Abstract
Chapter 34 examines the role, responsibilities and time commitment for the Chairperson. We begin by reviewing the division in CEO/Chairperson roles from Stage 1 and the OECD recommendations in Stage 2.
There follows discussion of agenda items, access to information and promoting alternative views. Moving further into the Chapter, we examine outside meetings for non-executive directors, CEO entrenchment, time commitment for the Chairperson and demarcation of the Chairperson and the CEO.
Chapter 34 concludes with the conditions and criteria for the Chairperson and annual election.
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Notes
- 1.
Australian Securities Exchange, ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, Fourth Edition, February 2019, accessed 10 April 2020, available at https://www.asx.com.au/documents/regulation/cgc-principles-and-recommendations-fourth-edn.pdf (‘2019ASX’), Commentary to Rec 1.1, p 7(format altered).
- 2.
Francesco de Zwart, Enhancing Firm Sustainability Through Governance, The Relational Corporate Governance Approach, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, Corporations, Globalisation and the Law Series, July 2015, (‘Stage 1’). See discussion in section 8.6 of Stage 1, pp 251–256.
For Stage 1, see also, Francesco de Zwart, “Enhancing firm sustainability through governance – Part 1: The challenge of corporate governance” (2018) 33(2) Aust Jnl of Corp Law 144 and Francesco de Zwart, “Enhancing firm sustainability through governance – Part 2: The framework of the relational corporate governance approach” (2019) 34(1) Aust Jnl of Corp Law 27.
- 3.
Ibid, section 8.6.1 of Stage 1, pp 251–252 citing C Weir, D Laing and P J McKnight, ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Performance of UK Firms”, accessed 4 March 2015 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=286440, 7. The authors cite Eugene F Fama and Michael C Jensen, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 301–49.
- 4.
Board Independent Director: Executive Director Proportion – Monitoring Effect – see discussion in sections 7.3.2.1.1–7.3.2.1.2 of Stage 1, above n 2, pp 208–212.
- 5.
See discussion in section 8.6.2 of Stage 1, above n 2, p 254.
- 6.
See discussion in Sect. 26.3 of this Stage 2 citing OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages, June 2009, approved for publication 29 May 2009, accessed 12 April 2017 at www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/43056196.pdf, (‘OECD Key Findings 2009’), p 46 and OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis, Conclusions and emerging good practices to enhance implementation of the Principles, 24 February 2010, accessed 11 May 2017 at www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/44679170.pdf, (‘OECD 2010 Conclusions and Practices’), p 17.
- 7.
OECD 2010 Conclusions and Practices, ibid., Para 49, p 19.
- 8.
David Walker, A review of corporate governance in UK Banks and other financial industry entities, Final recommendations, 26 November 2009, The Walker Review secretariat, accessed 14 March 2017 at http://www.http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf (‘Walker Review 2009’), Para 4.19, p 58.
- 9.
Ibid, Para 4.15, p 56.
- 10.
Ibid, Recommendation 9, p 60.
- 11.
Ibid. Para 4.15, p 56.
- 12.
Ibid, Para 4.16, p 57.
- 13.
See discussion in section 7.3.2.1.1 of Stage 1, above n 2, pp 208–209.
- 14.
Walker Review 2009, above n 8, Para 4.18 and Recommendation 7, pp 57–58.
- 15.
Ibid, Para 4.19, p 58.
- 16.
The Bank for International Settlements, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Guidelines, Corporate Governance Principles for Banks, July 2015, accessed 21 March 2017 at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d328.htm, (‘BCBS Guidelines 2015’), Para 61, p 61.
- 17.
See discussion in sections 8.2.3–8.2.3.1 of Stage 1, above n 2, pp 229–232.
- 18.
OECD 2010 Conclusions and Practices, above n 6, Para 48, p 18.
- 19.
Walker Review 2009, above n 8, Para 4.20, p 58.
- 20.
Ibid, Para 4.21, pp 58–59.
- 21.
Ibid, Para 4.20, p 58. See also Recommendation 8, p 60.
- 22.
Ibid, Para 4.21, pp 58–59. See also Recommendation 8, p 60.
- 23.
Ibid, Recommendation 10, p 62.
- 24.
Ibid, Para 4.25, p 61.
- 25.
Ibid, Recommendation 10, p 62.
- 26.
See discussion in section 7.3.2.1.1 of Stage 1, above n 2, p 209 citing M S Weisbach and B E Hermalin, ‘Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature’ (15 June 2000), accessed 3 March 2015 at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=233111, 9–10.
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de Zwart, F. (2022). Role, Responsibilities and Time Commitment for the Chairperson. In: The Key Code and Advanced Handbook for the Governance and Supervision of Banks in Australia. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-1710-2_34
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