11.1 The History of Global Climate Governance

Since the 1980s, global climate change has drawn increasing attention from the international community. In 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was set up by the United Nations to organize thousands of scientists around the world to assess the scientific facts, causes, impacts, options for adaptation and mitigation and cost effects of climate change. Five assessment reports have been issued so far, and the sixth one is under preparation. The IPCC assessment report is a scientific report based on facts and research findings, and also the most important scientific basis for international climate negotiations and global governance decisions.

As global climate change endangers the survival and development of mankind, global cooperation in combating climate change is growing into a consensus of the international community. At the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was adopted, kicking off the global process of tackling climate change. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (hereinafter referred to as the Convention) envisaged the goals of the human society to address climate change: curb global greenhouse gas emissions from human activities; stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases; prevent a spike in surface temperatures; ensure that the earth’s ecosystems can adapt naturally to climate change; and protect grain production from threats. At the same time, the Convention has also put forward the basic principles to deal with climate change, among which two principles are the most important. The first is “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities”, primarily in view of the high emissions since the industrial revolution in the developed countries, who were deemed the major contributor to the current climate change and should bear the historical responsibility to take the lead in emission reduction and provide developing countries with funding, technology and capacity building support for them to adapt to and mitigate climate change. The second principle—“Sustainable Development”, pointed out that the economic development and poverty eradication of developing countries are still the top and overriding priorities at present. Therefore, developing countries need to closely integrate climate change efforts with sustainable development.

In accordance with the goals and principles set forth in the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at the Third Conference of the Parties held in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997, stipulating quantified obligations for developed countries to cut greenhouse gas emissions. Developed countries as a group should reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5% from 1990 levels, during the first five-year “commitment period” from 2008 to 2012. This overall obligation to reduce emissions has been broken down into each developed country (i.e. Annex I countries in the Convention). The signing of the Kyoto Protocol marks the beginning of substantial progress for human society to cope with climate change [1].

The 13th Conference of the Parties was convened in Bali, Indonesia. The conference launched the “Bali Roadmap”, charting the course for new negotiating process to determine how developed nations would further quantify obligations of emissions reduction after the end of the first commitment period in 2012, and to discuss how to meaningfully engage developing countries in the global actions to reduce emissions. With the consultations and hard work of all parties in Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban and Doha climate talks, the second commitment period (2013–2020) for developed countries was finally adopted, and so was the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, which launched a new process to negotiate a post-2020 climate regime for more ambitious emissions cut in all countries at the end of the Paris climate conference in 2015. The second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol lost its substantive relevance as the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, Russia and other developed countries did not sign/ratify it, and the Paris Agreement has become the new institutional framework for global climate governance beyond 2020.

Unanimously adopted by the Conference of the Parties, the Paris Agreement is a legally binding document that applies to all countries under the Convention in accordance with the targets and principles of the Convention. It defines the institutional framework of global cooperation and actions on climate change beyond 2020 and embodies the political will and common actions of all countries involved to tackle climate change [2]. Though playing down the “dichotomy” of the developed and developing countries in terms of their responsibilities and obligations, the Paris Agreement reflects the principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” in a range of elements, including mitigation, adaptation, capital, technology, capacity building, transparency and global stocktake, and demonstrates flexibility for developing countries by providing a balanced arrangement.

The Paris Agreement sets the long-term global goal of “holding the increase in global average temperature to well below 2 ℃ above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 ℃ above pre-industrial levels” in a bid to substantially reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. To achieve this goal, the Paris Agreement calls for reaching “global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible” and achieving “a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century” which means achieving global net zero emissions by the second half of the century. This global long-term goal is built upon Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), which requires all Parties to propose their NDC targets and action plans in a “bottom up” fashion under the guidance of “holding the global temperature rise to well below 2 ℃ and preferably to 1.5 ℃”. In order to achieve the global long-term goals, the transparency of national mitigation actions and funding support should be enhanced. Meanwhile, a global review or stocktake on the worldwide actions should be conducted every five years to evaluate the collective progress of agreement implementation and long-term goals, prompt further update of NDCs, strengthen actions and funding support, and narrow and bridge the emissions gap with long-term global temperature goals.

The new international institutional framework established by the Paris Agreement signifies a key turning point in the model and philosophy of global governance. On the one hand, it represents an unprecedented consensus and a shared political will across the world to deal with the “urgent and potentially irreversible threat that climate change poses to human societies and the planet”. On the other, the Paris Agreement, by designing bottom-up mechanisms to encourage countries to set ambitious goals and action plans, rather than imposing top-down responsibilities and obligations, demonstrates the shift in thinking from the “zero-sum game” to a “win–win outcome”. The new institutional framework seeks to spur low carbon economic transformation in all countries, and facilitate the coordination between climate change management and promotion of equitable access to sustainable development and poverty eradication, and achieve the dual benefits of “development” and “carbon reduction”. At the same time, it stresses the joint actions on sustainable development and climate change initiatives, promoting win–win cooperation between the countries.

China has made outstanding contributions to the adoption and enforcement of the Paris Agreement. The US-China and France-China joint statements on climate change before the conference had already built consensus on the core and focal issues of the negotiations, which ultimately served as the basis for consensus among all Parties. The withdrawal of the Trump administration from the Paris Agreement has undermined global climate governance, and might shake the confidence and actions of the international community on climate cooperation, and fuel unilateralism and protectionism, and affect the willingness and strength of other developed countries in providing climate financing and technical support. In contrast, the global “bottom-up” collaborative efforts are booming. For instance, twenty US states that represent over 60% of US population and GDP formed the US Climate Alliance and vowed to uphold the Paris Agreement within their borders. Due to China’s remarkable achievements in energy conservation and carbon reduction at home and its responsible and constructive attitude in global climate governance, the international community has full expectations for China’s leadership.

Clouded by unilateralism of some developed countries, the UN Climate Change Conference held in Madrid (COP25) in December 2018 failed to complete the unfinished tasks at COP24 in Katowice of reaching agreement on the detailed rules for implementing Paris Agreement (that is, market mechanism under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement). The failure to produce the desired outcome sparked concerns of the international community about the mechanism and capability of global climate governance under Paris Agreement. The global outbreak of COVID-19 in the end of 2019 has shifted the priority of policy agendas in all countries to shoring up economic weakness, improving industrial chains and accelerating economic recovery, which would inevitably put the brake on green and low-carbon transformation. At the same time, the pandemic has further heightened the sense of sovereignty and national consciousness of all countries, as evidenced by the all-round escalation of rivalry between China and the United States and other developed countries, with mounting “deglobalization” and “anti-globalization” sentiments. This means that the comprehensive, balanced and effective implementation of Paris Agreement is facing extremely daunting challenges.

A lookback of global climate governance history reveals a process of constant evolution of China’s strategic positioning in global climate governance. When UNFCCC was adopted in 1992, China’s carbon emissions were still fairly low, and the strategic positioning was to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests as a developing country. The negotiation was conducted in a way to ensure sufficient emission space before 2030 to support economic and social development. With the continuous rise of its comprehensive national strength, China’s positioning and mission for global climate governance have undergone notable evolvement. Especially after the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the government introduced the new strategic positioning of “steering international cooperation on climate change and becoming a major participant, contributor and torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological civilization”. China’s current and near-to-mid-term climate strategies mainly center around the demand for sustainable development of domestic resources and environment and focus on the synergy of carbon emission reduction and environmental protection. But by the middle of the twenty-first century when China evolves into a modern socialist powerhouse with the largest economy in the world, it must assume the responsibility of a major country to contribute to the development of human societies, protect the ecological safety of the Earth, and provide more public goods for the world. This is also the historical mission of the Communist Party of China. Therefore, China’s long-term low-carbon development strategy must go beyond the domestic needs for sustainable development and proactively take on the international responsibility of addressing climate change. While China’s current low-carbon strategy can well achieve its nationally determined contributions (NDCs), it falls short of the goal of 2 ℃ and the mission of protecting the ecological safety of the Earth. The 2 ℃ scenario must be taken as the target in a prompt manner to drive the transformation. Moreover, the current policies should be reinforced in the next decade (14th and 15th Five-Year Plan periods), and the transformation should be sped up after 2030 to move toward the 2 ℃ scenario. Failure to do so would exponentially increase the difficulty and cost of emission reduction in the future.

11.2 Several Core and Focal Issues in Global Climate Governance

11.2.1 The Principle of Equity and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities

In the process of global cooperation on climate change, each country faces different prominent problems and conflicts in achieving its own sustainable development on account of varied national conditions and stages of development, hence different standpoints and requests are reflected in global climate governance. But climate change is a global challenge. In balancing the overall interests of the world and the local interests of individual countries, the governance system would inevitably involve the sharing of responsibilities and obligations, which, more often than not, sparks conflict and tensions between countries. Therefore, the establishment of a fair and effective international institutional framework becomes the cornerstone for the world’s multilateral mechanism on climate change. With the progress of climate governance, the notion of equitable access to sustainable development has become a request and principle shared by all developing countries in the negotiations of the international climate change system, and an integral part in building the system of international sustainable development.

Climate equity has always been at the heart of climate negotiations and the bedrock for the international governance system of fairness, justice and win–win cooperation. The Paris Agreement is the institutional framework applicable to all countries. It is guided by the principles of the Convention, including equity, common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and respective capabilities. Though watering down the “dichotomy” between developed and developing countries in terms of their responsibilities and obligations laid out in Kyoto protocol, it brings to the fore the principle of CBDR in the elements of mitigation, adaptation, capital, technology, capacity building and transparency, etc., with flexibility for developing countries. On mitigation, for instance, the Paris Agreement stipulates that developed countries should continue to take the lead by taking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets, and that developing countries should continue to ramp up their mitigation efforts, and are encouraged to move over time toward economy-wide absolute emission reduction in the light of different national circumstances. On funding, for another example, the Paris Agreement sets that “developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention”, and requests developed countries to raise at least $100 billion every year before 2025 to support developing countries, and encourages other Parties “to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily” [3].

The CBDR principle established in the Convention stems from the notion of “corrective justice” and reflects “distributive justice”. The principle comprehensively delineated the different responsibilities between developed and developing countries relative to global warming, stating that developed countries bear the historical responsibility of global warming, and that the need of developing countries for greenhouse gas emissions must be accommodated to secure their transformation toward sustainable development. Under this circumstance, the Convention requests developed countries to take the lead in emission reduction, and provide developing countries with funding, technology and capacity building for them to adapt to and mitigate climate change. In order to underline the importance of balancing responsibilities and capabilities for climate equity, the principle of “respective capabilities” has always been accompanied by the principle of CBDR in the Convention and the subsequent negotiations as well as the outcome of Rio+20. Especially after the Cancun Conference when the notion of climate justice featuring “equitable access to sustainable development (EASD)” cropped up, there was a perspective of development that said the global climate governance justice system that focused on the past, present and future had been formed, that is, the CBDR principle which primarily traces the history is mainly used to identify historical responsibilities; the reality-based principle of “respective capabilities” mainly caters to the differences in development stages; and the future-oriented principle of “Equitable Access to Sustainable Development” mainly accommodates the long-term right to development [4].

The Convention is a fundamental legal document for global climate governance and the cornerstone for the establishment of an international climate governance system. Its basic principles have been observed and reaffirmed under the Paris Agreement. The creation of the global climate system must showcase the concept of “fairness”, requiring equal consultation and broad participation of all countries and comprehensive and balanced solicitation and reflection of requests from countries under different national conditions and development stages. It should also adhere to the concept of fairness, historical responsibilities and respective capabilities in terms of code of conduct, and embody the CBDR principle. The Paris Agreement also emphasizes the “intrinsic relationship that climate change actions, responses and impacts have with equitable access to sustainable development and eradication of poverty”. The equitable access to sustainable development is the shared request and principle for developing countries in global climate governance talks, and the central element in the global climate governance system [5].

In the process of industrialization and modernization, developed countries recklessly consumed the planet’s mineral resources and discharged wastes in a way that severely exceeded the Earth’s capacity, and thus bears the historical responsibility for climate change in the past century. In contrast, on the way to industrialization and modernization, developing countries no longer enjoy the same resources and environment endowment, and could not follow the path of high resource consumption and eco-environmental damage for the sake of development as their developed counterpart did. Their modernization endeavors will be severely hampered by the capacity of the Earth’s environment and carbon emission limit, prompting a path of resources-saving, environmentally-friendly, and low carbon development to bring about green and low carbon transition for the energy system and economic development. Now and in the future, only with ambitious emission reduction by developed countries can it reserve sufficient room for carbon emissions by developing countries to support their economic transformation and sustainable development. The pressing low carbon transformation of developing countries also requires financial and technical support from developed nations to ensure equitable access to modern high-quality energy services for the people in the developing world, eliminate poverty, improve people’s livelihood, promote fairness and sustainability and, in the meantime, achieve low carbon economic development. The tighter the schedule for global carbon neutrality, the less carbon emission is permitted for the growth of developing countries. So it is essential for developed countries to lead the transition to net zero emissions, and also for developing nations to rapidly follow up for deep emission reduction, but the two would by no means become carbon neutral at the same time.

During the current implementation of the Paris Agreement, developed countries increasingly sought to downplay and forsake the CBDR principle by pushing the rhetoric of collective responsibilities and actions and more ambitious efforts by all parties, and ignoring their responsibility to assist developing countries in terms of funding, technology and capacity building in order to mitigate and adapt to climate change. The CBDR principle is the bedrock for a global climate governance system featuring fairness, rationality and win–win cooperation. It represents an institutional safeguard for achieving sustainable development by all countries and addressing the climate crisis in a coordinated and win–win manner. It is also the guiding principle that must be observed in global climate governance and international cooperation for a long time to come. China should adhere to the strategic positioning of developing countries, consolidate and build the strategic support for developing countries, maintain and uphold the basic principles enshrined in the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and promote the building of a global climate governance system and cooperation process featuring fairness, justice and win–win cooperation.

11.2.2 Positioning China as a Developing Country

The distinction between developed and developing countries in global climate governance is a political and historical concept of responsibility. Annex I to the Convention adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 designated 41 countries undertaking the responsibilities and obligations of developed countries, including the countries of the former Soviet Union and the economies in transition in Eastern Europe, aside from the traditional post-industrialized economies. These countries enjoyed relatively developed economies with a higher per capita GDP. Their per capita greenhouse gas emissions have been much higher than those of developing countries. These countries have the historical and realistic responsibility for global climate change. In the context of global actions against climate change, these countries belong to developed nations, while non-Annex I countries fall under the category of developing countries. China is a non-Annex I country, which means that its status as a developing country is recognized under the Convention.

Both of the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol adopted by the UN Climate Conference in 1997 and the Post-2007 Bali Roadmap insist on binding quantified absolute emission reduction obligations for developed countries, while developing countries are only required to take appropriate mitigation actions of their own in their sustainable development priority areas. As a developing country, China has not undertaken the obligation of quantitative emission reduction under the Kyoto Protocol, nor is it obliged to contribute to the “Green Climate Fund”. Under the “Bali Roadmap”, China set the NDC targets of a 40 ~ 45% drop in carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 2020 from the 2005 level, 15% of non-fossil energy, and forest stock growing to 1.3 billion cubic meters, etc., which are the voluntary emission reduction efforts in the priority areas of sustainable development such as energy transformation and ecological protection—in line with China’s status as a developing country.

The Paris Agreement adopted by the UN Climate Conference at the end of 2015 established the post-2020 new global climate governance mechanism, which sought to keep global temperature rise below 2 ℃ above pre-industrial levels while pursuing efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 ℃. It also created a new bottom-up structure where countries submit their own targets and action plans for NDCs—a new framework applicable to all Parties. Meanwhile, the mechanism also observed the principles of the Convention: equity, common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, taking into account the varied national conditions. The elements of climate change mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building and transparency still demonstrate the flexibility of differentiated responsibilities and actions for developing and developed countries.

More than twenty years since the signing of the Convention, major changes have taken place in the economic development and greenhouse gas emissions of both developing and developed countries. In 1990, developed countries in Annex I accounted for only 22.2% of the world’s population, 83% of the global GDP, nearly 70% of global greenhouse gas emissions, and 82% of global cumulative emissions since the industrial revolution. This confirmed the primary responsibility of developed countries for global climate change, and their due obligations were identified accordingly. By 2016, developed countries in Annex I saw their share of global GDP dropping to 63%, their emissions to 38%, and cumulative historical emissions to 68%. In contrast, emissions in developing countries were surging, with the per capita carbon dioxide emissions increasing from 12% to 34% of that in developed countries. This showed that, for one thing, with the economic development and emissions increase, developing countries should continuously scale up efforts to slash emissions and assume more responsibilities and obligations. For another, the historical and realistic responsibilities of developed and developing countries remained unchanged at the core, and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities would be relevant for a long time to come.

In 1990, China only produced 10% of the world’s CO2 emissions, and the per capita emissions was less than half of the world average. Yet by 2016, China’s emissions had made up 28% of the world’s total emissions, more than the US and EU combined; China’s per capita had reached 1.5 times of the world average, exceeding that of the EU; its share of cumulative global CO2 emissions had risen from 5.2% in 2005 to 12.7%, which was still much lower than the US share of 25%, and the per capita cumulative emissions was only 68% of the world average. On the one hand, this means that the characteristics and status of China as a developing country had not been fundamentally reversed and would be maintained for a considerable period of time in the future; On the other hand, with the economic development, growing comprehensive national strength and rapidly increasing greenhouse gas emissions, China and other emerging developing countries must ramp up their actions in the global fight against climate change and enhance their NDC targets in order to make greater contributions.

In view of China’s rising national strength and growing proportion of its greenhouse gas emissions in the world, there have been voices in the international community that questioned and challenged China’s status as a developing country. U.S. climate negotiators even proposed to create a “graduation” for developing countries by delisting China, South Korea, Singapore and other emerging countries from non-Annex I so that they would undertake similar responsibilities and obligations as Annex I developed countries. However, this involves a modification of the Convention and a consensus by all parties, and therefore is hard to be put on the negotiation agenda. The division between Annex I developed countries and non-Annex I developing countries will not change and cannot be changed for a long time to come. Of course, flexibility should be shown in terms of the responsibilities and obligations in case of changed national circumstances in some countries.

The CBDR principle and flexibility embodied in the bottom-up NDC mechanism and all elements of the Paris Agreement are conducive to China’s long-term strategic positioning as a developing country, providing space and the opportunities for China to safeguard national interests and play an active role in global climate governance. China’s NDC targets by 2030 under the Paris Agreement—60% ~ 65% reduction in CO2 emission per unit of GDP from the 2005 level, 20% non-fossil energy share in primary energy consumption, and peaking of CO2 emissions around 2030 and making best efforts to peak earlier—were based on the principles of Paris Agreement and China’s status as a developing country. These ambitious targets for emission reduction are aligned with its national conditions and development stage. China’s NDC targets only cover energy-related CO2 emissions and are relative emission reduction targets for cutting CO2 emissions per unit of GDP, which is different from the quantified economy-wide absolute greenhouse gases emission reduction targets implemented by developed countries. With economic development and increasing overall national strength, China will also need to ramp up emission reduction efforts and take the initiative to assume more international responsibilities in the future. After peaking CO2 emissions before 2030, China needs to strive for an economy-wide absolute reduction of all greenhouse gas emissions.

On May 20, 2020, the White House released the United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China, further demonstrating its strategic intent to suppress and contain China. It strenuously denies China’s status as a developing country, stressing that China is already a “mature economy” but still gains many benefits that are not accessible to the United States through the title of a developing nation. The document emphasizes that the United States views China as an equal rival, and will examine the benefits arising from China’s being a developing country in international institutions and rules and ask for revisions to turn China into a “developed country”. Upholding and cementing China’s developing country status echoes China’s national conditions and stage of development and safeguards China’s legitimate rights and interests in international affairs. It is also conducive to expanding the strategic support of developing countries to defuse the plots and measures of the United States and other western countries to isolate and suppress China. Global climate change has always been an important area for developed and developing countries to compete and for big powers to contest. It will also be a major arena in which the United States and other western countries deny China’s status as a developing country, disunite China and other developing countries, and apply pressure on and shift their responsibilities and obligations to China. In the wake of COVID-19, the United States will amplify its demands and position for China to take equal responsibilities and obligations in the field of climate change, and will continue to put pressure on China’s emission reduction and funding commitments. Consolidating and maintaining China’s strategic positioning as a developing country in global climate governance can strengthen China’s solidarity with the vast number of developing countries, strive for a relatively loose carbon emission space for China to realize modernization, and set an example for China to maintain its developing country status in other fields.

11.2.3 The 1.5 ℃ Global Temperature Target

The objective of the Convention, adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, is to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”, and “such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner”. Due to the lack of scientific research at that time, no specific control targets of temperature rise was proposed. With the progress of scientific research, the European Union first proposed to set a global climate target of keeping temperature rise below 2 ℃ above pre-industrial levels. The Copenhagen Climate Conference in 2009 failed to reach agreement on the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, but managed to build consensus on the 2 ℃ goal. Later, the European Union, Small Island States and the Least Developed Countries went a step further by raising the target to 1.5 ℃, and their voices were getting louder. Therefore, the Paris Agreement, after balancing various opinions, put forward “holding the increase in the global average temperature increase to well below 2 ℃ above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 ℃ above pre-industrial levels”, and requested IPCC to submit a technical document on the impact of global warming of 1.5 ℃ above pre-industrial levels and related pathways of global greenhouse gas emissions.

In October 2018, IPCC issued the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 ℃, suggesting that the 1.5 ℃ target is technically feasible and could enable notable reduction in climate risks and negative impacts compared to 2 ℃, and is generally conducive to achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations [6]. However, the 1.5 ℃ target requires more urgent efforts in emission reduction. Specifically, net zero CO2 emission and deep emission reduction of other greenhouse gases should be achieved by the middle of this century, which would incur a marginal cost 3 to 4 times larger than the 2 ℃ target. The release of the special report sparked worldwide repercussions. The United Kingdom has revised its Climate Change Act to introduce a carbon neutral target for 2050. The European Union updated its climate ambition for 2030 in the Green Deal, with a 50–55% cut in greenhouse gas emissions from the 1990 levels and a target of net zero emission (i.e., carbon neutral) by 2050, which will be protected by legislation. Some states in the United States, such as California and New York, also set targets for carbon neutrality by the middle of this century. Now, developed countries, including New Zealand, France, Canada, Spain, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, and developing countries such as Chile, Ethiopia, Costa Rica and Fiji have also outlined their own goals of achieving net zero emission by 2050 or before. COP26, which has been postponed to 2021 due to the pandemic, will continue to focus on strengthening emission reduction efforts of all countries. And it is expected that more countries will commit to a carbon neutral target with net zero emissions by 2050 in their low emission development strategies for the mid-century to be submitted in 2020.

The 1.5 ℃ target requires that global carbon emissions peak as soon as possible and begin to decline rapidly afterwards, so much so that CO2 emissions are reduced by 45% by 2030 compared to 2010, global net zero emission is achieved by 2050, and achieving deep reductions in other greenhouse gases. According to the NDC targets of all countries under the Paris Agreement and the current trend, global greenhouse gas emissions will continue to rise by 2030, and there will be an annual emission reduction gap of about 11 ~ 21.5 billion tons to achieve the 2 ℃ target. Global warming is likely to reach 1.5 ℃ between 2030 and 2050 and to reach about 2.7 ℃ or even exceed 3 ℃ by the end of this century. If the current rate of global warming continues, the 2 ℃ target will not be achieved, not to mention the 1.5 ℃ target. Therefore, it is essential for all Parties to significantly enhance and update their NDC targets and actions and encourage all stakeholders to step up their ambitions.

As the all-round implementation of the Paris Agreement settles in, the top priority is to adhere to the goals and principles of the Paris Agreement, facilitate its comprehensive, balanced and effective enforcement, encourage all parties to ramp up their own efforts and boost joint international actions. COP26 should press for consensus on the market mechanism of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, wrap up negotiations on the Paris Rulebook, and promote cooperation under the global market mechanism. It should review global emission reduction actions before 2020 and the implementation of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. It is also necessary to focus on how to ensure the delivery of US$100 billion each year committed by developed countries and other pressing issues such as climate disasters and adaptation in vulnerable areas of developing countries, and avoid empty talk on grand visions without concrete immediate action in order not to delay global joint response.

To keep global temperature rise under 1.5 ℃, the world as a whole should become carbon neutral by the middle of this century. The historical and current high emissions of developed countries are self-evident, and the cumulative carbon emissions so far alone could push up the temperature by 1.2 ℃. With increasing urgency of global long-term emission reduction, the pressure and risks for ensuring equitable access to sustainable development are mounting, as developing countries are left with smaller emission space in the process of modernization. To attain the 2 ℃ target, a maximum of 117 ~ 150 billion tons of carbon emissions are allowed in the future. To achieve the 1.5 ℃ target, the future emission space is 42 ~ 58 billion tons, which is 1/2 ~ 2/3 less than the 2 ℃ scenario, and primarily come from increased efforts by developing countries where more urgent and ambitious low-carbon transition is required for sustainable development. This points to the need for greater financial and technical support from developed countries. Under the 1.5 ℃ target, the world as a whole should achieve net zero CO2 emissions by 2050. However, it is impossible for all countries to achieve net zero emissions simultaneously. Developed countries should take the lead in achieving net zero CO2 emissions around 2035, and achieve a certain level of negative emissions of all greenhouse gases by 2050, so as to leave the developing world necessary carbon emissions space for their modernization efforts and an equitable access to sustainable development [7].

The establishment of the long-term goals of tacking climate change is a multilateral political decision under the Convention. The description of the long-term global temperature target in the Paris Agreement embodies the hard-won consensus by all Parties. It’s built on the scientific assessment of the interplay between climate change and the economy, society and environment, accommodating the impact and loss of climate change, adaptation and mitigation, and cost and sacrifices for emission reduction. Due to varied national conditions and stages of development, different countries face different climate risks and have different priority areas of sustainable development. This underscores the importance of coordinating the diverse interests and requests of all parties and global cooperation, and promoting joint actions for win–win cooperation. China should continue to play its role as a responsible major country in global climate governance, actively leverage its influence as major developing country, boost exchanges and communication with other countries and international organizations, and lay the groundwork for building consensus on COP26 related issues.

China will still in the stage of building modernization before the middle of this century, and will face greater challenges for achieving carbon neutrality compared to developed countries. It entails faster and more drastic transformation of China’s energy and economic systems. In the United States, for instance, the average age of coal-fired power plants is already about 45 years with a higher cost of generating electricity than that of natural gas and renewable energy. It’s natural for them to be naturally decommissioned or replaced by clean electricity technologies. By comparison, the median age of coal-fired power plants in China is only 12 years. Most advanced supercritical and ultra-supercritical large coal-fired power plants were built in the past decade, and huge stranded infrastructure cost would be incurred should these plants are rapidly phased out. Furthermore, a large uptake of renewable power would place mounting strains on the grids, energy storage and peak shaving and stable operation, requiring groundbreaking technologies in the space of battery energy storage, hydrogen storage, smart grid, etc. It also involves faster and greater electrification penetration for energy end-users, which can only be made possible through innovations and industrialization of state-of-the-art technologies. The very frontier and hot spots of the world’s technology competition, these technologies are a symbol for a country’s technological innovation capabilities and technological competitiveness. This research found that China is currently not technologically prepared for carbon neutrality by 2050, and the cost of deep emission reduction will rise steeply in a non-linear fashion. Therefore, more in-depth research and analysis are required for the economic evaluation on the emission reduction pathways and technology options for carbon neutrality, study on the costs of urgent transformation, thus providing China’s wisdom and solutions for a global validation of the long-term targets.

11.2.4 Carbon Pricing and Carbon Border Tax

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement calls for the creation of a global mechanism for carbon market cooperation to boost national emission reduction and international cooperation. Similar to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol, it encourages collaborative emission reduction between developed and developing countries. While contributing to emission reduction of developed countries at a low cost, it helps promote low-carbon transition and sustainable development of developing nations. The cooperation of market mechanisms among nations under the Paris Agreement will spur the development of global carbon pricing mechanism, cement the Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) system of all countries, foster technological innovation for emission reduction and international cooperation, and enable global collective emission reduction at a lower cost. The negotiations of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement on international market mechanism mainly involved measures for preventing carbon leakage and double-counting of emission reductions to ensure environmental integrity, and coordinating interests of parties with CDM. The international community also cherishes a desire for COP26 to reach agreement on the implementation rules for Article 6, so as to promote cooperation among countries and their own capacity building.

The urgency and trend of global low-carbon transformation will also trigger changes and disputes in global economic and trade rules. To illustrate, some developed countries erect “green trade barriers” by raising the standards for energy efficiency or eco-friendliness of commodities, and suppress the growing trade competitiveness of developing countries through trade protectionism. The European Union (EU), the United States (US) and other developed countries have been planning to implement Border Carbon Adjustments (BCAs) such as carbon tariffs. Prior to COP25 in November 2019, the EU launched the Green Deal, establishing the target of 50% to 55% of emission reduction by 2030 and net zero emission by 2050 through legislation, making Europe the first climate-neutral continent [8]. The EU policy package also included carbon border adjustment for selected industries before 2021 as a critical component of Green Deal on the diplomatic front, which would be the centerpiece for EU’s future climate negotiations. The Republican and Democratic think tanks in the US are also contemplating the possibility and planning of carbon tariffs on imported products and carbon benefits at home in case US returns to the Paris Agreement in the future. Such unilateralism and protectionism tendencies in global climate governance needs a meticulous review and high vigilance.

The unilateral imposition of carbon tariffs by developed nations does not conform to the principles of the Convention. Article 3.5 (Principles) of the Convention clearly states: “the Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing country Parties, thus enabling them better to address the problems of climate change. Measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.” The carbon border tax levied by developed countries for the sake of domestic emission reduction policies and actions obviously contradicts this clause.

For emerging developing countries whose exports are mostly medium and low-end manufacturing products with high-energy consumption and low added value, carbon tariff will seriously erode their trade competitiveness [5]. The input–output method is employed to make the following calculations based on the latest foreign trade data from the Statistical Office of the European Union and China Trade and External Economic Statistical Yearbook: 1.53 billion tons of CO2 emissions were embodied in China’s exports in 2018, and 542 million tons for imported goods. CO2 embodied in the net exports comprised roughly 10.5% of the total national emissions, of which 270 million tons were exported to the EU, accounting for 17.6%; 286 million tons went to the US, or 18.7%. Imported carbons from the EU and US were 31 million tons and 44 million tons respectively, making China the net exporter of embodied CO2 emissions. The EU adopted carbon border tax on grounds of preventing carbon leakage, targeting imports with higher embodied CO2 than domestic products that might push up global carbon emissions. The details of the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism and its target countries and its coverage of sectors and products are not yet clear. The measures might include a carbon tariff on specific industries or products, or imposing mandatory purchase of emission allowance under the EU carbon market on imported products, or a domestic carbon tax rebate or purchased allowance for exported products. In short, the purpose is to preserve the competitiveness of local enterprises in the EU and the international market, transfer the cost and pressure of emission reduction to countries that “have not made proper commitments”, namely developing countries. If a carbon tax of 40 ~ 60 US dollars per ton is charged on China’s exports to Europe and the United States, the tax would make up 2.6% ~ 4.0% of the total export, which would put the strain on China’s exporters.

The trend of global economic integration has accelerated the adjustment and division of labor in the global industrial chain. While massively transferring high-energy-consuming raw material and low-end manufacturing industries to developing countries, developed countries have focused on the development of high-tech and modern service industries, thus occupying a top position in the international industrial value chain. The developing world, on the other hand, is pushed to the middle and low-end with low added value, high energy consumption and emission intensity, producing textiles, household appliances, motorcycles and other daily consumer and low-end manufacturing goods to be exported to developed countries. While these mid—and low-end products are produced in developing countries, they are consumed in developed nations. But under current rules, energy consumption and CO2 emissions are calculated based on the origin of production. Developed countries consume these products, but are not accounted for emissions in the manufacturing process. That is, in fact, a shift of emission responsibilities and obligations in the form of carbon transfer or carbon leakage. Developed countries are obliged to assist developing countries to enhance energy efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions during the production of these products, reduce the amount of emissions transferred to developing countries, and share the responsibility of cutting the transferred emissions.

In developed countries, the ambitious emission reduction targets and the implementation of carbon tax or carbon emission trading policy would increase the cost of emission reduction for enterprises. For example, imposing carbon border tax on imports from developing countries on grounds of protecting local enterprises is tantamount to a transfer of emission reduction cost to their developing counterparts. By relocating the high energy-intensive and low-end raw materials manufacturing industries to developing countries, developed countries have brought down their emissions and passed on domestic emission reduction costs to developing countries through imposing carbon tax on developing countries’ products and using the collected tax proceeds to subsidize or encourage domestic enterprises’ technology innovation and emission reduction. Currently, some developed countries are planning to implement a carbon tax rebate for their exports to developing countries, that is, to refund the increased cost of domestic enterprises under their own carbon tax or carbon market mechanism at the time of export so that they can stay competitive in the international market. This is a unilateral act of using carbon tax policy to safeguards own interests in international economic and trade competition.

As the world gears up for more urgent emission reduction, the unilateral implementation of carbon border tax by developed countries is, on the whole, an unfair act of trade protectionism through the transfer of responsibility and cost of emission reduction in the name of combating climate change. It not only harms global cooperation on climate change, technology innovation, emission cost reduction, and the related targets and pathways, but also gives rise to a new round of trade disputes and frictions, undermines WTO rules, and overshadows the prospect of a fair and just international climate governance mechanism for win–win cooperation as well as the process of global cooperation on climate change. It would only jeopardize its own image and undercut its influence and leadership in global climate governance. Under the mega trend of global economic and industrial convergence, developed countries should ramp up technology transfer and financial support to developing countries, promote technological innovation, energy conservation and efficiency improvement, and emission reduction in developing countries, thereby promoting carbon emissions reduction and fostering win–win cooperation among all countries in the world.

The pretext for EU and other developed countries to implement carbon tax is that the insufficient emission reduction efforts and the low emission reduction cost of companies in developing countries have created unfair advantages over companies in developed countries. In response to this concern, China should consolidate and speed up the development of the domestic carbon market and gradually include major high-emission sectors in the carbon market, as a clear signal of carbon pricing for energy-intensive products to write off or weaken the basis for developed countries to impose carbon border tax, and play a leading role in the development of the global carbon market and the carbon pricing mechanism in the future.

At present, most of China’s export manufacturing products are at the middle and low-end of the international industrial chain with high energy consumption and low value rate. As a result, China has become a net exporter of embodied CO2 emissions in foreign trade. While accelerating the transformation towards green, low-carbon and circular economy under the new development concept, China should also drive the transformation and upgrading of export-oriented enterprises, optimize the export mix, control and reduce the export of energy-intensive products, and move toward the higher end of the value chain to enhance quality and efficiency. At the same time, China should actively promote the export of new and high technologies and modern services, increase the weight of services in its export, effectively reduce the outward transfer of embodied carbon emissions, and gradually balance embodied emissions from imports and exports. This is the fundamental countermeasure for China to deal with the carbon border tax of developed countries in international trade and build the international competitiveness of its products and technologies. It is also a major step to reduce the total amount of domestic CO2 emissions and should be a critical component of China’s strategy of green and low-carbon economic transformation and high-quality development.

11.3 Intensive Engagement and Active Leadership in Global Climate Governance and International Cooperation

11.3.1 Xi Jinping’s Thought on Ecological Civilization Is of Important Guiding Significance to Global Low-Carbon Development and Transformation

Upholding Xi Jinping’s Thought on Ecological Civilization, promoting global ecological progress and achieving harmonious development between man and nature is the ultimate solution to climate change and an inevitable path toward global sustainable development. Xi’s ideology of eco-civilization contains a range of expressions, including “the harmonious coexistence between man and nature”, “green is gold”, “good ecological environment represents the greatest well-being of the people”, “mountains, waters, forests, fields, lakes and grassland are a community of life”, “preserving ecological environment through the most stringent system and the rigorous rule of law”, etc. This notion of eco-civilization is universally relevant for all countries, especially the developing nations. It provides directions for them to build ecological culture systems based on ecological values, coordinates economic development, social progress and environmental protection, facilitates low carbon transition of the energy and economic systems, and embarks on a path of climate-friendly, low carbon economic development. In his proposal for building global ecological civilization, Xi Jinping underlined the importance of “putting in place an ecological system with the respect for nature and green development at the heart, addressing the problems brought by industrial civilization, pursuing harmony between man and nature, and realizing sustainable development of the world and all-round development of man.” The notion of global ecological civilization will also be a vital guiding ideology for global collaborative actions against ecological crisis, in particular climate change, prompting the transformation of human society from industrial civilization to ecological civilization, steering a paradigm shift of world economic and social development, and achieving the harmonious development between man and nature [9].

Xi Jinping’s Thought on Eco-civilization advocates the establishment of a green, low carbon and circular economic system for sustainable development through the building of a clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient energy system, development of green finance and creation of a legal and policy framework for green production and consumption, etc. It contributes China’s wisdom and expertise to the global cooperation on climate change and other ecological crisis of the planet, promotes the harmonious coexistence between man and nature and efforts to build a clean and beautiful world, thus driving the progress of global environmental governance and global ecological civilization.

Guided by Xi Jinping’s Thought on Ecological Civilization, China is firmly committed to the path of civilized development featuring increased productivity, well-being of the people and sound ecology. It implements the strictest system for ecological and environmental protection in an effort to build a beautiful China. It adheres to the concept of green, low-carbon, circular and sustainable development in line with the path of climate-friendly, low-carbon economic development encouraged by the Paris Agreement. China seamlessly integrates climate change efforts with sustainable development at home, creating a win–win scenario for the economy, people’s livelihood, energy, environment and CO2 emission reduction, and making enormous strides in energy reform and CO2 emission reduction. It has become an important contributor and torchbearer in advancing energy reform and low-carbon economic transformation in the world. China’s successful experience in energy and economic transformation, new urbanization, industrial transformation and upgrading, environmental governance, as well as its policy framework of energy conservation, carbon reduction and ecological civilization can inform and inspire other developing countries. Its remarkable achievements and successful experience in ecological progress and environmental protection, as well as the concept and practice of building an economic, institutional and ecological safety system for ecological progress will shed a new light on the world ecological progress and sustainable development.

The report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China reaffirmed China’s commitment to peaceful development in the new era, underscoring China’s stance in building a community with a shared future for mankind, upholding the notion of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits in global governance, and actively participating in the reform and development of the global governance system, and constantly contributing China’s wisdom and expertise. The report also highlighted China’s pledge to environmental friendliness, cooperation in tackling climate change, protection of the planet, and contribution to global ecological safety. Xi Jinping’s Thought on Global Ecological Civilization and the concept of building a community with a shared future for mankind embody Chinese wisdom and proposal for global environmental governance, and will play an important role in guiding the global efforts in building ecological civilization and moving toward a climate-friendly and low-carbon development path.

11.3.2 Actively Promote and Lead the Process of Global Climate Governance and Climate Negotiations

China will continue to assume responsibilities and obligations as a developing country for a long period of time. But in the long run, its strategic positioning shall be adjusted as its development stage changes. By the middle of this century when China becomes a great modern socialist country, it must gradually water down its status as a developing country, and proactively undertake the international responsibility for climate change, and actively promote and lead the process of global climate governance and climate negotiations in order to measure up to its rising status as a major country. As pointed out in the report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, “taking a driving seat in international cooperation to respond to climate change, China has become an important participant, contributor and torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological civilization”. Xi Jinping also stressed that China should “implement a proactive strategy on climate change management, promote and guide the establishment of a fair, reasonable and win–win global governance system, showcase its image as a major responsible country, and build a community with a shared future for mankind”.

The pioneering role in climate change negotiations is best seen in the capability to coordinate the varied positions and interests of parties, and to show impact, inspiration and leadership in building common ground of global targets and positions of all parties and seeking balance of varied interests. The ability to do so would facilitate consensus-building and unanimously accepted action plans, guide the direction and pace of global climate governance rule-making and cooperation process, thus taking the international moral high ground, improving international image and leadership, better safeguarding and expanding national interests, and demonstrating a country’s soft power.

In the course of chronic climate negotiations, countries in the world are divided into three forces, namely, the “two camps”—developing countries and developed countries; the Umbrella Group headed by the EU and the United States; and the group of developing countries—“G77+ China” with the “Basic Four” as the core. China, in reality, has become the “backbone” of the “BASIC Countries” and the group of developing countries, and has maintained close communication and dialogues with major developed countries. It has actively bridged differences of all parties in climate negotiations and built mutual trust for cooperation, and has demonstrated its rising influence and leadership. China has become the “go-to” nation for coordinating differences for Paris climate conference and subsequent hosts of COP conferences and the secretariat of UNFCCC.

The China’s leadership and pioneering role in global climate governance does not mean that it should contribute beyond its capabilities, given its current national condition and stage of development; nor should it share extra obligations that the United States has given up at greater cost. Rather, China should properly capture and lead the principles and trends of global climate governance, and set the stage for the reform and development of a fair and just international governance system. In the negotiations and full implementation of the Paris Agreement, China should adhere to the principles of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, consolidate the solidarity of developing countries, expand strategic support for developing countries, strengthen the coordination and communication with developed countries and promote the comprehensive, balanced and effective implementation of the Paris Agreement in terms of mitigation, adaptation, funding, technology, capacity building and transparency. China should also urge developed countries to fulfill their obligations to take the lead in emission reduction and provide financial and technical support to developing countries, so as to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of China and other developing countries [3]. China advocates for a new concept of global governance featuring mutual respect, fairness, justice and win–win cooperation. China takes addressing climate change as an opportunity for sustainable development of all countries and promotes mutually beneficial cooperation for collaborative development. This is conducive to expanding the areas and space for voluntary cooperation among countries and building the shared interests of all parties for a shift of climate negotiations from a “zero-sum game” to win–win cooperation. The new type of leadership and pioneering role that China has demonstrated in climate governance concepts and cooperation approach—different from the United States and Europe—are gaining increasing recognition by the international community. Addressing climate change represents the shared interest of mankind and enables more common ground and potential for win–win cooperation than other global risks and regional hotspot issues in the political, economic and social arenas, promising broad prospects and political will for cooperation. Climate change provides a stage for China to actively engage in the reform and development of global governance. China can make efforts to make it a pioneering and successful example of building international relations featuring mutual respect, fairness, justice and win–win cooperation in the new era and building a community with a shared future for mankind.

11.3.3 Actively Promote International Cooperation on Climate Change and South-South Cooperation on Climate Change Under the Belt and Road Initiative

At present, the issue of how to strengthen low-carbon transition in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects to address climate change has drawn wide attention from foreign media and sparked concerns, doubts and critiques. To dispel the misgivings, China should take concrete actions and make actual progress to let the fact speak for itself. Therefore, the BRI cooperation should highlight the ideology of building global ecological civilization and the notion of green, low-carbon and circular development, strengthen the targets and policy incentives for tackling climate change, and create a bright spot of international pragmatic cooperation on climate change.

In facilitating “Belt and Road” cooperation, China is taking pragmatic actions to put into practice the new concept of global governance of building a community with a shared future for mankind, and to achieve win–win cooperation and common development. Over the course of “Belt and Road” cooperation, China should follow the guiding principle of ecological civilization and the notion of green development so that it can be aligned with the sustainable development strategies of the countries involved. China should improve the “connectivity” among countries and regions, and take green and low-carbon development as the cardinal principle for promoting the development of and cooperation on the Belt and Road Initiative.

“Green and low-carbon” is the key to addressing the negative impacts of disputes on the Belt and Road Initiative (such as investment in coal-fired power plants and the transfer of high-carbon and high-polluting capacities). In the future, China needs to summarize its best practices in climate change management and environment and climate governance, come up with tailored solutions of green low carbon technologies, project financing, business models based on the specific needs of countries involved in BRI, and assist BRI countries and regions to achieve their NDC targets and sustainable development goals. On the other hand, China can use a variety of instruments to expand climate financing channels to secure funding for the green BRI projects, for example, exploring innovative investment and financing models to attract more investors for the low-carbon development in BRI countries; harnessing the role of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, Silk Road Fund and South-South Cooperation Fund on Climate Change, etc. to create synergies, in conjunction with bilateral development aid, investment from multilateral development banks, private investment funds and philanthropic funds. Financial institutions should follow the Green Investment Principles and take low carbon and sustainable development as guiding principles for BRI investments. By vigorously tapping the potential of the PPP model of third-party cooperation and win–win cooperation, it will enable BRI projects to gain financial and credit support from local governments, strengthen the coordination between local governments and investors and operators of green and low-carbon projects, and enhance climate risk management and cash flow management.

China’s South-South cooperation on climate change refers to China’s cooperation with one or more developing countries, as well as with developed countries or UN agencies, in jointly supporting developing countries in enhancing their capacity to cope with climate change and advancing project cooperation. As a part of China’s foreign aid, China’s South-South cooperation on climate change follows the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of recipient countries and aims at mutual benefit, “win–win” and “self-reliance”. China’s south-south cooperation, primarily through foreign aid, involves cooperation at bilateral, multilateral, regional and interregional levels. In the past few years, China has focused on some small and medium-sized projects in neighboring countries to meet their practical needs. For example, China assisted the construction of a residential housing project dubbed “safe island” in the Maldives to protect local residents from tsunamis and seawater erosion; China helped Bangladesh and the Maldives set up extreme weather warning systems to improve their ability to warn against climate and natural disasters; China State Oceanic Administration established the Framework Plan (2011–2015) for International Cooperation in the South China Sea and Adjacent Seas, which listed “ocean and climate change” and “marine disaster prevention and reduction” as the main funding areas; China worked with surrounding countries in conducting the research projects of “ocean–atmosphere interaction and observation of the tropical sea in southeast Indian Ocean” and “observation of the Indian monsoon outbursts”. China has also strengthened scientific and technological cooperation with Africa, implementing more than 100 joint scientific and technological research demonstration projects. Since 2012, China has offered climate change foreign aid in conducting a wide array of projects, including research and capacity building for renewable energy utilization and marine disaster warning; development, popularization and application of LED lighting; technology demonstration on the comprehensive utilization of straw; research on utilizing and promoting wind-solar complementary power production system; experiment and demonstration on the efficient utilization of drip irrigation, etc., assisting developing countries in improving their ability to tackle climate change.

Developing countries that involved in key cooperation projects under the Belt and Road Initiative should be the target countries for South-South cooperation on climate change. During infrastructure construction and production capacity cooperation in these countries, Chinese companies should bear in mind the impacts of climate change and take into account the impacts of extreme natural disasters caused by climate change in the project design, and in the meantime, maximize the use of energy-saving and low-carbon technologies, adopt the same or higher standards for environment and energy efficiency, and promote the resource-saving and circular industrial development model across the whole industry chain, and jointly build low carbon industrial parks or demonstration zones. Chinese companies should select suitable projects and build buildings, infrastructure and production capacity that are green, low-carbon and recognizable. These projects should be included in the South-South flagship climate cooperation scheme for setting up 10 low-carbon demonstration zones, launching 100 mitigation and adaption programs, and providing 1,000 places on climate-change training programs to meet the needs of these countries for low carbon infrastructure under their national climate change strategies, improve their ability to respond to climate change, and enlarge the scope of their cooperation with China and explore more investment opportunities. Chinese companies should also assist host countries in planning and implementing adaptation, mitigation and capacity building projects within the framework of international cooperation on climate change, and seek international financing sources (e.g., the Green Development Fund) and funding from international institutions (e.g., the World Bank). In a word, China should make the joint response to climate change a crucial component, guiding principle and bright spot of the BRI strategy to enhance its international image and influence.

It is also necessary to strengthen South-South scientific and technological cooperation and technology transfer on climate change. Amidst low-carbon transition, the vast number of developing countries have huge demand for technology and the market potential is enormous. China has advanced, practical and low-cost low-carbon technologies that are urgently needed by developing countries, such as energy conservation and new energy. When conducting international production capacity cooperation in foreign markets, Chinese businesses should pay more attention to technology cooperation and transfer. China should actively promote joint R&D and technology transfer platforms or technology parks with the host country to address the key challenges of localization and industrialization in the process of advanced low-carbon technology transfer. This will not only improve innovation and industrialization of advanced technology in host countries, but also enhance the international competitiveness of China’s leading technologies. China should play a pioneering role in exploring the model for technology transfer and the mechanism and pathway for mutual benefits within the framework of addressing climate change, and upgrade it to strategic cooperation at national level, which will certainly have a broad impact on the international community, drive and promote the development of financial and technical cooperation and related actions under the framework of climate change management.

Efforts should be made to quickly implement and make good use of the China South-South Climate Cooperation Fund. China has announced that it will invest 20 billion RMB to establish the China South-South Climate Cooperation Fund and has launched the flagship climate cooperation scheme for low-carbon demonstration, adaptation, mitigation and capacity building in developing countries, which were well-received by the international community and anticipated by developing countries. Now it is urgent to secure the funding sources and finalize the management mechanism to make use of the fund as soon as possible. The South-South Climate Cooperation Fund should not be operated or used in isolation. Rather, it calls for overall planning and inter-departmental coordination. It should be deemed as a seed fund or guiding fund to leverage and marshal other sources of funding, including funds from public and private sectors, and be channeled to projects via grant and commercial and mutually beneficial cooperation to maximize the role of the fund. Various channels for China’s foreign aid and foreign cooperation can embed the element of climate cooperation, add and improve project selection and design to accommodate the policy incentives and technological pathway for mitigating natural disasters, saving energy and reducing carbon, so that these channels can be integrated into the framework of South-South climate cooperation to produce more visible and influential outcome on a large scale. Meanwhile, technical assistance and personnel training should be provided to developing countries to address the pressing issues pertaining to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, for example, greenhouse gas inventory development, MRV system building, and long-term low emissions development strategy preparation, etc. Developed countries have counted all channels of their financial support to developing nations as climate support, which greatly exaggerated the amount of their financial assistance. China also needs to sort through its financial support to developing countries under the Belt and Road Initiative, highlight policy incentives for tackling climate change, and integrate various financial sources to enable greater outcome and impact.

On one hand, China should continue to step up the cooperation with the European Union and other developed countries and regions, especially in the field of creating carbon emission trading market. By learning from the experience and lessons of international carbon markets, China can enhance the top-level planning of its carbon market and anticipate potential problems. On the other hand, the design and pathway of China’s carbon market based on its institutional system at the current stage of development also provide important reference for other developing countries. So far, many developing nations have expressed their willingness to learn from China’s experience in carbon market. With the steady progress of China’s carbon market, its impact on the global carbon market will see a major boost, whether measured by its market size or pricing power. China should actively participate in international rule-making during the development of global carbon pricing mechanism and market mechanism under the Paris Agreement. Enhancing international cooperation on the carbon market will not only benefit the long-term development of China’s carbon market, but also contribute to China’s strategy of opening up and better align with China’s efforts to build a community with a shared future for mankind.

The Paris Agreement calls for active participation and voluntary actions by all sectors of society of non-parties except those at national level. At present, various types of climate coalitions and associations formed by local governments, cities, industries, enterprises and civil society are cropping up, such as the World Alliance for Low Carbon Cities and the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative. These organizations not only put forward and develop common low carbon targets and action plans using a “bottom-up” approach, but also advocate code of conduct at the city, industry, corporate, financial investment and social levels. They recommend advanced technical standards, promote carbon labels and low-carbon certification, encourage green investment, strengthen self-discipline actions and cooperation, communicate and share their experience, becoming a vital force in advancing the implementation of Paris Agreement. Currently, with the active participation at all levels, China should make holistic planning and guide the directions for stakeholders to expand all-round influence, catalyze positive momentum in all fields, build its own competitive advantages, and contribute to the improvement of the comprehensive national competitiveness and international influence.

Its’ crucial to reinforce exchanges and communication among international think tanks in the field of climate change and harness the role of public diplomacy. The exchanges and cooperation among think tanks contribute to mutual understanding, promote mutual trust, and help publicize China’s climate governance concepts and domestic actions and results, disseminate China’s values of ecological civilization and expand global influence. This is also an important area for China to enhance international influence and discourse power, and a symbol of the country’s soft power. China should foster the growth of climate change think tanks and strengthen the coordination and cooperation among think tanks from different disciplines and with research focus. These think tanks are expected to study China issues under a global horizon and analyze global issues from a Chinese perspective. They should conduct comprehensive research and build discourse power in climate science, policies, technologies, etc., and showcase their influence and credibility in the field of science and policies in order to provide scientific and technical support to China’s torchbearer role in global climate governance.

11.3.4 Actively Respond to the Post-Covid Global Governance

The raging COVID-19 represents a global public crisis that will profoundly affect and reshape the world political, economic and trade landscape, and intensify the turbulence of once-in-a-century transformation. Global climate change is a long-term ecological crisis for mankind. Enormous uncertainties exist for the post-Covid global climate cooperation, which will inevitably spark international concern and competition among major countries. The Paris Agreement mandates all parties to report by 2020 their efforts in implementing and enhancing NDC targets and action plans, and to submit long-term low-carbon emission development strategies for 2050. The international community has great expectations on major countries in the world, and China has particularly come under the spotlight. Now, as China is fighting against the pandemic and planning for economic recovery and development, it should take into account both domestic and international situations to make overall planning for domestic high quality development and economic security and global response to climate change and low carbon transition. It should spearhead global energy revolution and low carbon economic development trend, showing the spirit of a major country that is responsible for the common interests of mankind, thereby influencing the trend of international public opinion and dealing with a more complicated international situation after the pandemic.

The COVID-19 has complicated relations between major countries. It has become more prominent that the United States and other western countries have ramped up their long-term strategies and actions to contain China’s peaceful rise. The pandemic has plunged the world into a severe economic recession, and the top priority of economic recovery for all governments is to safeguard people’s livelihood and shore up the weakness in their industrial chains and enhance the safety and competitiveness of key industries, which inevitably undercuts the priority of the green and low-carbon transformation of energy and economy. Plus, the reduced supply of funding in the wake of the pandemic dampens the investment and actions needed to combat climate change. Frequent exchanges and dialogues are underway between major countries, think tanks, and international agencies on the coordination of the response to the pandemic and the long-term climate crisis. The UN Secretary-General António Guterres urged governments to place addressing climate change at the heart of economic recovery efforts as climate change is the deeper crisis of the world. Therefore, adhering to the post-pandemic policy orientation of “green economic recovery” and reinforcing NDC targets and actions under the Paris Agreement have increasingly become the consensus and shared focus of the international community.

At present, the EU and other developed countries and some international organizations are pushing for the emission reduction target in line with the 1.5 ℃ future in climate negotiations. In the “European Green Deal”, the EU set out a strategy of carbon neutrality by 2050. The UK has amended its Climate Change Act to include carbon neutrality by 2050 into the legislation. The US Climate Alliance—covering California, New York and other states with over 65% of the US population and GDP—has been formed, with most of the states announcing carbon neutrality by 2050. Similar goals have been announced by some developing countries, such as Chile, Ethiopia and some small island states and least developed countries. Quite many countries and cities have declared to go 100% renewable in 2030–2050, and laid out timetable for phasing out coal and coal power as well as gasoline vehicles. The willingness and actions for deep decarbonization worldwide during and after the pandemic might be weakened in the short run, but it has become increasingly urgent for the medium- and long-term transitions towards low-carbon energy system and economy.

Climate change will become an ever-important arena for the post-pandemic competition between major countries. Despite the withdrawal of the Trump administration from the Paris Agreement, the US remains a Party to the UNFCCC. Adhering to the “America First” unilateralism during climate negotiations, the US has repeatedly asked China and other emerging developing countries to shoulder the same obligations as itself. President Joe Biden declared that the US must lead again on the global stage and will rejoin the Paris Agreement on his first day in office, followed by a summit of the world’s major emitters to accelerate global progress. Massive emergency investments will be made to secure a clean energy system and economy with net zero emissions by 2050. He also publicly declared to form a united front with democratic allies of shared values and take tough actions against China through carbon border tax and stringent standards for investment and financial subsidies. In response to this, China should cooperate with India and other emerging developing countries and those who share similar positions, adhere to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in the light of different national circumstances, boost extensive and pragmatic cooperation and joint actions with countries of different types and stages of development as well as national organizations, strengthen multi-level exchanges and dialogues with developed countries, pursue cooperation on the shared interests of mankind, and defuse the growing tensions with major powers. On the other hand, China should double down on domestic strategies and urgent actions, formulate and announce the targets, strategy and implementation pathway of deep decarbonization by 2050 with the goal of keeping global temperature rise below 2 ℃ and striving to hold it under 1.5 ℃, adapt to the current urgent situation of global emission reduction and showcase the posture of a major country that proactively assumes international responsibilities. It’s essential to follow Xi Jinping’s thought on ecological civilization and the concept of building a community with a shared future for mankind, and actively promote the development of global governance system and the international cooperation.

Tackling climate change is in the common interest of mankind. It represents the international moral high ground contested by major countries, and calls for close cooperation and concerted actions by all countries. The current global climate governance follows the multilateral mechanism of broad participation and equal consultation by all countries, which requires extensive communication and consultation between developed and developing countries. China has demonstrated growing influence and coordination capability in the field of climate change, and the international community also expects China to show further leadership and bridge more differences. Therefore, there is also room and need for China, the US and other developed countries to carry out dialogue, consultation and cooperation in the post-Covid-19 era. China should give full play to its diplomatic strength in global climate governance and adhere to multilateralism to respond to the unilateralism of the US and resolve the challenges and pressure.