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Relevance and Significance of Constituent Assembly Debates in Constitutional Interpretation: A Comparative Analysis with Reference to Amendments

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The Indian Yearbook of Comparative Law 2019

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Abstract

Constituent Assembly Debates, as a resource of ideas, inspire various schools of interpretation. However, the originalists abide by its faith quite strongly. It gives a picture of subjective purpose which ought to be balanced and integrated with the textually explicit provisions and structure of the Constitution in order to promote the constitutional goals. In determining the limits of amending power, ambit of amendments and the method of overarching them with the unamended parts, the Constituent Assembly Debates throws useful light and inspires to build unwritten principles in support of foundational values. The two extreme positions, originalism and living tree notion, developed in the US and Canada and the moderate approach evolved in India have both diverse experiences and similar outcomes. The interface between time and space occurring in this domain is a continuous dialogue a society has to engage in for balancing between continuity and change.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It connotes author’s real intention. See, Aharon Barak and Sari Bashi, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton University Press 2005, Rept. Universal Law Publishing Co 2007) 120.

  2. 2.

    It connotes intention of the Framers and Ratifiers and public understanding at the time of adoption. See, Lawrence B Solum, ‘What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Original Theory’ in Grant Huscroft and Bradley W Miller (eds), The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation (Cambridge University Press 2011) 12–41.

  3. 3.

    Aharaon Barak (n 1) 384–5.

  4. 4.

    John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 1971) 196–7; also see Ronald Moore, ‘Rawls on Constitution-Making’ Nomos. (1979) Vol. 20, Constitutionalism 238–268.

  5. 5.

    Infirmities in the composition of CA become insignificant because of the valuable work of the CA and people’s acceptance of the same. On public participation in the constitution making process see, Rohit De, A People’s Constitution: The Everyday Life of Law in the Indian Republic (Princeton University Press 2018) 2–7.

  6. 6.

    Rawls (n 4) 5.

  7. 7.

    Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford University Press 1966 rept 2019) 10–31.

  8. 8.

    Walter Murphy, James E Fleming, Sotiosa Barber and Atephen Macedo, American Constitutional Interpretation (3rd ed, Foundation Press 2003) 405.

  9. 9.

    Paul Brest, ‘The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding’ 60 B U L Rev 204 Solum. (n 2) 13.

  10. 10.

    Dred Scott v Sandford 60 US (19 How) 393 (1867); 15 L Ed 691; however, there was erroneous application of this approach in the factual matrix of the case that involved constitutionality of a federal law that rendered slaves free when they entered a state where slavery is prohibited. The intention underlying the Preamble and other historical materials did not suggest disapproval of the legislative policy. See Justice William H Rehnquist, ‘The Notion of a Living Constitution’ (1976) 54 Tex L Rev 693.

  11. 11.

    Ingraham v Wright 430 US 651 (1977); Oregon v Mitchell 400 US 112 (1970) at 165; Roper v Simmons 543 US 551 (1977) at 626; District of Columbia v Heller 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008); McDonald v City of Chicago 130 S Ct 3020 (2010).

  12. 12.

    For this classification, see Sotiriosa A Barber and James E Fleming, Constitutional Interpretation: Basic Questions (Oxford University Press 2007) 79.

  13. 13.

    Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Harvard University Press 1996) 7–12.

  14. 14.

    Thomas M Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Powers of the States of the American Union (8th ed, Little brown & Co 1927) 54–55.

  15. 15.

    Robert Bork, ‘Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems’ 47 Ind L J 1 at 17.

  16. 16.

    Rehnquist (n 10).

  17. 17.

    Justice Antonia Scalia, ‘Originalism: The Lesser Evil’ 57 U Cin L Rev 849.

  18. 18.

    Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment (Liberty Fund 1977).

  19. 19.

    Richard Fallon, Jr., ‘Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning’ 119 Harv L Rev 1275 at 1317; Charles A Miller, The Supreme Court and Uses of History (Belkap Press 1969); Henry P Monaghan, ‘Our Perfect Constitution’ 56 N Y U L Rev.353 at 375.

  20. 20.

    Bruce A. Ackerman, ‘The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution’ (1984) 93 Yale L J 1013.

  21. 21.

    Alexander M Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Bobbs -Merrill 1962).

  22. 22.

    Randy E Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution (Princeton University Press 2004); Keith Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning (Harvard University Press 1999).

  23. 23.

    Keith Whittington, ‘On Pluralism within Originalism’ in Grant Huscroft and Bradley W Miller (ed) (n 2) 70–86.

  24. 24.

    Jeffry Goldsworthy, ‘Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation’ (1997) 25 Fed. L. Rev 1.

  25. 25.

    Jack M. Balkin, ‘Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption’ (2007) 24 Const. Comment 291.

  26. 26.

    Kent Greenwalt, ‘Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation’ in Julius Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds.) The oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press 2002) 300.

  27. 27.

    Jeffry Goldsworthy, ‘The Case for Originalism’ in Grant Huscroft and Bradley W Miller (ed) (n 2) 44–69.

  28. 28.

    M D A Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (Eighth Ed. Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) 1555.

  29. 29.

    Hanna Lerner, ‘The Indian Founding: a comparative perspective’ in Sujith Choudhry, Madhav Khosla and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution (Oxford university Press, 2016) 55–70 at 59–64.

  30. 30.

    Brest (n 9); also see Solum (n 2).

  31. 31.

    Murphy et al. (n 8) 398–99.

  32. 32.

    Gregoire C N Webber, ‘Originalism’s Constitution’ in Huscroft and Miller (n 2) 147–178 at 177.

  33. 33.

    Murphy et al. (n 8) 404–5.

  34. 34.

    Mitchell N Berman, ‘Originalism is Bunk’ (2009) 84 (1) NYU L Rev, 1–96 at 74–75.

  35. 35.

    Mitchell N Berman, ‘Reflective Equilibrium and Constitutional Method: Lessons from John McCain and the Natural Born Citizenship Clause’ in Huscroft and Miller (n 2) 246–284 at 283.

  36. 36.

    MDA Freeman (n 28) 1555.

  37. 37.

    ibid.

  38. 38.

    Ejusdem generis rule, Quazi v Quazi [1979] 3 WLR 833 at 839; expressio unius exclusio alterius, R v Padfrey and Sadler [1970] 2 All E R 12.

  39. 39.

    (1930) AC 124.

  40. 40.

    Edwards v Canada (Attorney General) [1928] SCR 276.

  41. 41.

    W J Waluchow, ‘The Living Tree’ in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem and Nathale Des Rosiers (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2017) 890–909; James Allan, ‘The Curious Concept of the “Living Tree” (or Non-Locked-In) Constitution’ in Huscroft and Miller (n 2) 179–202.

  42. 42.

    Missouri v Holland 252 US 416 (1920).

  43. 43.

    Peter W Hogg, ‘Canada: Privy Council to Supreme Court’ in Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (Oxford University Press 2006) 55–105 at 78–79.

  44. 44.

    S. Radhakrishnan, Speech in Constituent Assembly Debates 20th January 1947, Book I, 269–273.

  45. 45.

    A K Gopalan v State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27.

  46. 46.

    In Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala [1973] AIR SC 1461, paragraph 1801) the Court said, ‘In the State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee (1954) S.C.R. pp. 558, 563–4, the expectation entertained by the Constituent Assembly that the Court will not interfere with the fixation of compensation by Parliament was belied.’ Also see P Ishwara Bhat, Fundamental Rights: A Study of their Interrelationships (Eastern Law House 2004) 510–526.

  47. 47.

    State of Madras v Champakam Dorairajan AIR 1951 SC 226.

  48. 48.

    Minerva Mills v Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789.

  49. 49.

    I C Golaknath v State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643; Kesavananda Bharati (n 46).

  50. 50.

    National Textile Workers Union v P R Ramakrishna AIR 1983 SC 759.

  51. 51.

    Justice K S Puttaswamy v Union of India AIR 2017 SC 4161.

  52. 52.

    ibid, Sanjay Kishan Kaul J, paragraph 448; Dhananjay Chandrachud J observed that in the changing technological world where earlier models become soon obsolete, it is injustice to the Constitution and its Makers to freeze its meaning into originalist interpretation. Constitution can survive as a living instrument only if it has resilience (paragraph 151).

  53. 53.

    Textualists like Justice Antonin Scalia considered that they look no further than the words of the constitution to reach a decision, and they do not care about the intent and secret meaning which the framers had in their mind. See Antonin Scalia, ‘A Theory of Constitutional Interpretation’ Remarks at the Catholic University of America, Washington DC, 18 October 1996.

  54. 54.

    Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479, 14 L Ed 2nd 510 (1965).

  55. 55.

    ibid, per Justice Goldberg, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan.

  56. 56.

    3 US (Dall) 386; 1 L Ed 648 (1798).

  57. 57.

    Lemon v Kurtzman 403 US 02 (1971).

  58. 58.

    Trop v Dulles 356 US 86, 2 L Ed 2d 630 (1958).

  59. 59.

    West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943).

  60. 60.

    Madison, Federalist No 45 and 51; also see Murphy et al. (n 8) 419.

  61. 61.

    Barak (n 1) 375.

  62. 62.

    ibid 377–383.

  63. 63.

    ibid 385–388.

  64. 64.

    Murphy et al. (n 8) 405. Justice Brandeis observed in his dissent in Olmstead v United States, 277 US 438; 72 L Ed 944, 956: ‘The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favourable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and satisfaction of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.’ He culled out right to privacy from the original intention.

  65. 65.

    Austin (n 7) 10–31.

  66. 66.

    Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy (Picador, 2007) 105.

  67. 67.

    Rohit De (n 5); Guha (n 65).

  68. 68.

    Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Third ed, Carswell 1992) 4, 1286; also see Robert Vipond, ‘1867: Confederation’ in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem and Nathale Des Rosiers (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2017) 83–101.

  69. 69.

    When originalists argue that change in meaning should be only through constitutional amendment, and when opportunity for such amendment is denied or unduly delayed in the Constitution, it becomes imperative for judiciary to depart from originalism and dare to make a new law through interpretation. See Jeffry Goldsworthy (n 24); also see James Allan (41); also see Grant Huscroft, ‘Vagueness, Finiteness, and the Limits of Interpretation and Construction’ in Huscroft and Miller (n 2) 203–222.

  70. 70.

    Hogg, (n 67) 1290–92; W C Waluchow (n 41) 894–904.

  71. 71.

    Incidentally residuary power vests with the federal government.

  72. 72.

    I C Golaknath v State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643; Also see for similar approaches, Union of India v H S Dhillon [1971] 2 SCC 779.

  73. 73.

    State of Travancore Cochin and others v Bombay Company Ltd AIR 1952 SC 36; A K Gopalan v State of Madras [1950] AIR SC 27.

  74. 74.

    Kesavananda Bharati (n 46); S R Chaudhuri v State of Punjab AIR 2001 SC 2707; Manoj Narula v Union of India AIR 2014 SC 2597; TMA Pai Foundation v State of Karnataka AIR 2003 SC 355; Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v Union of India AIR SC 5457.

  75. 75.

    Samaraditya Pal, India’s Constitution: Origins and Evolution, Volumes 1 to 10 (Lexis Nexis 2014).

  76. 76.

    The History Editors, ‘The Federalist Papers’ < https://www.history.com/topics/early-us/federalist-papers > accessed on 18 August 2020.

  77. 77.

    Lee Epstein and Thomas G Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Institutional Powers and Constraints (7th ed, CQ Press 2010).

  78. 78.

    Barber & Fleming (n 12) 36–37.

  79. 79.

    Hogg (n 67) 1286; Vipond (n 67)/.

  80. 80.

    Vipond (n 67) 89–96.

  81. 81.

    Austin (n 7) Chapter 2.

  82. 82.

    Vipond (n 67) 97.

  83. 83.

    253 US 1 (1920); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3rd ed, Foundation Press 2000) 102.

  84. 84.

    National Prohibition case, 253 US 350 (1920); Leser v Garnet 253 US 130 (1922); United States v Sprague, 282 US 716 (1931); Dillon v Gloss 256 US 368 (1921); Coleman v Miller, 307 US 433 (1939).

  85. 85.

    The Federalist Papers: No. 85, Zale Law School—The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy < https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed85.asp ≥ accessed on 18th August 2020.

  86. 86.

    Barron v The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 US 243 (1833).

  87. 87.

    Article I section 9; in Calder v Bull 3 U S (Dall) 386 (1798) Justice Chase had viewed for majority that the Framers had not considered restraint on ex post facto laws as extending to prohibit deprivation of property right for public purpose without just compensation.

  88. 88.

    Dred Scott v Sandford 60 US 393 (1857).

  89. 89.

    ibid para 599.

  90. 90.

    ‘No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws’.

  91. 91.

    The Butchers’ Benevolent Association of New Orleans v The Crescent City Live-Stock landing and Slaughterhouse Company, (Slaughterhouse case) 83 US 36 (1873).

  92. 92.

    Murphy et al. (n 8) 148.

  93. 93.

    Hurtado v California, 110 US 516 (1884).

  94. 94.

    Adamson v People of State of California, 332 US 46 (1947).

  95. 95.

    United States v Stanley (Civil rights case) 109 US 3 (1883).

  96. 96.

    163 US 537 (1896).

  97. 97.

    ibid para 43.

  98. 98.

    Brown v Board of Education of Topeka 347 US 483 (1954).

  99. 99.

    Regents of the University of California v Allan Bakke 438 US 265 (1978).

  100. 100.

    Whitney v California 274 US 357 (1927).

  101. 101.

    Lochner v New York 1898 US 45 (1905).

  102. 102.

    District of Columbia v Heller 554 US 570 (2008).

  103. 103.

    For discussion see Benoit Pelletier, ‘Amending the Constitution of Canada’ in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem and Nathale Des Rosiers (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2017) 253–275.

  104. 104.

    Re Resolution to amend the constitution (1981) 1 SCR 753.

  105. 105.

    See for discussion, W J Waluchow (n 41) 894–896. In an interesting development in 1982, when Quebec objected against the amendment, the Supreme Court ruled that no province had any conventional veto power. Re: Objections by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution (1982) 2 SCR 793.

  106. 106.

    P W Hogg, Canadian Constitutional Law (3rd edn, Carswell 1992) 70–82.

  107. 107.

    Reference re: Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 SCR 217.

  108. 108.

    Reference re: Senate Reform (2014) 1 SCR 704.

  109. 109.

    Jean Leclair, ‘Constitutional Principles in the Secession Reference’ in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem and Nathale Des Rosiers (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2017) 1019–1020.

  110. 110.

    Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461.

  111. 111.

    Leclair (n 105) 1026.

  112. 112.

    Law Society of Upper Canada v Skapinker [1984] 1 SCR 357.

  113. 113.

    R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1985) 1 SCR 295.

  114. 114.

    The category of ‘natural limits’ guiding the Courts to decide permissibility of same-sex marriage came before the Supreme Court in relation to legislative power on marriage under the BNA Act in Reference re same Sex Marriage (2004) 3 SCR 698. In the context of conflicting submissions, the Court expressed inability to exclude same-sex marriage within the concept of marriage. For a discussion on determination of moral question within natural limits, see Huscroft (n 68) 210–211.

  115. 115.

    Edwards v Canada (Attorney General) [1930] AC 124 at 136.

  116. 116.

    Reference re Section 94 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act (1985) 2 SCR 486.

  117. 117.

    Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927 at 1003–1004.

  118. 118.

    Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General) [2002] 4 SCR 429.

  119. 119.

    Peter W Hogg (n 43) 101, Grant Huscroft (n 68) 222.

  120. 120.

    Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan AIR 1965 SC paragraph 57.

  121. 121.

    I C Golaknath v State of Punjab (1967) 2 SCR 762.

  122. 122.

    ibid para 19 and 20.

  123. 123.

    ibid para 21.

  124. 124.

    ibid para 92.

  125. 125.

    ibid para 49.

  126. 126.

    Kesavananda Bharati (n 110) para 1174.

  127. 127.

    State of Travancore-Cochin v Bombay Co Ltd AIR 1952 SC 366.

  128. 128.

    A K Gopalan v State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27.

  129. 129.

    Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v Union of India AIR 1971 SC 530.

  130. 130.

    ibid para 599.

  131. 131.

    ibid para 1379.

  132. 132.

    ibid para 1401.

  133. 133.

    Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 299, para 684 per Y V Chandrachud J.

  134. 134.

    Minerva Mills v Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789, paras 109 and 110.

  135. 135.

    Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India AIR 2015 SCW 5457.

  136. 136.

    ibid para 58, per Khehar J.

  137. 137.

    P Ishwara Bhat, Law and Social Transformation in India (Eastern Book Co 2009) Chap. 4.

  138. 138.

    State of West Bengal v Bela Banerji AIR 1954 SC 170.

  139. 139.

    Vajravelu Mudaliar v Special Deputy Collector AIR 1965 SC 1017.

  140. 140.

    Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v Stae of Gujarat AIR 1995 SC 142, para 25.

  141. 141.

    I R Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2007 SCW 611, para 102.

  142. 142.

    K T Plantation Co. v State of Karnataka AIR 2011 SC 3430, para 122 per SH Kapadia CJI.

  143. 143.

    M R Balaji v State of Mysore AIR 1963 SC 649, para 17.

  144. 144.

    State of Madras v Smt. Champakam Dorairajan AIR 1951 SC 226.

  145. 145.

    Indra Sawhney v Union of India AIR 1993 SC 477, per B P Jeevan Reddy J, para 78: ‘We are referring to these debates as furnishing the context in which and the objective to achieve which this phrase was put in clause (4). We are aware that what is said during these debates is not conclusive or binding upon the court because several members may have expressed several views, all of which may not be reflected in the provision finally enacted.’

  146. 146.

    M Nagaraj v Union of India AIR 2007 SC 71, para 19: ‘Constitution is not an ephemeral legal document embodying a set of legal rules for the passing hour. It sets out principles for an expanding future and is intended to endure for ages to come and consequently to be adapted to the various crisis of human affairs. Therefore, a purposive rather than a strict literal approach to the interpretation should be adopted. A Constitutional provision must be construed not in a narrow and constricted sense but in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account of changing conditions and purposes so that constitutional provision does not get fossilized but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems and challenges.’

  147. 147.

    ibid para 121.

  148. 148.

    ibid para 111.

  149. 149.

    Jarnail Singh v Lachmi Narain Gupta AIROnline 2018 SC 240.

  150. 150.

    State of Kerala v N M Thomas AIR 1976 SC 490.

  151. 151.

    R C Poudyal v Union of India AIR 1993 SC 1804.

  152. 152.

    ibid para 31.

  153. 153.

    Kihoto Hollohan v Zachilu AIR 1992 SC W 3497.

  154. 154.

    Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly AIR Online 2019 SC 1448.

  155. 155.

    Balachandra Jarkhiholi v B S Yeddyurappa (2011) 7 SCC 1; Ravi S Naik v Union of India 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641; Keisham Meghachandra Singh v Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly W.P. (T) No. 7806 of 2011 (decided on 19 March 2020).

  156. 156.

    Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly, AIR Online 2019 SC 1448. para 82

  157. 157.

    ibid para 114.

  158. 158.

    Bhanumati v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2010 SC 3796.

  159. 159.

    Usha Bharti v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2014 SCW 1981.

  160. 160.

    Bhanumati v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 2010 SC 3796.

  161. 161.

    Vipulbhai Chowdhary v Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation AIR 2015 SC 1960.

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  1. Karnataka State Law University, Hubballi, India

    P. Ishwara Bhat

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  1. Jindal Global Law School, O. P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India

    Mathew John

  2. Jindal Global Law School, O. P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana, India

    Vishwas H. Devaiah

  3. BML Munjal Law School, Gurugram, Haryana, India

    Pritam Baruah

  4. Jindal Global Law School, O. P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India

    Moiz Tundawala

  5. Centre for Comparative Law, National Law University, Delhi, New Delhi, Delhi, India

    Niraj Kumar

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Bhat, P.I. (2021). Relevance and Significance of Constituent Assembly Debates in Constitutional Interpretation: A Comparative Analysis with Reference to Amendments. In: John, M., Devaiah, V.H., Baruah, P., Tundawala, M., Kumar, N. (eds) The Indian Yearbook of Comparative Law 2019. The Indian Yearbook of Comparative Law. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2175-8_11

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