Abstract
This chapter studies current relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in order to show the importance of Cairo for Riyadh’s economic and strategic plans in the Red Sea. These plans are presented as an extension of the conflict dynamics in the Gulf region, and as a strategy to curb Iranian influence therein.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
How the rulers of the UAE felt about this scenario is shown by the fact that legal proceedings were instituted against more than 100 people between April 2011 and November 2014. Most of the accused were charged with founding a secret organization affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood with the aim of toppling the UAE regime (Sailer 2016).
- 2.
“P5 + 1” refers to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—China, France, Russia, UK, and the United States—plus Germany.
- 3.
The new king replaced Crown Prince Muqrin with his nephew, Mohammed bin Nayef, the interior minister, who thus became set to be the first grandson of the kingdom’s founder to take power. Defense minister Mohammed bin Salman was named second in line to the throne.
- 4.
By royal decree Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef was removed as next in line to the throne and replaced by Mohammed bin Salman. The Saudi Press Agency reported that the new crown prince was also named deputy prime minister and maintained his post as defense minister, while the former crown prince was removed from his post as interior minister.
- 5.
Krieg writes: “Tens of millions of dollars were invested by the UAE to not only buy influence in existing conservative think tanks, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Atlantic Council or the Middle East Institute, but also to create its own Arab Gulf States Institute. The proximity of think-tankers to Capitol Hill policymakers completed the circle of Emirati outreach infrastructure into the American heart of power.”
- 6.
In 2011, Iran’s revenues from gas were estimated at 30 million dollars while Qatar’s revenues were estimated at 120 million dollars.
- 7.
The United States has two strategically important bases in Qatar, the Al-Udeid Airbase and Camp AS-Sayliyah: “Al-Udeid is the largest overseas airbase used by the United States and has two active runways capable of handling every aircraft in the U.S. inventory, together with robust fueling and ammunition storage facilities. In addition, the base also houses the forward headquarters of U.S. Special Operations Central Command (SOCCENT) and U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) with their advanced command and control infrastructures. This complex has been built up considerably over 14 years, with much of the funding provided by Qatar” (Des Roches 2017).
- 8.
Funding for the causeway was announced from the Saudi Bin Laden Group, which was reported as “ready” to work for the Egyptian government after the Mursi government took office (Saudi Bin Laden Group 2019).
- 9.
In the case of UAE, it is well known that DP World (an Emirati company that is one of the world’s largest maritime firms and directs operations in more than 40 countries) had been making investments in the Horn of Africa since the 90s. It built a large port in Djibouti, and is now working on another in Somaliland, trying to gain a strategic foothold in east Africa to secure commercial and military advantage through ports, despite the risks of exacerbating tensions in the region.
- 10.
See the ETIDAL website, etidal.org/en/about-etidal/, accessed on 20 March 2020.
- 11.
Lavrov also said that the UNSC sanctions against Eritrea, imposed in 2009 after reports that the country was aiding Somalia’s Al-Shaabab, should be lifted, and praised Eritrea for all that it had done in the name of regional peace over the past few months, in view of its rapidly moving rapprochement with Ethiopia, completely transforming the geopolitical situation.
- 12.
One of the first movers into Red Sea just before the end of the Cold War was Qatar, which sought to position itself as a mediator of choice—hosting peace talks for Darfur, and between Eritrea and Djibouti—and as a key sponsor of civil Islamism. It also used the media outlet Al Jazeera to generate an impact far beyond the country’s small size. Next to move was Turkey. Before the Syrian war began in 2011, prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had a vision of reviving Turkish leadership throughout the lands of the former Ottoman Empire using the soft power of trade, aid, and education. Turkey became the first country to open an embassy in fragile Somalia after its Transitional Federal Government returned and has remained a major supporter of the new government. It is also an active investor in Sudan with plans to open a base at Suakin on the country’s Red Sea coast.
References
Ahram Online. (2014). Egypt relies on Gulf aid to energize economy: Finance Minister. Ahram Online, Retrieved March 1, 2019, from http://english.ahram.org.eg.
Ahram Online. (2015a). Azhar says Saudi decision to form Islamic military Alliance historic. Ahram Online. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from http://english.ahram.org.eg.
Ahram Online. (2015b). Egypt, Saudi Arabia issue ‘Cairo Declaration’ to strengthen cooperation. Ahram Online. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from http://english.ahram.org.eg.
Al Jazeera English. (2017). Saudi Arabia appoints King Salman Son Crown Prince. Al Jazeera English. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from https://www.aljazeera.com.
Alsaafin, L., & Ilahoum, R. (2018). Why Arab leaders remain silent on Khassoggi disappearance? Al Jazeera, Retrieved March 7, 2019, from https://www.aljazeera.com.
Amin, M. (2018). The Turkey-Sudan alliance: Changing Red Sea geopolitics. Anadolu Agency. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://www.aa.com.tr.
Ardemagni, E. (2018). The age of ports: Gulf monarchies and sea rivalry. Aspenia Online. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from https://www.aspeniaonline.it.
Asisian, N. (2018). The Qatar crisis, its Regional Implications, and the US National Interest. Small Wars Journal. Retrieved March 2, 2019, from https://www.researchgate.net.
Azikiwe, A. (2016). Who is behind Egypt’s gift of two strategic Red Sea islands to Saudi Arabia. Mondialisation. Retrieved March 3, 2019, from https://www.mondialisation.ca.
Beker, V. (2010). Israel hides behind Iranophobia to justify its actions. The National. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from https://www.thenational.ae.
Bernhofen, D. M., Zouheir, E., & Kneller, R. (2013). Estimating the effects of the container revolution on world trade. Journal of International Economics, 98, 36–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2015.09.001.
Calabrese, J. (2018). Oman’s transition post oil economy arching toward Asia, Middle East Institute. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://www.mei.edu.
Cavas, C. (2017). US Navy beefs up in the Red Sea presence. Defense News. Retrieved March 3, 2019, from https://www.defensenews.com.
De Young, K. (2015). Saudi Arabia launches Islamic military alliance to Combat terrorism. The Washington Post. Retrieved February 29, 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com.
Des Roches, D. (2017). A base is more than buildings: The military implications of the Qatar crisis. War on the Rocks website. Retrieved March 20, 2020, from https://warontherocks.com.
Dewaal, A. (2018). Beyond the Red Sea. A driving force in the Politics of the Horn World Peace Foundation. Retrieved March 2, 2019, from https://sites.tufts.edu.
Doumar, G. R. A., Patel, R., & Smith, M. J. (2017). Legal analysis of the demands presented to Qatar, Arab Center, Washington, DC. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from http://arabcenterdc.org.
Eglash, R. (2016). How two Red Sea Island shed light on secret relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia? The Washington Post. Retrieved February 23, 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com.
Egypt Today. (2017). Egypt KSA to cooperate on peaceful uses of nuclear power. Egypt Today. Retrieved March 1, 2019, from https://www.egypttoday.com.
Fick, M. (2014). Egypt army extends power by taking charge of gulf aid. Reuters. Retrieved February 22, 2019, from http://www.reuters.com.
Haaretz. (2018). Egypt’s top court approves controversial Red Sea Islands transfer to Saudi Arabia. Haaretz. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://www.haaretz.com.
Hallwood, P., & Miceli, T. J. (2014). Enforcing the law: An economic approach to maritime piracy and its control, piracy studies. The Research Portal for Maritime Security. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from http://piracy-studies.org.
Hirsi Ali, A. (2017). The plot behind Saudi Arabia’s fight with Qatar. The New York Times. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://www.nytimes.com.
Kamrava, M. (2016). Iran-Qatar relations. In A. Ehteshami, N. Quilliam, & C. Baghat (Ed.), Security and bilateral issues between Iran and its Arab Neighbours (pp. 167–187). Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kerr, S., & Khalaf, R. (2015). King Salman speeds up accession of new generation in Saudi shuffle. The Financial Times. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from https://www.ft.com.
Kerr, S., & Saleh, H. (2014). UAE’s Arabtec signs $40bn housing deal with Egypt’s interim military rulers. The Financial Times. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from https://www.ft.com.
Krieg, A. (2018). Never mind Russia, the UAE has united with AIPAC to capture Washington. Middle East Eye. Retrieved March 2, 2019, from https://www.middleeasteye.net.
Lakhal, S., & Souad, M. H. (2017). The Red-Med Railway Project a serious competitor to the Suez Canal for Cargo containers? Independent Journal of Management & Production, 8(3), 898–917. https://doi.org/10.14807/ijmp.v8i3.619.
Levinson, C., & Bardley, M. (2013). In Egypt, the ‘Deep State’ rises again. The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved March 1, 2019, from https://www.wsj.com.
Mesa, L. (2019). Egipto y las monarquías del Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo. Entre tensiones y acuerdos. México: UNAM.
Mohie, M. (2015). Why is Egypt participating in operation decisive storm? Mada Masr. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://madamasr.com.
Morsy, A (2012). An eager Iran & Hesitant Egypt: Relations before and after the Arab Spring. Muftah. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://muftah.org.
NATO Association of Canada. (2014). An overview of Somali piracy. NATO Association of Canada. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from http://natoassociation.ca.
Pervez, M. (2014). How Saudi’s planted Sisi in Egypt’s power structure. World Bulletin. Retrieved March 5, 2019, from https://www.worldbulletin.net.
Roberts, D. (2011). Blame Iran: A dangerous response to Bahraini uprising. The Guardian. Retrieved March 8, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com.
Sailer, M. (2016). Changed priorities in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates Rethink their Relationship with Egypt. SWP Comments 8. German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Retrieved March 3, 2019, from https://www.swpberlin.org.
Saudi Bin Laden Group. (2019). King Salman causeway. Saudi Bin Laden Group. Retrieved March 8, 2019, from https://www.protenders.com.
Shay, S. (2018). Saudi Arabia and the ‘nuclearization’ of the Middle East. Institute for Policy and Strategy. Institute for Policy and Strategy, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy. Retrieved March 15, 2020, from https://www.idc.ac.
Solomon, S. (2018, September 2). Russia-Eritrea relations grow with planned logistics center. VOA online. Retrieved March 30, 2020, from https://www.voanews.com.
Tharoor, I. (2019, March 9). The West’s rebuke of Saudi Arabia won’t change its course. The Washington Times. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from https://www.washingtonpost.com.
The Guardian. (2013). Egypt declares MB a terrorist group. The Guardian. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from https://www.theguardian.com.
Vision 2030. (2016). Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Retrieved March 4, 2019, from https://vision2030.gov.sa/en.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2021 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Garduño García, M. (2021). Trans-Gulf Resonances: The Central Role of Egypt in the Saudi Dispute Over Qatar. In: Zweiri, M., Rahman, M.M., Kamal, A. (eds) The 2017 Gulf Crisis . Gulf Studies, vol 3. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8735-1_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-15-8734-4
Online ISBN: 978-981-15-8735-1
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)