Abstract
The research presented here is based on the premise that a variety of actors involved in various transcultural and transnational networks shape cultural diplomacy in the cases examined. While their general aim of promoting interest in China is identical to that of Chinese state actors, their choice of topic and methods of presentation may differ widely. Therefore, this paper highlights the role that local actors, both foreign and Chinese, play in cultural diplomacy, discussing transnational networks and the involvement of cultural capital.
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Notes
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I would like to thank my colleague Isabelle Cheng, University of Portsmouth, who provided a comprehensive overview on the current academic discourse on cultural diplomacy in the PRC.
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For a critical discussion of the idea and practice of the concept of the harmonious world, which was developed by former President Hu Jintao and then transformed into the ‘Chinese dream’ by the current President Xi Jinping, see Nordin (2016).
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On the other hand, China has become much more involved in international systems, such as:
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the United Nations, as the largest contributor of the P-5 to U.N. peacekeeping operations;
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the World Trade Organization, as a frequent utilizer and target of dispute settlement cases;
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the World Bank, as the third largest contributor and largest recipient of loans;
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the International Atomic Energy Agency, as a member of the team that negotiated a freeze on Iran’s nuclear weapons program;
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the IMF, whose reserve currency (Special Drawing Rights) China is on track to join; and
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the United Nation’s other specialized agencies (Bader 2016, 13).
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Since 2006, the official title is the ‘Office of Chinese Language Council International’ (Guojia Hanyu guoji tuiguang lingdao xiaozu bangongshi; Li 2019, 5). Its predecessor was the ‘China National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language’ (Guojia duiwai Hanyu Jiaoxue lingdao xiaozu), established in 1987.
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I received the same answers from my interviews as Hartig: ‘The more important question for the present is what actually happens at CIs with regard to events, lectures and talks. In conversation, interviewees would usually assure me that, so far, there had been no interference from the Chinese side and no attempts to push topics in a certain direction. ‘As long as I am here, we did not get any kind of instruction, which for me is a counterargument to the accusation of propaganda’ (I-A3). Another director said, ‘the Chinese don’t dictate to us what we should or cannot do’ (I-A2). A statement that is repeated throughout the institutes is that “Hanban doesn’t impinge on our daily work at all” (I-G6). Although it appears that Hanban does not usually intervene in the daily work of CIs, it still has an influence on the programes of CIs by its power to reject or approve the annual project budget. According to one CI director, Hanban’s agreement to the funding depends in the last analysis on “whether they actually like the proposal” (I-A4) and it stands to reason that Hanban may not like a proposal for a project that is deemed inappropriate’ (Hartig 2015, 132).
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Other researchers partly came to the same conclusion: ‘This article reports three main findings: (1) the geopolitical influence of Confucius Institutes is uneven in different regions and they are engaged in an ongoing process of geopolitical construction’; in addition these researchers also reported that ‘analyses of correlation with China’s national image show that not only does the influence of the institution vary in regions but also that the project could have a negative impact on bilateral cooperation, suggesting that, contrary to popular thinking, Confucius Institutes have not had a positive impact on China’s global interests,’ which seems to be too general and is very much dependent on the concrete case and ‘the capacity of the institutes in everyday operations is systematically limited, reflecting China’s inexperience in managing this global cultural network’ which also could not be established in my case study (Yuan et al. 2016, 334).
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I would distance myself from reports that there is a coordinated and well-financed Chinese United Front strategy, as was suggested by one commentator on my chapter. This aspect has been raised, e.g., by the Nottingham-based sinologist Andreas Fulda, ‘Wie die Kommunistische Partei die Wissenschaft gefährdet,’ Zentrum Liberale Moderne ‘How the Communist Party Endangered Science,’ https://libmod.de/china-wie-die-partei-die-freie-wissenschaft-gefaehrdet/, June 12, 2019). Other sinologists, e.g., Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer and Michael Lackner, have stressed the importance of cultural exchange despite the different political systems. Yan Xu-Lackner, the director of the Confucius Institute at the University Erlangen-Nürnberg, has also been cited warning against overestimating Beijing’s political intentions with respect to the Confucius Institutes. She reports on more than 80 events a year, makes critical films, and heads one of the best-funded institutes (Schmoll 2018). Especially in the United States, Confucius Institutes have had to close, but as Randy Kluver, former director of the Confucius Institute at A&M University in Texas, said: ‘I have been active for years countering these accusations that the Confucius Institutes are a vehicle for propaganda. Nothing could be further from the truth.’ Kluver left Texas A&M last year and is now dean of the School of Global Studies and Partnerships at Oklahoma State University. He went on, ‘It’s disappointing to me that, No. 1, the accusations continue to be floated even though there’s no evidence of propaganda.’ https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/04/09/texas-am-cuts-ties-confucius-institutes-response-congressmens-concerns.
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Since 2014 only at https://dnc-online.de/.
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As Hartig (Hartig 2015, 169) indicates, the Confucius Institutes, on the other hand, escape the reciprocity system as they are established and registered in the host country, and the Ministry of Education (Hanban) is only one of the actors—the others are usually the Chinese and the foreign host university or institution (http://en.chinaculture.org/ccc/worldwide.html).
From the website: ‘Interested parties can also find numerous printed and electronic media in Chinese as well as German literature about China in the in-house library and attached reading room. Be our guest and be inspired by China’s millennia-old culture’ (http://www.architektur-ausstellungen.de/institution/berlin/chinesisches-kulturzentrum-berlin). I would argue, however, that despite the similar descriptions of the Confucius Institute and the China Cultural Center, which I will describe when discussing the CI in Berlin, the largest difference remains the initial form. In the CI two partners—one Chinese and one foreign—are the main actors, and often these are universities and respective departments which have already had established forms of cooperation for years. Thus, workshops, lectures, and exhibitions which provide a much more nuanced picture of China are more likely to be found in CIs than in the Cultural Center.
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In 2019, only four documentaries were shown, three of which (by the director Chen Xiaoqing) dealt only with food culture. In 2018, there was no documentary film; in 2017, there was one screening of the documentary film Village Diary and the possibility of a conversation with director Jiao Bo on rural China, and there was no film in 2016. There were seven documentary films in 2015 (including the documentary film by Zhang Tongdao, following the lives of 18 children over 13 years), there was one in 2014, and there were four documentaries in 2013 (dealing mostly with famous architecture and landscapes).
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http://www.konfuziusinstitut-berlin.de/html/de/ueber-uns/index.html; see also Ptackova (2018).
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The cooperation agreement, statute (of the association), and declaration of intent of the three participating institutions, the Free University of Berlin, Beijing University, and Hanban are publicly accessible under the Freedom of Information Act Berlin (IFG). Online: https://media.frag-den-staat.de/files/foi/399746/19due213aKonfuzius_Institut.pdf.
In addition to questions regarding finances, the most important issues are as follows (translated by the author from German):
‘In 2005, the Peking University, represented by the President, Prof. Xu Zhihong, and the Freie Universität Berlin, represented by Uni Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dieter Lenzen, signed the cooperation agreement on the foundation of the Confucius Institute an der Freien Universität Berlin.’
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Activities
The activities of the association are focused on the promotion of knowledge of Chinese culture, the cultivation of Chinese-German cooperation, the teaching of Chinese language skills, the support of Sinology and Chinese studies at the FU Berlin, and the demand of China-related projects.
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Statute
Purpose of the association are the requirement of knowledge of Chinese culture, the maintenance of Chinese German cooperation, the teaching of Chinese language skills, support of Chinese Studies and Chinese studies at the FU Berlin and the demand of China-related projects Letter of Intent of the National Office of Chinese Teaching as a Foreign Language, People’s Republic of China and the Free University of Berlin, Federal Republic of Germany on the joint establishment of a Confucius Institute at the Free University of Berlin.
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The demand and development of Chinese teaching in Germany, including the provision of training for Chinese language teachers, the development of teaching materials according to local requirements, the organization of scientific lectures and seminars, and the organization of temporary courses.
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The demand of relevant activities with the aim to arouse public interest in China or the Chinese language. By organizing activities such as academic lectures, seminars, conferences, and Chinese film festivals, an understanding of Chinese literature, history, economics, philosophy, etc., is to be achieved.
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‘Confucius had positive associations with teaching in particular, and culture more generally, and the name offered global brand recognition’ (Starr 2009, 69).
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Sometimes, the foreign partner is another cultural institution and not a university/institute for higher learning. In Germany, it is usually registered as an association, but other legal frameworks are possible, depending on local laws. CIs are always registered in the foreign country according to their legal framework.
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To give a few examples of the wide range of topics discussed in workshops or presented in lectures during the last two years: Workshops were organized partly in cooperation with the publicly funded GIGA Institute of Asian Studies and dealt with ‘The reorientation of the Chinese economic model under Xi Jinping: Analysis of the institutional framework’ and ‘EU-China Relations: A New Era of Cooperation?’ The addressing of other issues clearly shows an open and critical stance dealing with ‘Food security and food safety,’ ‘Green Innovation,’ and ‘20 years Beijing-Berlin: Beijing’s controversial urban spaces.’ An exhibition by high-ranking academics of Beijing University was ‘The spirit of Beijing University: A calligraphy exhibition’; various academics gave lectures on issues such as ‘The “Chinese Dream” in the Future Discourse of Modern China’ (Prof. Nicola Spakowski, Albert-Ludwigs-University of Freiburg) and ‘China’s global cultural diplomacy’ (my own lecture). Prof. Philip Clart, University of Leipzig, discussed ‘The Fate of the People’s Religion in the People’s Republic of China: 1949 to today.’
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See, for example, Roetz (2011). Arguments for a lack of criticism of China in German academia can be summarized as follows: (1) cultural relativism; (2) sinology or the Chinese sciences have, with exceptions, by no means felt forced to correct a holistic view of Chinese culture as presented by China itself, and with regard to China’s cultural diplomacy, this is to say that China itself now propagates this image which makes it immune from criticism; (3) reasons such as the lack of funding in the German (and in general European university system) and the need to cooperate with the Chinese government.
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In 2011, the Confucius Institute in Freiburg organized—together with Freiburg University—a reading by the exiled writer Liao Yiwu, who has been living in Germany since 2011. The website of the CI states: ‘In his new book Die Kugel und das Opium. Fates from Tiananmen Square Liao remembers the protest movement of 1989 and its bloody suppression’ (Mit der Lesung des Exil-Schriftstellers Liao Yiwu, der seit 2011 in Deutschland lebt, wird die Reihe um eine authentische chinesische Stimme bereichert. In seinem neuen Buch’Die Kugel und das Opium. Schicksale vom Platz des Himmlischen Friedens’ erinnert Liao an die Protestbewegung von 1989 und ihre blutige Niederschlagung). In general, however, Confucius Institutes as well as their European partner universities know about the limits on what can be openly discussed and advertised. This well-known fact was clear to the initiators of all Confucius Institutes, but as long as there is no interference with other academic activities and the audience is able to openly discuss whatever topic they like, the CIs are still a platform to connect China (the PRC) to Germany and Austria. Direct contact may help to increase mutual understanding, and the CIs are only one of many platforms. Others—e.g., Amnesty International or Tibet organizations—have a different attitude and the audience is free to choose.
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In addition, there is, of course, an open discussion on the role of CIs in a democratic society. Accusations of improper behavior, e.g., in Maryland and Stockholm, have been solved by closing down the CIs. Xin Liu, who compared the role of the CIs in South Korea and the United Kingdom, also came to the conclusion that ‘despite the centralized input from Hanban and the globalized outreach of the CI, no standard “recipe” can be found for all the nine CIs interviewed, and stark differences can be observed in their day-to-day activities. Localization is essential here, as the same message sent would be received and perceived differently in the process of interacting with different ideologies, cultural spheres, historical contexts and media environment of the destinations’ (657). Furthermore, she concluded: ‘the real crucial link in the international exchange is the last three feet, which is bridged by personal contact, one person talking to another’. …What the CI offers can considerably contribute in this aspect: by bringing teachers from China to the host institutions, facilitating student exchange programs between the two partner institutions, organizing study tours, and providing scholarships and chances to study in China. All this helps to correct some of the mystified or imagined ‘knowledge’ about China, (657). ‘Correcting the improper views of China held by the evil West’ is a highly compromised Chinese propagandistic line, which is academically untenable because it doesn’t demonstrate how the West errs in perceiving China.
- 26.
Information is taken from the website https://www.gdcf-berlin.de/ and from interviews with the management of the Chinaladen, the bookstore run by the GDCF, e.g., Vera Wollenweber, Dagmar Yu-Dembski.
- 27.
See, http://www.stadtkultur-international.de/en/eva-sternfeld/: For over 30 years, Eva Sternfeld has been involved in research on issues related to the environment, urban development, and water management in China. She holds a PhD degree from the East-Asian Institute of the Free University of Berlin. From 2000 to April 2008, she worked with the China Environment and Sustainable Development Reference and Research Center (CESDRRC) in Beijing. The environmental information facility was set up by the Center for Environmental Education and Communication (CEEC) of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). Since August 2008, she has been an assistant professor at the Technical University of Berlin; she directs the university’s Center for Cultural Studies on Science and Technology in China at the Technical University of Berlin. Dr. Sternfeld has worked as a consultant for various German and international institutions.
Dagmar Yu-Dembski studied journalism, art history, and Sinology at the Free University of Berlin. She is the chairwoman of the Society for German-Chinese Friendship Berlin e.V., the publisher of the magazine, ‘The New China,’ and the MANAGING Director of the Confucius Institute at the Free University of Berlin.
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The website mentions W. Grube, J. J. M. de Groot, O. Franke, E. Haenisch, W. Simon, E. Hauer, and P. Ratchnevsky.
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Edney (2014, 19) also argues that the ‘key tension embedded in China’s foreign propaganda practices—the tension between the desire to showcase a range of Chinese views that appeal to foreign audiences and the need to ensure they are all politically consistent—is a product of the way the Party-state uses propaganda practices to exercise power domestically.’
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Lately, there has been a great deal of research which highlights the increasing activities of China with respect to foreign academics, the media, and other cultural institutions. While I do not doubt the existence of these activities, the question remains whether invitations to five star hotels in China for conferences, the provision of free teaching material, and free books alone can change attitudes toward China if the materials provided are not credible at all. I myself was given free copies published by the Foreign Language Press, China International Publishing Group recently at an international conference in China, including A Concise Reader of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing 2016. I do not have to be a sinologist to understand that this book is mere propaganda, and students at the CI—the normal interested audience for anything to do with China—will recognize this immediately.
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Damm, J. (2021). China’s Cultural Diplomacy in Berlin: The Impact of Transnational and Local Actors. In: Ptáčková, J., Klimeš, O., Rawnsley, G. (eds) Transnational Sites of China’s Cultural Diplomacy. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5592-3_8
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