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The Apparent Chinese Paradox

Facing a Global Transnational Threat

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The Syrian Crisis

Abstract

The chapter analyzes China’s role in Syria which marked Beijing’s involvement in Middle Eastern politics and more broadly in world affairs. The chapter analyzes this involvement from the perception of threat, namely the threat of Islamic groups getting emboldened at home. For a long time Beijing remained away from Middle Eastern conflicts, leaving them to the other permanent member states of the Security Council, namely the United States, Britain, France and Russia. However, China used its veto six times in the UN Security Council against resolutions condemning Bashar al-Assad. With the emergence of the Syrian crisis, China has been playing a more proactive role. The presence of Chinese fighters among the rank of the opposition is alarming for Chinese authorities. They fear that the emergence of an Islamic State replacing the Assad regime will buttress the Uyghur in Xijiang province. This chapter analyzes the PRC’s real motives and goals. For example, if China was neutral in the Syrian crisis, why did it repeatedly veto drafts condemning Bashar’s regime in the UNSC? Why did it provide weapons to the same regime? The Chinese position is often identified or linked to Russia. Do they have the same motives and objectives? This chapter explores these issues and sheds light on undisclosed reasons and motives driving the Chinese foreign policy in Syria.

Hichem Karoui—Non-resident Senior Fellow at two Chinese think tanks in Beijing: Charigo Center for International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) and the Center for China and Globalization (CCG)

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The author would like to thank the colleagues who took time to read and discuss this chapter, when it was presented as a conference paper at the annual meeting of the Gulf in Cambridge 2018. I am also grateful to Dr. Dania Koleilat Khatib, for her patience and enrichment of this chapter with thoughtful and tactful notes. I like to extend my thanks to my Syrian friends and colleagues who invited me to observe their debates, as well as to my Chinese colleagues and diplomats (particularly Mr Wang Xin and Mr Wu Sike), with whom I have had positive exchanges.

  2. 2.

    Jeremy M. Sharp, Syria: Issues for the 112th Congress and Background on US Sanctions, (Congressional Research Service, June 21, 2011)2.

  3. 3.

    Security Council member countries India, Brazil, South Africa, Lebanon abstained from voting on the resolution. ‘After seven months of near complete inaction in the Council, while at least 2600 people were being killed, and thousands injured, arrested or tortured, this vote is a disgrace,’ said Philippe Bolopion, the United Nations director for Human Rights Watch. ‘By casting their veto, Russia and China are enabling the Syrian government’s abhorrent repression campaign,’ CNN (October 5, 2011), https://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/04/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html.

  4. 4.

    Jeremy M. Sharp, (June 21, 2011) op. cit.

  5. 5.

    Patrick J. McDonnell, “Russia, China veto new U.N. resolution on Syria,” Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2012. http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/04/world/la-fg-syria-violence-20120205.

  6. 6.

    Russia, China lose credit in Arab world: League chief, Reuters, (February 6, 2012). https://tinyurl.com/y9ls2ufq.

  7. 7.

    UPDATE 4-China defends Syria veto, doubts West’s intentions, Reuters, (February 6, 2012). https://tinyurl.com/yd8m6x2g.

  8. 8.

    Qiu Huafei, Contemporary Chinese Foreign Affairs and International Relations, Current Affairs Press, CIP, Beijing, 2012, pp. 73–74.

  9. 9.

    See Gafar Karar Ahmed and Hichem Karoui, Three Essays on China and the Arabs: History, Conflict Management, Strategy and Trade. N-Publishing, 2018, pp. 146–147.

  10. 10.

    Zhao Huasheng, “China and Afghanistan: China’s Interests, Stances, and Perspectives,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, p. 2, March 2012, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/120322_Zhao_ChinaAfghan_web.pdf.

  11. 11.

    China’s Position on the US War in Iraq, Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN. http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/mideast/ylk/t537117.htm.

  12. 12.

    Statement by Ambassador ZHANG Jun at the Security Council Meeting on the Political Process in Syria, December 20, 2019. http://www.china-un.org/eng/chinaandun/securitycouncil/regionalhotspots/mideast/t1726735.htm.

  13. 13.

    John B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle: The United States, China and the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007); in: Mordechai Chaziza, THE ARAB SPRING: IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINESE POLICY, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 2013) 74.

  14. 14.

    The World Bank in China: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview#3.

  15. 15.

    Chaziza (2013), op. cit.

  16. 16.

    Kristin Huang, Need growing for China to take greater military role in Middle East, analysts say, SCMP (September 18, 2016), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2020329/need-growing-china-take-greater-military-role-middle.

  17. 17.

    China’s New Grand Strategy for the Middle East, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2016/01/chinas-new-grand-strategy-for-the-middle-east/.

  18. 18.

    Jeremy Page, China Builds First Overseas Military Outpost, WSJ (August 19, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-builds-first-overseas-military-outpost-1471622690.

  19. 19.

    Emily Rauhala, “Islamic State claim of hostage killing complicates China’s terror debate,” The Washington Post, November 19, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/11/19/islamic-state-claim-of-hostage-killing-complicates-chinas-terror-debate/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6fd31bf5fcdf.

  20. 20.

    Mordechai Chaziza, China’s Middle east Policy: the isis Factor, Middle east Policy, Vol. XXiii, No. 1, Spring 2016.

  21. 21.

    Chaziza, spring 2016, op. cit.

  22. 22.

    Gerry Shih, “Rising Uighur militancy changes China’s security landscape,” The Associated Press, September 10, 2016. https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/rising-uighur-militancy-changes-china-s-security-landscape-1.3066460.

  23. 23.

    Scott Livingston, The Implications of China’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Law for Global Technology, IAPP, March 18, 2015. https://iapp.org/news/a/the-implications-of-chinas-draft-anti-terrorism-law-for-global-technology/.

  24. 24.

    https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/28/world/asia/china-passes-antiterrorism-law-that-critics-fear-may-overreach.html.

  25. 25.

    The ISSG issued a statement, following its May17, 2016 meeting in Vienna, beginning thus: «Meeting in Vienna on May 17, 2016, as the International Syria Support Group (ISSG), the Arab League, Australia, Canada, China, Egypt, the European Union, France, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, the Netherlands, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the United States reaffirmed the ISSG’s determination to strengthen the Cessation of Hostilities, to ensure full and sustained humanitarian access in Syria, and to ensure progress toward a peaceful political transition.» Read the full statement here: http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=4528.

  26. 26.

    See for example, Michael Clarke, “Is China’s Uyghur Challenge Changing Its Calculus on Syria?” The Diplomat, December 7, 2017. https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/is-chinas-uyghur-challenge-changing-its-calculus-on-syria/.

  27. 27.

    Qiu Yongzheng and Liu Chang, «Xinjiang jihad hits Syria», Global Times, October 29, 2012. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/740936.shtml.

  28. 28.

    https://intelcenter.com/reports/charts/TIP-Threat/index.html.

  29. 29.

    Turkistan, the black horse in the battles of Khan Tuman (in Arabic).

    https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/78997.

  30. 30.

    Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, «Turkey and China: Merging Realpolitik with Idealism»,  vol. 8, no. 15 of the Turkey Analyst, August 20, 2015.

  31. 31.

    Caleb Weiss, Foreign fighters in Turkistan Islamic Party call on Westerners to migrate to Syria, FDD Long War Journal, May 21, 2018. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/05/foreign-fighters-in-turkistan-islamic-party-omar-diaby.php.

  32. 32.

    A private conversation with a former Chinese ambassador to the Middle East, in 2017 in Beijing. I cite him on the condition of anonymity.

  33. 33.

    Ibid.

  34. 34.

    Private conversation with a former Chinese ambassador, op. cit.

  35. 35.

    Thomas Joscelyn, «Jihadist front established to represent foreign fighters in Syria»,  FDD Long War Journal, July 20, 2015. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/07/jihadist-front-established-to-represent-foreign-fighters-in-syria.php.

  36. 36.

    “New pages from the secret records of Syria Turkestan Mujahedeens,” (in Arabic).

    . https://al-akhbar.com/Syria/250633.

  37. 37.

    Thomas Joscelyn, «Al Qaeda-linked cleric leads new recruiting campaign for jihadists in Syria»,  FDD Long War Journal, April 28, 2016. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/04/al-qaeda-linked-cleric-leads-new-recruiting-campaign-for-jihadists-in-syria.php

  38. 38.

    Caleb Weiss, «Saudi al Qaeda cleric showcases training camp for children in Syria», FDD Long War Journal September 4, 2015. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/09/saudi-al-qaeda-cleric-showcases-training-camp-for-children-in-syria.php

  39. 39.

    “Turkistan Islamist Party airs a broadcast on Iranian prisoners,” (in Arabic). . https://bit.ly/2LMTGcj

  40. 40.

    .

  41. 41.

    ”TIP, Creation and Support,” (Arabic). . https://bit.ly/2IYMLix.

  42. 42.

    Jacob Zenn, «Jihad in China? Marketing the Turkistan Islamic Party», Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor, vol. 9 Issue 11, March 17, 2011. https://bit.ly/2J1WIf9.

  43. 43.

    East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) From: “Chap. 8; Other Groups of Concern,” Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, US Department of State, April 30, 2006. http://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/146/east-turkistan-islamic-movement-etim.

  44. 44.

    http://syriaalhadath.com/archives/89517.

  45. 45.

    Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, op. cit.

  46. 46.

    “Uyghurs reinforce their positions…” (Arabic). . https://bit.ly/2skhRqA. See too . http://syriaalhadath.com/archives/89517. Also . https://bit.ly/2L8qv2o

  47. 47.

    Qiu Yongzheng and Liu Chang (2012), op. cit.

  48. 48.

    Ibid.

  49. 49.

    Ibid.

  50. 50.

    Special Envoy of the Chinese Government on Syrian Issue Xie Xiaoyan Visits Syria, MFA, Beijing. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1358513.shtml.

  51. 51.

    Shannon Tiezzi, Who is Fighting China’s War On Terror? The Diplomat, November 26, 2013.

  52. 52.

    Shannon Tiezzi, Chinese Involvement in Global Jihad, The Diplomat, June 25, 2014. https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinese-involvement-in-global-jihad.

  53. 53.

    Jonas Parello-Plesner and Mathieu Duchatel, China’s Strong Arm, IISS, Routledge, London, 2015, p. 82.

  54. 54.

    Many expressed these concerns in Europe. See for example, Douglas Murray, The Strange Death of Europe, Bloomsbury Continuum, London (2017–2018).

  55. 55.

    China completes food aid project for Syrian refugees in Lebanon. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-04/20/c_137123596.htm.

  56. 56.

    Saudi Arabia to host ‘expanded’ Syrian opposition conference. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-saudi/saudi-arabia-to-host-expanded-syrian-opposition-conference-idUSKBN1DD2DI.

  57. 57.

    China calls on Turkey to halt military incursion in Syria and ‘return to right track.’ https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3033066/china-calls-turkey-halt-military-incursion-syria-and-return.

  58. 58.

    China ready to take part in Astana talks as observer. https://tass.com/world/966898.

  59. 59.

    China reaffirms necessity to respect Syria’s territorial integrity. https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/china-reaffirms-necessity-to-respect-syrias-territorial-integrity/.

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Karoui, H. (2021). The Apparent Chinese Paradox. In: Khatib, D. (eds) The Syrian Crisis. Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-5050-8_3

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