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Deriving Implicit Security Requirements in Safety-Explicit Formal Development of Control Systems

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Implicit and Explicit Semantics Integration in Proof-Based Developments of Discrete Systems

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Abstract

Nowadays, safety-critical control systems are becoming increasingly open and interconnected. Therefore, while engineering a safety-critical system, we should guarantee that the system safety is not jeopardised by the security attacks. However, often the security requirements are not uncovered until the late design stages. Hence, there is a clear need for the modelling techniques that enable a formal reasoning about safety and security interdependencies at the early stages of the system development. In this work, we present a formal approach that allows the designers to uncover the implicit security requirements that are implied by the explicit system-level safety goals. We rely on modelling and refinement in Event-B to systematically uncover mutual interdependencies between safety and security and derive the constraints that should be imposed on the system to guarantee its safety in the presence of accidental and malicious faults.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Åbo Akademi University, Turku, Finland

    Inna Vistbakka

  2. KTH, Stockholm, Sweden

    Elena Troubitsyna

Authors
  1. Inna Vistbakka
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  2. Elena Troubitsyna
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Correspondence to Inna Vistbakka .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computing and Applied Mathematics, IRIT/INPT-ENSEEIHT, Toulouse, France

    Yamine Ait-Ameur

  2. National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan

    Shin Nakajima

  3. Telecom Nancy, University of Lorraine, Vandœuvre-lès-Nancy, France

    Dominique Méry

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Vistbakka, I., Troubitsyna, E. (2021). Deriving Implicit Security Requirements in Safety-Explicit Formal Development of Control Systems. In: Ait-Ameur, Y., Nakajima, S., Méry, D. (eds) Implicit and Explicit Semantics Integration in Proof-Based Developments of Discrete Systems. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5054-6_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5054-6_6

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  • Online ISBN: 978-981-15-5054-6

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