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Establishing a Common Ground—Admiral Zheng He as an Agent of Cultural Diplomacy in Malaysia

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Transnational Sites of China’s Cultural Diplomacy

Abstract

Selective mining of history for examples of harmonious cooperation is one of the more pronounced features of China’s cultural diplomacy. In Southeast Asia the voyages of Zheng He, the world-famous eunuch admiral, are often invoked as a common ground on which to build new and beneficial relations with various countries of the region. Portrayed as an intrepid explorer as well as an envoy of peace bringing the know-how of an advanced Chinese culture, the admiral is ideally poised to embody the values the PRC government is eager to propagate. This is especially true in the case of Malaysia, where the Ming voyages coincided with the rise of Muslim political power and the founding of the first Malay state, the Sultanate of Malacca. In Malaysia the PRC’s message of friendly cooperation and peaceful contacts has been readily adopted and heartily promoted by government as well as certain non-governmental actors including members of the local Chinese community, who for various reasons contribute to the dissemination of the image the PRC would like to project. Focusing on selected sites of transnational societal spaces in Malaysia (The International Cheng Ho Society, Zheng He Museum in Malacca, and Malacca itself), the chapter analyses various ways in which the voyages are utilized, explaining why the idea of Zheng He’s voyages seen as a culture quest appeals to the respective actors involved in its promotion. Focus on the sites of interaction provides a much clearer, if more complicated picture of converging and overlapping interests and enables a better understanding of the various factors shaping and influencing cultural diplomacy in a complex relationship in which ethnic, social, and political conditions of the target country play an essential role.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In case of Malaysia, there are various historical communities such as Baba Nyonya, Cantonese, Hokkien, or Teochew living side by side with later, twentieth-century Chinese migrants. For discussion of periodization and different waves of Chinese migration to Southeast Asia, see Wang (1992).

  2. 2.

    Following 2016 China had installed missiles on the Spratley Islands and in 2018 organized week-long naval drills in the South China Sea, parading its large flotila including an aircraft carrier (Le 2018). For an overview of different aspects of Chinese activity in South China Sea see Storey and Lin (2016).

  3. 3.

    For details of the China-Malaysia relationship under Najib’s government see the chapter of Tomáš Petrů in this volume.

  4. 4.

    For the evolution of China-Malaysia relations and Chinese involvement in Malaysian politics, see Thirumaran (2007, 195–196). For the complicated position of the Chinese diaspora in Malaysia in regard to the nation- and state-building efforts of the Malays, see Yow (2016, 837, 846–848).

  5. 5.

    Concern about rising influence of China in Malaysia was certainly one of the factors leading to the fall of Najib Razak and his government in Spring 2018 (Malhi 2018). The new Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad announced a shift of Malaysian stance towards China which should ‘not to be anti-China but more pro-Malaysia’ (Ignatius 2018).

  6. 6.

    A case in point is the reaction to a controversial proclamation of the PRC’s ambassador Huang Huikang in Malaysia in September 2015 (Chinese envoy must apologize 2015) or his financial support of the local Chinese communities’ schools in Malaysia. For detailed discussion, see the chapter of Tomáš Petrů in this volume.

  7. 7.

    For a summary of the known facts about Zheng He’s life and a balanced overview of the voyages see Dreyer (2007).

  8. 8.

    For example, see a statement of Li Jinming from the Department of World History, Fudan University, quoted in Li (2005).

  9. 9.

    For example, the PRC state councilor Dai Bingguo quoted in Murphy (2010).

  10. 10.

    For an example of this kind of narrative turning Zheng He into a useful tool of Chinese cultural diplomacy see the speech given by the Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang at the East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur on November 22, 2015 (Full text of Premier’s 2015).

  11. 11.

    For diplomatic relations with the Ming and Malaccan rulers’ visits to China see Wang (2005a) and (2005b) respectively.

  12. 12.

    Called Muzium Budaya Cheng Ho in Malay and Zheng He Wenhua Guan in Chinese. See its webpage at http://www.chengho.org/museum/.

  13. 13.

    For the career and activities of Tan Ta Sen see Hong and Huang (2009, 300–301).

  14. 14.

    The Chinese original, called Zheng He shishi, was published in 2005 by Yunnan Renmin Chubanshe.

  15. 15.

    Based on the author’s visit to the site in May 2015. For the details of the museum exhibitions, see also Tan (2014, 85–86) and the webpages of the Museum at http://www.chengho.org/museum/.

  16. 16.

    And it has certainly been viewed like that. An example could be Indonesian scholar Johannes Widodo, who says that ‘The story of Zheng He in Melaka has been fantasized, distorted, and commoditized under the pretext of cultural promotion and for the sake of generating tourism revenue’ (Widodo 2008). For similar reservations of a Singapore-based historian, Geoff Wade, see Hong and Huang (2009, 297–304).

  17. 17.

    Up to a certain point, Tan Ta Sen seems to act with a motivation similar to An Husei’s, a Kazakhstani businessman analyzed by Věra Exnerová in her chapter in this volume. However, while An’s interest is to achieve a higher social standing through being simply a part of a high profile cultural diplomacy effort supported by the governments of both China and Kazakhstan, Tan Ta Sen identifies with the content of the Chinese cultural diplomacy narrative, aiming for something qualitatively different, the enhanced standing of the Chinese community in the region vis-à-vis the Malay majority.

  18. 18.

    These were Vice Premier Liu Yandong (Lim 2017, 10), the Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Jia Qinglin (Jia Qinglin visits 2013) and Li Keqiang (Li Keqiang visits 2015).

  19. 19.

    It seems that the exhibitions of the museum mainly target Chinese tourists. While there are also captions in Malay and English, much more information is provided in Chinese, especially in the section dedicated to Zheng He’s life (personal observation).

  20. 20.

    See the society webpage (About Our Society, http://www.chengho.org/aboutus). For the membership see also Lim (2017, 12).

  21. 21.

    For the public-oriented activities, see the annual reports of the society on its webpage (only those up to 2012 are available).

  22. 22.

    The association of respective authors with the IZHS is not always clear. While Wang Gungwu is an official advisor to the society and Chung Chee Kit is the director of the Friends of Admiral Zheng He (another Singapore-based group), Johannes Widodo from the Department of Architecture, National University of Singapore, has expressed deep reservations about the Zheng He Cultural Museum. See Widodo (2008).

  23. 23.

    For an assessment of the book see Ptak (2007).

  24. 24.

    It should have commemorated the 605th anniversary of Zheng He’s first voyage and the second anniversary of the designation of Malacca as a UNESCO-listed World Heritage City.

  25. 25.

    The second volume collecting the Chinese papers appeared as Zheng He yu Ya Fei shijie and was edited by Leo Suryadinata, Kua Bak Lim, and Koh Hock Kiat. Unfortunately, I was not able to access this volume.

  26. 26.

    Mentioned by Tan Ta Sen in an interview with Lim Tai Wei without giving a precise date (Lim 2017, 6).

  27. 27.

    As the official webpage of the IZHS has not been updated since 2012 and the Facebook account since 2014 it is not entirely clear what the society does at the moment.

  28. 28.

    For example, the role of the Ming factor in establishing the Malacca Sultanate and the contribution of Chinese Muslim communities to the Islamization of the region are becoming established facts. See, for example, Wade (2005) and Lombard and Salmon (1993) respectively. For a historical overview of these notions, see Wain (2017).

  29. 29.

    For an example of this view see Wong (2014) or quotations from a speech of the Governor of Malacca opening the 2009 Zheng He and the Afro-Asian World conference (Chia and Church 2012, xxii).

  30. 30.

    For example, Dato Dzulkifli Abd Razak, a vice chancellor of the Universiti Sains Malaysia claims that ‘Zheng He’s voyages did not amount to the “gunboat” diplomacy generally associated more with the Europeans. Later, this turned into hegemony and colonisation in their war with Islam and working out of profit’ (Abd Razak 2005).

  31. 31.

    Vice Minister of Trade and Industry Mah Siew Keong, mentioned in Li (2005).

  32. 32.

    For example, Idris Haron, the chief minister of Malacca State has said in an interview that ‘closer ties with China within the BRI and revival of the Maritime Silk Road is believed to bring development opportunities and economic benefits to the state’ (Jiang 2015).

  33. 33.

    According to Thirumaran, another incentive for allowing more space for the Malaysian Chinese cultural heritage was the effort of the ruling UMNO party to win the support of the Malaysian Chinese constituency. For both see Thirumaran (2007, 192–197).

  34. 34.

    Personal observation during a visit in 2016.

  35. 35.

    So far, the huge success of this tourist show has encouraged similar Impressions to be staged in eight other cities in China.

  36. 36.

    Xi Jinping chose to personally witness the signing of the agreement during his official visit to Malaysia in 2013 (Ho 2016).

  37. 37.

    See the official pages of the project at https://impression-city.com/.

  38. 38.

    For the promo of the performance see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqDCkrv-rtA.

  39. 39.

    It is interesting to note that while in Malaysia and Kazakhstan (see Věra Exnerová’s chapter) economic interests of the various transnational actors often play a substantial role in their willingness to participate in China’s cultural diplomacy effort, they are conspicuously absent in case of Berlin (see Jens Damm’s chapter in this volume).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic

    Jakub Hrubý

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  1. Jakub Hrubý
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Correspondence to Jakub Hrubý .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic

    Jarmila Ptáčková

  2. Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic

    Ondřej Klimeš

  3. University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China

    Gary Rawnsley

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Hrubý, J. (2021). Establishing a Common Ground—Admiral Zheng He as an Agent of Cultural Diplomacy in Malaysia. In: Ptáčková, J., Klimeš, O., Rawnsley, G. (eds) Transnational Sites of China’s Cultural Diplomacy. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5592-3_5

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