Abstract
Given a default theory \((\Delta ,D),\) where \(\Delta \) is a theory in propositional logic and D is a set of defaults, we will define three kinds of the minimal change in default logic: a theory \(\Theta \) is a \(\subseteq \)-/\(\preceq \)-/\(\vdash _\preceq \)-minimal change of D by \(\Delta ,\) where \(\Theta \) is a \(\subseteq \)-minimal change of D by \(\Delta \) if and only if \(\mathrm{Th}(\Theta \cup \Delta )\) is an extension of \((\Delta ,D).\) \(\preceq \)-minimal change has the actual importance. For example, let \((\Delta ,D)\) be a default theory, where \(\Delta \) says that someone is a human (denoted by p) and this man has no arms (denoted by \(\lnot q\)); and D contains one default \(\dfrac{p:q\wedge r}{q\wedge r},\) which says that a man defaultly has arms and legs, where r denotes that this man has legs. By default logic, \((\Delta ,D)\) has an extension \(\{p\},\) that is, we know that this man is a human.
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Li, W., Sui, Y. (2021). An Application to Default Logic. In: R-CALCULUS: A Logic of Belief Revision. Perspectives in Formal Induction, Revision and Evolution. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2944-0_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2944-0_10
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