Interpretation of Network Sovereignty

Abstract

In recent years, with the integration of the Internet and various economic and social fields, the security situation in cyberspace has been changing rapidly. There are more and more network games at the national level and the network attack and defense have become more intense. Network sovereignty has become one of sovereignty that all states are striving for. Cyber war against national targets has emerged and will not abate. Major countries have successively set up cyberspace forces. These facts have demonstrated the existence of a new frontier for humanity, national interests,  and digital sovereignty in cyberspace, and demonstrated the absence of international rules or laws that effectively coordinate the management of this space. The chaos in the online media during the US presidential election in 2020, in which the incumbent US president has been banned from several public accounts by major online social media, shows that there is still a long way to go in terms of citizens’ digital human rights and the reasonable and orderly legislative and judicial administration of domestic cyberspace management. All of these topics are discussed in detail in this chapter.

In recent years, with the integration of the Internet and various economic and social fields, the security situation in cyberspace has been changing rapidly. There are more and more network games at the national level and the network attack and defense have become more intense. Network sovereignty has become one of sovereignty that all states are striving for.

2.1 International Community and Network Sovereignty

Since the establishment of the principle of national sovereignty by the Westphalian Peace Council in 1648, upholding sovereignty and opposing hegemony have been the important contents of international governance practice. More than 30 years after its birth, the DNS system has proved more robust than expected as the infrastructure of the Internet. However, root domains, important top-level domains, and root certificates were previously controlled by the U.S. government or by the U.S. government-authorized nonprofit ICANN due to some historical factors. Besides, attacks on the domain name system have become one of the most significant threats to global Internet security. The autonomous capability of the Internet in various regions, namely the network sovereignty, is always under threat, and the international community has long been concerned about this.

In 2003, the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) was held in Geneva. The Conference adopted the Geneva Declaration of Principles, which outlined the network sovereignty of states, “policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States. They have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues” [1].

On February 2, 2017, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) announced on its website that the Tallinn Manual 2.0 was officially published. Compared with the initial version, Tallinn Manual 2.0 divided cyberspace into three layers: the physical layer, the logical layer, and the social layer, and specified that all the objects, facilities, and personnel involved in these three layers could be controlled by states under the principle of sovereignty [2]. At the same time, the Manual also affirmed that states had external sovereignty in the field of cyberspace and states were free to engage in network activities and accede to international network treaties.

Since the core of the US strategy shifted from comprehensive defense to attack and deterrence in 2015, the competition among states for dominance and discourse power in cyberspace is more intense. On December 14, 2017, the Federal Communications Commission announced the abolition of the principle of net neutrality. In the same year, the UK used cyber attack and jamming for the first time in a joint military operation. On February 12, 2019, the State Duma of Russia passed a bill, which was designed to ensure the operation of the Internet in the country if access to servers abroad is cut off. The Japanese government released a new Medium-Term Defense Force Readiness Plan, which planned to set up a command to coordinate professional forces in space and cyberspace from 2019 to 2023 to enhance the size and capability of the network defense forces.

The International Code of Conduct for Information Security (the “Code”) was an international effort to develop norms of behavior in the digital space, submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2011 by China and Russia. In 2015, China together with the United Nations permanent representatives from the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization wrote to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and submitted the revised Code, the content of which was reflected in the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly that year. The resolution reaffirmed that, “Policy authority for Internet-related public issues is the sovereign right of States, which have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues”, and claimed that “comply with the UN Charter and universally recognized norms governing international relations, including respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states”, and “All states have rights and responsibilities to protect, under relevant laws and regulations, their information space and critical information infrastructure from threats, disturbance, attack and sabotage” [3].

On the opening ceremony of the second world Internet Conference, China’s leader Xi Jinping pointed out that, “International community should strengthen dialogue and cooperation based on mutual respect and trust, promote the reform of the global governance system of the Internet, and jointly build a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative cyberspace, and establish a multilateral, democratic and transparent global Internet governance system”.

2.2 International Comments on Network Sovereignty

Alvin Toffler, a famous sociologist, predicted in his book the Third Wave in the 1980s that, “Whoever masters the information and controls the Internet, will have the world”. Today, with the development of the network information field, this prediction has been verified. After entering into the twenty-first century, states carried out a variety of network actions, such as the phishing case of Syrian Electronic Army, the test of Russia’s unplugged internet and so on, games between states are being played in cyberspace.

2.2.1 Age of Cyber Warfare

National security and stability are closely related to network sovereignty. Since the end of the twentieth century, the construction of network forces in various states has been continuously strengthened, and the technology and means of network attack have emerged one after another (Fig. 2.1).

Fig. 2.1

Cyber warfare now—tales from the digital battlefield (Lima Charlie news) [4]

• Estonia

Estonia was the first country in history to experience a massive cyber attack on its government and critical infrastructure. In three weeks from April to May 2007, Estonia was hit by a massive network attack, which focused on the websites of the Estonian president and parliament, various government departments, political parties, three of the six major news organizations, the two largest banks, and communications companies. When the attack broke out, it caused great shock in the local area, and almost all websites were paralyzed, causing great losses. The scale and intensity of the cyber attack in Estonia had brought it to the attention of the international military community, and it was regarded as the first cyber warfare at the national level.

• Iraq

In terms of the operation of the Internet, as the network in Asia and Europe passes through the United States, the United States can control the root server to count and monitor the relevant information resolved by all the servers, such as the number of visits and the frequency of website clicks. During the Iraq War in 2003, the United States used the resolution rights of the root server to cancel all application parsing work of Iraqi domain name “iq”, and all Iraqi domain names with the suffix “iq” could not be searched from the Internet, which dealt a major blow to the network sovereignty of Iraqi.

• Libya

In April 2004, the United States launched a network attack that brought down the top-level domain name of Libyan, making sites with the suffix “ly” (Libyan abbreviation) unsearchable on the engine, and Libya disappeared from the Internet for three days.

• Syria

In 2013, the Syrian Electronic Army accessed the Twitter account of the Associated Press (AP) by including malicious links in phishing emails. The email was sent to the employee of AP in the name of a colleague. Hackers then posted a fake news report on the AP account that said there had been two explosions at the White House and that President Barack Obama had been injured. The reaction was so dramatic that the stock market fell 150 points in five minutes.

• Iran

In August 2010, Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant was attacked by a computer network virus of unknown origin. At least 30,000 Iranian computers were attacked, so that, Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant, which had just been capped, had to take out the nuclear fuel and delay its start. Iran’s nuclear development plans had also been put on hold. The computer virus later came to be known as Stuxnet.

• Israel

As early as 1998, Israel recruited young men who successfully invaded the U.S. Department of Defense and began to step up the research into cyberwarfare. In the Palestine-Israel conflict and Lebanon-Israel conflict, Israel used the way of network attacks to tamper with web pages and attack TV stations to influence the direction of public opinion. The Israeli military hacked into military computers to steal secrets to determine the focal points and precise coordinates of fire strikes. They blocked the communication and command system of the enemy to grasp the best combat time. All of this was a snapshot of the Israeli military in the cyberwarfare.

• Venezuela

In early March 2019, Venezuela experienced a massive power outage that affected 18 out of 23 states, directly paralyzing transportation, health, communications, and infrastructure. Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro accused that the United States orchestrated this network attack on the Venezuelan power system to create chaos and force the government out of office through a nationwide blackout. Some analysts believed that in the absence of direct and indirect military intervention, launching network attacks on Venezuela may be the best option for the United States.

• The United States

The United States has dominated the Internet for decades, and its network discourse power has been impacted by governments and groups of all states. The United States is the region with the highest incidence of transnational network crimes. It is also the most popular state for top hackers in the world, while it is actively hacking into networks around the world. The United States Department of Energy was hacked 1131 times between 2010 and 2014, 159 times successfully. Julian Assange, the founder of WikiLeaks, once hacked into the U.S. military and obtained 90,000 classified U.S. military emails. Some criminal groups, such as Anonymous and the New World, frequently challenged the network sovereignty of the United States. In October 2016, public institutions and social networking sites in California, New York, Boston, Seattle, and other areas in the United States were hacked by Anonymous for several hours, causing nearly half of the network in the United States to crash. It was one of the largest attacks in history.

2.2.2 Governance of Network Sovereignty

According to the principle of cyberspace sovereignty, the state plays a leading role as the most important subject in the governance of cyberspace. At present, national governance of network sovereignty is mainly carried out at both internal and external levels. Internally, through legislation and the establishment of special regulatory agencies, cyberspace can be formally brought under the jurisdiction of the national legal system to achieve effective governance of cyberspace and establish national authority in cyberspace. Externally, national network security can be guaranteed through network security defense measures, establishing the dominant position of sovereign states in network security [5].

• 1. Domestic Legislative and Regulatory Policies

Since 1995, South Korea has amended the Telecommunications and Commerce Law, passed the Basic Law on National Informatization and the Regulations on Network Security Management, and other new laws and regulations. South Korea started to implement the Internet real-name system in 2002. Through a series of legislative activities, the national jurisdiction has been extended to the Internet field [5].

Since the establishment of the European Union, a series of relevant policies and regulations have been introduced. Besides, to proceed with some legislative activities, many states have set up specialized agencies to manage the cyberspace. As early as March 2004, the European Union established the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA). In January 2013, the European Union established a special police department, the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), to combat online child pornography and organized network fraud activities [5].

The government of the United States has set up six special network security agencies to monitor cyberspace. The outbreak of the PRISM (surveillance program) showed that the U.S. government’s control of cyberspace has never been interrupted.

Other states, such as Thailand and Japan, have also set up institutions to regulate cyberspace. Many states have adopted legislation and institutional construction to regulate the behavior in cyberspace. National sovereignty and government regulation have never been far from cyberspace governance.

• 2. External Multilateral Co-government

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a nonprofit organization set up to manage domain name systems, IP address allocation, protocol configuration, and master server systems. It is managed under contract by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and other entities together with the U.S. government now. For a long time, it was unilateral control by the United States, inconsistent with neither the industry’s expectations of Internet freedom nor other states’ expectations of network sovereignty. As a result, calls for the reform of ICANN have continued unabated. Since 2014, many states, including China, Russia, Brazil, and India, have proposed multiple multilateral cooperation programs on global governance of cyberspace under the principle of network sovereignty [5].

In April 2014, at the Conference in Sao Paulo, Brazil and other states proposed a more moderate improvement plan within the framework of ICANN, requiring promoting the position of the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) of ICANN, enhancing the voice of states in ICANN, and confirming the independent jurisdiction over the limited number of services in ICANN.

The East West Institute of the United States submitted a work report at the Berlin summit, which required that the governments of sovereign states should be given substantive management authority in the ICANN system.

At the Pusan conference in 2014, India proposed to transfer the main functions of global governance in cyberspace from ICANN to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which was explicitly refuted by the United States, claiming that it would never transfer the management authority of ICANN to the management agencies composed of one or more states.

These schemes introduced the principle of multilateralism, compared with schemes of the United States. These proposals sought to enhance the role of sovereign states in the global governance of cyberspace. The first two proposals called for enhancing regulatory authority for sovereign states under the original ICANN framework, while India’s proposal directly called for sovereign states and international organizations among them to become the main body of global governance in cyberspace, replacing the functions and status of the former ICANN.

Therefore, in the network space governance, adhering to the principle of national sovereignty, establishing international multilateral cooperation mechanism, with governments around the world hand in hand, and through the way of negotiation mediation, jointly participating in the global governance in cyberspace, is the most effective and legal way. Only the principle of state sovereignty in cyberspace governance is truly clear, can states ensure the security right in cyberspace, and participate equally in the global governance in cyberspace. Through the establishment of multilateral cooperation mechanisms, international conflicts on cyber issues can be effectively avoided and all sovereign states in the world can coexist peacefully and achieve win-win cooperation in cyberspace [5].

2.2.3 Strategic Layout of Some States

• 1. Germany

Germany has been forming a hacking force since 2006, and it was described as an effort to close the gap with other states. In a 2012 document submitted to the Bundestag, the German military said it had the initial capability to attack enemy networks. On April 1, 2017, the German Armed Forces formally established the Cyber and Information Command. The command, together with the army, navy, air force, and medical services, constitutes the Bundeswehr system, which will play a leading role in the NATO alliance.

In 2019, to ensure the digital sovereignty of European users of cloud services, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy launched the GAIA-X project, which aimed to develop an efficient and competitive, secure, and trustworthy data infrastructure for Europe, and reduce the reliance on cloud services from Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and other American companies (Fig. 2.2).

Fig. 2.2

GAIA-X project [6]

The project was supported by representatives of business, science, and administration from Germany and France, together with other European partners. The founding members on the German side included Beckhoff Automation, BMW, Bosch, DE-CIX, Deutsche Telekom, German Edge Cloud, PlusServer, SAP, and Siemens. The project objectives were that combining existing central and decentralized infrastructures to form a system, which can offer a uniform data and service room. Bundesverband Information swirtschaft, Telekommunikation und neue Medien (BITKOM), declared that the GAIA-X project would make an important contribution to strengthening digital and data sovereignty in Europe. “The next stage will be for Germany to invite other EU member states to join the project”, German Economy Minister Tomas Altmaier said.

• 2. Russia

Russia is one of the states that are actively preparing for the sovereignty network. It has tested its unplugged internet and strengthened the supervision of network information through national legislation and other means.

The Russian government has a long history of tight control over the network environment. As early as 2006, the government restricted the use of websites and apps such as the professional social network LinkedIn, the chat app Zello, the instant messaging tool Telegram, and required foreign companies to give the system access right to the government for monitoring user data. The Russian government required all Internet facilities to pass through an official control center, and allowed itself to cut off external connections at any time, closed unapproved websites, and monitored all Internet traffic. The Russian government is also preparing to adopt a series of technical measures and formulate more related policies in the future.

In November 2019, Russia formally promulgated and implemented the Sovereign Internet Law, which stated that it was necessary to be prepared to use the Russian sovereignty network RuNet to safeguard national network security in case of external network attacks. Under the bill, government agencies and security agencies, as well as all communications operators, messaging, and email providers, would have to take part in the test, but it would not affect regular Internet users. The law stipulated that the Internet infrastructure of Russia should gradually be free from dependence on foreign nodes, especially in the case of external attacks, Russia can cut off the connection with the outside world and operate the regional Internet independently. Russia is currently building its domain name system (DNS), which is expected to be completed by 2021 (Fig. 2.3).

Fig. 2.3

A map showing undersea internet cables around the world [7]

On December 24, 2019, Russia successfully tested its unplugged internet. The results showed that the Internet services in Russia could still work when isolated from the rest of the Internet. This test took a few days and was conducted on a specially designated network. This is the first time for Russia to conduct network tests against the risk of being disconnected from the Internet. The tests also examined the stability of communications, the security of cellular communications, including issues of protecting personal data, preventing calls and SMS from being hijacked, intercepting traffic, and the security of using the Internet of Things [8].

Meanwhile, Russia’s setting up its homegrown version of Wikipedia and is requiring all smartphones to come with Russian software pre-installed.

• 3. The United States

As early as the late 1990s, the U.S. government began to pay attention to the challenges brought by the development of the Internet, attaching importance to the construction of the information security mechanism in cyberspace, setting up several network security institutions, and issuing several laws and regulations, striving to maintain the information security in cyberspace.

In November 2008, President Obama announced the creation of a cyberspace Policy review panel to review the state of U.S. network security. In December 2009, the White House Office of Cybersecurity was established. In May 2010, the U.S. military established the Cyber Command to coordinate and safeguard the operations in cyberspace. In May 2011, the U.S. government published International Strategy for Cyberspace, which combined Internet policy with International policy goals for the first time. In July 2011, the U.S. Department of Defense issued the Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, which provided specific operational guidelines for the deployment and implementation of U.S. military network operations. In 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order 13,636, which explicitly proposed the mechanism for sharing security information in cyberspace. Then, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) led a partnership with the private sector to develop the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (FCIC), and the U.S. government had an agreement with the private sector on cybersecurity issues. In February 2016, the U.S. government issued the Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP) and established the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity to ensure greater information security capabilities for the United States in the digital age [9]. On March 23, 2018, President Trump formally signed the Clarify Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act), which provided a legal basis for the U.S. to obtain foreign data and the eligible foreign governments to obtain data in the U.S [10].

The U.S. government attaches great importance to network sovereignty by maintaining network and information system security through policy promulgation, institution establishment, law enforcement, and other means.

• 4. France

In 2013, in the White Paper on Defense and National Security, France identified network attack as one of the most serious external threats to national sovereignty and called for the establishment of network defense forces. France planned to set up a chain of network defense operations and invested 1 billion euros by 2019 for network security and defense research. At the same time, France planned to reserve a civilian network security and defense force, training civilian network defense experts to serve the government and the military when necessary [11] (Fig. 2.4).

Fig. 2.4

2013 French white paper on defence and national security [12]

• 5. The United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has set up the UK Office of Cyber Security, which is directly responsible to the Prime Minister, to draw up the development plan of cyberwarfare forces and the action platform for cyber security at the strategic level. The UK’s Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) is affiliated with the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and is responsible for providing intelligence support for military cyber warfare operations. The UK’s National Cyber Force is affiliated with the Ministry of National Defence, it’s mainly responsible for training and operation planning related to military cyber warfare, and coordinating military technical experts to carry out security protection for military network targets [11].

2.3 Safeguarding Network Sovereignty

Network sovereignty is an important part of national sovereignty as well as the extension of national sovereignty in cyberspace. Just as the principle of national sovereignty constitutes the foundation of the modern international order, the principle of network sovereignty is also the cornerstone of the international order in cyberspace. In the tide of globalization, technology is changing at a rapid pace, and the Internet is one of the best. If a state can take the lead in cyberspace issues, it can take the lead in the building of order and the game of rules in cyberspace. Therefore, we should respond to the demand of most states for network sovereignty and firmly safeguard network sovereignty.

2.3.1 Strengthen the Awareness of National Network Sovereignty

Cyberspace is the fifth frontier, besides the four frontiers of land, sea, sky, and space, and the research on cyberspace is still in its infancy. States have different understandings about how to apply sovereignty rules in cyberspace, but growing voices are calling for greater attention to network sovereignty (Fig. 2.5).

Fig. 2.5

Cyberspace [13]

The European Union advocates jurisdiction over the security of citizens’ data. German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has long, and lately more openly, been defending the need for Europe to shield its digital sovereignty. The UK has launched the National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP) to protect the UK from network attack and develop sovereignty in cyberspace. Russia has introduced the Sovereign Internet Law, which established the autonomous and controllable network sovereignty of the Russian Network from five aspects, including domain name autonomy, regular exercises, platform control, and active disconnection of the Internet. China is the initiator and advocate of national sovereignty in cyberspace. In June 2010, China issued a white paper, named “the State of the Internet in China”, which clearly stated that the Internet in China was under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty, and Chinese Internet sovereignty should be respected and upheld [14]. On July 1, 2015, the National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China came into effect, and China defined cyberspace sovereignty in the form of law for the first time [15].

On December 16, 2015, at the Second World Internet Conference, Xi Jinping, the Chinese President, attended the opening ceremony and delivered a speech, and elaborated on the four principles and made a five-point proposal concerning Internet development and governance. The four principles included respecting sovereignty in cyberspace, upholding peace and security, promoting openness and cooperation, and building a sound order. The five-point proposal includes accelerating the building of global Internet infrastructure for greater connectivity, building an online platform for cultural exchanges and mutual learning, promoting innovative development of the digital economy for common prosperity, maintaining cybersecurity to promote orderly development, building a system of global governance in cyberspace to promote equity and justice (Fig. 2.6).

Fig. 2.6

Location of the world internet conference at Wuzhen, China [16]

On December 27, 2016, the China national network information office issued the National Network Security Strategy, which called for the network security strategy as a national strategy, specified that the network sovereignty was the new frontier of national sovereignty. “The Internet was the new field of human activity as important as land, sea, sky, and space, and national sovereignty had been extended to cyberspace, and cyberspace sovereignty had become an important part of national sovereignty. It has become the consensus of the international community to respect the sovereignty of cyberspace, safeguard network security, seek joint governance and achieve win-win results” [17]. Like national sovereignty, network sovereignty is inviolable. Therefore, the strategy also required that, “Chinese citizens should resolutely safeguard the sovereignty of cyberspace. All network activities within the scope of China’s sovereignty are subject to the constitution, laws, and regulations. We should take all measures, including economic, administrative, scientific, technological, legal, diplomatic, and military measures, to protect the security of China’s information facilities and resources, and unswervingly safeguard China’s cyberspace sovereignty. We are firmly opposed to any act that subverts China’s state power or undermines China’s national sovereignty through the Internet” and “we should respect the right of all states to choose their development path, cyberspace management model and cyberspace public policy and to participate peacefully in international cyberspace governance. The cyberspace affairs of each state are up to its people. States have the right, in light of their national conditions and drawing on international experience, to enact laws and regulations on cyberspace and take necessary measures under the law to manage their information systems and network activities within their territory”. On March 1, 2017, China launched the International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace, addressed China’s position on issues related to international cyberspace governance, and claimed that, “a clear definition of cyberspace sovereignty not only reflects the responsibilities and rights of governments to govern cyberspace under the law, but also helps promote the building of a platform for benign interactions among governments, enterprises, and society, and creates a healthy ecological environment for the development of information technology and international exchanges and cooperation” [18].

2.3.2 Opposing the Theory of Negating Sovereignty in Cyberspace

Different states have different attitudes towards network sovereignty, based on their development level of network technology and status in the international community.

Developed countries, the US, for example, believes that cyberspace, outer space, international waters, and space, constitute the infrastructure of the global system and belong to the global commons [19], so states should not exercise national sovereignty there. The view of the United States’ denial of network sovereignty is inseparable from its global cyberspace strategy, which aims to establish hegemony in the global cyberspace and strive for national interests to the maximum extent. But at the same time, the United States has enacted several strategies and laws about cyberspace. In short, the network developed states, represented by the United States, adopt the double standards on the issue of network sovereignty. In the international network space, the network is considered the global commons, when they need to collect other information for their national interests. At this time, they claim that the United Nations is not competent for the task of cyberspace governance, and a new international mechanism for conducting global governance of cyberspace should be established, the purpose of which is to introduce American global strategy through the network. However, when it is necessary to strengthen the domestic network supervision, they claim that cyberspace is a sovereign domain, and their state has absolute and exclusive sovereignty jurisdiction over cyberspace.

In the international community, emerging network states, such as Russia, have certain strengths in some network technologies and infrastructure and have become the developed states in network science and technology by vigorously developing network business. These emerging network states believe that the network should have explicit sovereign attribute.

Besides, there are some network developing states with relatively backward development of network technology. These states attach more importance to the role of network sovereignty so that they can protect relevant interests as far as possible in relatively backward areas. Network developing states have taken an active part in the governance of cyberspace issues and made up for their shortcomings in network technology through legislation. Meanwhile, they have actively carried out cooperation with emerging network powers to jointly safeguard national sovereignty in cyberspace.

The conflict between these network ideas is typically reflected in the struggle for control of the domain name system. Cheng Weidong, a Chinese scholar, said that the theory of negating sovereignty in cyberspace, which some developed states insist on, ignores the essential characteristics of the network, and ignores the principal contradiction and the main aspects of contradiction, has violated the basic Marxist materialist dialectics, also does not have the practical basis of network field, and cannot stand the test of practice. In essence, the theory of negating sovereignty in cyberspace reflects the special interests of a few states and attempts to use the assertion of network freedom to spread western values [20]. As Professors Goldsmith and Wu Xiuming of Harvard Law School have pointed out, a few sovereignty holdouts, while talking about the top-down governance, Internet community and other things, have never actually ceded control of the root domain name, and the root domain name is still under their control and ownership. No matter how powerful a single country is, it does not have the right to control the root domain name. Therefore, talking about privatization or internationalization can divert the attention of critics. But the United States has never meant to give up its power over such an important resource [21]. Other scholars believe that the leapfrog technology cannot be the natural reason for the borderless and super-territorial cyberspace, and the global commons theory of cyberspace undermines the basis for international cooperation on cyberspace governance [22]. The principle of sovereignty is a basic principle that should be upheld in international cyberspace governance. Cyberspace within the territory of a state is governed by this state and is not subject to any other factors. The academic circles criticize the theory of negating sovereignty in cyberspace, which illustrates the foundation of network sovereignty from the perspective of theory and jurisprudence.

2.3.3 Peace and Stability in Cyberspace

Safeguarding cyber sovereignty in the age of globalization requires more comprehensive international cooperation. In international exchanges in the field of cyberspace, the use and development of cyberspace should be conducted peacefully. This is conducive to the development of the overall international network environment and is a manifestation of the peaceful development of the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of prohibition of the use of force. Nowadays, there are endless network attacks in international cyberspace, despite the Tallinn Manual 2.0 has provided a detailed analysis of the right of self-defense against network attacks, it is more important to advocate the peaceful use of cyberspace. We should oppose all forms of cyber warfare and non-peaceful activities by taking advantage of information technology. We will continue to advocate the importance of sovereignty in cyberspace, uphold the principle that network sovereignty brooks no foreign interference, and firmly oppose the intention of a few states to interfere in the internal affairs of other states by taking advantage of the international nature of the Internet. We advocate that all states abandon the Cold War mentality in cyberspace governance and the double standards of cyber commons and sovereignty, seek peace through consultation and cooperation based on full respect for other states’ network sovereignty, and further enhance their security through the peaceful use of cyberspace.

On the other hand, the innovation of core technologies is the most important for determining whether a state can become a network powerful nation, perform the defense power in cyberspace, and safeguard the independent right and jurisdiction in cyberspace. Internet is a sunrise industry to promote economic development, as well as an important field to safeguard national interests. Only when a state has technological advantages in the field of international cyberspace can its voice be enhanced.

Therefore, only by proposing a new network architecture from the technical level can the current domain name system truly remove its control over the network, realize equal and multilateral cooperative governance among states, and realize sovereignty autonomy in the field of the Internet.

2.3.4 Expanding the Network Sovereignty Concept

Only by respecting the network sovereignty can states, regardless of their size or strength, conduct dialogue and exchanges on an equal footing, fully safeguard their interests in cyberspace and effectively promote the solution of various network problems. The current global Internet governance system has yet to be improved. China puts forward the claim of network sovereignty, which has been widely praised by the international community.

Safeguarding sovereignty equality in cyberspace can accommodate different interests of different states, eliminate potential conflicts among states, and create opportunities for mutual benefit and win-win outcomes among states. While the Internet has integrated the world into a global village, it has also created a pattern of mutually dependent interests among states in the world. Every state’s sovereignty rights and interests in the field of information should not be infringed upon by others, and every state has the right to safeguard its information security. We should foster the sense of building a community with a shared future in cyberspace and abandon the old concept of zero-sum games and winner-takes-all in cyberspace. Each state cannot seek its absolute security at the expense of the security of other states. All states must follow the principle of equality in network sovereignty, respect the major interests of other states, and stick to the principle of working together, mutual trust, and mutual benefit. Thus, a realistic basis for international cooperation will be established, and more states and people can ride the express train of the information age and share the fruits of Internet development. States need to foster consensus in cyberspace, expand the interests of cooperation in cyberspace, strengthen exchanges among the international community on network security technologies, institutional building, and management experience. We should work hand in hand to build a multilateral, democratic, and transparent global Internet governance system.

On December 3, 2017, at the fourth world Internet conference, representatives from China, Egypt, Laos, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates jointly launched the “Belt and Road” Digital Economy International Cooperation Initiative. With the help of the “Belt and Road” initiative, China can combine geographical advantages with network technology [23], promote the concept of network sovereignty, and promote the building of a community with a shared future in cyberspace (Fig. 2.7).

Fig. 2.7

“The belt and road” Digital economy international cooperation initiative launching ceremony (2017), by Shuqiong Pan [24]

Many states along the “Belt and Road” route have maintained good bilateral relations with China for a long time, and they also face some threats in terms of economic and social development and national security. For example, some states have a low level of network infrastructure construction, which needs to be improved urgently. China has comparative technological advantages and can carry out in-depth cooperation in such fields as network infrastructure construction, to strengthen support and assistance for the popularization of Internet technology and infrastructure construction in backward areas. On the premise of respecting each other’s network sovereignty, we should vigorously develop and build our cyberspace, narrow the digital divide [25], and then build the “Information Silk Road” with the vast developing states and some developed states along the “Belt and Road” (Fig. 2.8).

Fig. 2.8

Belt and road initiative [26]

2.4 Current Situation of the Sovereignty of Broadcasting TV Network

Broadcast TV network is the key link of three networks convergence of cable television network, telecom network, and computer network. Moreover, it’s the representative of an efficient and cheap comprehensive network. Broadcast network has the advantages of wide frequency band, large capacity, many functions, low cost, strong anti-interference ability, and supports various services to connect thousands of families. Its development has laid a foundation for the development of information superhighway.

Broadcast TV network has covered a vast area. In 2003, the number of Chinese Community Antenna Television (CATV) subscribers exceeded 100 million. After eight years of rapid development, the number exceeded 200 million in 2011. By the end of 2016, the actual number of CATV users was 252 million, among which the number of digital TV users also reached 210 million, with a digitalization rate of 83.3%. Television has become one of the information tools with the highest household occupancy rate, and the CATV network has become the most popular multimedia in the home. However, the CATV network still uses coaxial cable to deliver TV programs to users at an analog level. The development direction of the CATV network includes the two-way broadband TV on demand (VOD), access to the Internet through CATV network for TV on demand, CATV call, etc. The ultimate development target is to make the CATV network become a broadband bidirectional multimedia communication network.

With the rapid development of new media formats such as IPTV, Internet TV and mobile TV, broadcast TV networks are facing unprecedented challenges. For example, in terms of video business architecture, flexible and convenient services of Internet video can meet the rapid changes of user needs and consumer psychology under the information development, which makes the traditional TV camp split. As the main promoter of digital TV reform in the radio and television industry, the cable network is in the situation of network segmentation and decentralization, and the national operation subject is still unformed.

In fact, the broadcast network has some inherent advantages, such as safe and reliable network transmission, stable and clear transmission quality, the exclusive copyright of some programs, and strong credibility. However, due to the lack of supervision on content, the openness of the telecommunication network and the Internet is too casual.

In a word, the signal transmission of public radio and television channels is one of the basic services of the broadcast TV network. As an important national information infrastructure, the broadcast TV network is an important national strategic resource and an important barrier against network risks. Therefore, the broadcast TV network should provide technical means for the national guidance of public opinion in cyberspace, and stabilize the sovereign equality in cyberspace. We must build, strengthen, and enhance its role in the national network security system, strengthen the broadcast TV network based on the sovereignty network research and construction.

This book proposes and sets up the sovereignty network, a new future network architecture, from the technical level. It makes the cyber space dynamic, peaceful, multilateral co-governance, and achieve a balance between freedom and order. The sovereignty network based on MIN is the first technically viable sovereignty Internet architecture in the world. The architecture of sovereignty network is shown as Fig. 2.9. We describe its architecture, core technologies, application and diffusion, and choose the broadcast TV network as a typical application scenario to introduce.

Fig. 2.9

The architecture of sovereignty network [47]

2.5 The 4th Power: United States Presidential Election in 2020 and Network Sovereignty

2.5.1 United States Presidential Election and the Storming of the United States Capitol

The 2020 United States presidential election was the 59th quadrennial presidential election, held on November 3, 2020. All 435 seats in the House of Representatives and 33 seats in the Senate were also be elected to form the 117th United States Congress. The general election in November was also an indirect election, in which voters cast ballots for a slate of members of the Electoral College, these electors then directly elected the president and vice president. On December 14, 2020, electors voted to confirm Joe Biden as the 46th president of the United States and Kamala Harris as vice president [27] (Fig. 2.10).

Fig. 2.10

2020 US elections [28]

Trump secured the Republican nomination without serious opposition, while Biden secured the Democratic nomination over his closest rival, Senator Bernie Sanders, in a competitive primary that featured the largest field of candidates for any political party in the modern era of American politics. Biden’s running mate, Senator Harris from California, was the first African-American, first Asian-American, and third female vice presidential nominee on a major party ticket. In addition, there were some nominees representing other political parties and independent nominees. Central issues of the election included the public health and economic impacts of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic; civil unrest in reaction to the killing of George Floyd and others; the U.S. Supreme Court following the death of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett; and the future of the Affordable Care Act [27].

The election saw a record number of ballots cast early and by mail due to the ongoing pandemic. As a result of the large number of mail-in ballots, some swing states saw delays in vote counting and reporting; this led to major news outlets delaying their projection. After Election Day, Trump and numerous Republicans attempted to subvert the election and overturn the results, alleging widespread voter fraud. On November 7, 2020, all major US news outlets announced that Biden and Kamala Harris had won the election, receiving the minimum 270 electoral votes needed after winning Pennsylvania’s 20 Electoral College votes. On November 9, 2020, even after the major US news outlets had declared that Biden had won the election, the General Services Administration had not certified the winner and refused to approve documents to begin the transition process. On November 23, 2020, the General Services Administration officially approved the documents for the transition process to proceed with the handover, and stated that its role was not to certify the elect, but that the real elect would be determined by the electoral process prescribed by the Constitution of the United States [27] (Fig. 2.11).

Fig. 2.11

The storming of the United States Capitol [29]

Trump said he would leave the White House if the Electoral College voted for Joe Biden. On December 14, the Electoral College voted to choose the president and vice president. The voting results confirmed Joe Biden as the 46th president of the United States and Kamala Harris as the 49th vice president of the United States. Congress was scheduled to meet in joint session on Jan. 6, 2021, to formally count the electoral college votes submitted by states, which was known as certifying the voting result of each state. Under the Constitution of the United States, the count and certification of the electoral votes by both houses of Congress was the final step in formally confirming the president’s election. But the Capitol was attacked by extremists that day, rioters breached police perimeters and stormed the United States Capitol Complex.

It was the first time the U.S. Capitol had been attacked since the British invaded in 1814. A large number of demonstrators gathered outside the Capitol and carried pro-Trump flags to protest the election. The demonstration then escalated into a riot, with protesters clashing with security guards and tear gas was in the air. Some demonstrators even broke the windows of the Capitol and entered the inside of the building. Five people were killed during the riot. The counting of the electoral votes by Congress was interrupted by pro-Trump rioters storming the Capitol [30]. This riot led to the suspension of the joint session to certify the election results. After the joint session of the United States Congress confirmed Joe Biden and Kamala Harris in the early hours of January 7 local time, Trump immediately issued a statement promising an “orderly” transfer of power on January 20, 2021 (Fig. 2.12).

Fig. 2.12

Supporters of President Donald Trump climb the west wall of the U.S. Capitol on Wednesday, Jan. 6, 2021, in Washington (Jose Luis Magana/Associated Press)

2.5.2 Social Media Platforms Banned Trump’s Accounts

After the storming of the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021, which was carried out by a mob of supporters of President Donald Trump, many social media platforms and technology companies suspended or banned Trump’s and his team’s accounts from their platforms, and many business organizations cut ties with him [30]. On January 9, 2021, Fox News listed the social media platforms which has “banned” or “restricted” Trump, these platforms took different measures to block Trump’s and related accounts.

According to the statistics of American media Axios, the platforms that had taken measures to ban or restrict Trump and his related accounts include Twitter, Facebook, Google, Apple, YouTube, Reddit, Instagram, Snapchat, Discord, Pinterest and other platforms [31]. Some platforms and websites had taken “Trump” as a sensitive word and removed posts as soon as they detected it. The account of Trump’s teenage youngest son, Barron, was suspended after he sent a tweet “Hello Twitter” (Fig. 2.13).

Fig. 2.13

Twitter has suspended President Trump from its platform [32]

“After close review of recent Tweets from the @realDonaldTrump account and the context around them we have permanently suspended the account due to the risk of further incitement of violence,” Twitter said. “In the context of horrific events this week, we made it clear on Wednesday that additional violations of the Twitter Rules would potentially result in this very course of action.” [33] (Fig. 2.14).

Fig. 2.14

Official statement from Twitter [34]

After Twitter had banned his @realDonaldTrump account, Trump tweeted from the US president’s official @Potus account suggesting he would “look at the possibilities of building out our own platform in the future” and railing against Twitter. But the tweets were removed from the platform as soon as they were posted [35] (Fig. 2.15).

Fig. 2.15

Trump’s tweets after his account had been suspended by Twitter [35]

“If it is clear that another account is being used for the purposes of evading a ban, it is also subject to suspension,” Twitter said in a statement. “For government accounts, such as @POTUS and @WhiteHouse, we will not suspend those accounts but will take action to limit their use. However, these accounts will be transitioned over to the new administration in due course and will not be suspended by Twitter unless absolutely necessary to alleviate real-world harm.” Twitter’s policy would also prohibit Trump from directing a third party to operate a Twitter account on his behalf [33].

Trump supporters have been migrating to niche social media platforms such as Parler for days. Parler briefly topped the app download charts. In response, Internet giants targeted Parler. Google removed Parler from the App Store and Apple issued an ultimatum to Parler. Amazon stopped offering Parler web services such as hosting. According to a report by Agence France Presse (AFP) on January 11, 2021, the Parler platform could not be accessed after midnight on that day, showing that it was disconnected [36].

Twitter boss Jack Dorsey has said banning US President Donald Trump was the right thing to do. He reiterated that removing the president from Twitter was made after “a clear warning” to Mr. Trump. “We made a decision with the best information we had based on threats to physical safety both on and off Twitter,” Mr. Dorsey said. But he accepted that the move would have consequences for an open and free internet [37] (Fig. 2.16).

Fig. 2.16

Twitter’s chief said he did not celebrate or feel pride in the ban—which came after the Capitol riot [37]

Political figures in Europe disapproved of the social media platforms’ decision to block Mr. Trump’s account, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Steffen Seibert, Merkel’s chief spokesman, said the operators of social media platforms “bear great responsibility for political communication not being poisoned by hatred, by lies and by incitement to violence”, at a regular news conference in Berlin, on January 11, 2021. He said it’s right not to “stand back” when such content is posted, for example by flagging it. But Seibert also said that the freedom of opinion is a fundamental right of “elementary significance.” “This fundamental right can be intervened in, but according to the law and within the framework defined by legislators—not according to a decision by the management of social media platforms,” he told reporters in Berlin. “Seen from this angle, the chancellor considers it problematic that the accounts of the U.S. president have now been permanently blocked” [38].

Bruno Le Maire, France’s finance minister, said he was “shocked” by Twitter’s decision to ban Trump, adding that “digital regulation should not be done by the digital oligarchy… (and) is a matter for the sovereign people, governments and the judiciary” [39].

Cédric O, France’s digital minister, expressed similar concerns. He wondered about these social networks which “may decide to censor someone followed by 88 million people completely unilaterally”. “They intervene in the public debate without any democratic supervision, without action of justice, by referring only to their general conditions of use”, he estimated. “Imagine that Twitter or Facebook becomes politicized and considers that it is on this or that political side, he explains. They could change their terms of service by saying, for example, ‘you are not allowed to make pro-Democrat or pro-Republicans, or pro-party or party in France. In such cases, they would censor an entire expression without any supervision since they are beyond the control of justice and the plurality of democratic expression” [40].

Thierry Breton, the European Union’s commissioner for the internal market, said in a Politico opinion piece: “Just as 9/11 marked a paradigm shift for global security, 20 years later we are witnessing a before-and-after in the role of digital platforms in our democracy”. Breton said the incidents in Washington revealed “the fragility of our democracies—and the threat that under-regulated tech companies can pose to their survival”. He expressed serious doubts about whether social media companies alone should have the power to block accounts of a US president. “The fact that a CEO can pull the plug on (Trump’s) loudspeaker without any checks and balances is perplexing,” Breton wrote. “It is not only confirmation of the power of these platforms, but it also displays deep weaknesses in the way our society is organized in the digital space,” he added. Breton also defended the EU’s recent proposals to more closely regulate big tech, including the Digital Services Act that could see platforms face fines for failures to curb illegal content [41].

“Who decides free speech?” 20 Minuten AG said that free speech was not just a legal issue. The worry is that in the digital world, the Internet giants have the final say. Der Spiegel said the Internet giants had allowed their platforms to be abused for too long over the years, allowing false and incitement to violence to spread on their platforms in an effort to monopolize and expand, and that some politicians in power enjoyed special protections. But the fact that these billionaires from Silicon Valley can decide for themselves who will be banned and who will be allowed to speak online is frightening [36].

2.5.3 Regulating the Power of Social Media Platform

The fourth power, also known as the 4th power, refers to the fourth political power in addition to “executive power, legislative power, judicial power”, refers to the media, the public and thereby. The 4th power theory emphasizes the freedom of speech stipulated by the press. The 4th power theory points out that “the purpose of the freedom of the press guaranteed by the constitution is to maintain the autonomy of the media, so that the media can provide information, public opinion and entertainment programs that are not controlled or influenced by the government, promote people to care about the work of the government and discuss public affairs, so as to play the function of supervising the government.”

In network age, individual free speech should be under the control of national sovereignty, not determined by digital platforms. Although states have always been and will continue to play a central role in international affairs, the non-state actors such as multinational corporations are also becoming increasingly important, and some enterprises even have more powerful associative power than sovereign states. For example, the market value of Google’s parent company Alphabet is equivalent to the combined GDP of Belgium and the Netherlands. Twitter, Facebook, Apple and others have access to information about hundreds of millions of netizens around the world.

Internet giants have gained a stronger position in front of the country and the public. It depends on the vast amount of data they have, the user engagement brought by their services, and the political and social power of the platforms themselves. The blocking of Trump’s account by some social media in the United States is precisely the exercise of their super power [42].

Global information, communication technologies and industries are growing more rapidly than global governance and the regulatory forces of sovereign states. How to define the authority boundary and legal responsibility of the digital oligarchy has become a problem and it’s difficult to reach agreement among states. The influence of related enterprises on national politics, economy, society and other aspects as well as the challenges brought by them are increasing day by day. Uncontrolled digital power has caused a certain negative impact on the traditional political life, social opinion and economic activities [42].

The legal environment in the United States is relatively friendly to digital platforms. Following the tradition of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, American politics and society are very cautious about public power interfering with the dissemination of public opinion. Section 230 of Communications Decency Act (CDA) provides immunity from liability for providers and users of an “interactive computer service” who publish information provided by third-party users. The statute in Section 230(c)(2) further provides “Good Samaritan” protection from civil liability for operators of interactive computer services in the removal or moderation of third-party material they deem obscene or offensive, even of constitutionally protected speech, as long as it is done in good faith [43]. This means that the judicial authorities cannot hold Internet companies accountable for what users say on the Internet platforms, on the other hand, users cannot hold Internet companies accountable for their posts being deleted or blocked on the Internet platforms. This regulation is designed to prevent the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from interfering with the Internet, and also allows websites to censor content according to their own needs [44].

For more than 20 years, Section 230 has been criticized by politicians and civil rights activists as condoning cyberbullying, but many in the tech industry believe it creates the foundations of modern Internet services. While the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has proposed legislation in 2019 to change the division of responsibility for content censorship, it has faced fierce opposition from some companies such as Facebook. On October 14, 2019, Facebook and Twitter again restricted the sharing of two scandalous reports about Hunter Biden, son of former vice president Joe Biden, citing violations of the platform’s rules. This move brought the debate over whether to alter Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act to the surface again [44].

Twitter’s decision to suspend of U.S. President Donald Trump’s account was pushing European leaders to stress the need to regulate social media companies [45]. Thierry Breton, EU Commissioner for Internal Market, raised concerns about the “deep weaknesses in the way our society is organized in the digital space”. Manfred Weber, chairman of the EPP group at the European Parliament, pointed out that “we cannot leave it to American Big Tech companies to decide what we do and do not discuss, what can and cannot be said in a democratic discourse. We need a stricter regulatory approach” [46].

Europe has taken a very different stance to regulating Big Tech than the U.S., where companies are often left to regulate themselves and typically enjoy a significant degree of legal immunity though protections like Section 230. This most recent criticism against large social media platforms could be interpreted as a warning shot [39]. The European Commission has taken a double initiative in this direction on behalf of EU member states [46]. The Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act are two crucial steps ahead for Europe, and they are mainly aimed at Internet giants known as “gatekeepers” rather than ordinary enterprises [44]. The Digital Services Act will regulate the business models and behaviors of Internet giants in line with European standards, stressing that Internet giants have a legal obligation to censor content, which could lead to huge fines of hundreds of millions of euros if breached. These two laws will also create a precedent for major states to establish rules for the regulation of digital enterprises, and have a strong leading significance for the formulation of legal norms in relevant fields around the world.

For some time, US Internet companies, represented by Silicon Valley giants, have been the target of EU regulatory “focus”. In February 2020, the newly appointed President of the European Commission, Ursula Gertrud von der Leyen, explained the concept of “digital sovereignty”, “EU must have the ability to make its own choices based on its own values and rules in the digital field”. Many European media believed that the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Digital Services Act, will be a key legal tool for the current leadership of the EU to ensure digital sovereignty [44].

At the same time, EU is also striving for the construction of its own Internet infrastructure [44]. In their speeches last year, Ursula Gertrud von der Leyen, Merkel and the French President Macron all mentioned Europe’s huge dependence on U.S. Internet companies such as Google, Facebook and Twitter. They announced that EU would launch the “GAIA-X” cloud computing platform as a platform to store data, based on the joint development of France and Germany.

In conclusion, Trump’s accounts suspension shows that digital sovereignty should be strictly governed by national network sovereignty, and the consolidation of national network sovereignty needs to be implemented in the construction of sovereignty network, so as to ensure the effective protection of network sovereignty and national security.