.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See “ASEAN - China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,”signed during the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh on November 14, 2002, available athttp://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  2. 2.

    Carlyle Thayer, China’s Core interest in the South China Sea, Scribd (Sep. 17, 2010), available athttp://www.scribd.com/doc/38047349/Thayer-China-s-Core-Interest-in-the-South-China-Sea (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  3. 3.

    See “Remarks by Hilary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State” at the National Convention Center, ARF 17, Hanoi, Vietnam, (July 23, 2010), available athttp://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  4. 4.

    Hungdah Chiu & Choon-ho Park, Legal Status of the Paracels and Spratlys Islands, 3 OceanDev. &Intl.L. 3 (1975).

  5. 5.

    In this paper, China and Taiwan are treated as one claimant since of the same position with regard to the Paracels and Spratlys disputes.

  6. 6.

    GregAustin,China’sOceanFrontier:InternationalLaw,MilitaryForce andNationalDevelopment (1998); BobCatley &MalmurKeliat,Spratlys: TheDispute in theSouthChinaSea (1997); Robert Beckman, China, UNCLOS and the South China Sea, AsianSoc’yInt’lL. 3rdBiennialConferencePaper12 (2011), available athttp://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/AsianSIL-Beckman-China-UNCLOS-and-the-South-China-Sea-26-July-2011.pdf (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012); John Chao, South China Sea: Boundary Problems Relating to the Nansha and Hsisha Islands, 9 ChineseY.B. Int’lL. & Aff. 66–156 (1989–1990); Lee G. Cordner, The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea, 25 OceanDev. & Intl.L. 61 (1994); MoniqueChemillier-Gendreau,Sovereignty over theParacel andSpratlyIslands (2000); Jorge Coquia, Maritime Boundary Problems in the South China Sea, 24 U. Brit.Colum.L. Rev. 117–125 (1990); CooperativeMonitoring in theSouthChinaSea:SatelliteImagery,Confidence-BuildingMeasures, and theSpratlyIslandsDisputes (John Baker & David Wiencek eds. 2002); EricDenécé,Géostratégie de laMer deChineMéridionale et des basins maritimes adjacents(1999); Daniel Dzurek, The Spratly Islands Dispute: Who’s On First?, 2 Mar.Briefing (1996); Alex Elferink, The Islands in the South China Sea: How Does Their Presence Limit the Extent of the High Seas and the Area and the Maritime Zones of the Mainland Coasts?, 32 OceanDev. &Intl.L. 169–190 (2001); Fishing inTroubledWaters.Proceedings of anAcademicConference onTerritorialClaims in theSouthChinaSea (Ronald Hill et al. eds. 1991), 97 Centre of Asian Studies Occasional Papers & Monographs; Xavier Furtado, International Law and the Dispute Over the Spratly Islands: Whither UNCLOS? 21 Contemp.SoutheastAsia 386–404 (1999); Marius Gjetnes, The Spratlys: Are They Rocks or Islands?, 32 OceanDev. &Intl.L. 191–204 (2001); B.A. Hamzah, Jurisdictional Issues and Conflicting Claims in the Spratlys, 1:1 ForeignRel.J. 1–26 (1990); Christopher Joyner, The Spratly Islands Dispute: Rethinking the Interplay of Law, Diplomacy and Geo-politics in the South China Sea, 13 Int’lJ.Marine &CoastalL. 193–236 (1998); VanLoiLuu,TheSino-VietnameseDifference on theHoangSa andTruongSaArchipelagoes (1996); R. Haller-Trost,TheSpratlyIslands:A Study on theLimitations ofInternationalLaw (1990); DieterHeinzig,Disputed islands in theSouthChinaSea: Paracels,Spratlys,Pratas,MacclesfieldBank(1976); KriangsakKittichaisaree;TheLaw of theSea andMaritimeBoundaryDelimitation inSouth-EastAsia (1987); Chiu & Park, supra note 4; VictorPrescott,Limits ofNationalClaims inTheSouthChinaSea (1999); VictorPrescott,TheGulf ofThailand:MaritimeLimits toConflict andCooperation (1998); Eric Hyer, Special Issue: The South China Sea Territorial Disputes, 12 Am.AsianRev. 1–209 (1994); War orPeace in theSouthChinaSea? (Timo Kivimaki ed. 2002); HongThaoNguyen,LeVietnam et sesDifferendsMaritimes dans laMer deBien dongMer deChineMeridionale (2004); Hong Thao Nguyen & Ramses Amer, Managing Vietnam Maritime Boundary Disputes, 38 OceanDev. &Intl.L. (2007); MarwynSamuels, Contest for theSouthChinaSea (1982); MarkValencia &JonVanDyke &NoelLudwig,Sharing the resources of theSouthChinaSea (1997); Hong Thao Nguyen & Ramses Amer, A New Legal Arrangement for The South China Sea, 40 OceanDev. &Int’l.L. 333–349 (2009); Zou Keyuan, South China Sea Studies in China: Achievements, Constraints and Prospects, 11 Sing.Y.B. Int’lL. 85 (2007).

  7. 7.

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, The Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Archipelagoes and International Law 32(1988) [Vietnam White Paper 1988], available athttp://www.presscenter.org.vn/en//images/42905-bngvietnam88.pdf (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  8. 8.

    Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 16; Samuels, supra note 6, at 40.

  9. 9.

    See Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 845–846 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, 2001 I.C.J. (Mar. 16), cf. Separate Opinion of Torres Bernárdez, ¶¶ 73 & 76, available athttp://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/87/7047.pdf (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  10. 10.

    Island of Palmas Case, id. at 829; D.J. Harris,Cases andMaterials onInternationalLaw 190 (5th ed. 1998); Judicial decisions involving questions of international law (Fr. v. Mex.) by Victor Emmanuel, 26 Am.J.Int’lL. 394 (1932); Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Nor. v. Den.) 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53; Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), 1953 I.C.J. (Nov. 17); Case concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.C.J. (Dec. 17), available atwww.icj-cij.org/docket/files/102/7714.pdf (last visit on Mar. 30, 2012); Case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malay. v. Sing.), 2008 I.C.J. (May 23), available athttp://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/130/14492.pdf (last visit on Mar. 30, 2012).

  11. 11.

    P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introductionto International Lnear Guangdong, with the 149 (7th ed. 1997).

  12. 12.

    See Island of Palmas Case, supra note 9, at 840; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, supra note 10, at 46. Both dicta were confirmed in the recent Case concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, supra note 10, ¶¶ 63–69.

  13. 13.

    Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 58–64; Samuels, supra note 6, at 23–24. It reads: “A large quantity of historical works and documents as well as many archaeological finds prove beyond all doubt that the Xisha and Nansha Islands have been Chinese territories since antiquity.”.

  14. 14.

    Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 60.

  15. 15.

    Quang Ngoc Nguyen, Tu lieu lich su ve hai quan dao Hoang Sa, Truong Sa cua Vietnam (Historical documents on the Paracels and Spratlys Islands of Vietnam), BDHD01 32–50 (2001).

  16. 16.

    See Volume 13, folio 4, at 2 of Hai Quoc Do Chi, written in the 22nd year of the reign of Dasquang of the Qing (1730), Archives of the French Foreign Ministry (AS 1840 China 797).

  17. 17.

    Samuels, supra note 6, at 25. It reads: “By the mid-19th Century, the literari cognitive map of the South China Sea had become more elaborate, but still barely touched upon the islands of the sea… There is no evidence here that the Ching State had in any sense absorbed the islands into the imperial domain.”.

  18. 18.

    There are Wu Jing Zong Yao (with the preface by King Song Renzong 1023–1063) describing the Song dispatched its navy to patrol the Jiurulozhou; Yuan Shi (1349) noting of astronomical observations “beyond the Zhouya” (i.e. South of the Hainan island); Seven voyages in the Southern Seas carried out by Zheng He under the Ming dinastry (1405–1433); Quan Zhou Fu Zhi writing of patrol by General Wu Sheng (1710) passed by Tonggu, Qizhouyang, Sigensha. Crossing the Bien Dong in the course of nearly 30 years, sometimes passing by the Paracels, Zheng He did not occupy any island. See Jianming Shen, International Law Rules and Historical Evidences Supporting China’s Title to the South China Sea Islands, 21 HastingsInt’l &Comp.L. Rev. (1997–1998). For the Vietnamse position, see Vietnam White Paper 1988, supra note 7; Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6; Luu, supra note 6, at 24.

  19. 19.

    In his Geography ofGuangdong published in 1909, Li Hanzhung writes more precisely: “Today, the maritime frontiers are limited in the South by the island of Hainan, beyond this limit is the Qizhouyang. The Admiral commanding the navy of Guangdong stopped his patrol there and returned [to his base].” See Luu, supra note 6.

  20. 20.

    This incident is reported in a Note of May 6, 1921 from the Government General of Indochina (Directorate of Political and Indigenous Affairs). The text is more specific, reading as follows: “The mandarins protested, claiming that the Paracels were abandoned islands which belonged to China no more than to Annam, that they were not administratively attached to any district of Hainan and that no special authority was responsible for policing them.” See No. 49 of August 8, 1899 from the Tsungli Yamen to Mr. Bax Ironside at Peking conveying the text of a communication received from the Governor-General of Liangkuang Provinces (i.e. Viceroy at Canton). It reads: “But on a wide expanse of ocean no particular coastguards can be said to be responsible, and how can the local authorities protect every spot in hundreds of miles of sea?” See P.A. Lapicque,A Propos des ilesParacels 605–616 (1929); Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 36–37.

  21. 21.

    Letter No. 704 – A – Ex, dated 20 March 1930, from the Governor General of Indochina, Hanoi to the Minister for the Colonies, Paris. See Annex 5, Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6 at 166–167.

  22. 22.

    LeQuyDon,PhuBienTapLuc (Miscellany on the Government of the Marches), Book II (1994), mimeographed. (The name Nguyen Phuc Chu must be rather Nguyen Phuc Khoat because the first had died by that date). See Luu, supra note 6, at 44–45.

  23. 23.

    Gerardo Valero, Spratly Archipelago Dispute: Is the Question of Sovereignty Still Relevant? 18 MarinePol’y 401 (1994).

  24. 24.

    The Official Yearbook of the Chinese Government included even Annam, Burma, Siam, Laos, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and the Holy Sea as its vassal States in the nineteenth century. See Jean-Pierre Ferrier, Le conflit des iles Paracels et le probleme de la souverainete sur les iles inhabitees, 21 AnnuaireFrancais deDroitInternational180–181 (1975); Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 76–77.

  25. 25.

    See Treaty of Protectorate (Patenote Treaty) on June 6, 1884. Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Patenote Treaty reads: “France shall represent Annam in all its external relations.” For details, see RaoulAbor,Conventions etTraites deDroitInternational interessant l’Indochine (1929); Luu, supra note 6, at 47.

  26. 26.

    See Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, supra note 10 at 56.

  27. 27.

    Pierre-YvesManguin,LesPortugais sur les cotes duVietnam et duCampa.Etude sur les routes maritimes et les relations commerciales, d’apres les sources portugaies(16e, 17e, 18e siecle) (1972). See also Pierre-Yves Manguin, La traversee de la mer de chine meridionale, des detroits a Canton, jusqu’au XVIIe siecle (La question des iles Paracels), Asie deSud-EstContinentale-Actes duXxiXeCongresInternational desOrientalistes 110–115 (1976); GunterSchilder,AustraliaUnveiled:The share of theDutch navigators in the discovery ofAustralia 278 Map N 18 (1976).

  28. 28.

    Geoffrey Marston, Abandonment of Territorial Claims: The Cases of Bouvet and Spratly Islands, 57 Brit.Y.B. Int’lL. 350 (1986).

  29. 29.

    Ly & dam are traditional distance measure units. One dam (or ly) is about 500 m.

  30. 30.

    See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, The Hoang Sa And Truong Sa Archipelagoes Vietnamese Territories 9–11 (1981) [Vietnam White Paper 1981]. For the map, Vietnam White Paper 1981, at 19 (Toan Tap Thien Nam Tu Chi Lo Do Thu / Route Map from the Capital to the Four Directions, 1686), available athttp://www.google.co.kr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCQQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fnghiencuubiendong.vn%2Ftrung-tam-du-lieu-bien-dong%2Fdoc_download%2F157-the-hoang-sa-and-truong-sa-archipelagoes-vietnamese-territories&ei=MMuCT7zKNM7mmAXQneT1Bw&usg=AFQjCNHC_qm-PrwFCXAE1YBwtsXiZwlTzg&sig2=x5QhiW8R-fdeMyiXQkOAjg (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  31. 31.

    Id. at 11.

  32. 32.

    Tac, thuoc are measure units in the old feudal regime of Vietnam.

  33. 33.

    The Royal Handwriting Collection under the Ming Mang Regime, vol. 64, at 143, conserved at the Sino-Vietnamese Institute, Hanoi-Vietnam.

  34. 34.

    Id. at 146.

  35. 35.

    The Seventh year of Thieu Tri’s reign, in Book 51 of Thieu Tri’s royal notes, at 235.

  36. 36.

    Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 5, at 76.

  37. 37.

    National Committee for Border Affairs & Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, The Indisputable Sovereignty of Viet Nam over the Paracel Islands, published online on Jan. 30, 2011, available athttp://www.biengioilanhtho.gov.vn/Media/bbg/News/Archives/vie/chu%20quyen%20tren%202%20quan%20dao%20Hoang%20Sa%20-%20Truong%20sa.pdf (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  38. 38.

    Luu, supra note 6, at 35.

  39. 39.

    Jean-Louis Taberd, Note on the Geography of Cochinchina, 6 J.AsiaticSoc’yBengal 737–745 (1837).

  40. 40.

    Id.

  41. 41.

    “Tabula Geographica Imperii Anamitici” is attached in the 1938 Latin–Annamese Dictionary (Dictionarium Latino–Anamiticum). See Luu, supra note 6, at 98.

  42. 42.

    Nguyen, supra note 15, at 38.

  43. 43.

    See Le Qui Don, supra note 22; Luu, supra note 6, at 39; Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 72.

  44. 44.

    Bac Hai (North Sea) is the name of the Spratlys, called by the Vietnamese and Chinese fishermen at that time to indicate the sea in the north of province Hatien and near to Puolo Condor. For references, see Guangdongshengbowuguan (Guangdong Museum), Xishawenwu (Study on things of Xisha Islands in the South China Sea) (Beijing, 1975), at 11, quoting Shuilubo (Book of Maritime Routes of Fishermen from Hainan Island) that described 29 shipping routes for Donghai (Paracel) and 11 routes to Beihai (Nansha).

  45. 45.

    Manguin, supra note 27.

  46. 46.

    Schilder, supra note 27.

  47. 47.

    Hong Thao Nguyen, Sang xu bo tot tim ban do Hoang Sa (Going to Spain to find the map on the Paracels), VietnamNet (Apr. 3, 2009).

  48. 48.

    French National Archive, Mar. Box of files B. 4/276, at 161, 203. See also Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 57. See also HongThaoNguyen,LeVietnam et ses differends maritimes dans laMer deBien dong (Mer deChine meridionale) 212 (2004).

  49. 49.

    LongTeVo,Les archipels deHoang sa et deTruongSa selon les anciens ouvrages vietnamiens d’histoire et de géographie (1974); Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 71.

  50. 50.

    See the Royal Order signed by Tay Son Lord in 1786 urged: “Hoi Duc Hau commander of the Hoang Sa compagny to bring four boats to Hoang Sa to collect all kinds of objects in gold, silver, copper, the small and big guns with tortoises, preciuos fishes for the Court upon under the law.” The Royal Handwriting Collection under the Tay Son Ruler, conserved at the Sino-Vietnamese Institute, Hanoi-Vietnam. See Luu, supra note 6, at 97.

  51. 51.

    The solo-note of Ministry of Public Works on July 13, 1837 (in the 18th year of Minh Mang Rulers) recorded the case of mariners Pham Van Bien, Vu Van Hung, Pham Van Sinh fined by 80 floggings for the delay departure. The commander of the garrison Trương Viet Soai, in the course of the voyage in 1836, did not return with the maps and for that was condemned to capital punishment. See Institute of National History, 165:2 Dai Nam Thuc Luc Chinh Bien (Accounts of Dai Nam’s Present Dynasty, 1865–1882), vol.165, pt. 2 (1848).

  52. 52.

    Institute of National History, id.

  53. 53.

    Id.

  54. 54.

    J. Gutzlaff, Geography of the Cochin-chinese Empire, 19 J.GeographicalSoc’yLondon 93–94 (1849).

  55. 55.

    Luu, supra note 5, at 43.

  56. 56.

    See Documents conserved in the Sino-Vietnamese Institute of Hanoi, Vietnam with the code VN/ CT 1 Han, M M 11/27 (MM Q43/57), VN/ CT 3 Han, MM 11/27.6 (MM 43/59).

  57. 57.

    See Quoc Trieu Chinh Bien Toat Yeu, vol. 3, folio 104a, conserved in the Sino-Vietnamese Institute of Hanoi.

  58. 58.

    Le Mémoire sur la Cochichine de Jean Baptiste Chaigneau par Salles A, dans Bulletin des Amis du vieux Hue No. 3 Avril – Juin 1923, at 25–83.

  59. 59.

    See ShiDaShan,HaiwaiJishi (Record of Events of Overseas) 62 (2000); Record of Events of Overseas, vol. 3, sheets 23b & 24b, The Tokyo Bunko - Oriental Library [日本東洋文庫].

  60. 60.

    Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case, supra note 10, at 45. It reads: “A claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular act or title such as a treaty or cession but merely upon continued display of authority, involves two elements each of which must be show to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such authority.”.

  61. 61.

    DieterHeinzig,Disputes islands in theSouthChinaSea25 (1976).

  62. 62.

    MalcolmShaw,InternationalLaw 502–507 (6th ed. 2008).

  63. 63.

    IanBrownlie,Principles ofPublicInternationalLaw 138–139(5th ed.1998).

  64. 64.

    G.A. Res. 1514(XV) ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/L.323 and Add.1–6 (Dec. 14, 1960) titled, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, available athttp://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/152/88/IMG/NR015288.pdf?OpenElement (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  65. 65.

    Id. ¶ 6.

  66. 66.

    Patenote Treaty, supra note 25.

  67. 67.

    Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 108. The Official Telegram of 4 July 1931 by Governor of Indochina Mr. Pasquier reads: “Annam had posseded rights since the XVIIIth century. The French position was therefore to have the appearance of the simple exercise of preexisting sovereign right.”.

  68. 68.

    In 1898, a private person, Mr. Chabrier, had asked permission to establish on the Paracels a base to supply for fishermen. In June 1899, the Governor General of Indochina, P. Doumer asked Paris to build a lighthouse in Paracels. But the plan failed due to lack of budget. See Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Minister of Marine, Paris (Jan. 14, 1921), Archives of the MFA of the French Republic, AS 18–40, NS China, file 312, at 16–18. See P.A. Lapique,Apropos des ilesParacels 610 (Extreme-Asie ed. 1929).

  69. 69.

    Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 108.

  70. 70.

    To quoc, Them mot Chau ban khang dinh chu quyen Hoang Sa (A new found imperial ordinence to reconfirm the sovereignty over the Paracels), HNSV News (Dec. 25, 2009), available athttp://news.hnsv.com/viet-nam/them-mot-chau-ban-khang-dinh-chu-quyen-hoang-sa-28924/ (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  71. 71.

    See People’sDaily (Nov. 25, 1975).

  72. 72.

    JournalOfficiel de laRepubliqueFrancaiseNo. 26, 7837 (1933).

  73. 73.

    Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 111 & 225(Annex 30).

  74. 74.

    Note du Service juridique du Ministere des affaires etrangeres pour la Direction d’Asie-Oceanie, le 6 Septembre 1946; Archives du Ministere des affaires etrangeres de la Republique Francaise, AS 44–55, Dossier 213, at 16.

  75. 75.

    Nguyen, supra note 48, at 232.

  76. 76.

    Id. at 242.

  77. 77.

    See Cairo Declaration of 1943, available athttp://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/cairo.asp (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  78. 78.

    See Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 5, at 120; Nguyen, supra note 48, at 242–244.

  79. 79.

    See LeMonde (Sept. 9–10, 1951).

  80. 80.

    See the official Note of the Republic of China (“ROC”) Diplomatic Mission in Paris dated on September 29, 1932. Nguyen, supra note 48, at 232. Renmin Ribao Peking N. 3 of July 1956, Chinese authors claimed that Paracels and Spratlys lying east of the frontier line traced by the Franco-Chinese Treaty of 26 June 1887, i.e. the 1080 03′13″ E would be under the Chinese administration. In fact, the text of Franco-Chinese Treaty of 26 June 1887 said that: “The north–south line passing through the eastern point of island of Tcha’s-Kou or Ouan-Chan (Tra Co) which form the boundary, are also allocated to China. The island of Gotho (Kao Tao) and other islands west of this meridian belong to Annam.” The purpose of the text is allocation of coastal islands in the Gulf of Tonkin. It didn’t mention the two archipelagos.

  81. 81.

    Zou Keyuan, The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin, 34 OceanDev. &Intl.L. 22–24 (2005); Hong Thao Nguyen, Maritime Delimitation and Fishery Cooperation in the Tonkin Gulf, 34 OceanDev. &Intl.L. 41–44 (2005); Ted McDorman, People’s Republic of China-Vietnam, 5 Int’lMar.Boundaries3755–3758 (2005).

  82. 82.

    MikeGrabel,ThePentagonPapers (vol.1): theDefenseDepartmentHistory ofUnitedStatesDecisionmaking onVietnam, Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954–1960, (Ch. 5/Sec. 2) 270–282 (1971), available athttp://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent12.htm (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  83. 83.

    Information and Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affaires, Vietnam’s Sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes (1979) [Vietnam White Paper 1979]; Vietnam White Paper 1981, supra note 30; Vietnam White Paper 1988, supra note 7.

  84. 84.

    Id.

  85. 85.

    Ban Bien Tap, Vietnamese PM Nguyen Tan Dung’s explanatory report at 2nd session of 13th NA, (Dec. 5, 2011), available athttp://nguyentandung.us/vietnamese-pm-nguyen-tan-dung-s-explanatory-report-at-2nd-session-of-13th-na.html (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  86. 86.

    Su Hao, China’s Positions and Interests in the South China Sea: A Rational Choices in its Cooperative Policies (CSIS, 2006), available athttp://csis.org/publication/chinas-positions-and-interests-south-china-sea-rational-choices-its-cooperative-policies (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  87. 87.

    Austin, supra note 6 at 126–130. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs(China), Documents and Other Materials concerning the Recognition by the Vietnamese Government that the Xisha and Nansha Islands are Chinese Territory (1980).

  88. 88.

    Luu, supra note 6, at 75–78.

  89. 89.

    See Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea, 1:28 PekingRev. 21 (Sept. 9, 1958).

  90. 90.

    Vietnam White Paper 1979.

  91. 91.

    For the official explanation, see Vietnam White Paper 1988, supra note 7, at 20–23.

  92. 92.

    The S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) available athttp://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1927.09.07_lotus.htm (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  93. 93.

    Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 267, ¶ 44; Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 473, ¶ 47.

  94. 94.

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  95. 95.

    U.N. International Law Commission, 58th sess. (2006), Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, available athttp://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_9_2006.pdf (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  96. 96.

    Id. acts 3 & 7.

  97. 97.

    Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 130.

  98. 98.

    Vietnam White Paper 1981, supra note 30, at 139.

  99. 99.

    For details, see S. Jayakumar &T.Koh,PedraBranca:TheRoad to theWorldCourt(2009).

  100. 100.

    Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh Case, supra note 10, ¶ 227.

  101. 101.

    Vu Duong Ninh (ed.), Bien gioi tren dat lien Viet Nam – Trung Quoc [China – Vietnam Land boundary], Hanoi (Cong An Nhan Dan ed. 2011).

  102. 102.

    Burkina Faso v. Mali Case, supra note 94, ¶ 574.

  103. 103.

    See Austin, supra note 6 at 125–130, 149; R. Haller-Trost,TheContestedMaritime andTerritorialBoundaries ofMalaysia:AnInternationalLawPerspective 321 (1998); Daniel Dzurek, The Spratlys Island Dispute: Who’s on first? 2 Mar.Briefings 53 (1996); Jianming Shen, International Law Rules and Historical Evidences Supporting China’s Title to the South China Sea Islands, 21 HastingsInt’l &Comp.L. Rev.57 (1997).

  104. 104.

    Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 129.

  105. 105.

    Fisheries Case (U. K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. ¶ 116; Temple of Preah Vihear Case, supra note 94, at 6 & 26.

  106. 106.

    Brownlie, supra note 63, at 646.

  107. 107.

    North Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra note 94, ¶ 30.

  108. 108.

    Chemillier-Gendreau, supra note 6, at 130. It reads: “The fact nevertheless remains that this particular moment in the history of the partition of Vietnam blurs the Vietnamese position. The now reunified Vietnam (through the victory of the North) must decide to which entity it is successor on this point. The territorial logic reinforces succession to the rights and actions of South Vietnam, which alone has jurisdiction from the geographical standpoint.”.

  109. 109.

    Hong Thao Nguyen & Hai Oanh Hoang, The Implementation of the 1982 Convention in Vietnam, 2 Petrovietnam 36–44 (2005).

  110. 110.

    Id.

  111. 111.

    The resolution states that: “It is necessary to distinguish the settlement of dispute over Hoang Sa and Truong Sa from the issues of protection of the marine zones and the continental shelf under the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Vietnam based on the principles and criteria of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982.” Id.

  112. 112.

    Hong Thao Nguyen, Building a Law on Maritime Zones of Vietnam, 12:144VietnamL. & LegalF. 12–18 (2006).

  113. 113.

    Hong Thao Nguyen, South China Sea – Three Stages, Four Challenges, Two Regional Approaches and One Belief, TheSouthChinaSea:Towards a region of peace, security and cooperation 281–285 (2011), Proceedings of the International Workshop co-organized by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and Vietnam Lawyers Association (Nov. 1–12, 2010).

  114. 114.

    Michael Richardson, Energy and Geopolitics in the South China Sea: Implication for ASEAN and the Dialogue Partners (April 2009), DiscussionForum:Inst.SoutheastAsianStud., available athttp://www.iseas.edu.sg/aseanstudiescentre/ascdf2.htm (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012); ShiyingPan,ThePetropolitics of theNanshaIslands –China’sIndisputable legalCase162 (1996).

  115. 115.

    Yann Huei Song, The Application of Article 121 (3) of the Law of the Sea Convention to the Five Selected Disputed Islands in the South China Sea, TheSouthChinaSea:Cooperation forRegional sec. & dev. 44–45 (Proceedings of the International Workshop co-organized by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and Vietnam Lawyers Association, November 26–27, 2009, Hanoi, Vietnam).

  116. 116.

    Robert Smith, Maritime Delimitation in the South China Sea: Potentiality and Challenges, 41 OceanDev. &Intl.L. 227 (2010). See also John Van Dyke & Dale Bennett, Islands and the Delimitation of Ocean Space in the South China Sea, 10 OceanY.B. 54 (1993). Van Dyke and Bennett propose a 12-mile territorial sea for rocks in the Spratlys islands. See John Van Dyke & Robert Brooks, Uninhabited Islands: Their Impact on the Ownership of the Ocean’s Resources, 12 OceanDev. &Intl.L. 265 (1983); Jonathan Charney, Rocks That Cannot Sustain Human Habitation, 93 Am.J. Int’lL. 872 (1999); Barbara Kwiatkowska & Alfred Soons, Entitlement to Maritime Areas of Rocks Which Cannot Sustain Hamuan Habitation or Economic Life of Their Owns, 21 Neth.Y.B. Int’lL. 167–168 (1999); Robert Beckman & Clive Schofield. Moving Beyond Disputes Over Islands Sovereignty: ICJ Decision Sets Stage For Maritime Boundary delimitation in the Singapore Strait, 40 OceanDev. &Intl.L. 10 (2009); Barry Hart Dubner, The Spratly Rocks Dispute – A Rockapelago’ Defies Norms of International Law, 9 Temp.Int’l &Comp.L. J. 304–305 (1995); Alex Elferink, The Islands in the South China Sea: How Does Their Presence Limit the Extent of the High Seas and the Area and the Maritime Zones of the Mainland Coasts?, 32 OceanDev. &Intl.L. 174 (2001).

  117. 117.

    Case concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, 18 R.I.A.A. (1977); North Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra note 94; the Continental Shelf Case (Tunis. v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J (Feb. 24); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. (Oct. 12); the Continental Shelf Case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta) 1985 I.C.J. (June 3); Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and the French Republic, 31 I.L.M. 1149–1178 (1992); Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v. Nor.) 1993 I.C.J. (June 14); Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Application 2004 I.C.J. (Sept. 16).

  118. 118.

    Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the Agreement between Chinese and U.S. Oil Companies for the Exploration and Exploitation of Oil and Gas on the Continental Shelf of Vietnam, Press Release No. 08/BC, Vietnamese Mission to the United Nations, May 19, 1992.

  119. 119.

    Greg Torode, Vietnam offered profits of oilfield, TheMorningHoaNamPost, (Sept. 5, 1994).

  120. 120.

    Mark Valencia, The South China Sea: Potential Conflict and Cooperation, YogyakartaWorkshop onManagingPotentialConflicts in theSouthChinaSea 2 (1992). It reads: “The area in question … is bathymetrically continuous with the Vietnamese continental shelf and geographically and bathymetrically separated from the Spratleys islands proper.”.

  121. 121.

    Malaysia-Vietnam, Executive Summary – Joint Submission in respect to the southern part of the South China Sea (May 7, 2009). See the website of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (“CLCS”), available athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/mys_vnm2009excutivesummary.pdf (last visited on Apr. 24, 2012).

  122. 122.

    See Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant to Article 76, paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. Partial Submission in respect of Vietnam’s extended continental shelf: North area (VNM-N), Pt. I (Executive Summary): VNM-N-ES-DOC April 2009; Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines: Submissions to the Commission, Submission of Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, available athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/vnm2009n_executivesummary.pdf (last visited on Apr. 24, 2012).

  123. 123.

    Hong Thao Nguyen & Ramses Amer, Coastal States in the South China Sea and Submissions on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf, 42 OceanDev. &Int’l.L. 245–263 (2011).

  124. 124.

    See Brunei Darussalam’s Preliminary Submission concerning the Outer Limits of its Continental Shelf (May 12, 2009), available athttp://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/brn2009preliminaryinformation.pdf (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  125. 125.

    The Philippine Republic Act No. 9522, An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5466, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes, approved 10 March 2009, available atwww.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9522_2009.html (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  126. 126.

    CLCS, The Philippines Note Verbale No. 000228 (April 5, 2011), available athttp://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/phl_re_chn_2011.pdf (last visited on Apr. 24, 2012). See also Dang Thang Nguyen & Hong Thao Nguyen, China’s Nine Dotted Lines in the South China Sea: The 2011 Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Between the Philippines and China, 43 OceanDev. &Int’lL. 47/Appendix 1(2012) (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  127. 127.

    Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert F. del Rosario refers to the China’s “nine dash line.” See Press Release from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines on August 8, 2011, seehttp://www.gov.ph/2011/08/05/secretary-del-rosario-says-china%E2%80%99s-9-dash-line-is-%E2%80%9Ccrux-of-the-problem%E2%80%9D-in-wps-proposes-preventive-diplomacy%E2%80%9D-solutions/ (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  128. 128.

    Note Verbale No. CML/8/2011 dated April 14, 2011 of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations [China Note Verbale on April 14, 2011] (in respose to the Philippines Note Verbale No. 000228), available athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  129. 129.

    See Chinese boats ‘harass’ Vietnam oil ship, Upstreamonline,available athttp://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article258870.ece (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  130. 130.

    Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nation, New York, Note CML2/2009, Feb 2, 2009 with reference to the Japan’s Submission dated of 12 November 2008 to the Commission on Limits of the Continental Shelf concerning the outer limit of continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, available athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/chn_6feb09_e.pdf (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  131. 131.

    U.S. State Department, Limits in the Seas No. 117, Straight Baselines Claim: China (July 9, 1996), available atwww.state.gov/documents/organization/57692.pdf (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012). See also Law of theSeaBulletin 32 (1996).

  132. 132.

    Ian Storey, Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Cause for Concern, in Workshop:TheSouthChinaSea:Cooperation forRegionalSec. &Dev.at 160–166 (Nov. 26–27, 2009); Leszek Buszynski, Rising Tensions in the South China Sea and Implications for Regional Security, Workshop:TheSouthChinaSea:Towards aRegion ofPeace,Sec. &Cooperation, at 89–101 (Nov. 11–12, 2010).

  133. 133.

    Yann-huei Song & Peter Yu, China’s Historic Waters in the South China Sea: An Analysis from Taiwan, R.O.C., 12 Am.AsianRev. 83–101 (1994); Jiangming Shen, International Law Rules and Historical Evidences Supporting China’s Title to the South China Sea Islands, 21 HastingsInt’l &Comp.L. Rev. 1–75 (1997–98); Keyuan Zou, The Chinese Traditional Maritime Boundary Line in the South China Sea and its Legal Consequences for the Resolution of the dispute over the Spratly Islands, 14 Int’lJ. Marine &CoastalL. 52 (1999); Jiangming Shen, China’s Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands: A Historical Perspective, 1 ChineseJ. Int’lL. 94–157 (2002); Jinming Li & Dexia Li, The Dotted Line on the Chinese Map of the South China Sea: A Note, 34 OceanDev. &Intl.L. 287–295 (2003).

  134. 134.

    See Note Verbale No. CML/17/2009 dated 07 May 2009 of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations (protesting Malaysia-Vietnam Joint Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf); Note Verbale No. CML/18/2009 dated 07 May 2009 of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations (protesting Vietnam Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf). See also the CLCS website, available at http:// www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submission_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  135. 135.

    Zou, supra note 134, at 52; Li & Li, supra note 134. See also Hong Thao Nguyen, China’s Nine Broken Line in the Bien Dong Sea (South China Sea) in the Light of International Law, VietnamNews,at 4 (May. 18, 1997).

  136. 136.

    See Pan, supra note 114; Peter Yu, The Chinese (Broken) U-shaped Line in the South China Sea: Points, Lines, and Zones, 25 Contemp.SoutheastAsia, republished at J. Int’l &StrategicAff. 405–430 (2003); Kuan-Hsiung Wang, The ROC’s Maritime Claims and Practices with Special Reference to the South China Sea, 41 OceanDev. &Intl.L. 237–252 (2010); Yann-huei Song & Peter Yu, China’s ‘Historic Waters’ in the South China Sea: An Analysis from Taiwan, R.O.C., 12 Am.AsianRev. 83–101 (1994).

  137. 137.

    See China Note Verbale on April 14, 2011, supra note 128, China claims that: “The China’s Nansha islands is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf,” available athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2011_re_phl_e.pdf (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012). See also Zhiguo Gao, The South China Sea: From Conflict to Cooperation?, 25 OceanDev. &Intl.L. 346 (1994), The Judge of the ITLOS stated that: “The boundary line on the Chinese map is merely a line that delineates ownership of islands rather than a maritime boundary in the conventional sense.”.

  138. 138.

    See Article 14 of the Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Act, adopted at the third session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (June 26, 1998), available athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/chn_1998_eez_act.pdf (last visited on 24 April 2012). See also Yann-Huei Song and Zou Keyuan, Maritime Legislation of Mainland China and Taiwan: Developments, Comparison, Implications, and Potential Challenges for the United States, 31 OceanDev. &Intl.L. 303–345 (2000); Ji Guoxing, Outer Continental Shelf Claims in the South China Sea: A New Challenge to the China’s U shaped line, in International Workshop:Non-TraditionalSecurityCooperation in theSouthChinaSea inHaikou (May 20–22, 2010); Nozomu Hayashi, Official says Beijing has ‘Historical Rights’ over South China Sea, AsahiShimbun(Daily) Jan. 26, 2012, available athttp://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/AJ201201260061 (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012). In the interview with Asahi Shimbun, Wu Shicun, president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, in Haikou, Hainan province, explained the rationale for Beijing’s territorial claims that: all islands lying within the “cow’s tongue”(nine dotted line) belong to China, and that China has ‘historical rights,’ including fishing rights, over the surrounding waters.

  139. 139.

    Carlyle Thayer, Recent Development in the South China Sea: Implications for Peace, Stability and Cooperation in the Region, InternationalWorkshop on theSouthChinaSea, inHanoi(Paper presented to the Second International Workshop on the South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development, co-sponsored by the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam and the Vietnam Lawyers’ Association) (Nov. 27, 2009), available athttp://www.scribd.com/doc/42829909/Thayer-Recent-Developments-in-the-South-China-Sea-Implications-for-Regional-Security (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  140. 140.

    Note Verbale No. 86/HC-2009 dated 08 May 2009 of the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the United Nations (in response to Notes Verbale No. CML/12/2009 of 13 April 2009, CML/17/2009 of 07 May 2009 and CML/18/2009 of 07 May 2009 of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations) (Vietnam’s 2009 Note Verbale). See the CLCS website, available athttp://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submission_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  141. 141.

    Note Verbale No. 480/POL-703/VII/10 dated 08 July 2010 of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations (in response to Note Verbale No. CML/17/2009 dated 07 May 2009 of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China) (Indonesia’s 2010 Note Verbale). http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e.pdf (last visited on Mar. 30, 2012).

  142. 142.

    Id.

  143. 143.

    Note Verbale of the Philippines on 05 April 2011, supra note 126.

  144. 144.

    Thayer, supra note 2.

  145. 145.

    Kuan-Hsiung Wang, The ROC’s Maritime Claims and Practices with Special Reference to the South China Sea, 41OceanDev. &Int’lL. 238 (2010).

  146. 146.

    Erik Franckx & Marco Benatar, Dotted Lines in the South China Sea: Fishing for (Legal) Clarity, 2AsianJ. Int’lL. 91 (2012), at n. 5, Zou Keyuan mentions the existence of an even earlier line in the South China Sea drawn up by a Chinese cartographer, Hu Jinjie, in 1914 and subsequently in the 1920s and 1930s. Nonetheless, it must be streesed that: (1) these earlier apparitions are prior to the first official map depicting the ‘U line’ and (2) the aforementioned atlats were compiled by individuals, thus acting in personal capacity.

  147. 147.

    Temple at Prear Vihear Case, supra note 94, at 35.

  148. 148.

    International Law Reports, vol. 91, at 584 (Lauterpacht & Greenwood eds. 1993).

  149. 149.

    Franckx & Benatar, supra note 146, at 216.

  150. 150.

    Beckman, supra note 6 at 13; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27.

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    Nguyen & Hoang, supra note 109.

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    China’s then prime minister Li Peng launched the Chinese proposal and model for joint development in 1990. For details on the proposal as well as a detailed overview of China’s policies toward the South China Sea in the 1990s, see LaiToLee,China and theSouthChinaSeaDialogues (1999). See also Nguyen & Amer, A New Legal Arrangement for the South China Sea, supra note 6.

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    Hong Thao Nguyen, Vietnam and the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, 32 OceanDev. &Intl.L. 105–130 (2001).

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    Nguyen & Amer, A New Legal Arrangement for the South China Sea, supra note 6.

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    VNA, Vietnam-China Joint Statement, October 16, 2011, available at http://vna/Agrement15102011seaprinciples\vietnam-china-joint-statement-2011.htm (last visted on Mar. 30, 2012).

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Nguyen, H.T. (2022). Vietnam’s Position on the Sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratlys: Its Maritime Claims. In: Lee, E.Y.J. (eds) ASEAN International Law. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3195-5_14

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