Abstract
Transitions towards democratic systems only begin and develop successfully if there is pressure from the population to drive them, because obviously the elites will never give up part of their powers or privileges for the sake of democracy. In Central Asia these mobilizations have generally been very weak, so the processes of accumulation of power in a few elites have been very powerful, building highly concentrated regimes of power, and political systems have acquired a neopatrimonial authoritarian character based on very few people who have managed to become powerful. The configuration of the new systems was the product of competition for power between a very limited number of elites who were not accountable to the population and its demands. In this introductory chapter we analyse these processes from the perspective of the Sociology of Power and Neopatrimonialism.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
We begin from the assumption that the analysis of power relations in a society from a macro-perspective should not only focus on the political system, but should encompass its power regime (Izquierdo Brichs 2009), taking all the power resources into account.
- 2.
- 3.
See Izquierdo-Brichs and Etherington (2017), Farrés Fernández (2012), Izquierdo Brichs (2007b, 2008), Izquierdo-Brichs and Lampridi-Kemou (2013), and (Kemou 2007). A presentation of the different concepts used by the sociology of power, including a comparative analysis with the dominant theoretical perspectives, can be found in (Lampridi-Kemou 2012). This section uses some of the considerations from the earlier texts.
- 4.
- 5.
In his classic text, The Power Elite, C. Wright Mills primarily focuses on the elites who control the state, corporations and the armed forces (Wright Mills 2000 [1956]). However, the sociology of power needs to analyse the competition for control of all the power resources since, depending on the context, resources like ideology, information or the population itself can be even more decisive. Corresponding to this analysis, our conception of power is connected to the competitive process itself, and the definition of power, whether as resource or relationship, is based on how useful it is in terms of accumulating more power.
- 6.
Michal Kalecki introduced this perspective in his analysis of the role of the ‘military-imperialist’ complex in competition with large corporate capital in the US economy (Kalecki 1972, 90–94, 109–112). Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, following Kalecki and analysing the competition for capital, present the concept of differential accumulation and the idea that capital is one of the forms that power adopts (Nitzan & Bichler 2002, 36–38).
- 7.
Here we distance ourselves from Veblen, who focused his study of the elites on the distinction between the ‘leisure class’ and the rest of the population. From our point of view, the driving force in the system is competition between elites, and not their distinction from the lower orders (Veblen 1971 [1899]).
- 8.
- 9.
For instance, the major structural changes that shaped the current power regimes primarily centre around the appearance of capital and the state as central resources in the processes of the accumulation of power, and how these resources and the elites competing for control over them influence the configuration of modern societies. Increasingly, in a system that can only be analysed in global terms at this point, resources like large corporations and international financial institutions, both public and private, and agents like the global elites who control them also become key to the analysis (Izquierdo-Brichs and Etherington 2017).
- 10.
In its 2016 index, Transparency International ranked Kazakhstan at 131, Kyrgyzstan at 136, Tajikistan at 151, Turkmenistan at 154 and Uzbekistan at 156 (out of 176 states, with some having the same points). Transparency International (2017) Corruption Perception Index 2016, https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table
- 11.
- 12.
See Izquierdo-Brichs and Etherington (2017).
- 13.
Without entering the terminological debate, we prefer to use these concepts, which are much more widespread than Henry Hale’s ‘patronalism’ (Hale 2015).
- 14.
See Akchurina and Polese (2018).
- 15.
From the perspective of the sociology of power, however, it is important not to confuse the systemic game with the structure. The system is based on circular and linear power relations. Elite decisions cannot escape the competition for the differential accumulation of power, since if they abandon the priority of maximizing power, they lose their position as elites. However, this competition plays out within a structure that is different in each system.
- 16.
One extreme, but very graphic example of these pressures is the acceptance of war as a legal institution when carried out by states, but not when other organizations are involved.
References
Achcar, G. (2013). The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Akchurina, V., & Polese, A. (2018). Kirguistán y la mezcla de élites: de un Estado ilustrado a un Estado en la sombra. In F. Serra Massansalvador & F. Izquierdo-Brichs (Eds.), Poder y regímenes en Asia Central. Barcelona: Bellaterra.
Arendt, H. (2005 [1970]). Sobre la violencia. Madrid: Alianza.
Balandier, G. (1999). Anthropologie Politique. Paris: Quadrige/PUF.
Beblawi, H., & Luciani, G. (Eds.). (1987). The Rentier State. London: Croom Helm.
Bhaskar, R. A. (1979). The Possibility of Naturalism. London: Routledge.
Brenner, N., & Theodore, N. (2002). Preface: From the “New Localism” to the Spaces of Neoliberalism. In N. Brenner & N. Theodore (Eds.), Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in Western Europe and North America. Oxford: Blackwell.
Chehabi, H. E., & Linz, J. J. (Eds.). (1998). Sultanistic Regimes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Collins, K. (2006). Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Djalili, M.-R., & Kellner, T. (2003). Géopolitique de la nouvelle Asie centrale. De la fin de l’URSS à l’après-11 septembre. Paris: PUF.
Erdmann, G., & Engel, U. (2006). Neopatrimonialism Revisited: Beyond a Catch-All Concept (GIGA Working Paper, 16).
Farrés Fernández, G. (2012). Poder y análisis de conflictos internacionales: el complejo conflictual. Revista CIDOB d’afers internacionals, 99.
Feliu, L., & Izquierdo Brichs, F. (2016). Estructura de poder y desafíos populares. La respuesta del régimen marroquí al movimiento 20 de febrero. Revista de Estudios Políticos, 174.
Feliu, L., Mateo Dieste, J. L., & Izquierdo Brichs, F. (2018). Un siglo de movilización social en Marruecos. Barcelona: Bellaterra.
Foucault, M. (1999). Estrategias de poder. Barcelona: Paidós.
Galbraith, J. K. (1973). Power and the Useful Economist. The American Economic Review, 63, 1.
Galbraith, J. K. (2004). La economía del fraude inocente. Madrid: Crítica.
Geiss, P. G. (2012). Changing Political Systems and Regime Types: In Between the Neopatrimonial and the Bureaucratic-Developmental State in Central Asia. In S. Stewart, M. Klein, A. Schimitz, & H.-H. Schröder (Eds.), Presidents, Oligarchs and Bureaucrats: Forms of Rule in the Post-Soviet Space. London: Ashgate.
Giddens, A. (1974). Elites in the British Class Structure. In P. Stanworth & A. Giddens (Eds.), Elites and Power in British Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Giddens, A. (1976). New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of interpretative Sociologies. London: Hutchinson.
Giddens, A. (1981). A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism: Power, Property and the State (Vol. 1). London: Macmillan.
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge: Polity.
Hale, H. E. (2015). Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Horák, S. (2018). Turkmenistán: Estabilidad a través de la movilización del régimen. In F. Serra Massansalvador & F. Izquierdo-Brichs (Eds.), Poder y regímenes en Asia Central. Barcelona: Bellaterra.
Ibn Jaldún (1987 [1382]). Introducción a la historia universal (Al-Muqaddimah). México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
IMF. (2018). World Economic Outlook (April 2018). IMF DataMapper/Datasets. International Monetary Fund. http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/datasets/WEO. Accessed 18 April 2018.
IMF & WB. (2002, February 4). Poverty Reduction, Growth and Debt Sustainability in Low-Income CIS Countries. International Monetary Fund & World Bank. http://www.imf.org/External/NP/EU2/2002/edebt/eng/040202.pdf.
Inglehart, Ronald. (1977). The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Izquierdo-Brichs, F., & Etherington, J. (2017). Poder global. Una mirada desde la Sociología del Poder. Barcelona: Bellaterra.
Izquierdo-Brichs, F., & Lampridi-Kemou, A. (2013). Sociology of Power in Today’s Arab World. In F. Izquierdo Brichs (Ed.), Political Regimes in the Arab World. London and New York: Routledge.
Izquierdo Brichs, F. (2007a). Poder y Estado rentista en el mundo árabe. Revista de Estudios Internacionales Mediterráneos, 2.
Izquierdo Brichs, F. (2007b). Poder y transición política en el mundo árabe. Awraq, XXIV.
Izquierdo Brichs, F. (2008). Poder y felicidad. Una propuesta de sociología del poder. Madrid: La Catarata.
Izquierdo Brichs, F. (Ed.). (2009). Poder y regímenes en el mundo árabe contemporáneo. Barcelona: Cidob/Bellaterra.
Izquierdo Brichs, F. (Ed.). (2013). Political Regimes in the Arab World. Abingdon and New York: Routledge.
Kalecki, M. (1972). The Last Phase in the Transformation of Capitalism. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Kemou, A. (2007). Nasser’s National Interest: A ‘Sociology of Power’ Analysis. Altafulla: Fimam.
Kitschelt, H., Mansfeldova, Z., Markowski, R., & Tóka, G. (1999). Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lampridi-Kemou, A. (2012). Egypt’s National Interest. A ‘Sociology of Power’ Analysis. Barcelona: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Dret Públic i CC. Historicojurídiques.
Lemon, E., & Roberts, F. J. (2018). Tayikistán: Cleptocracia, consolidación pactada por las élites y autoritarismo. In F. Serra Massansalvador & F. Izquierdo-Brichs (Eds.), Poder y regímenes en Asia Central. Barcelona: Bellaterra.
Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Machiavelli, N. (1513–1517). Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius, Firenze. Project Gutenberg. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/10827/10827-8.txt.
Mañé, A., & De la Cámara, C. (2005). Rusia: ¿hacia una economía petrolero-rentista? Revista de Economía Crítica, 3.
Mannheim, K. (1940). Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. London: Routledge.
Nitzan, J., & Bichler, S. (2002). The Global Political Economy of Israel. London: Pluto Press.
Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ruiz Ramas, R. (2010). Los regímenes neopatrimonialistas y el clan en Asia Central, 1991–2010: un análisis conceptual. In S. Stavridis & C. De Prado (Eds.), Panorámica de actores y factores en Asia Central. Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza.
Ruiz Ramas, R., & Morales, J. (2018). La competición por el poder en Uzbekistán: neopatrimonialismo y autoritarismo durante y después de Karimov. In F. Serra Massansalvador & F. Izquierdo-Brichs (Eds.), Poder y regímenes en Asia Central. Barcelona: Bellaterra.
Skocpol, T. (1979). States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Strange, S. (1996). The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tipaldou, S. (2018). La turbulenta relación entre élites y oposición en Asia Central: El caso de Kazajstán. In F. Serra Massansalvador & F. Izquierdo-Brichs (Eds.), Poder y regímenes en Asia Central. Barcelona: Bellaterra.
Veblen, T. (1971 [1899]). Teoría de la clase ociosa. México, Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Vieille, P. (1984). Le pétrole comme rapport social. Peuples méditerranéens, 26
Weber, M. (1985). Ensayos de sociología contemporánea (p. 1) Barcelona: Planeta-Agostini.
Whitley, R. (1974). The City and Industry: The Directors of Large Companies, Their Characteristics and Connections. In P. Stanworth & A. Giddens (Eds.), Elites and Power in British Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wight, C. (2006). Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wright Mills, C. (2000 [1956]). The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press.
Zemni, S., & Bogaert, K. (2009). Trade, Security and Neoliberal Politics: Whither Arab Reform? Evidence from the Moroccan Case. The Journal of North African Studies, 14, 1.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Izquierdo-Brichs, F. (2021). Neopatrimonialism, Power and Regimes in Central Asia: A Sociology of Power Analysis. In: Izquierdo-Brichs, F., Serra-Massansalvador, F. (eds) Political Regimes and Neopatrimonialism in Central Asia. The Steppe and Beyond: Studies on Central Asia. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9093-1_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-15-9092-4
Online ISBN: 978-981-15-9093-1
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)