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Abstract

This chapter discusses how the doctrine of responsible government fails to operate in Australia because the rules of parliamentary privilege, coupled with the dominance of two major political blocs, ensures that the mechanisms which are theoretically available to parliament to ensure executive subordination to the legislature are never used. The chapter examines several instances of executive defiance of parliament and argues that the power of parliamentary committees to force members of the executive to answer questions need to be enhanced, drawing on the example of the United States where paradoxically, despite not having a system of responsible government, the executive is subject to the scrutiny of the legislature to a far greater degree in Australia. The chapter also discusses how the right of parliament to obtain information from the executive should be balanced against executive claims of public interest immunity. The chapter also argues that the method of choosing the Speaker of parliament needs to be reformed so as to ensure that the incumbent is genuinely independent.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Rudd (2017, pp. 306, 334–5, 420).

  2. 2.

    Head (2009).

  3. 3.

    Seccombe (2017).

  4. 4.

    Seccombe (1998).

  5. 5.

    Henderson (1998).

  6. 6.

    Armstrong (1998).

  7. 7.

    Coorey (2002).

  8. 8.

    Atkins (2004).

  9. 9.

    Franklin (2010).

  10. 10.

    The Slipper saga is discussed in Singleton et al. (2012, p. 154).

  11. 11.

    Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2013).

  12. 12.

    Malone (2016).

  13. 13.

    Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives Standing Orders, (2015) SO 94(a).

  14. 14.

    Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives Standing Orders, (2015) SO 94(d).

  15. 15.

    Laundy (1964, pp. 22–5).

  16. 16.

    Laundy (1964, p. 7).

  17. 17.

    Laundy (1964, pp. 108–15). The contrasts in this regard between the speakership in the UK and Australia are discussed in Ward (2012, pp. 180–1).

  18. 18.

    Rozzoli (2006, pp. 194–201).

  19. 19.

    (1955) 92 CLR 157.

  20. 20.

    Evans (2004, p. 369). For a discussion of the role of Senate Estimates Committees see Parliament of Australia (2019) and Lynch (2001).

  21. 21.

    (1996) 40 NSWLR 650.

  22. 22.

    Evans (2004, pp. 30, 57, 377).

  23. 23.

    Evans (2004, p. 378).

  24. 24.

    Evans (2004, Appendix 2, Paras 12 and 13).

  25. 25.

    Evans (2004, pp. 416–7, 423).

  26. 26.

    Walters (2004).

  27. 27.

    Kirk (2004).

  28. 28.

    See Maiden (2006), Ross Peake (2006) Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2006).

  29. 29.

    See Emma Griffiths (2013) and Zander (2014).

  30. 30.

    Anderson (2016).

  31. 31.

    Thompson (2006).

  32. 32.

    Ryle et al. (2005).

  33. 33.

    Evans (2002).

  34. 34.

    In 1994 Senator Kernot of the Australian Democrats introduced a Bill which would have made it a criminal offence, prosecutable in the Federal Court at the instance of a House of Parliament, to fail to comply with an order of a House or a committee. The Bill would also have empowered the court to order compliance with the legislature’s request. The Bill provided for a public interest immunity defence, with the onus being on the accused to prove that the public interest in not complying outweighed the need for open parliamentary inquiries. Courts could conduct in camera hearings to determine whether the defence had been established. Unsurprisingly, the Bill was not proceeded with due to opposition by the major parties.

  35. 35.

    (1996) 40 NSWLR 650.

  36. 36.

    (1998) 195 CLR 424.

  37. 37.

    (1999) 46 NSWLR 563.

  38. 38.

    Evans (2004, pp. 643–4).

  39. 39.

    Evans (2004, pp. 659–60).

  40. 40.

    19 US (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).

  41. 41.

    273 US 135 (1927).

  42. 42.

    273 US 135 (1927), 174.

  43. 43.

    273 US 135 (1927), 177.

  44. 44.

    273 US 135 (1927), 177.

  45. 45.

    For a discussion of this case see Marshall (2004, pp. 792–7).

  46. 46.

    Wilson (1913, p. 303).

  47. 47.

    498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 732–3.

  48. 48.

    418 US 683 (1974).

  49. 49.

    Although this case involved the question of the extent to which executive privilege can serve to defeat a subpoena in which information or attendance of a witness is sought by the judicial branch (in other words, in court proceedings), what was held by the Supreme Court applies equally to cases where information is sought from the executive by the legislative branch. See Tribe (2000, p. 784).

  50. 50.

    418 US 683 (1974) 705, 708.

  51. 51.

    418 US 683 (1974), 703.

  52. 52.

    418 US 683 (1974), 711–12. See also Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v Nixon 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir 1974) and United States v A T & T 521 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir 1976) and 567 F. 2d 121 (D.C. Cir 1977).

  53. 53.

    418 US 683 (1974), 710–11.

  54. 54.

    418 US 683 (1974), 713–14.

  55. 55.

    433 US 425 (1977).

  56. 56.

    433 US 425 (1977), 446–7.

  57. 57.

    433 US 425 (1977), 443.

  58. 58.

    On the political ramifications of claims of executive privilege see Louis Fisher (2002).

  59. 59.

    Fisher (2002, p. 325).

  60. 60.

    Fisher (2002, pp. 394–401).

  61. 61.

    See Rozell (1994, p. 90).

  62. 62.

    Rozell (1994, p. 150).

  63. 63.

    Marshall (2004, pp. 806–08).

  64. 64.

    (1978) 142 CLR 1.

  65. 65.

    (1978) 142 CLR 1), 38–43.

  66. 66.

    Alister v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 404. See also Commonwealth v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (2000) 171 ALR 379 and NTEU v Commonwealth (2001) 111 FCR 583.

  67. 67.

    (1999) 46 NSWLR 563.

  68. 68.

    Confidentiality would thus not apply to a document merely because it had been physically present during a cabinet meeting – for an example of trolley-loads of documents being wheeled into cabinet meetings simply in order for it to be said that they were ‘cabinet documents’ see Roberts (2006).

  69. 69.

    The issue of how cases involving ineligibility under s 44 are processed is discussed in Chap. 11.

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Harris, B. (2020). Holding Government to Account. In: Constitutional Reform as a Remedy for Political Disenchantment in Australia. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3599-4_7

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