Abstract
Agency public enforcement and private actions before the courts are the two complementing channels to cure market failure. Most antitrust jurisdictions rely on specialized antitrust agencies because it is believed that generalist courts do not have relevant expertise. When agencies are equipped with personnel having knowledge and expertise in economics, they investigate competition cases by applying such knowledge. At the same time, agencies with a top-down organization hierarchy may also suffer from public choice problems, and when the pressure from interest groups prevails, a court system should be built upon to enforce competition law through a more balanced system. Solely relying on the regulatory agencies to investigate competition cases, neglecting the fact that the goals of regulators may not be aligned with the goals of competition. The advantage for a court, but not agency, to enforce the law is that courts are restrained from regulatory capture, as defined in the public choice theory. The main challenge for courts to deal with complex economic antitrust cases is the lack of specific expertise, and such limitation could be remedied with the help of economic experts. This chapter discusses the economic complexity of the competition cases, the problem of specialization for courts versus agencies, and the role of experts. It will positively review the current development of private enforcement of the AML, and the potential role of expert witnesses.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See for example, Neven and De Coninck (2010).
- 2.
For example, Federal Judicial Center published Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence in 2000. The first two chapters of the Reference Guide in this manual are Reference Guide on Statistics and Reference Guide on Multiple Regression. Baker and Rubinfeld (1999, p. 387).
- 3.
Botteman (2006 p. 71).
- 4.
- 5.
Neven claimed that the demand for economic consultancy in Europe has dramatically increased since the 1990s, especially after the promulgation of the EC Merger Regulation. Neven (2006, p. 748).
- 6.
Both in the US and EU, the ratio of economists to lawyer at the competition enforcement agencies has increased significantly. In the EU, the Chief Competition Economist at the Directorate-General Competition (DG COMP) was appointed in 2003. Until 2005, among over 700 officials working at (DG COMP), 200 of them have an economics or business background, and about 20 of them hold a Ph.D. degree in economics. In 2005, 10 specialized economists who have a Ph.D. degree in industrial organization were hired by this office either as a permanent EU official, or as a temporary agent. See Roeller (2005, p. 16). Thus, as Neven argued, the number of professionals with an economic background working at the competition agency is comparable with those working in the economic consultancy firms. However, the economic resources that are devoted to case analysis are still unbalanced between private parties and the competition agency. See Neven (2006, p. 752, p. 781). In the US, the enforcement agencies are well-equipped with both professionals of PhD economists, but also antitrust lawyers who have a solid understanding of economic reasoning. See Baker and Bresnahan (2006, p. 28).
- 7.
For example in the EU, Botteman claimed that “There are very few instances where the CFI and the ECJ have been confronted with econometric analyses carried out by the Commission or by experts acting on behalf of the notifying parties or other third parties.” Botteman (2006 p. 73, p. 85).
- 8.
Botteman (2006, p. 86).
- 9.
Back to 1948 Judge Prettyman pointed out that “The tribunal does the best it can to decipher the truth from the resultant welter. Nothing could be sillier.” Prettyman, ‘Needed: New Trial Technique: Suggestions for the Trial of Complicated Cases’, 34 ABA J 766, 770 (1948) cited by Massel (1962, p. 48).
- 10.
Baker and Bresnahan (2006, p. 29).
- 11.
It has been both an academic and a political concern to improve the performance of regulatory agencies by improving the institutional and organizational designs. For example, the study of competition agencies: Wright and Diveley (2012, pp. 1–22).
- 12.
Kovacic (1997, p. 920).
- 13.
This is named by Wright and Diveley “Expertise Hypothesis”, see Wright and Diveley (2012 p. 5). Note that the legislative debate on delegating enforcement power to agencies or courts has lasted for centuries. Back to 1887 when the Interstate Commerce Act was promulgated, one of the most debated issues was whether this Act should be enforced by courts or agencies. See Stephenson (2006, p. 1039). see also Gilligan et al. (1989, pp. 35, 47–49). In the US, the legislative debate on allocating powers on the interpretation of statutes also refers to the Chevron doctrine and its exceptions, which defines when administrative agencies are empowered to interpret the statute. See Stephenson (2006, p. 1041).
- 14.
Dogan and Lamley (2008, p. 15).
- 15.
See for example, Neven and De Coninck.
- 16.
For example, Federal Judicial Center published Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence in 2000. The first two chapters of the ‘reference guide’ in this manual are ‘reference guide on Statistics’ and ‘reference guide on Multiple Regression’. Baker and Rubinfeld (1999, p. 387).
- 17.
As Baye and Wright put it: “The battle of the experts has become a standard, and critical battle in the antitrust litigation wars.” Baye and Wright (2011, p. 5).
- 18.
Farber and McDonnell (2005, p. 620). Discussions of antitrust often focus on economics, leaving many students with the feeling that they have mistakenly wandered into an economics class rather than a law class. .
- 19.
Easterbrook (1984, p. 57).
- 20.
Botteman (2006, p. 71).
- 21.
Crane (2008, p. 1159).
- 22.
Recalling the century-long debate on economic versus non-economic goals of antitrust law. see also Sokol (2015, p. 1247).
- 23.
Neven claimed that the demand for economic consultancy in Europe has dramatically increased since the 1990s, especially after the promulgation of the EC Merger Regulation. Neven (2006, p. 748).
- 24.
Lianos (2009, p. 6).
- 25.
Baye and Wright (2011, p. 5).
- 26.
Faure and Visscher (2011, p. 385).
- 27.
For example, Schreiber (2010).
- 28.
Petroski (2013, p. 108).
- 29.
Baker (1992).
- 30.
Baker (1992, pp. 331–332).
- 31.
Landis (1938), The Administrative Process.
- 32.
Wright and Diveley (2012, p. 5).
- 33.
Lettow (1986, p. 8).
- 34.
Lettow (1986, p. 8).
- 35.
Lettow (1986, p. 8).
- 36.
Lettow (1986, p. 9).
- 37.
Lettow (1986, p. 9).
- 38.
Lettow (1986, p. 9).
- 39.
Macey (1992, p. 103).
- 40.
Macey (1992, p. 103).
- 41.
Note the “epistemic deference” problem: there is an epistemic asymmetry between judges and experts. See Brewer (1998).
- 42.
Baye and Wright (2011, p. 5).
- 43.
Baye and Wright (2011), p. 6.
- 44.
Moore (2001).
- 45.
Chu (2001, pp. 1075–1164).
- 46.
Wagner and Petherbridge (2004 , pp. 1105–1180).
- 47.
Tomlin and Cooper (2006).
- 48.
Posner (2001, p. 277). (“By having technical experts present evidence at trial that the judge and jury is expected somehow to assimilate.”).
- 49.
Wright and Diveley (2012, p. 13).
- 50.
Wright and Diveley (2012, p. 22).
- 51.
- 52.
- 53.
Petroski (2013, p. 108).
- 54.
Deason(1998, p. 101).
- 55.
Deason (1998, p. 102).
- 56.
Robertson (2010 p. 184).
- 57.
Robertson (2010, p. 185).
- 58.
Robertson (2010, p. 187).
- 59.
Robertson (2010, p. 186).
- 60.
Robertson (2010, p. 188).
- 61.
Van Dusen (1962, pp. 498, 500).
- 62.
Friedman (1953, p. 4).
- 63.
Weller (1997, p. 888).
- 64.
Weller (1997, p. 888).
- 65.
Areeda (1988, p. 1033).
- 66.
Areeda (1988, p. 1033).
- 67.
As Stigler put it: “The apparatus of economics is very flexible: without breaking the rules of the profession—by being illogical or even by denying the validity of the traditional theory—a sufficient clear person can reach any conclusion he wishes on any real problem (in contrast to formal problems).” Stigler (1965, p. 63).
- 68.
Fox (1986, p. 579).
- 69.
Mandel (1999, p. 118).
- 70.
Fox (1986, p. 580).
- 71.
Fox (1986, p. 580).
- 72.
Mandel (1999, p. 119).
- 73.
Mandel (1999, p. 119).
- 74.
- 75.
- 76.
One of the major debated issues in implementing the competition policy in Europe is to what extent economic analysis should be used, and what role economists should play in the antitrust decision making. See Roeller (2005, p. 13).
- 77.
Fox (1986, p. 581).
- 78.
Fox (1986, p. 581).
- 79.
Fox (1986, p. 585).
- 80.
Baker and Bresnahan (2006, p. 3).
- 81.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction I made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”).
- 82.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (“It is the trial judge’s responsibility to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”).
- 83.
The Federal Rules of Evidence—Rule 702: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify hereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
- 84.
Deason (1998, at pp. 84–86).
- 85.
Robertson (2010, p. 200).
- 86.
Lee (1988, p. 480).
- 87.
Deason (1998, p. 76).
- 88.
Harrison (2001, p. 260).
- 89.
Champagne et al. (1992, p. 5).
- 90.
Harrison (2001, p. 260).
- 91.
- 92.
Harrison (2001, p. 268).
- 93.
Mandel (1999, p. 116).
- 94.
Mandel (1999, p. 116).
- 95.
Harrison (2001, p. 269).
- 96.
Shuman et al. (1994, pp. 193, 200).
- 97.
Harrison (2001, p. 270).
- 98.
Article 50 of the AML: The business operators that carry out the monopolistic conduct and cause damages to others shall bear the civil liability according to law.
- 99.
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Yin Longduan Xingwei Yinfa De Minshi Jiufen Anjian Yingyong Falyu Ruogan Wenti De Guiding (最高人民法院关于审理因垄断行为引发的民事纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的规定) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute Cases Arising from Monopolistic Conduct], Interpretation No. 5 [2012] of the Supreme People’s Court, issued by the Supreme People’s Court on May 3 2012 and effective on June 1 2012.
- 100.
Article 7 of the Provision, id.
- 101.
Article 8 of the Provision, id.
- 102.
Articles 1–2 of the Provision, id.
- 103.
Articles 3, 4 to 5 of the Provision, id.
- 104.
Article 6 of the Provision, id.
- 105.
Hou (2015, p. 1).
- 106.
Zhan and Tan (2015).
- 107.
Zhan et al. (2018).
- 108.
Liu et al. (2020).
- 109.
Zhan and Tan (2015).
- 110.
- 111.
China Competition Bulletin, Edition 35, January/February 2015, at p. 7.
- 112.
China Competition Bulletin 2016, Edition 40, January/February, at p. 16.
- 113.
China Competition Bulletin, Edition 44, September/October 2016, at p. 3.
- 114.
China Competition Bulletin, Edition 44, September/ October 2016, at p. 3.
- 115.
China Competition Bulletin, Edition 45, November/December 2016, at p. 8.
- 116.
China Competition Bulletin, Edition 47, June 2017, at p. 7.
- 117.
Hou (2015, p. 7).
- 118.
Zhao and He Jing (2017, p. 1179).
- 119.
Ren (2017, p. 11).
- 120.
Yuangao Nanjing Jiangong Jituan Youxian Gongsi Hunningtu Fengongsi Yu Beigao Jiangsusheng Wujiaju Wujia Xingzheng Chufa Xingwei Yian De Xingzheng Caidingshu (原告南京建工集团有限公司混凝土分公司与被告江苏省物价局物价行政处罚行为一案的行政裁定书) [Administrative Ruling of Plaintiff Nanjing Construction Engineering Group Co., Ltd. Concrete Branch and Defendant Jiangsu Price Bureau] September 24, 2014 available at http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/.
- 121.
陕西:30家机动车检测机构垄断涨价被罚570余万元(Shaanxi: 30 motor vehicle inspection agencies fined 5.7 million yuan for charging monopoly price) Xinhuanews, April 13 2016, available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2016-04-13/doc-ifxriqqv5567588.shtml (accessed 30.03.2020).
- 122.
临沂25家会计师事务所垄断协议案(Monopoly agreement case of 25 accounting firms in Linyi) Shandong Administration for Market Regulation official website August 20, 2019, available at http://amr.shandong.gov.cn/art/2019/8/20/art_88466_6978770.html (accessed 15.03.2020).
- 123.
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Zai Quanguo Fayuan Tuijin Zhishi Chanquan Minshi Xingzheng He Xingshi Anjian Shenpan Sanheyi Gongzuo de Yijian (最高人民法院关于在全国法院推进知识产权民事、行政和刑事案件审判“三合一”工作的意见) [Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Promoting the “Three in One” Trial of Civil, Administrative and Criminal Cases Involving Intellectual Property Rights in Courts Nationwide] issued on July 5, 2016 and effective on July 5, 2016.
- 124.
Zhan, Song and Yang (2018, p. 4).
- 125.
China Competition Bulletin, Edition 38, July/August 2015, at p. 3.
- 126.
China Competition Bulletin, Edition 43, July/August 2016, at p. 4.
- 127.
China Competition Bulletin, Edition 47, June 2017, at p. 6.
- 128.
China Competition Bulletin, Edition 41, March/April 2016, at p. 5.
- 129.
Zhang (2015).
- 130.
US Chamber of Commerce (2014).
- 131.
Zhang (2011).
- 132.
China Competition Bulletin, edition 45, November/December 2016.
- 133.
China Competition Bulletin, edition 47, June 2017.
- 134.
Winston (2005, p. 313).
- 135.
Li (2011, p. 6) and Winston (2005, p. 314).
- 136.
Tay (2007) and Killion (2004, p. 511).
- 137.
Clarke (2003, p. 108).
- 138.
Michelson and Li (2012, p. 4).
- 139.
Ohlhausen (2013).
- 140.
回眸2019:反垄断与公平竞争(Looking Back on 2019: Antitrust and Fair Competition)SAMR Development and Research Center, January 19, 2020, available at https://www.imsilkroad.com/news/p/398809.html?from=singlemessage&isappinstalled=0.
- 141.
Looking Back on 2019: Antitrust and Fair Competition, id.
- 142.
Fei Deng et al (2018, pp. 2, 10, 11).
- 143.
Dogan and Lamley (2008, p. 2).
- 144.
Dogan and Lamley (2008, p. 3).
References
Areeda, P. (1988). Always a borrower: Law and other disciplines. Duke Law Journal, 1988(5), 1029–1043.
Baker, T. E. (1992). The impropriety of expert witness testimony on the law. Kansas Law Review, 40, 325–364.
Baker, J. B., & Rubinfeld, D. L. (1999). Empirical methods in antitrust litigation: review and critique. American Law and Economics Review, 1(1), 386–435.
Baker, J. B., & Bresnahan, T. F. (2006). Economic evidence in antitrust: defining markets and measuring market power, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School Working Paper No. 328, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=931225.
Baye, M. R., & Wright, J. D. (2011). Is antitrust too complicated for generalist judges? The impact of economic complexity and judicial training on appeals. Journal of Law and Economics, 54(1), 1–24.
Botteman, Y. (2006). Mergers, standard of proof and expert economic evidence. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2(1), 71–100.
Brewer, S. (1998). Scientific expert testimony and intellectual due processes. Yale Law Journal, 107, 1535–1681.
Crane, D. A. (2008). Technocracy and antitrust. Texas Law Review, 86, 1159–1221.
Chu, C. A. (2001). Empirical analysis of the federal circuit’s claim construction trends. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 16, 1075–1164.
Champagne A et al. (1992). Expert witness in the court: an empirical examination. Judicature Journal, 76
Crowley, D. W. (1987). Judicial review of administrative agencies: does the type of agency matter? The Western Political Quarterly, 40(2), 265–283.
Damien, J. N., & De Coninck, R., Best practices on the submission of economic evidence and data collection, DG Competition, European Commission, Office of the Chief Economist
Deng, F. (2018). Roundtable on Antitrust Developments in China Ten Years On, the antitrust source, August 2018
Deason, E. E. (1998). Court-appointed expert witnesses: scientific positivism meets bias and deference. Oregon Law Review, 77, 59–156.
Dogan, S. L., & Lamley, M. A. (2008) Antitrust law and regulatory gaming. John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Stanford Law School Working Paper No. 367.
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984). Foreword: The court and the economic system. Harvard Law Review, 98(4), 4–60.
Farber, D. A., & McDonnell, B. H. (2005). “Is there a text in this class?” the conflict between textualism and antitrust. Contemporary Legal Issues, 14, 619–668.
Faure, M., & Visscher, L. (2011). The role of experts in assessing damages—A law and economics account. European Journal of Risk Regulation, 376–396.
Fels. A., Wang, X., Ng, W., & Emch, A. (Eds.) China Competition Bulletin, A Publication of the Competition Law & Economics Network at Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, Edition 40, January/February 2016.
Fels, A., Wang, X., Ng, W., & Emch, A. (Eds.) China Competition Bulletin, A Publication of the Competition Law & Economics Network at Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, Edition 41, March/April 2016.
Fels, A., Wang, X., Ng, W., & Emch, A. (Eds.) China Competition Bulletin, A Publication of the Competition Law & Economics Network at Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, Edition 44, September/October 2016.
Fels, A., Wang, X., Ng, W., & Emch, A. (eds.) China Competition Bulletin, A Publication of the Competition Law & Economics Network at Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, Edition 45, November/December 2016.
Fels, A., Wang, X., Ng, W., & Emch, A. (Eds.) China Competition Bulletin, A Publication of the Competition Law & Economics Network at Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, Edition 47, June 2017.
Friedman, M. (1953). Essay on the methodology of positive economics, in Essays in Positive Economics, University of Chicago Press.
Fox, E. M. (1986). The politics of law and economics in judicial decision making: antitrust as a window. New York University Law Review, 61, 554–588.
Gilligan, T. W., et al. (1989). Regulation and the theory of legislative choice: the interstate commerce act of 1887. Journal of Law and Economics, 32, 47–49.
Harrison, J. L. (2001). Reconceptualizing the expert witness: social costs, current controls and proposed responses. Yale Journal on Regulation, 18, 253–314.
Humphries, M. A., & Songer, D. R. (1999). Law and politics in judicial oversight of federal administrative agencies. The Journal of Politics, 61(1), 207–220.
Hou, J. A. (2015) Is Chinese private antitrust litigation ready to take off? Zelle Hofmann Voelbel & Mason LLP, Competition Policy International 2015, available at https://dev.competitionpolicyinternational.com/is-chinese-private-antitrust-litigation-ready-to-take-off/.
Kovacic, W. E. (1997). The quality of appointments and the capability of the Federal Trade Commission. Administrative Law Review, 49, 915–962.
Landis, J. M. (1938). The administrative process. Yale University Press.
Lettow, C. F. (1986). Strategic choices in the selection of expert witness. Natural Resources & Environment, 2(2), 6–9.
Lee, T. V. (1988). Court-appointed experts and judicial reluctance: A proposal to amend Rule 706 of the federal rules of evidence. Yale Law & Policy Review, 6(2), 480–503.
Lianos, I. (2009). “Judging” economists. Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation—A European View, CLES Working Paper Series 1/2009.
Liu, .C, Li, A., Bi, Y., Liu, S., Hong, L., & Liu, J. (2020). China’s anti-monopoly law enters its second decade. King & Wood Mallesons on February 20, 2020, available at https://www.chinalawinsight.com/2020/02/articles/antitrust/chinas-anti-monopoly-law-enters-its-second-decade/#_ftn18.
Macey, J. R. (1992). Organizational design and political control of administrative agencies. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 8(1), 93–110.
Massel, M. S. (1962). Economic analysis in judicial antitrust decisions. ABA Antitrust Section, 20, 46–61.
Mandel, M. J. (1999). Going for the gold: Economists as expert witness. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13(2), 113–120.
Moore, K. A. (2001). Are district court judges equipped to resolve patent cases? Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 15, 1–39.
Neven, D. J. (2006). Competition economics and antitrust in Europe. Economic Policy, 21(48), 742–791.
Neven, D. J., & De Coninck, R. (2010). Best practices on the submission of economic evidence and data collection, DG Competition of European Commission Staff Working Paper, available at https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/best_practices_submission_en.pdf.
Ohlhausen, M. K. (2013). Illuminating the Story of China’s Anti-monopoly Law, the antitrust source October 2013.
Posner, R. A. (2001). Antitrust law, 2nd edition Chicago University Press.
Posner, R. A. (1999a). An economic approach to the law of evidence. Stanford Law Review, 51, 1477–1546.
Posner, R. A. (1999). The law and economics of the economic expert witness. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 91–100
Prettyman. (1948). Needed: New trial technique: suggestions for the trial of complicated cases. American Bar Association Journal, 34(9), 766–660.
Petroski, K. (2013). Texts versus testimony: Rethinking legal uses of non-legal expertise. University of Hawaii Law Review, 35(1), 81–128.
Ren, Q. (2017). Anti-monopoly litigation in China: a review for the year of 2016. Competition Policy International Asian Column, March 27, 2017 available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/anti-monopoly-litigation-in-china-a-review-for-the-year-of-2016/.
Roeller, L. H. (2005). Economic analysis and competition policy enforcement in Europe, In: P. A. G. Van Bergeijk, E. Kloosterhuis (Eds.), Modelling European Mergers: Theory, Competition Policy and Case Studies, Edward Elgar 2005, pp. 13–27.
Rubinfeld, D. L. (1985). Econometrics in the courtroom. Columbia Law Review, 85(5), 1048–1097.
Robertson, C. T. (2010). Blind expertise. New York University Law Review, 85(1), 174–257.
Sheehan, R. S. (1990). Administrative agencies and the court: A reexamination of the impact of agency type on decisional outcomes. Western Political Quarterly, 43(December), 875–885.
Schreiber, T. (2010). Private antitrust litigation in the European Union. The International Lawyer, 44(4), 1157–1172.
Shuman, D. W., Whitaker, E., & Champagne, A. (1994). An empirical examination of the use of expert witnesses in the courts—Part II: a three city survey. Jurimetrics Journal, 34, 193–208.
Stephenson, M. C. (2005). Public regulation of private enforcement: the case for expanding the role of administrative agencies. Virginia Law Re view, 91(1), 93–173.
Stephenson, M. C. (2006). Legislative allocation of delegated power: uncertainty, risk, and the choice between agencies and courts. Harvard Law Review, 119(4), 1035–1070.
Sokol, D. D. (2015). Tensions between antitrust and industrial policy. George Mason Law Review, 22(5), 1247–1268.
Stigler, G. J. (1965). Essays in the history of economics. University of Chicago Press
Tomlin, J. T., & Cooper, D. (2006). When should judges appoint experts?: A law and economics perspective. Bepress Legal Series working Paper 1699, available at https://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1699.
US Chamber of Commerce. (2014). Competing Interests in China’s Competition Law Enforcement: China’s Anti-monopoly Law Application and the Role of Industrial Policy available at https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/aml_final_090814_final_locked.pdf.
Van Dusen. (1962). A United States district judge’s view of the impartial medical expert system, 32 F.R.D.
Wright, J. D., & Diveley, A. M. (2012) Do expert agencies outperform generalist judges? Some preliminary evidence from the Federal Trade Commission. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 1–22
Weller, C. D. (1997). Antitrust economics as science after Daubert. Antitrust Bulletin, 42, 871–935.
Wagner, P., & Petherbridge, L. (2004). Is the federal circuit succeeding? An empirical assessment of judicial performance. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 152, 1105–1180.
Zhao, B., & He, J. (2017). How China’s enforcement agencies and courts are shaping antitrust policies on vertical restraints. George Mason Law Review, 24, 1171–1212.
Zhan, H., Song, Y., & Yang, Z. (2018) A new era comes-highlights of the anti-monopoly law of China in 2018, Anjie Law Firm, available at http://www.anjielaw.com/en/uploads/soft/190201/1-1Z2011P205.pdf.
Zhan, H., & Tan, W. (2015). Private antitrust enforcement in China. Anjie Law Firm June 30, 2015, available at http://en.anjielaw.com/publications_detail/newsId=303.html.
Zhang, A. H. (2011). The enforcement of the anti-monopoly law in China: An institutional design perspective. The Antitrust Bulletin, 56, 631–663.
Zhang, A. H. (2015). Taming the Chinese leviathan: Is antitrust regulation a false hope? Stanford Journal of International Law, 51, 195–228.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2020 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ma, J. (2020). Enforcement of Competition Law—Role of the Courts and Economic Experts. In: Competition Law in China. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5105-5_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5105-5_11
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-15-5104-8
Online ISBN: 978-981-15-5105-5
eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)