Abstract
In his later works, Davidson argues that an agent cannot have any propositional thought if it has never interacted with another agent in a certain way. This is later known as the triangulation argument. However, this argument is very controversial and not many philosophers accept it. One of the reasons is that there is no consensus on how exactly the argument goes. In this chapter, I try to reformulate this argument, and special attention is paid to the methodological considerations on relevant similarity, which I believe, are often being overlooked in current literature. A tentative modification of the kind of interactions required is also given.
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Notes
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It should be emphasized that when Davidson discusses KA, he is considering a very thin sense of normativity, that is, the standard of correct application of a concept and the truth condition of a thought. Another way to ask this question would therefore be: If mere dispositions cannot explain the correct or incorrect application of a concept, or the truth or falsity of thought, what else can?
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See also Blackburn (1984).
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One can also construct a triangulation scenario in terms of an agent with his imagined self or one in his expectation, the situation is, I believe, essentially the same.
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Leong, W.C. (2021). Methodological Considerations in the Triangulation Argument. In: Yang, S.CM., Myers, R.H. (eds) Donald Davidson on Action, Mind and Value. Logic in Asia: Studia Logica Library. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-7230-2_9
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