Practicing His Military Thoughts

Abstract

In September 1516 (the eleventh year of the Zhengde Emperor ), the Imperial Court issued a new appointment of “Zuo-Qiandu-Yushi-Xunfu of Du Chayuan” governing Nan-Gan-Ting-Zhang and other places to Wang Yang-ming . Then why did the Imperial Court designate Wang Yang-ming such an appointment at that very time?

4.1 Mission Entrusted in Political Crisis

In September 1516 (the eleventh year of the Zhengde Emperor ), the Imperial Court issued a new appointment of “Zuo-Qiandu-Yushi-Xunfu of Du Chayuan” governing Nan-Gan-Ting-Zhang and other places to Wang Yang-ming . Then why did the Imperial Court designate Wang Yang-ming such an appointment at that very time?

As we know, the reign of Zhu Hou-zhao , Emperor Wuzong of Ming ,¹ was one of the darkest periods of the whole Ming dynasty . The emperor himself, unambitious, flighty and impatient, self-willed and conceited, was absolutely a philistine. At the beginning of his accession to the throne, he was addicted to frolicking, luxurious feasts, and conviviality. He put eunuchs such as Liu Jin and others in important positions, while upright ministers were expelled so that the whole Imperial Court was filled with a foul atmosphere, and the country was increasingly beset by enemies within and without. From 1508 (the third year of the Zhengde Emperor ) on, natural calamities and man-made disasters kept rising one after another every year, and thievery became more and more serious. Vast junctional areas of the four provinces of Jiangxi , Huguang , Fujian , and Guangdong were the most seriously ravaged by rampant thieves and brigands. Topographically, it was vast in area, with lofty mountains and high ranges such as Damao Mountain ,² Dayu Range ,³ Jiulian Mountain ,⁴ Bamian Mountain ,⁵ and so on, and they were all connected in unbroken lines. Since it was a heavily populated area, each bandit head often took control of a mountain stronghold lording it over a district, and meanwhile they ganged up with one another to share information and commit crimes, which resulted in the lower production and a terrible life for the local people. In 1511 (the sixth year of the Zhengde Emperor ) or so, the Imperial Court began to send army men to arrest and exterminate the thieves and brigands. Instead of achieving any effect, however, the suppressions brought about even more bandits. On the one hand, the officers and army men seemed weak and incompetent so that the bandits’ arrogance was further enflamed and they behaved with more unbearable insolence. On the other hand, some good ordinary people felt hopeless and they simply joined the bandits. Therefore, till the tenth year of the Zhengde Emperor , about the year 1516, in the boundaries of the four provinces, there appeared three major factions: (1) the first one brisked within the borders of Zhangzhou prefecture in Fujian Province , with Xiaoxi ⁶ as its base, and Zhan Shi-fu , and Wen Huo-shao as its chiefs; (2) the second one was entrenched inside Nanan and Ganzhou Prefectures in Jiangxi Province , taking Hengshui and Tonggang as its main bases, with Xie Zhi-shan and Lan Tian-feng as its heads; and (3) the third, moving about inside the territory of Huizhou Prefecture , Guangdong Province, they took the place Litou as their stronghold and had Chi Zhong-rong (or Chi Da-bin in other references) lead them. These three factions were the most powerful, with each having followers as many as thousands in number, and naturally the most swollen with arrogance. After previous fruitless efforts, the Imperial Court appointed Wang Yang-ming “Zuo-Qiandu-Yushi-Xunfu of Ducha Yuan ” governing Nan-Gan-Ting-Zhang and other places at the time. Therefore, we might as well say that Wang Yang-ming was entrusted the great mission just in the critical political crisis.

Here we must make clear this concept of “bandits or robbers,” especially the nature of the gang. Some previous scholars thought that those so-called “bandits” were “insurgent peasants,” hence Wang Yang-ming was stigmatized to have ruthlessly suppressed the peasant uprisings. Actually, according to the historical materials, the personnel constituting the bandits were rather complicated in the objective sense. Their main purpose was to loot though at times they would capture territories, and at one time or two, they even breached county governments here and there. So on the whole, these factions did not reach the level of uprising, or even peasants uprising, in that the latter always had one common leader and held one unified political purpose, which was to overthrow the rule of an emperor or to terminate a dynasty. While each of the regional bandits here fought his own battle, they did not keep in step with one another, and meanwhile they basically fought to loot for goods from the ordinary people, so they should be regarded as folk bandits. Simply taking them as peasants’ uprisings is surely not so objective or true to the actual situation then.

Undoubtedly, Wang Yang-ming was quite clear about the real intention of the emperor when he was offered this new appointment. Therefore, he became extremely hesitant when the imperial decree was issued on September 14. He submitted a statement to the Imperial Court immediately requesting to resign from this new mission, and within the statement he listed three major reasons.

Firstly, he said that he had always been feeble and sick so that he was afraid not to be able to assume the heavy military responsibility of commanding the army rushing on the battlefield. In the event of failure, he would tarnish the Imperial Court , let alone being utterly discredited himself.

Secondly, as a grand coordinator was an executive holding the military and political scepter of a region, such a vital position should never be given up easily, but should be held by a real qualified person instead. He himself, however, was mediocre even inferior in talent, pedantic, and perfunctory in nature. Thus, he could not be the right person for the position.

Thirdly, he lost his mother early in his boyhood and was brought up mainly by his grandmother Cen . Now that she was already 97 years old, he had to stay around her to fulfill filial duty rather than leave and go far away from home.

In view of the above three points, Wang Yang-ming advised the Imperial Court to send someone else and allow him to hold his original post.

Now let’s analyze the resignation of Wang Yang-ming . In all his three excuses, only the second, which says that he was mediocre and inferior in talent, was just a polite formula, while the other two were indeed his actual situations. This might be the real reason for his hesitation. For one thing, he consistently intended to become a sage and had a keen interest in military strategies and tactics for a long time so that the new appointment asking him to be a “Zuo-Qiandu-Yushi-Xunfu of Ducha Yuan ” governing Nan-Gan-Ting-Zhang and other places to guard the regions and protect the people by eliminating the local rebellions really offered him a great opportunity to show his rare gifts and bold strategy, and thus to realize his ambition of being a sage. So in this sense, this gracious declination was not all his real intention. But as a matter of fact, he was always poor in health and was not really cured from his coughing. A few years before, he had been frequently transferred from position to position, and busy with lecturing from place to place. Although he did recuperating programs with noticeable effects, the disease was never uprooted and it attacked him from time to time. Now he would have to go to the vast and boundless mountain areas to suppress the bandits in Jiangxi . It was uncertain whether he could withstand the toil of fighting here and there even if he could survive the treacherous wars. Deep in the valleys, the air was damp and a miasma was rampant, which would be likely to worsen his poor physical condition. Considering this, one should by no means view this resignation of Wang Yang-ming as a hypocritical pretense, but a true reflection of his mixed emotions at that time.

In fact, the Imperial Court would not approve of this resignation since the terrible situation in this particular provincial area was worsening day by day and Wang Yang-ming then had no other choice but to accept the critical mission despite all his personal problems. Then on October 24 that same year, the Imperial Court transmitted another imperial edict to Wang Yang-ming ordering him to accede right away. Seemingly still waiting for the final approval of his resignation from the emperor, Wang Yang-ming did not go to his post at once as ordered. Interestingly soon afterward, just on November 14, another Du-Yushi named Wen Sen forfeited the chance to combat the bandit rebellion while pleading for retirement, excusing himself for illness. The official document from Li Bu ⁷ replied that, if Wang Yang-ming followed Wen Sen’s lead, he would make the matter worse, and surely would subject himself to severe punishment. Wen Sen was berated accordingly. Meanwhile, the Imperial Court issued the third imperial edict demanding Wang Shou-ren (the real name of Wang Yang-ming ) to assume the post without any delay. On December 2, the final approval from the Imperial Court came, saying, “Wang Shou-ren is not allowed to resign.”

In his own prophetic vision, Wang Yang-ming had foreseen from the very beginning that the Imperial Court would never allow him to resign, so shortly after his submission of the resignation he rushed back to Shaoxing City from Nanjing . Maintaining his health while waiting for the approval of the Imperial Court on the one hand, and on the other hand, he was making every preparation for his new post in Jiangxi . So on December 3, 1516 (the eleventh year of the Zhengde Emperor ), the following day after the fourth order came urging him to take office, he set off hurriedly to Jiangxi from Shaoxing . This marked the second major turning point of Wang Yang-ming , from which he began his military life, when he was 45 years old.

Without any stop, Wang Yang-ming rushed to Jiangxi Province , and boarded a ship sailing southward along the Gan River .⁸ An interesting thing happened when they arrived in Wanan County ,⁹ where they encountered hundreds of bandits who were recklessly robbing so that all merchant ships dared not go forward. Seeing this, Wang Yang-ming reorganized the ships, allying them into battle arrays. He had all flags hoisted and all the drums beaten thunderously while the ships kept advancing forward. The bandits were frightened, promptly thinking that they ran into a superior force this time and as a result they stopped looting and began to worship on bended knees on the bank. Wang Yang-ming stopped the fleet of ships, went ashore and talked to the robbers, “You were originally law-abiding people and were obliged to commit crimes. Now I have come and shall send officials here to placate you. Therefore, we hope you will again abide by the law and behave yourselves from now on rather than keep doing evil, otherwise, you will stew in your own juice!” Hearing this, the bandits all broke up in a hubbub instantly. From this episode, we can see how serious the famine was as most of the bandits were just desperate exiled persons ganging up.

In the first month of the lunar year in 1517 (the twelfth year of the Zhengde Emperor ), Wang Yang-ming arrived in Ganzhou , Jiangxi Province . Despite his fatigue after the long journey, he began his work at his earliest convenience, i.e., on the next day of the Lantern Festival (January 15th of Chinese Lunar Calendar ), 1517. He devoted himself heart and soul to dealing with the local military and political affairs.

The top priority for him then, of course, was to pacify the disturbances of insufferably arrogant bandit robbers in the junctional areas of the four provinces. For Wang Yang-ming , that was the fundamental purpose of his new office-holding. Being a newcomer in Ganzhou , he did not know the actual situation and had no idea where to start. That was the so-called being pressed for time with heavy tasks. From the previous chapters, we already have a general knowledge of Wang’s basic work style. He was really down to earth concerning his work. Wherever he went, he would implement a thorough field investigation, including the customs and living conditions of the local people. Shouldering the important mission of sweeping away the serious local banditry the moment he came to Jiangxi , he did likewise to know various practical situations since there were actually no better ways to observe and experience the reality. Accordingly, within his administrative region, the first thing he took up was issuing government documents to all the subordinated prefectures the minute he assumed the duty, demanding them by all means to fulfill the following tasks and to make prompt reports. The tasks he assigned were as follows:

First, conscientiously assess the substantiality of such military facilities as blockhouses and forts, and check the number of soldiers, the military training status, and combat capabilities.

Second, make an exhaustively detailed survey of the activities of the bandits, including which gangs were very frantic and rampant, which were already dismissed and in need of being placated, and which could be talked into surrender. All these must be made clear and recorded in full detail. Furthermore, the relevant feasible and specific measures had to be worked out.

Third, conduct a full investigation into the local people. This should cover aspects such as which people were particularly familiar with the local terrains and could serve as guides, which rich families were willing to contribute their money and grain, which wasted fields were suitable for military use, and the like. All these were to be examined clearly and listed with specific names and amounts.

Fourth, look into the local transportation carefully and thoroughly, especially the main roads and citadels that the bandits and robbers mainly haunted, where new checkpoints could be set to cut the passage of the gangs. All these should be reliably detailed and clearly marked in maps.

Wang Yang-ming stressed the general working principles concerning the above aspects, “See to strive for practicability rather than the least work on empty talk.” He demanded that all prefectures fulfill all the above requirements within a month and with nobody muddling through their work. In the meantime, he himself reached out deep into the ordinary people, investigating the real situations of different places. More importantly, he was good at learning lessons from earlier repeated failures in the fights against the bandits. On the strength of these investigations and the lessons learned, Wang Yang-ming made prompt but sound judgment, and turned to all pre-war military preparations, among which, two things were well known.

The first was the enforcement of Shijiapai System . So what was the system? Simply, it is a ten-family-unit household registration and inspection system invented by Wang Yang-ming. At first, the system was only implemented among city residents, and later carried over into the rural areas. The actual practice went like this: Every household hung a wooden board outside their house, on which were written names, numbers, native places of the family members, the temporary residents if any. Then every ten households formed a unit, of which there was another wooden board for the detailed family information of the ten households. Each day one person from one of the ten families took turns to preside at checking the population information door by door. Should anyone suspicious or any unregistered temporary residents be found, they must be reported to the local government offices immediately. Provided any concealed case turned up, all the ten families together would be punished by the law. This Shijiapai System was actually a creative reformation of the original Baojia System . One may well remember that earlier in the Luling County , Wang Yang-ming waged the Baojia System, in which the self-defense of individual families was combined with the collective joint defense, and hence reinforced the effective official supervision over people. Now Wang Yang-ming exercised the Shijiapai System because he found out that one major reason why in so many previous suppressions the bandit forces had never been wiped out was that the mountain fastnesses usually had their spies hide among the ordinary people at the foot of the mountains so that whenever there were any signs of government officers and army men, they would have already got fully prepared before the battle. In that case, the military actions of the government forces were always in the open air while those of the bandits went on secretly. As a result, gangs won every battle launched openly by the government. Every time the government started a military action, it only became a waste of man power and money as no substantial effect had been gained. By carrying out the Shijiapai System , Wang Yang-ming’s real intention was to cut off the enemy’s communication with the outside, and to the maximum degree it prevented the enemy from planting their spies to steal military information, or prevent any other contacts with the bandits on the sly, so that military secrets could be safe, and accordingly, the government stood a far better chance to win against the bandits and robbers.

The second was the training of militiamen. Why? The answer was that after his investigation of the officers and army men, Wang Yang-ming found serious problems within the army, such as inadequate funding for military expenditure, shortage of troops, weakness in combat capabilities, and doldrums in the soldiers’ morale. Wang Yang-ming once said, “Sending such a troop into the battlefield is nothing more than driving sheep into a pack of wolves, since such armed forces cannot qualify for any military missions at all.” Such problems with the troops had been noticed, of course, so “Tu Bing ¹⁰” or even “Lang Bing” ¹¹ had often been recruited for battles. Time after time, conventional forces of the government would develop serious anaclisis in face of any wars, whether major or minor ones. Then the vicious circle began: the more dependent the regular armed forces became, the less attention they paid to the development of their own military qualities and the weaker they became. Then by the way, what were “Tu Bing ” and “Lang Bing”? As for “Tu Bing,” they were native local minority troops coming from two tribes of Yongshun ¹² and Baojing ¹³ in west Huguang Province , while “Lang Bing” came from such counties as Donglan ,¹⁴ Nadi ,¹⁵ and Nandan ¹⁶ in Guangxi Province . These ethnic armed groups were brave and battlewise, and they were often used as the main forces to suppress bandits by the government. However, Wang Yang-ming thought that the long-distance transfer of these troops had the following disadvantages: (1) The movement was too sluggish and time-consuming. Such a transfer took several months at least, or even a few years sometimes. (2) It greatly increased military expense, wasting human and material resources. (3) It caused the military action to be widely known so that sudden and unexpected attack became impossible, thus bungling the chance of winning the battle. (4) These valiant warriors tended to be chaotic and less disciplined so that wherever they passed through, the people were plunged into an abyss of misery, which made them no less sinful than the bandits and robbers, so using them for suppression was just quenching a thirst with poison. Chen Jin , the Du-Yushi before Wang Yang-ming , requisitioned “Lang Bing ” in 1512 (the seventh year of the Zhengde Emperor ), as a result, wherever the troops went, they raped women, looted properties, burned houses, slaughtered the innocent, some even had their whole families exterminated so that people suffered from terrible miseries. Chen Jin then received severe punishment by the Imperial Court . Given this, Wang Yang-ming demanded that they change the thought and mentality of always blindly depending on the ethnic armed groups and face up to the battles, and for this the government had to build up their own crack troops. In order to achieve this ambition, he ordered all his prefectures to select brave talents with at least one ability, the so-called heavily built phenomena such as outstanding archers, crossbow operators, martial arts experts, masters of free combat, and the like, to form a troop of about 2,000 people. Wang Yang-ming assembled them in Ganzhou City and conducted military training for them himself. It was just the establishment of this elite squad that optimized the inner military structure of the officers and men, so that the soldiers’ morale and combat effectiveness were greatly improved.

The Shijiapai System and militiamen training were the two most important pre-war preparations Wang Yang-ming made for the purpose of rooting out the bandits and robbers after he arrived in Ganzhou . Then it was February of 1517 (the twelfth year of the Zhengde Emperor ), Wang Yang-ming had made all necessary pre-war preparations, and felt it was then the right time to launch military attacks against those entrenched bandit forces. From then on, he commanded three major battles in a row against the enemies and eliminated completely those ever present, intricately intertwined bandits and robbers who had been doing harm for years in the junctional areas of Jingxi , Fujian , Huguang , and Guangdong Provinces .

Based on the reports from different districts informing him about the specific activities of the bandits, Wang Yang-ming first planned to clean up bandit gangs headed by Zhan Shi-fu and Wen Huo-shao in the southern area of Zhangzhou by focusing the military forces there and carrying out comprehensive action. For this he began his battle disposition in February that year. We must remember here that Wang Yang-ming assumed his duty in Ganzhou only about a month ago, so the time interval was rather short. Therefore, we can see that he was highly efficient. The first battle he started was mainly in the boundary area of the south Zhangzhou , Fujian Province and the northeastern part of Guangdong Province , so we might well call it the Zhang Nan Campaign .¹⁷

Now, let’s turn the topic of the Zhang Nan Campaign to the brief summary of the basic strategic thoughts Wang Yang-ming displayed in his pre-war preparations.

• (1) Do according to The Art of War .¹⁸ One tactic in The Art of War goes that knowing your enemy and yourself, you can fight a hundred battles and win them all. An actual war is made of offense and defense. Wang Yang-ming read a lot of books on the art of war so that he knew quite well its truth, and developed them into his own capacity in commanding battles in later days. He first gained thorough knowledge about the military power on both sides and started the wars with full assurance. Upon reaching Ganzhou, he carried an extensive survey and research into the military strength, arm of the services, suppositions scales, war power, and so on of both sides. In the meantime, he sent spies to detect other detailed information about the enemy. Training militiamen was just to make up for the shortage of manpower resources on the part of the government. An overall knowledge of the enemy’s situation as well as that of his own and never launching with little preparation or assurance were Wang Yang-ming’s basic strategy and tactics.

• (2) Isolate the enemies. Although bandits in the junctional areas of the four provinces were widely scattered and various in military forces, they kept colluding regularly and exchanging information with each other so that once there was official military action, all bandit strongholds were tipped off and quickly got support from each other. As a result, it was finally the official armies who were surrounded and isolated, with the result self-evident here. What Wang Yang-ming meant to do was to change from the disadvantage of often being isolated to the advantage of active isolation of the enemies. So in actual military dispositions, he sent soldiers to tightly guard all the passes to the mountain tops so as to cut off the roads as well as the way of communication. Strict enforcement of the Shijiapai System cut off cleanly and clearly the possibility of being spied on by the enemies from the mountains. In this way, the government had almost all the situations of the enemies at their fingertips while the enemies knew nothing about their opposition. This measure saw a striking effect in the battle since government troops could attack the bandits unexpectedly and suddenly.

• (3) Concentrate superior forces to surround the enemies. Since the border areas of the four provinces were rather vast, a unilateral attack against the enemies tended to achieve very little in that when attacks came from the east, the enemies would escape west, and vice versa. In view of this, Wang Yang-ming cuts apart the enemy forces and surrounded them separately, and then concentrated superior forces on sweeping away smaller enemy troops one by one. The Zhang Nan Campaign was a case in point in which Wang Yang-ming concentrated his superior forces in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces to attack the enemies from both the western and eastern sides. This cut-apart-and-surround strategy improved the effect and efficiency of the war enormously.

• (4) Capture the leader instead of killing more. Wang Yang-ming stressed that the aim of a war was to disintegrate the enemy troops so that they could no longer do harm to the ordinary people. The bandits and robbers, originally good people, had actually been forced to become bad men for reasons of one sort or another, so indiscriminate slaughter was undesirable. This analysis reflected more truthfully the situations of the bandits in different places then. Every time after winning a battle, Wang Yang-ming made every effort to pacify those minor offenders, which fundamentally helped Wang Yang-ming win a universal support from the majority of the people.

As we all know, Wang Yang-ming had previously been nothing but a scholar and had had no battlefield experience at all. So how could he direct military operations with miraculous skills? Every why has its wherefore. We may still remember that at the age of 12, Wang Yang-ming had the dream of becoming a sage . At the age of 15, he went to inspect the frontier juncture. Probably from then on, he developed the habit of on-site examination wherever he went. Later on, he carefully studied various kinds of books on the art of war , including strategies and tactics. While reading the books, he simulated military operations with nut kernels, exercising his ability in formation and lineups of battle arrays. Having succeeded in receiving the Jinshi degree, he trained the laborers with military strategies and tactics when he supervised the construction of the mausoleum for Wang Yue , Earl of Weining . All these experiences laid a solid foundation for his later military career. What is more, Wang Yang-ming was not only an advocate of the Oneness of Knowing and Doing but a firm practitioner of this philosophy. He consistently integrated learning into practice. When he was county magistrate in Luling, he learned politics from political practice and made everything into perfect order so that he won love and esteem from the people. When in war, he learned the art of war , put the theories into practice, and therefore won many great battles. We might well say that his military feat was born out of his childhood ambition of becoming a sage . And also, of course, it was the result of his combination of theoretical learning with military practice. Just as is known to all that opportunities are given to those who are well prepared.

Now let’s come back to the Zhang Nan Campaign . In the pre-battle military dispositions, Wang Yang-ming carefully analyzed the situations of both sides with the officers. He required chief commanders in Guangdong and Fujian Provinces to cooperate with each other to surround the enemies. As planned, military forces in Guangdong advanced eastward, meanwhile a tight guard was kept in all passes to prevent the enemies from escaping westward on the one hand, and cut off completely any possible contact or communication between the bandits outside and inside Guangdong Province on the other hand. In the opposite direction, the troops in Fujian Province pressed westward from the east in their process of advancement and at the same time they had to take strict precautions against road traffic and information transmissions of the bandits and robbers. He ordered all of the commanders to start the attack all at once.

As Wang Yang-ming anticipated, the converging attack would surely turn out to be effective. When the battle broke out, its progress was fairly smooth at the beginning. The troops in Fujian were brave and skillful in battle, which had a great impact on the enemies, and as a result small-scale victories were gained one after another. Battlefield situations, however, were more often than not complex and easily changeable. Soon after several minor victories, the war situation suddenly changed unfavorably since something went wrong in the cooperation between the east and the west. The military forces in Fujian were doing just well, as the officers and soldiers followed Wang Yang-ming’s instructions strictly and fought bravely so that the gangs headed by Zhan Shi-fu could not bear the attack and retreated westward. Under this circumstance, however, the troops in Guangdong did not fight back fiercely to block the enemies so that the surrounding plan shattered. The enemies broke the line of defense and escaped into such natural defenses as Xianghu Mountain ,¹⁹ and Jianguan ,²⁰ etc., taking favorable terrains at once. Such being the case, the initial favorable battle situation took a sudden turn and hurtled toward defeat. The Zhang Nan Campaign was caught at a stalemate.

That reversion was out of the expectation of Wang Yang-ming . Facing the new situation, he immediately reanalyzed the situation, adjusted the plan, redeployed the military disposition, and ultimately reversed the tide. Then what rearrangement did Wang Yang-ming make? And by what means did he finally win the battle?

(Translated by Sun Yong-tian; Proofread by Sheng Yue-dong)

4.2 Moving to Fight in Jiangxi

The early stage of Zhang Nan Campaign had been smoothly progressing, however, with the battle going on, the enemy troops successfully broke through to Xianghu Mountain , Jianguan and Ketang Cave ²¹ at the boundary of Fujian and Guangdong Provinces due to the poor cooperation of the troops from Guangdong Province. Then the battle was brought to a stalemate since the imperial troops could hardly find effective ways to attack the enemy who had occupied the favorable terrain at the time.

Apparently, it was extremely unfavorable for the imperial troops to get stuck in such a position which would not only undermine the soldiers’ morale but increase military spending, so Wang Yang-ming anxiously desired to end the battle as soon as possible. How to figure out a way to turn around the deadlock became the foremost problem Wang Yang-ming was faced with.

With the battle in stalemate there was a serious disagreement in terms of the judgment about the present situation and further military cooperation between officers from Fujian and Guangdong , since the former advocated a massive attack at the right opportunity to thoroughly eliminate the enemy troops, who, as they argued, had been living on a razor’s edge with severe damage despite the natural barriers of Xianghu Mountain , while the latter emphasized the advantages of enemy troops who had occupied lofty mountains and the disadvantages of imperial troops who were insufficient in number and weak in fighting capacity, proposed putting off the final fight to the autumn with the assistance of “wolf soldiers,” ethnic armies.

Wang Yang-ming , with his own independent judgment of the battle, severely criticized the head officers from both sides. On the one hand, he pointed out that it must be admitted that the battle had been in stalemate and it was the enemy troops who had occupied the more favorable terrain, so the massive attack might turn out to be a military risk without a guarantee of overall victory, for the enemy would undoubtedly take further precautions. Thus, the strategy of “sudden onslaught” from Fujian officers was infeasible. On the other hand, Wang Yang-ming felt there was a serious fear toward the enemy among the Guangdong troops, which helped the enemies to break through successfully. As for the proposal of frequently transferring “wolf soldiers,” Wang Yang-ming viewed it just as the typical reflection of fear of the enemies. As a matter of fact, such a movement, as the last resort, was meaningless since it would inevitably waste time and greatly increase military spending, which would finally add a burden to ordinary people. Besides, Wang Yang-ming held the view that the key to victory is how to effectively deploy the troops rather than how many soldiers are involved. In fact, the present number of 2,000 soldiers was sufficient for the fight. Therefore, the proposal of officers from Guangdong was also impractical.

Then what measures should be taken? Wang Yang-ming put emphasis on the unity of thinking from different officers, eliminating both the unnecessary fear, which would lead to bungling opportunities of winning the battle, and the underestimation of enemy troops, which would lead to rash advance. He understood that effective measures must be adopted so as to turn around the military situation. So he carried out a military deployment on the basis of his own judgment and strictly gave orders with the following requirements:

First, there should be a public announcement that the battle had ceased. Ask the soldiers to spread the word that the imperial troops had come up short in the battle and had to wait for the arrival of “wolf soldiers” before they could renew the attack since the enemy troops had moved to the natural barriers of Xianghu Mountain ; as well as this order the imperial troops to claim that they would not resume the fight until the autumn since it was unfavorable for the imperial troops to fight in the warm spring. Wang Yang-ming required the officers to dismiss soldiers as pretense of ceasefire so as to deceive the enemies. In the meantime, he demanded that the soldiers should stay nearby, be ready to assemble at any time and to gather as soon as possible.

Second, the troops should make preparations for upcoming military action. Meanwhile, spies should be dispatched to carry out reconnaissance and to report the enemy troops’ movements.

Third, the soldiers should swiftly get together and attack the enemies at the proper time. Besides, soldiers should fight in their full strength, even at the risk of their lives, and whoever shrank back in battle would be severely punished according to military law.

Fourth, there must be a clear task division in the fighting process. The vanguards should just undertake the task of breaking the enemy troops’ formation, while the following massive forces would have the responsibility of capturing or killing the head officers of the enemy troops. No division in the imperial troops was allowed in disarray just to compete for military exploit and honor.

Fifth, unnecessary massacres were not allowed in the upcoming campaign, the aim of which was just to kill head officers of the enemy troops.

Sixth, there must be cooperative military action with strict discipline.

After making the latest military deployment, Wang Yang-ming led one branch of the troops to Shanghang ²² via Tingzhou ²³ to observe the situation, with the intention of directing the campaign on the front line by himself. The new deployment, particularly the pretend signs of ceasefire soon turned out to be effective, misleading the enemy troops to become less alert with the false assumption that the battle would pause for a while. Then the opportunity arose on February 29 when Wang Yang-ming commanded the military officers to quickly assemble the troops and swiftly march in three divisions toward Xianghu Mountain , the bandits’ lair. The enemy troops, however, were still unaware of the attack until the imperial troops laid siege to Xianghu Mountain and conquered the main strategic positions of each road. The joint attack was launched at 7 a.m. In spite of desperate resistance, unable to find the way out, the enemy officers and soldiers were mostly killed or captured. This battle came to an end with the imperial troops’ total victory at noon.

The battle of Xianghu Mountain, with 22,000 officers and soldiers directly involved, was the most significant part of the whole Zhang Nan Campaign , which thoroughly turned round the overall situation of the war since a great amount of the elite forces in the enemy troops was destroyed. Besides, there was a powerful military pressure put on the rest of the enemy troops. At this point, it was the imperial troops who took over the advantages. Moreover, the victory of the battle greatly inspired the imperial troops, and convinced some officers who had been in fear of the enemy. After the main battle, Wang Yang-ming sent an order to track down and arrest those enemy soldiers still at large lest they collect again to fight back. Meanwhile, Wang Yang-ming ordered the troops to follow up the victory with a second attack on Ketang Cave and Jianguan , which were, respectively, the lairs of Zhan Shi-fu and Wen Huo-shao , the chief enemy leaders. In the battle of Ketang Cave , Wang Yang-ming divided the troops into five divisions, with successive and non-stop attacks, finally capturing Zhan Shi-fu and some of his followers alive and driving the rest into other stockaded villages. On March 20 Wang Yang-ming began to attack Jianguan and after dozens of fights captured the enemy leaders alive, including Wen Huo-shao. Considering the situation that there were still enemy troops fleeing to mountains at the boundary between Fujian and Guangdong Provinces , Wang Yang-ming commanded the imperial troops in Fujian Province , Guangdong Province, and Jiangxi Province to take unified military action at midnight on March 21 so as to clean up the rest of enemy troops at the boundary between Fujian and Guangdong Provinces.

The end of the battle of Jianguan basically marked the end of the whole 3-month Zhang Nan Campaign , leading to the rooting out of bandits at the boundary between Fujian and Guangdong Provinces for many years. Then Wang Yang-ming withdrew troops back to Ganzhou in April.

Coming back to Ganzhou, Wang Yang-ming immediately turned to the post-war reconstruction of civil production and people’s lives. He issued an official placatory statement, urging those who had been following the bandits to obey the law and work hard in production in the spring plowing season, inculcating them with such obligations as working hard in producing crops, guarding houses, protecting family members, respecting parents, and raising children. They were also instructed to do good rather than evil so as to bask in blessings and escape from misfortune, and to keep rightful etiquette as law-abiding citizens.

Although the Zhang Nan Campaign had come to an end, Wang Yang-ming continued to ponder on how to eliminate the recurrence of bandits at the boundary between Fujian and Guangdong where bandits were most likely to rise over the last few decades. After conducting a site investigation in the area with Xiaoxi ²⁴ as the central place haunted by bandits, he noticed the region was vast and inconvenient for traffic, and it was under the administration of Nanjing County which actually was unable to control this area. Therefore, he insisted on promoting political reconstruction, setting up a new county with Xiaoxi as the center, so as not only to control the significant routes between Fujian and Guangdong , but to strengthen political administration and found academies in this region, thus to promote benevolence and etiquette. After consultations with the Fujian Provincial Ancha Si,²⁵ the Prefecture²⁶ of Zhangzhou , and the Magistrate of Nanjing County, Wang Yang-ming designated Xiaoxi as the place of a new county and delimited the boundary. This new county was first named Qingping County ,²⁷ and was then renamed Pinghe County .²⁸ With the approval of the central government, Pinghe County was officially founded in March 1518 (the thirteenth year of the Zhengde Emperor ).

Having finished the post-war rehabilitation, Wang Yang-ming began to reevaluate the military situation of the boundary between the four provinces. With the Zhang Nan Campaign at an end, bandits in the boundary between Fujian and Guangdong had basically been wiped out. Judging from the situation, Wang Yang-ming considered it necessary to launch other military attacks against the most rampant bandits mainly at Hengshui , Zuoxi , and Tonggang ²⁹ in Jiangxi Province . Even when Wang Yang-ming still concentrated on the attack upon Zhang Nan, bandits in Hengshui and Tonggang with Xie Zhi-shan and Lan Tian-feng , as their heads came out to plunder properties of local inhabitants and recklessly and violently assault nearby county towns. It was the precipitous terrain with steep mountains and cliffs which could hardly be conquered that emboldened the bandits with no scruples. Wang Yang-ming was also aware of the impracticability of immediate attack on Hengshui and Tonggang. On the one hand, the imperial troops in Jiangxi Province were too weak in combat capability to vanquish the enemy troops due to lack of routine drilling. On the other hand, it was necessary to transfer troops from Jiangxi , Huguang , and Guangdong so as to launch the attack. Before that, he must overcome a lot of problems lest the intended military action should turn out a great risk, such as poor cooperation among leading officers from various regions, dread of enemies among officers, disobedience against command, lack of courage among soldiers, deficiency of combat capability, etc. Then Wang Yang-ming made efforts on regulation inside the troops with adaptation of military structure as well as the consolidation of fighting capability prior to planning specific strategies for the Hengshui and Tonggang Campaign . In particular, he took measures as follows.

First, Wang Yang-ming managed to deal with the decentralization of military power. In May 1517 (the twelfth year of the Zhengde Emperor ), he wrote to the central government, reporting the general situation of the Zhang Nan Campaign and analyzing the military trend at the time. Meanwhile, he asked for greater military power, which was finally approved of in September, granting him the power to handle and supervise the military affairs of Southern Jiangxi , Tingzhou and Zhangzhou with eight flags as the authority of discretion. Actually, Wang Yang-ming had already started projecting the next military action according to his own approaches just after writing to the central government in May.

Second, Wang Yang-ming reorganized the troops as the solution to the injustice in award and punishment as well as the disobedience in the process of fighting. He reshaped the troop structure as follows: every 25 soldiers were grouped into units of Wu ³⁰ with the leader Xiaojia ; every 50 soldiers were grouped into units of Dui with the leader Zongjia ; every 200 soldiers were grouped into units of Shao with the leader Shaozhang and the assistant Xieshao ; every 400 soldiers were grouped into units of Ying ³¹ with the leaders Yingguan ³² and Canmou ³³; every 1,200 soldiers were grouped into units of Zhen with the leader Pianjiang ³⁴; every 2,400 soldiers were grouped into units of Jun ³⁵ with the leader Fujiang .³⁶ Besides this, Wang Yang-ming set a rule that higher ranking officers were authorized to impose punishment on lower ranking officers so as to enforce and maintain strict military discipline. Meanwhile, he set up a command system with a commander seal for each level to use in military transfer as the token in case of spies.

Third, Wang Yang-ming strived to tackle the soldiers’ weak combat capability resulting from a lack of routine drilling. On the one hand, he replenished the troops with excellent soldiers recruited from ordinary people. On the other hand, he amassed the newly reorganized military units to conduct military drills on the drilling ground in the city of Ganzhou , and to promote coordination with a uniform command so as to improve overall combat capability.

Fourth, Wang Yang-ming made great efforts to tackle the shortage of military funds. He submitted a proposal to the central government in June, requesting to modify laws on salt, to encourage the salt business, and to supplement military funds by levying salt taxation, which finally received approval from the government.

Fifth, Wang Yang-ming established strict disciplinary measures that would be enforced on the troops. For example, officers and soldiers would be beheaded for delaying the fulfillment of a military plan, fleeing from the battlefield, breaking military discipline, disturbing inhabitants or robbing private properties where they stayed, even just picking up valuables from the ground while marching, etc. This strict discipline significantly guaranteed the combat effectiveness of his troops, and in return the ban on disturbance and robbery of the people’s goods made the people all the more supportive of his troops.

These were some of the main measures Wang Yang-ming took to strengthen the form of his troops prior to specifically planning the Hengshui and Tonggang Campaign .

Apart from these measures taken to enhance his troops’ fighting capability, Wang Yang-ming also did something to prevent the enemies from colluding with each other because he realized that the enemy troops in Hengshui and Tonggang had been keeping in touch with those in Litou , Longchuan County , Guangdong Province , despite the long distance between them. Therefore, in the process of the battle, it was important to keep the target enemy troops in Hengshui and Tonggang isolated, without any mutual contact or sharing of information with other enemy troops, and to prevent military support from the enemy of the strongpoint in Litou, Guangdong Province, who must at least be made to keep neutral by taking a wait-and-see attitude toward the battle. To this end, Wang Yang-ming released an official announcement with conciliatory intent to the bandits in Litou and sent some cattle, wine, treasure, and cloth, expecting them to stop fighting with and to surrender to the central government with sincere repentance. With earnest exhortation, this announcement was written in simple words and easy to understand, not only reassuring the bandits in Litou , but also persuading some of their heads to surrender. Those who did surrender played a very important part in the siege of Litou. We will talk about it later.

As was mentioned above, Wang Yang-ming had made a lot of preparations for launching the Hengshui and Tonggang Campaign . It was in July that he started to substantively plan the wide-ranged and tough military action. Wang Yang-ming carried out his meticulous military deployment to ensure that the battle would progress smoothly until the government troops would win the final victory.

The main target of the siege was the enemies in Hengshui , Zuoxi , and Tonggang, which chiefly lay in Dayu County , Nankang County and Shangyou County , Nan’an Prefecture , Jiangxi Province . Among these bandits, those in Tonggang were recognized as the toughest ones holed up in the most difficult terrain. Therefore, at the military meeting attended by Wang Yang-ming and other officers from the provinces of Jiangxi, Huguang and Guangdong , the majority proposed to conquer Tonggang before they attacked Hengshui and Zuoxi because they thought that once the toughest enemy was completely wiped out, the rest would be relatively easy to deal with. However, Wang Yang-ming held a different view. He argued that Hengshui and Zuoxi were most dangerous to Jiangxi and Huguang and should be annihilated prior to the others. If Tonggang was attacked first, troops from Huguang and Jiangxi must be transferred, thus troops from Jiangxi had to take a detour round Hengshui and Zuoxi before they could lay siege to Tonggang, which was actually quite risky since the troops from Jiangxi, exhausted after a long-distance March, were likely to get attacked from both front and behind. In contrast, if the imperial troops conquered Hengshui and Zuoxi first, it was much more likely for them to win the battle by moving forward step by step to Tonggang and laying a siege in cooperation with the troops from Huguang . In the meantime, Wang Yang-ming stressed that it was helpful to mislead the enemy into considering Tonggang would be the first target could make bandits in Hengshui and Zuoxi less vigilant. Besides, bandits in Tonggang would gradually become less alert when they found no attacks arriving as expected, which would help the imperial troops to capture the enemies unprepared. Wang Yang-ming’s analysis was so penetrating that officers from various provinces were deeply convinced and they reached consensus that the first attack should be against Hengshui and Zuoxi instead of Tonggang .

In accordance with the strategy to isolate one gang of bandits from the others and crush them one by one, Wang Yang-ming first commanded one of the battalions from Fujian to enter Nan’an . In this battle, the troops from Jiangxi would be the main force to attack Hengshui and Zuoxi with the plan of action. Wang Yang-ming estimated in advance that the troops from Huguang could reach the place as they had been supposed to just at the time when the enemies in Hengshui and Zuoxi were annihilated, thus the troops from Hubei and Guangdong could meet to lay siege to Tonggang.

In order to beat the enemies effectively with concentrated superior force, Wang Yang-ming divided the main forces into ten posts with a mission of attack to get near the target. The deployment of ten posts was quite meticulous so as to encircle and wipe out the enemies, which also ensured sufficient forces to intercept, track down, and arrest the enemy soldiers who might retreat in disorder when defeated. A general principle was set that the enemies of individual sections must be left within the imperial troop’s range of attack, isolated from each other, and never allowed to join up again or support each other. The various branches of imperial troops were supposed to assemble at Tonggang via Hengshui and Zuoxi . With reiteration of strict military discipline, Wang Yang-ming ordered all of the troops to March on the night of October 7 according to a pre-planned route.

It was proved in the combat that the deployment arranged by Wang Yang-ming was really effective. The surrounding bandits’ lairs were quickly crushed by various troops marching toward Hengshui and Zuoxi on a large scale. Xie Zhi-shan , the ringleader of the bandits, was still unaware of the danger when the imperial troops arrived at Hengshui because on the one hand he had been misled into the misconception that it would be Tonggang that would be attacked first rather than Hengshui, and on the other hand he had neglected to take precautions, thinking that Hengshui was almost unconquerable with its natural barriers. It had never occurred to him that the imperial troops would lay siege to Hengshui from all directions so quickly. There was a desperate but hopeless resistance and the trend of the battle was irretrievable. Finally, Xie Zhi-shan was killed and many others lost their lives by falling into the ravine. Meanwhile, Zuoxi was also conquered and all the troops gathered in Hengshui . It was an exceptionally tough battle with heavy rain and dense fog, which was favorable for enemies to flee in all directions, who, as Wang Yang-ming warned, were certain to gather together as a potential menace if no follow-up action was taken. However, there was not sufficient time to make another chase and attack since it was already October 15, while they were supposed to attack Tonggang together with troops from Huguang on November 1. Time was pressing as it took at least 3 days to get from Hengshui to Tonggang with more than 50 km of mountain path. Then Wang Yang-ming urgently adjusted his strategy, dividing the troops into two divisions, one of them attacking from the front and the other from behind, to chase the rest of the enemy troops in Hengshui and Zuoxi , who by October 28 was eliminated at large, apart from those who fled to Tonggang . Then the imperial troops continued to march toward Tonggang following the previously planned route.

Tonggang, with natural barriers, could be accessed to the center only by five paths, which had been heavily guarded by massive forces of Lan Tian-feng , the ringleader of the bandits in Tonggang . It was rather tough, even impractical, to attack the place by force, for the commanding elevation was under the control of enemy troops and the imperial troops could in no way seize the paths under the falling stones or logs pushed down by the enemy guards. Besides, there was heavy rain which added more difficulty to the attack. In face of such a situation, Wang Yang-ming proposed requesting Lan Tian-feng to capitulate, which could at least gain time or induce him to let down his guard if he did not want to surrender, so as to give a chance to break through the natural barrier. Wang Yang-ming then chose two captives who had been old friends of Lan Tian-feng , absolved them from guilt and lifted them into the bandits’ lair with ropes to request Lan Tian-feng to capitulate, which, as Wang Yang-ming expected, was somehow effective in making the bandits less alert. On November 1, the imperial troops, despite the natural barriers and heavy rain, managed to break the guard of Tonggan while Lan Tian-feng was discussing with the crew whether they should capitulate or not. It was a tough fight when the imperial troops attacked from all directions and Lan Tian-feng responded in haste. Finally, the bandits’ lair in Tonggang was conquered and Lan Tian-feng was killed. By November 13, the enemies in Tonggang were basically wiped out. On December 9, Wang Yang-ming returned with troops in victory, marking the end of the Hengshui and Tonggang Campaign .

It is worth mentioning that Wang Yang-ming expected the battle to be quite tough in his planning, and ordered the troops from Huguang to set out on November 11 in cooperation with the troops from Jiangxi to carry out the siege on Tonggang . However, the battle progressed much more smoothly than he expected, so that the troops from Huguang had still not entered the field of Jiangxi by the time Tonggang was conquered. Therefore, Wang Yang-ming sent messengers to inform the officers of troops from Huguang that it was unnecessary for them to come across the boundary since the battle was already over. In spite of their absence, they were still awarded grand prizes and honor.

All the battles of the Hengshui and Tonggang Campaign took 3 months; actually 2 months to wipe out more than 80 bandits’ lairs, root out bandits in Jiangxi who had been an affliction for many years, and bring back peaceful life, which conformed to the interest of most ordinary people. So Wang Yang-ming gained a great reputation, almost like a god. He was greeted by the people with joss sticks on the head when he led troops back by way of Nankang County . In various regions of Jiangxi , a lot of temples were set up to worship him during seasons of the year.

On December 20, Wang Yang-ming came back to Ganzhou . He commended officers with meritorious conduct in the battles and wrote to the central government asking for promotion for them. Meanwhile, he gave profound consideration to the long-term stability and development of this region, just as he did after the Zhang Nan Campaign . Geographically speaking, Hengshui , Zuoxi , and Tonggang were rather remote, lying across Shangyou County , Nankang County , and Dayu County , with a distance of nearly 300 km to the capital area of each county, thus actually lying in a vacuum of administration, out of effective control from the three counties, which actually could be considered the essential cause of rampant bandits. Wang Yang-ming considered it necessary to set up a new county in the region of Hengshui to prevent the resurgence of bandits. After conducting the survey by himself, Wang Yang-ming selected Hengshui as the location of a new county named Chongyi and marked the boundary. This proposal was immediately approved by the central government. Chongyi County was set up in April 1518 (the thirteenth year of the Zhengde Emperor ). The first Zhixian was Shu Fu , the previous Xiancheng of Nankang County .

The complete end of Hengshui and Tonggang Campaign marked the elimination of bandits in the boundary of the Jiangxi , Fujian , Huguang , and Guangdong Provinces . With the successive victories of the imperial troops, bandits in the boundary of Guangdong and Jiangxi Provinces , taking Litou , Longchuan as their stronghold, were trapped in isolation. After the Hengshui and Tonggang Campaign, Wang Yang-ming continued his planning for the Litou Campaign . Litou was located in Jiulian Mountain , Longchuan County , Guangdong Province. The ringleader was named Chi Zhong-rong , with the nickname of Chi Da-bin . Bandits in Litou, emboldened by the complex terrain and natural barriers, plundered and ravaged recklessly. Among bandits at the boundary of the four provinces, those in Litou were the strongest. When planning the Hengshui and Tonggang Campaign , Wang Yang-ming had formed an overall strategy, involving the attack on Hengshui first, next on Zuoxi , the siege on Tonggang with the troops from Jiangxi and Huguang Provinces together, and finally annihilation of Litou bandits with all the troops from Jiangxi, Huguang, and Guangdong Provinces, which exactly reflected his particular emphasis on bandits in Litou. Under his rigorous planning and deployment, the Litou Campaign progressed quite smoothly and inexorably, somehow with a sign of amusement.

(Translated by Ding Ying; Proofread by Lin Xiao)

4.3 Taking Litou by Strategy

Wang Yang-ming launched two campaigns successively in the border areas of the four provinces of Jiangxi , Huguang , Fujian , and Guangdong , i.e., the Zhang Nan Campaign and the Hengshui and Tonggang Campaign . He eradicated the bandits in the border regions of Fujian and Guangdong Provinces , as well as those stationed in Hengshui and Tonggang in Jiangxi Province . There remained only one big bandit strongpoint—Litou , which was located in Longchuan , Huizhou , Guangdong at the junction of four provinces. After the Hengshui and Tonggang Campaign, he immediately planned to suppress the bandits in Litou.

Litou , which was divided into upper, middle, and lower parts, was located in a Jiulian mountainous area, Longchuan County , Guangdong Province , where there were rolling mountains and strategically important terrains. The bandits in Litou led by Chi Zhong-rong (nicknamed Chi Da-bin , i.e., Chi with ferocious whiskers) had been running rampant against the local people. With the natural barrier of Jiulian Mountain he acted brazenly and without scruple. The Imperial Court could do little to stop their evil doing. Several years before, the Imperial Court had moved thousands of “wolf troops” to encircle and suppress these bandits, but they failed to achieve the desired results, which in turn added to Chi Zhong-rong’s insolent arrogance. He boasted, “It’s easy to deal with wolf troops. It takes the Imperial Court at least half a year to move the wolf troops, but I only need to take one month to avoid them.” That was true. As a result, he became more unscrupulous.

Among the bandits in the border areas of the four provinces, the ones in Litou were the strongest. Wang Yang-ming paid special attention to the bandits in Litou, and referred to them as the giant of bandits, whom he elected as the last to be conquered in his military encirclement and suppression of these bandits. He compared it to processing logs, i.e., dealing with those parts first which were easy to cut and leaving the tough nuts to the end. Now that the other bandits had been suppressed and wiped out, he would crack the hardest nut in Litou. On the one hand, he was thinking over the details of a general military attack on Litou , and on the other hand he was trying his best to find a breakthrough to ensure the final success of the battle. With a tight military deployment and new breakthrough, the Litou Campaign went on smoothly, and in the end the imperial army conquered Litou swiftly, which was like splitting bamboo in a comic environment. Then how did it come to this?

As mentioned in the previous chapter, while launching the Hengshui and Tonggang Campaign, Yang-ming had issued a bulletin in Litou and rewarded the bandits there with cattle and wine so as to prevent them from offering their military aid to those in Hengshui and Tonggang . The bulletin was easy to understand and touching. Several sub-chiefs of the bandits in Litou , including Huang Jin-chao , came over with their men and surrendered to the Imperial Court . Wang Yang-ming accepted Huang’s surrender sincerely but with caution. Inspired by this, a plan of taking Litou by strategy gradually emerged in Wang’s mind .

Wang Yang-ming forgave Huang Jin-chao’s crimes for his surrender and rewarded him. To show his sincerity Huang asked to atone for his crimes by joining in the combat against Hengshi. Wang agreed, and gave him 500 soldiers. Hengshui was conquered on October 12. Huang Jin-chao wrote a letter to Chi Zhong-rong , telling him that Wang Yang-ming had conquered Hengshui and treated the men who came to surrender sincerely. In the end, he hoped that Chi Zhong-rong could also surrender with his men. Receiving the letter, Chi was scared. And he believed that Wang Yang-ming surely would attack Litou after Tonggang was conquered. Actually, Chi was unwilling to surrender in his heart, yet he was under Wang’s military pressure. Therefore, Chi stepped up war preparations in Litou on the one hand, and on the other hand, at the same time, he sent his brother Chi Zhong-an together with 200 people to surrender to Wang Yang-ming. These guys led by Chi Zhong-an were old and sick. Obviously, Chi had his own purposes in doing this. On the surface, he would like to show his “sincerity” of surrender, but his real purpose was to spy. Once Wang Yang-ming attacked Litou, these guys would become moles, i.e., Chi had inserted his own soldiers into the imperial army. Wang saw through their trick, but he kept quiet and welcomed them, rewarding them with gifts. In the battle of Tonggang , Chi Zhong-an asked to take part, and Wang agreed. But these guys were sent to an area far away from Litou to prevent them contacting Chi Zhong-rong .

Then how to take military action effectively in Litou? Wang Yang-ming thought that different from other regions, Litou was difficult to attack owing to its steep terrain and the fact that the bandits occupying this region had a strong fighting ability with extraordinary skills. If the bandits were in combat readiness, it would be difficult for the imperial army to win in the campaign. So it would help a lot if the enemy neglected to take precautions and the imperial army moved confidentially. Therefore, during the interval of attacking Tonggang , Wang summoned dozens of people familiar with Litou from nearby counties to learn the real situation there. These people all insisted that Chi Zhong-rong should be eliminated because he was a wicked man and had conducted all sorts of evil doings. They also pointed out that it was necessary to move a great number of “wolf soldiers” to destroy the bandits because “wolf soldiers” were good at fighting in mountain areas. Otherwise, it would be of no avail. But Wang believed that it was not a must to mobilize “wolf troops” in this campaign. As the Chinese saying goes, there are no constant conditions in warfare. It was most important of all to seize opportunities and adopt appropriate tactical strategies to win the battle. So Wang confidentially deployed military operations against Litou. He sent an official document to Huizhou Prefecture , Guangdong Province and ordered the officers there to call in troops and get a detailed knowledge of the terrain around Litou , getting well prepared for the campaign according to his strategy. Besides, he was seeking favorable opportunities by quietly watching the movements of Chi Zhong-rong and his underlings.

After Tonggang was conquered, Chi Zhong-rong was scared and preparing for war even more actively. Wang Yang-ming knew that with no detailed knowledge of the military installation and road conditions in Litou, once the campaign started, the imperial army would be in a passive situation. As the old Chinese saying goes, “How can you catch tiger cubs without entering the tiger’s lair,” equivalent to English proverb “Nothing ventured, nothing gained.” So he made a decision out of others’ expectations by sending a representative to Litou with various goods. The representative said to Chi Zhong-rong, “Since you have asked your brother to cross over, we know you were sincere in surrender, so Wang Gan-zhou (Wang Yang-ming) delegated me to reward you.” Seeing Chi’s men stepping up readiness for war, the messenger continued, “Why are you so busy with preparations for war?” Failing to conceal the fact, Chi was embarrassed and said, “I am sorry, we are doing this because I have learned that Lu Ke of Longchuan County would attack us. As a matter of fact we do not intend to fight with the imperial army but instead we are preparing to fight against his troops.”

This Lu Ke mentioned by Chi had been a minor bandit, but under Wang Yang-ming’s appeal he had already submitted to Wang with over three thousand followers. Wang had accepted Lu’s surrender and asked him to go back to Longchuan and get ready for attacking Litou. Learning that Chi Zhong-rong and Lu Ke hated each other, Wang decided to capture Chi wittily by taking advantage of their conflict.

When Wang Yang-ming and his soldiers arrived at Nankang County after the victory of the battle of Tonggang , Lu Ke came and reported to Wang that Chi Zhong-rong hatched a sinister plot and was busy preparing for war. Actually, Wang had already learned about this. But unexpectedly, Wang raged, “Chi Zhong-rong had already planned to submit to me. How dare you make a false accusation against him?” Wang ordered his men to bind Lu, and declared that he would put Lu to death. Lu was put into prison. Didn’t Wang know that Lu was telling the truth? Why did he fly into a rage? The reason was that Chi Zhong-an and his men were at the scene, and Wang performed this to deceive them. When Chi Zhong-an and his men saw Lu Ke come to accuse Chi Zhong-rong, they were scared. Seeing Wang put Lu into prison, they all became joyful and recounted his crimes. Naturally, Wang Yang-ming had noticed the change of their facial expressions. But out of these men’s expectation, the very night Lu Ke was confined, Wang explained to Lu that he was taking advantage of Lu to trap Chi Zhong-rong . Wang also asked Lu to summon his man back immediately after he returned and cooperate with the imperial army to conquer Litou .

When Wang Yang-ming reached Ganzhou on December 20, he held dinners and entertained his soldiers. He promulgated the order to stop the fight since the bandits in Hengshui and Tonggang areas were conquered and the bandits in Litou had announced that they would submit genuinely. To give a false impression, Wang disbanded the army. At the same time, Wang told Chi Zhong-an , “You may go back and help your brother to make preparations for the defense. Although Lu Ke was put into prison, you’d better beware of his henchmen’s attack.” Hearing this Chi chuckled to himself. Chi Zhong-an reported everything to his brother when he returned. Hence, the preparations for war were slackened in Litou .

Several days later, Wang Yang-ming dispatched an officer to Litou and granted the bandits with an amnesty, asking them to get well prepared for Lu Ke’s sneak attack. Chi Zhong-rong and his henchmen were all delighted. After a few days, Wang sent his adviser Lei Ji to Litou . When Lei arrived, he tried to persuade Chi Zhong-rong to Ganzhou , “Now that the government has granted you with various rewards, you’d better show your gratitude. Why not call on Wang Yang-ming in Ganzhou personally? What’s more, Lu Ke did not find it acceptable that he was put into prison and even said that you would rebel and that you would surely resist if the official soldiers came to capture you. So why don’t you go to Ganzhou before the imperial soldiers come? If you go, the government will really believe you and at the same time Lu Ke will surely be put to death since his lies will collapse by themselves.” Chi thought it reasonable, so he said to his henchmen, “What on earth does Wang Gan-zhou intend to do? I’d better go and see. You guys guard our home and I’ll be back in a few days.” Then he went to Ganzhou together with over 40 warriors, all with extraordinary skills.

Now the trick of trapping Chi Zhong-rong was almost fulfilled. As soon as Chi left Litou, Wang issued his military orders confidentially, ordering ten army divisions to encircle Litou , which kept the bandits in the mountains under his military control.

But Chi Zhong-rong was a man with sinister motives. When he arrived at Ganzhou, he went to the parade ground first instead of calling on Wang Yang-ming . He felt delighted inwardly when he found the parade ground was empty and all the government soldiers had gone home. The streets were gay with lanterns and colorful decorations; people were ready for the Chinese New Year and there was no trace of military training. He bribed the jailer and found Lu Ke in the prison trussed up tightly. Now he truly believed that Wang Yang-ming was tricked into trusting his surrender and he felt relieved. So he went to visit Wang. Wang asked directly, “Chi Zhong-rong, why did you visit the parade ground first instead of seeing me when you reached Ganzhou ? Do you suspect me?” Chi Zhong-rong responded immediately, “No, no … I would not dare doubt you, my respectable provincial governor.” Hearing this, Wang Yang-ming changed from anger to joy and was all smiles. He entertained Chi and his retinues in the Xiangfu Palace in Ganzhou, where everything was in order. Chi was pleased. But without Chi suspecting, that very night Wang Yang-ming released Lu Ke , asking him to assemble his soldiers and make preparations to attack Litou . On the second day, Chi wanted to go home, but Wang insisted that Chi had better stay for a few more days. Wang stated two reasons. Firstly, Chi could not arrive home before the Spring Festival even if he set off right now since it was already December 24 (Chinese Lunar Calendar ) and it took nearly 8 days traveling from Ganzhou to Litou. And secondly, if Chi went back it would be necessary for him to visit relatives and friends during the Spring Festival, which would be really tiresome. What’s more, a lantern festival would be held in Ganzhou. Chi had no other choice but to stay there. Wang directed his men to entertain Chi so as to reassure him.

As was recorded, although Wang Yang-ming trapped Chi with tricks and was ready to attack Litou , he was also sincere in trying to persuade Chi to submit. Wang asked Chi to dress in official robes and taught him etiquette. What’s more, Wang invited Chi to walk with him in the street of Ganzhou intentionally in order to watch his attitudes and manners. Finally, Wang found that Chi was a crusty man and would never submit. At this point, Wang made up his mind to kill Chi. However, after Chi was dead, Wang felt so sad that he ate nothing all day long.

On January 3, 1518 (Chinese Lunar Calendar , the thirteenth year of the Zhengde Emperor ), Wang Yang-ming estimated that Lu Ke should have arrived home and all the government forces should have got to the areas as ordered. So with his soldiers hiding in the hall, Wang held a banquet during which he killed Chi Zhong-rong and his retinues.

On one hand, Litou had no supreme leader since Chi Zhong-rong was killed; on the other hand, the bandits there were not in combat readiness because Wang had managed to give a false impression that the imperial army would not attack Litou . These two points greatly ensured the success of the Litou Campaign.

On January 7 (Chinese Lunar Calendar) , Wang Yang-ming gave the order to attack Litou . The bandits in Litou had got Chi Zhong-rong’s letter before he died which said that Ganzhou had stopped preparing for war, so they made almost no preparation for fighting. Thus, the imperial armies succeeded easily, and the military strongpoints of the bandits were conquered in succession. But unexpectedly, approximately 800 capable and vigorous bandits fled to Jiulian Mountain and occupied the advantageous position, which added great difficulty to the pursuit. Attack by force was obviously unwise and actually useless. Then what should they do? Wang believed that although the enemies had occupied the advantageous positions, they were chased and in disorder and had difficulty in resisting the military attack effectively, which was advantageous to the imperial army. Suddenly an idea occurred to him that he would adopt another strategy rather than attack by force. He selected 700 robust and athletic soldiers, and ordered them to wear the enemy’s uniform and sneak in among the enemy troops under the cover of night. Those soldiers ran toward the cliff occupied by the enemy. Seeing this, the bandits on the cliff took them for their fellow guys and helped them to get onto the cliff. The imperial army occupied the natural barrier rapidly through the strategy of “fishing in muddied waters.” On the second day, the enemy found they were cheated, but it was too late to fight back. Therefore, at the beginning of March the Litou Campaign was declared a victory.

After the Litou Campaign, Wang Yang-ming concerned himself with the local area’s lasting stability. In order to strengthen the political influence of the central government, he added Heping County , originally a part of Longchuan County , Guangdong Province . What was more, he appealed to the Imperial Court for the exemption of people’s taxes and corvee in Heping for 3 years, which was ratified.

He spent a little more than 1 year (from February 1517 to March 1518) eradicating the bandits in the border areas of the four provinces—Jiangxi , Fujian , Huguang , and Guangdong —which ensured the peaceful life of the local people. Therefore, his military activities were supported and he himself was highly esteemed by the people in Jiangxi.

In view of the three campaigns, we may summarize Wang Yang-ming’s strategy and tactics as follows:

• (1) Know the enemy and know yourself, and do not fight non-prepared wars. Wang Yang-ming would make great effort to get well prepared for every battle he would fight by obtaining the details of the power of the enemy, including arms, weapons, morale, combat capability, etc., and by solving any problem discovered in good time, which laid the foundation for the final victory.

• (2) Isolate the enemy, and maintain the strength of forces. Wang Yang-ming paid special attention to the tactics of isolating the enemy, such as cutting off the enemy’s road traffic and communication, making the enemy unable to pry for information, preventing them from getting military aid, keeping the target enemy in an isolated state, and putting them within the range of military attack, which resulted in their failure to know the real situation and thus ensured the superiority of the imperial army.

• (3) Slacken the enemy’s vigilance and undermine their will to fight. In a war, Wang Yang-ming would deceive the enemy by using spies and spreading false information, which played a crucial role in the Zhang Nan Campaign , the Litou Campaign , and later in the suppression of Zhu Chen-hao’s rebellion . As the saying goes, “All is fair in war,” or “Deceit is not to be despised in war,” or “In war there is no objection to deceit.” So adopting various tactics of disinformation is essential in the victory of a war, which showed Wang’s outstanding military wisdom, and created opportunities for the imperial army to defeat the enemy by surprise.

• (4) Concentrate the superior forces to wipe out the enemy, and give them no way to flee. First, isolate the enemy; then concentrate the superior forces to surround the enemy. The three campaigns mentioned above demonstrated Wang Yang-ming’s military thought of concentrating the superior forces to fight a war of annihilation. As for the isolated enemy, Wang Yang-ming would use the tactic of surrounding and outflanking the enemy, in order to keep the enemy within the bounds of a military attack, which effectively ensured the victory in the battles.

• (5) Grasp the overall situation by means of flexible tactics, and gain the upper hand of the war. Whenever Wang Yang-ming planned a battle, he paid special attention to taking into account the overall situation. For example, in the Hengshui and Tonggang Campaign , he spread the message of “attacking Tonggang first” in order to stabilize the situation in Litou . Whenever an unfavorable situation emerged, he would adopt flexible tactics to reverse it. For instance, in the course of conquering Litou and trapping Chi Zhong-rong , he ordered the government soldiers to wear the enemy’s dress and sneak in among the enemy troops, which helped the imperial army to gain the upper hand, thus ensuring the final victory of the battle.

• (6) Punish the principal culprit, and do not carry out massacres. Whenever Wang Yang-ming set out his war strategy, he emphasized the importance of punishing the principal culprit only. No killing was allowed if the enemy had given up resistance. And he also made great effort to conciliate the captured subordinate bandits, which reflected his generosity and his unique understanding of the purpose and significance of war.

• (7) Emphasize military discipline, and strictly keep the rules for reward and punishment. Being strict in discipline and discriminating in rewards and punishments contributed to enhancing the army’s fighting capacity. While the soldiers were marching or stationed in the residential area, he made rules of not taking a single thing from the residents, which resulted in local people’s support. And it also embodied his deep love for the people.

• (8) Pay special attention to the people’s livelihoods, and achieve long-term stability after war. Wang Yang-ming believed that war is launched to help the people live a prosperous life. Therefore, whenever a war ended, he would try his best to achieve the local area’s lasting stability. For example, he added Pinghe County in Fujian Province , Chongyi County in Jiangxi Province , and Heping County in Guangdong Province . He strengthened the administration and advocated moral education in these areas, which showed that he was a man with outstanding political foresight who was not eager for quick success or instant benefits.

Of course, Wang Yang-ming’s military thought was the crystallization of his reflection on ancient military strategy and tactics. He applied his military thought to battles. What’s more, his military thought in turn had a profound impact on the formation of later military thought in China, and even in Japan .

Through the three campaigns, Wang Yang-ming eliminated the banditry in the areas bordering the four provinces and completed his first step in becoming a sage and realizing his ambition of making achievements all over the country. It was the fruit of his long years’ studying military tactics. And it was also a test of his philosophy—“The Oneness of Knowing and Doing .” He applied his military knowledge in the battles and in turn he took from them more military knowledge to enrich his military thought. Therefore, knowledge and action, like a bird’s wings or a vehicle’s wheels, were mutual and indispensable in the process of gaining knowledge.

Wang Yang-ming eliminated the bandits with his brilliant military talents. In other words, he had fulfilled the task granted by the Imperial Court . So when the battles ended, he handed in his retirement report on March 4, 1518 (the thirteenth year of the Zhengde Emperor ). In the report, he emphasized his poor health and described himself as a useless man suffering from coughing, hot flushes, and paralysis of hands and feet, in the hope that the Imperial Court would understand and allow him to resign and stay home. But out of his expectation, the Imperial Court did not sympathize with him and the official reply did not come until October 2, which said that Wang Shou-ren made contributions in suppressing the revolts, but the resignation was not allowed since he only got occasional minor illness which only needed a little care.

We have reason to believe that Wang Yang-ming described his illness honestly in his resignation report because in the battles fought in mountains, sometimes he had to command troops from a stretcher. Therefore, it is understandable that he wanted to go home to recuperate, to give lectures, and improve his thought as he longed to do. But the Imperial Court did not think so, and thought that he only had a minor illness and as a result rejected his application. Hence, he had to stay in Ganzhou and devote himself to his duty.

Anyway, the wars were over and now he could devote more time to his philosophical thinking. In most of 1518 (the thirteenth year of the Zhengde Emperor ), besides dealing with local military affairs in Ganzhou , he recuperated and gave lectures. A number of young men were interested in his thought in Jiangxi Province , including Zou Shou-yi , Ou-yang De , Huang Hong-gang , and so on, who became his disciples, and later the backbone of the Jiangyou School .³⁷

On June 5, 1519 (the fourteenth year of the Zhengde Emperor ), Wang Yang-ming received the Imperial Court’s command that he should hurry to Fujian where an army mutiny occurred. So he set off along the Ganjiang River for Fujian via Nanchang . On June 15 he arrived at Huangtunao in Fengcheng County , outside Nanchang City. Gu Bi , Zhixian ³⁸ of Fengcheng County, welcomed him and reported to him some surprising news which influenced his life thereafter. What on earth was the news about? And what reaction would he have after he learned the news?

(Translated by Jiang Yang-fen; Proofread by Wu Yue-min)

4.4 Suppressing Zhu Chen-Hao’s Rebellion Alone

As soon as Wang Yang-ming arrived at Huangtunao , Fengcheng County, on the outskirts of Nanchang City, on June 15, 1519 (the fourteenth year of the Zhengde Emperor ), Gu Bi , Magistrate of Fengcheng County , told him the astonishing news: Zhu Chen-hao , the Ning Wang ,³⁹ had rebelled the day before. Wang Yang-ming should not enter Nanchang City in any event!

Upon this news, Wang Yang-ming felt like he’d been struck by lightening! He at once calmed down and in a flash made a judgment according to the situation. He decidedly turned around and returned to his boat and went back to Ji’an. Meanwhile, Zhu Chen-hao’s scouts found his tracks and immediately sent a great number of troops to chase after him. Let’s not start with whether Wang Yang-ming could throw off Zhu Chen-hao’s chase, but who Zhu Chen-hao was.

Zhu Chen-hao was the fifth generation of Zhu Yuan-zhang , Ming Taizu .⁴⁰ After Zhu Yuan-zhang established the Ming dynasty , he appointed his sons as princes, including his 17th son, Zhu Quan , as Prince of Ning . Zhu Chen-hao , one of the offspring of Zhu Quan , was given this title as the fourth generation of Prince of Ning in 1497 (the tenth year of the Hongzhi Emperor ⁴¹ in the Ming dynasty ). Nanchang had not been Prince Ning’s original fief, but was later changed into his fief during the reign of the Yongle Emperor .⁴² Zhu Chen-hao was surely a clan relative to Zhu Hou-zhao , Emperor Wuzong of Ming .⁴³ According to the family hierarchy, Zhu Chen-hao was one of the grandfathers of Emperor Wuzong, though only 12 years older. These two descendants of Zhu Yuan-zhang , Ming Taizu , were black really sheep to the royal family. As Emperor, Zhu Hou-zhao ignored state affairs and day and night just spent time traveling, singing, dancing, catering (capering), cockfighting, running horses, hunting rabbits with hawks, mostly not staying inside the Forbidden City . While in Nanchang , Zhu Chen-hao yearned for Beijing . According to his wish, Zhu Chen-hao really wanted to be emperor. Since the emperor didn’t want to stay in Beijing , he would like to go there instead. So almost at the same time as Zhu Hou-zhao began to reign, Zhu Chen-hao started to plot how to take his place.

According to historical records, Zhu Chen-hao behaved frivolously, was good at indulging in empty talk, doing nothing practical, whitewashing, and boiling the ocean. Princes in accordance with regulations of the Ming dynasty enjoyed very honorable status, with ministers bowing down to worship them although they had no actual fiefs. Yet they had the right to control thousands of guard troops and to mobilize local troops although they had no local authority. During the Yingzong Period (1457–1464, the Zhengtong Emperor ), Zhu Dian-pei , Zhu Chen-hao’s grandfather, the Ning Wang of the time, broke the law and his garrison was removed. In other words, when Zhu Chen-hao became the Ning Wang, there was no garrison in the Chamber of Ning Wang . Zhu Chen-hao knew clearly that if he had no absolutely loyal troops, it was impossible for him to take the Emperor’s place. Thus, from 1507 (the second year of the Zhengde Emperor ), he left no stone unturned to restore the garrison system in the Chamber of Ning Wang .

As is well known, the eunuch Liu Jin manipulated the Imperial Court at that time. Therefore, Zhu Chen-hao managed to connect with Liu Jin and sent him 20,000 Chinese tael silver dollars. As he gained benefits from Zhu Chen-hao , Liu Jin arbitrarily delivered a false decree to restore the garrison and station farm systems in the Chamber of Ning Wang . Thereafter, Zhu Chen-hao began openly and unscrupulously to expand his own troops on a large scale, to encroach on the people’s properties, and to establish partisans. After Liu Jin was executed by Linchi, i.e., by a thousand cuts and into myriad pieces, Bing Bu ⁴⁴ decreed to dispose of the garrison in the Chamber of Ning Wang again. However, Zhu Chen-hao did not stop expanding his private troops but all the more paced up his preparation for his ambition by looting public wealth, encroaching private properties, plundering merchant ships, as well as collaborating with bandits looting around. Not only did local civilians suffer from him, but also local officials who did not obey him would be elbowed out or even be killed at will. Besides, he sent his trusted followers to Beijing , bribing big shots in the Imperial Court publicly with carts of silver. After receiving his considerable bribes, Lu Wan , the Shangshu ⁴⁵ of Bing Bu then put in a good word for him in any case. Qian Ning , Emperor Zhu Hou-zhao’s foster son, was also his key tempting target. With their urgent incitements, the garrison in the Chamber of Ning Wang was restored again in 1514 (the ninth year of the Zhengde Emperor ). With his increasingly explicit rebellion ambition, Zhu Chen-hao practically established another Imperial Court , where he referred to himself as monarch, his troops as emperor’s guards, and his orders as imperial edicts.

Since 1515 (the tenth year of the Zhengde Emperor ), Zhu Chen-hao publicly enlisted warriors into his troops, collaborated with bandit leaders like Ling Shiyi , Liu Niansi , and Lang Bing and Tu Bing from other places, sent people to Guangzhou to purchase ox leathers, made helmets and weapons, and produced French firecrackers which were the precursor of artillery, the most advanced weapon at that time. The Chamber of Ning Wang manufactured massive weapons day and night. After years of preparation, Zhu Chen-hao had a troop of hundreds of thousands of well-armed soldiers. Furthermore, he sent scouts into the Imperial Court in Beijing . If there was any news, he could receive the message within 10 days across ten thousand miles.

Besides, he associated with local scholars as his think tank for scheming and planning his armed rebellion. Here two figures should be mentioned, Liu Yang-zheng and Li Shi-shi. Liu was a local Juren ⁴⁶ in Jiangxi Province , renowned for his talents, especially for the art of war . When Zhu Chen-hao received Liu in the palace for the first time, Liu greeted him and praised him, remarking on his prominent look that could bring order out of chaos, and Liu also told Zhu about Zhao Kuang-yin’s ⁴⁷ story of being draped with the imperial yellow robe by supporters and then acclaimed emperor. Naturally, Zhu was delighted. The rebellion plot was made in their discussions. The other figure Li Shi-shi who was a Jinshi ⁴⁸ and You-Du-Yushi ,⁴⁹ famous for his poetry, calligraphy, and painting, also played a major role in Zhu’s rebellion plot.

Zhu so rampantly built up military forces that it was out of the question that the Imperial Court knew nothing about Zhu’s massive military expansion. The point is the Zhengde Emperor Zhu Hou-zhao , self-conceited and unable to distinguish right from wrong, ignored the Imperial Court affairs and Zhu Chen-hao’s deeds, while the latter was more insidious and apparently knew that the only way to achieve his dream of becoming Emperor was to deceive the Zhengde Emperor using anything he could to please the Emperor. For instance, Zhu Chen-hao knew that the Zhengde Emperor was noted for his playfulness and that he would spend tens of thousands of Chinese tael of silver decorating the Imperial Court with new-style lanterns and colored hangings for every Spring Festival. In January 1514 (the ninth year of the Zhengde Emperor ), Zhu Chen-hao , to please the emperor, particularly sent his men to the Imperial Court with various gorgeous lights to decorate the pillars of Qianqing Gong ⁵⁰ and with fireworks to decorate its eaves. Unexpectedly, the fireworks were lit up, and Qianqing Gong caught fire and then burnt to the ground. Ridiculously when the Emperor saw the fire in the Leopard House , he cheered, “What a fire!” What an absurd Emperor you see!

It was the Emperor’s absurdity and ignorance that not only made Zhu Chen-hao’s rebellion plot possible but also caused his plot to nearly to come true. From 1515 (the tenth year of the Zhengde Emperor ), upright officials continuously exposed Zhu Chen-hao’s rebellion scheme, but aroused no attention from the Imperial Court , and even got killed. In June 1519 (the fourteenth year of the Zhengde Emperor ), Yang Ting-he , the Da Xueshi ⁵¹ of the Cabinet, had ensured Zhu Chen-hao’s rebellion preparation so that the Imperial Court decided to remove Zhu’s garrison once again as a necessary move.

On June 13, it happened to be Zhu Chen-hao’s birthday and he was holding a grand banquet to treat the main local officials from various places of Jiangxi Province, when the Imperial Court sent officials to Nanchang to announce the edict of removing Zhu’s garrison. At the news, Zhu Chen-hao was astonished and conferred with Liu Yang-zheng for countermeasures. Liu said, “It comes down to the pivotal moment that the only way out is to rise up right now. Otherwise, without the garrison, your Majesty has no military troops to rely on.” Zhu Chen-hao asked how. Liu replied, “According to the routine practice, all the key officials in Jiangxi will come to celebrate your birthday tomorrow. We must take the opportunity to put them under house arrest, forcing them into obeying; otherwise they will be killed directly if they disobey you.” Zhu Chen-hao regarded it as a marvelous idea. On the second day, as expected, almost all the key officials came to the Chamber of Ning Wang to show their gratitude to Zhu for the invitation when they were suddenly besieged by Zhu’s soldiers. Zhu declared, “My guests! Our Emperor is so decadent, traveling around and ignoring the Imperial Court affairs. His reign is done! The Empress Dowager therefore gave me a secret imperial edict to start a military action, send troops to the Imperial Court , and supervise the Imperial Court. What is your attitude?” Upon this apparent revolt, most officials knew clearly what was going on, but they were forced to accept it noncommittally as they were trapped. However, there were few officials who were hard nuts and refused to surrender. Sun Sui was one of them. Sun Sui , a censor, was from Yuyao , a town fellow of Wang Yang-ming . Two years earlier, he had intended to expose Zhu’s rebellion seven times but all were hindered by powerful and treacherous Imperial Court officials. At this decisive moment, he stood up and questioned Zhu, “Where is the confidential edict? Show us!” Zhu replied, “Stop asking! What I want you to do is to give me a reply. Will you escort me to Nanjing ?” Sun broke out in curses and immediately was killed. And all other disobeying officials were arrested.

Zhu Chen-hao then declared an uprising right on the spot, abolished the Zhengde title of the emperor’s reign and appointed Li Shi-shi the Zuo-Chengxiang ,⁵² and Liu Yang-zheng the Right-Chengxiang .⁵³ He issued an official denunciation of Zhu Hou-zhao , gathered one hundred thousand soldiers, held an abrupt and massive attack at Jiujiang and Nankang , and occupied both. Meanwhile, he sent trusted followers to take over the seals of municipal governments in Jiangxi . As a result, the government work grounded to a complete halt in Jiangxi Province .

All the above happened the day before Wang Yang-ming arrived at Fengcheng County, so he naturally had no clue about the rebellion. The moment he got the news, he at once turned back to his ship and headed for Ji’an. He knew clearly that he could not mobilize troops in counties around Nanchan, which were now under Zhu Chen-hao’s control. It was Ganzhou that was his reliable base area for him to establish his counterinsurgency unit. Nearby, he thought of Wu Wen-ding , Zhifu ,⁵⁴ of Ji’an Prefecture whom he could trust because Wu had participated in the Hengshui and Tonggang Campaign . He hurried for Ji’an; however, his ship couldn’t move because of a strong south wind. It is well known that most Chinese rivers flow from west to east, but the Gan River flows from south to north into Poyang Lake .⁵⁵ Therefore, Wang had to head for Ji’an against the flow and the wind. The matter of fact was that the boat was immovable! It was a real emergency when Zhu’s scouts found Wang’s tracks and led thousands of soldiers to chase after Wang. At this critical moment, Wang burnt incense to pray to heaven, “May heaven bless the rain! Let there be a north wind! Let me quash the revolt!” According to historical records, the north wind, as he wished, started blowing at once. But the boatman, out of fear, dared not steer the boat. Out of anger and worry, Wang cut one ear off the boatman with his sword. Then the boat finally went. The big sailing boat went slowly against the currents. Wang could see Zhu’s soldiers chasing after and hear their drums beating aloud. An idea came to him that he should exchange his official attire with the ones of his followers. So he wore plain clothes, found a small boat and fled away with his adviser Lei Ji in the darkness.

What should be mentioned is that Wang Yang-ming had intended to go to Fuzhou as his original destination with his wife Mrs. Zhu, and his foster son Wang Zheng-xian . Now when he was dropped off by Nanchang , Wang, in a fisherman’s disguise, had to leave them to escape from Zhu’s chase. He worried about their safety and felt hesitant when Mrs. Zhu came to the fore of the boat, sword in hand, and said to Wang, “Don’t worry about us. If Zhu Chen-hao’s men catch up, I will defend with this.” How many heroes and heroines the region south of the Yangtze River has bred since ancient times! Even today we can still be deeply moved by Mrs. Zhu’s heroic act.

Zhu Chen-hao’s soldiers chased up and boarded the boat, only to find that an official sitting in the middle was not Wang Yang-ming . Out of rage the soldiers raised their knives but did not strike down as a voice was heard nearby, “What is the use of killing this man?” Luckily the man saved his life. As Zhu Chen-hao’s soldiers wasted some time on the sailboat, Wang finally had time to escape their chase.

According to the situation at that time, Zhu Chen-hao would do well to steer his fleet east on the Yangtze River and conquer Nanjing City immediately after occupying Jiujiang and Nankang . Due to his sudden revolt, Nanjing might not be prepared. Had he occupied Nanjing City, he would have the leverage to challenge Beijing’s Imperial Court . Actually, Zhu Chen-hao had already thought of this move. But why couldn’t he realize this step?

It turned out that Wang consulted Lei Ji , his adviser, for the solution after he threw off Zhu Chen-hao’s chase. Wang, an experienced and wise military leader, figured out that Zhu Chen-hao had only three ways to go after the revolt which was not yet known in Nanjing or Beijing. The best way for him was to steer his troops north and occupy Beijing directly. The second-best way was to occupy Nanjing City as the base area to challenge Beijing’s Imperial Court . The worst way was only to occupy Nanchang , which would incur disasters for the people in Jiangxi Province . Obviously, Zhu’s worst way was Wang’s best. Thus, Wang’s priority was to hold back and keep Zhu’s troops from leaving Jiangxi to pose a direct threat to Beijing or Nanjing . Then how to stop Zhu? Wang worked out the strategy of sowing discord among the enemy. He, in the name of Yang Dan , the provincial commander-in-chief and the Du-Yushi of Military Affairs of the Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces , falsified a confidential letter which said Yang Dan carried out a confidential task in Jiangxi with 480,000 odd soldiers. Those municipal governments that received the letter should prepare for army provisions or receive military punishment. Besides this, it mentioned that the Imperial Court , aware of the ambition of the Ning Wang revolt, mobilized imperial armies to ambush the Ning Wang, ready for a final attack. Yang Dan’s troops were to cooperate with the imperial armies.

Wang Yang-ming forged this “confidential letter” and showed it to Lei Ji , who smiled, “It sounds real, but I’m afraid the Ning Wang will not believe it.” Wang replied, “he will feel unsure and hesitant, and then reluctant to make the next move.” Lei agreed with Wang’s opinion and added, “It is certain that Zhu Chen-hao will suspect its truth upon reading the letter.” Then Wang replied, “It is not that important whether Zhu believes the letter or not but it is important to make him doubt. Only if he doubts, his momentum is gone!”

But how to have Zhu receive the letter without revealing any flaw? Wang and Lei played a trick promising to pay a couple of yourens ⁵⁶ hundreds of Chinese tael and to make arrangements for their families whatever the outcome, and asking the yourens to disguise themselves as messengers. Meanwhile, Lei seized Li Shi-shi’s family members, tied them up in the stern of the boat and intentionally allowed them to see the confidential letters being stitched into those messengers’ clothes. After the confidential letters were stitched in, Wang played the trick as if he just happened to be there and flew into rage, shouting to Lei, “It’s top secret. How could you reveal it to them! I had to organize them.” Then, he pushed Li Shi-shi’s family members on shore and made as if to kill them with sword in hand, but sighed, “Heaven will punish the Ning Wang for his revolt. But it’s unnecessary to kill you innocent people. Only if you keep it secret, I will set you free.” After he released them, undoubtedly Zhu Chen-hao got this “confidential message.” Zhu seized those yourens and indeed found the confidential letters stitched in their clothing. He hesitated and canceled his plan to attack Nanjing , just biding his time.

Wu Wen-ding , Zhifu ⁵⁷ of Ji’an, as well as the local soldiers and civilians, exulted at Wang Yang-ming’s arrival on June 18. The moment he reached Ji’an , Wang Yang-ming wrote to the Imperial Court the document, Quick Report on Ning Wang’s Revolt ,⁵⁸ and sent the message to the Emperor, hoping that the Imperial Court would dispatch troops to quash the revolt. Meanwhile, he took advantage of his power as the Junwu of four provincial military affairs and issued a decree to Hu Guang, Canton , Fu Jian Provinces, ordering them to reinforce Jiangxi Province to counter the insurgency. He set up in Ganzhou , Jiangxi, and commanded all cities and counties in Jiangxi Province to summon troops at his disposal.

At that time, Wang Yang-ming, without a single soldier at hand, realized that only by using his trick of sowing discord among the enemy could he stop the Ning Wang for a while. To further confuse so as to gain time for his own troops, Wang Yang-ming again employed the same trick, but this time he wrote another confidential letter of welcome to the imperial armies in his own name. It read that following the imperial edict, the Bing Bu ⁵⁹ had promptly dispatched troops for Jiangxi to surround and suppress the Ning Wang. Eunuch Xu Tai led 40 thousand border soldiers, headed for Nanchang by land via Fengyang ⁶⁰; 40 thousand soldiers from the Beijing area would advance to Nanchang both by water and land via Xuzhou⁶¹ and Huai’an ⁶²; over 480 thousand soldiers were gathered in the Guangxi and Guangdong Provinces , among which over 80 thousand vanguards had already arrived at Ganzhou ; over 200 thousand soldiers were gathered in Huguang Province, among which over 60 thousand vanguards had already arrived at Huangzhou ⁶³; Wang Yang-ming himself gathered over 100 thousand soldiers, among which over 20 thousand vanguards had already stationed at Ji’an. When all these troops reached the planned spots, they would altogether attack and destroy Nanchang. With the same function as the previous false message this letter was obviously to keep Zhu inside Jiangxi , so it also mentioned if Zhu Chen-hao held fast to Nanchang, all government armies could only bide their time due to inappropriate time and place. On the contrary, once Zhu left Nanchang , or even Jiangxi, he would be besieged and squashed by the imperial forces. Besides, the letter mentioned that the Ning Wang’s advisers Li Shi-shi , Liu Yang-zheng , Ling Shiyi , and Liu Niansi all sent Wang Yang-ming confidential letters that they would change their positions in the war. Therefore, utterly isolated, Zhu’s days were numbered! Intendedly, Wang let Zhu’s scouts seize Wang’s messengers who carried this letter. In addition, Wang assigned his followers to copy the letter and post them up in the area, including at fork roads and roads haunted Zhu’s troops, to agitate Zhu’s soldiers into surrender.

Let’s review the series of tactics Wang employed in the battles. In today’s terms, he actually fought the intelligence war or the information war by using these tactics like false information, discord between enemies, and so on, in order to deceive enemies by mixing the false information with the genuine, spreading misleading news, and creating confusion in the enemy camp. At that time, he did not have a single soldier in his control, but all these tactics helped him achieve his goal as if he fought the enemy with heavy arms. These tactics did work for the following reasons. Firstly, the series of false intelligence made Zhu suspicious, hesitant, and sticking to Nanchang , with no further move toward Nanjing , which gained enough time for Wang to gather troops. Secondly, these false documents alienated Zhu’s core strength, including Zhu, his counselors Li Shi-shi and Liu Yang-zheng , and his generals Li Shiyi and Liu Niansi , broke their close relationships, aroused discord, suspicion, and distrust among them, and finally contributed to a death blow to Zhu’s military bloc. Thirdly, those thousands of posts calling on enemy to surrender disintegrated the morale of Zhu’s armies, seriously damping their combat effectiveness. No doubt these tactics are now deemed as the key factors to Wang’s military victory in the battle of suppressing Zhu Chen-hao’s rebellion because it was Wang Yang-ming’s false information that hindered Zhu from leaving Nanchang , and thus winning time for Wang’s military action and counterattack. In the Art of War , there is a saying about “subduing the enemy without fighting.” At the beginning of this battle, Wang did defeat the enemy without combat, which reflected Wang’s great military wisdom.

On the other hand, Wang surely knew that he only performed “The Stratagem of the Empty City ,” presenting a bold front to conceal a weak defense and that the only way to quash Zhu’s troops was an actual military strike. That was why he was very upset when no troops responded to his call or came to the rescue. Meanwhile, on the enemy’s side, after Zhu received the report from the scouts, only to find out that there were no imperial troops in Jiangxi by July 2, he realized that he was fooled by Wang. Then Zhu left behind over 10,000 soldiers in Nanchang , led in person 60,000 soldiers (claimed to be 100,000 soldiers) headed for Anqing to surround it, from Poyang Lake , via Jiujiang . Zhu clearly attempted to take over Anqing as the major fortress between Nanchang and Nanjing , and then to occupy Nanjing and ascend the throne there to rival the Emperor in Beijing’s Imperial Court . Heart torn with anxiety upon such news, Wang realized that it was urgent at that moment and that it was extremely hard to prevent Zhu from taking over Nanjing once Anqing was overcome.

However, still without a single soldier at hand, how could Wang Yang-ming withstand Zhu Chen-hao’s hundreds of thousands of chosen soldiers and eventually win the victory of the counterinsurgency?

(Translated by Lin Jing-jing; Proofread by Shi Ya-fang)

4.5 Capturing Zhu Chen-Hao Alive

Knowing that Zhu Chen-hao , with heavily armed soldiers, had left Poyang Lake for Anqing , Wang Yang-ming was extremely worried. He was fully aware that Nanjing would be in imminent danger and the situation would become more complicated if Anqing were to be taken over. Without a single soldier under his command, what could he do? One cannot make bricks without clay. Once again, Wang was forced to turn to the neighboring provinces for support. In a serious and sincere tone, he appealed to the neighboring provinces to work together for the common good of all and to protect the emperor with armed forces. In the meantime, he issued an irrevocable order to all the counties and prefectures within Jiangxi Province , demanding that a specified number of troops be summoned up right away. These soldiers were to assemble at Zhangshu Town in Linjiang Prefecture ⁶⁴ on July 15. Accompanied by Zhifu Wu Wen-ding ,⁶⁵ Wang led an army from Ji’an Prefecture and marched directly to Zhangshu .

The troops, led by officials including Zhifus , Zhixians , Tongpans ,⁶⁶ and commanders, rushed from all directions to Zhangshu on July 15 as expected. On July 18, after a short rest, Wang and his army pledged to fight until they were victorious. The whole army marched north under Wang’s leadership and was stationed in Fengcheng County outside Nanchang . On July 16, Zhu launched a joint attack against Anqing but met with stout resistance from the opposing soldiers located there. After the first round of attack, Anqing was at stake. Given the current military situation, the top priority would be to break the siege of Anqing launched by Zhu. At this critical moment, Wang held a military meeting with his officers. At the meeting, many officers suggested that an army should be dispatched immediately to support Anqing . If Anqing was taken down, the situation would get much worse. However, according to Wang, though the top priority was to come to the rescue of Anqing, sending reinforcements was not the best solution. In his view, Nankang and Jiujiang , both set with Zhu’s soldiers, had already become enemy territories. Zhu also had his crack troops stationed in Nanchang , with over 10,000 soldiers. Reinforcing Anqing would lead to an unfavorable situation. Zhu would turn around and make a frontal attack against the imperial reinforcements. At the same time, the armies in Jiujiang, Nankang , and Nanchang would go all out and attack them from behind. If it happened, Wang’s army would get stuck in the middle of a double siege. Although sending reinforcements could temporarily save Anqing, the soldiers there were too tired to be backups. Given these circumstances, the imperial army would be left fighting alone. Taking all the factors into consideration, Wang Yang-ming made a bold decision to attack and take over Nanchang . In Wang’s opinion, Zhu’s crack troops in Nanchang were rebels and did not have an advantage in terms of the number of soldiers. As rebels, they were morally doomed to fail. The “defending army” led by Wang, though assembled hastily, represented justice and possessed the moral advantages. If they got everything ready before the attack, it was possible for them to occupy Nanchang . Once Nanchang was occupied, Zhu would lose his most important base. Thus, it could not only keep Anqing out of danger, but also hold Zhu in check. Zhu would not dare to attack Nanjing rashly. After an agreement was reached at the meeting, Wang carefully deployed troops for the military attack on Nanchang. He divided the hastily assembled troops into 13 divisions, each with its own specific tasks and marching routes encircling Nanchang .

After the military deployment, Wang issued official notices to all the residents of Nanchang, including the garrisoned soldiers and Zhu’s family members. These notices said that Zhu Chen-hao’s rebellion was against the will of heaven, and that the local residents should keep on with their routine life without panic. Now an army totaling 200,000 soldiers under Wang’s command was ready to attack Nanchang . In response to that, all the people of Zhu’s house were supposed to open the door and yield, all the soldiers guarding Nanchang to give up resistance and surrender, and all the rebellious officials to welcome the arrival of the imperial army and help console the civilians. Those who resisted without repentance would surely meet their death. Creating fear among Zhu’s people, these official notices did contribute to the attack on Nanchang .

Wang and his army pledged to fight until victory while waiting in Shicha ⁶⁷ on July 19. In the meantime, a strict military order was issued demanding that soldiers proceed in a unified manner. After the first round of drums, the soldiers were required to approach the city of Nanchang. After the second round of drums, the soldiers were required to climb up the city walls of Nanchang . After the third round of drums, if Nanchang was not conquered, the Wuzhang ⁶⁸ would be punished by death. After the fourth round of drums, generals would be punished by death if Nanchang was not conquered. On that night, the 13 divisions left Shicha and headed for their respective charging positions. The next morning at dawn, they launched a joint attack on Nanchang.

The attack on Nanchang went quite smoothly. Although Zhu’s soldiers put up fierce resistance, they eventually failed to withhold Wang’s massive military charge. The official notices made by Wang contributed to the disintegration of Zhu’s soldiers’ morale. Zhu’s soldiers fell apart the moment they encountered Wang’s divisions head-on. When those at Zhu’s residence learned that Nanchang had fallen into the hands of Wang’s troops, they were so shocked and frightened that they felt they had no choice but to burn themselves. The fire spread so quickly that the neighboring civilian houses were also ablaze. Wang asked his soldiers to put out the fire immediately to placate the residents of Nanchang . He also made a series of post-war arrangements to console civilians, such as cleaning up the war fields, and sealing off Zhu’s residence and his storehouses. Wang also issued an order that coffins be bought for those who were burned at Zhu’s residence and that funerals be held according to the local rituals and customs. Other arrangements were carried out in an orderly way.

As for Zhu Chen-hao , in those days he was anxious about his continual failed attempts to surround and annihilate Anqing . On July 18, the day right before Wang took an oath in Shicha , Fengcheng County , a message arrived from Nanchang requesting the need for imminent support from his army. Wang had assembled his army in Fengcheng and was preparing to attack Nanchang. Fear welled up inside Zhu and prompted him to withdraw the siege of Anqing in order to support Nanchang . Knowing Zhu’s intention, his military adviser Li Shi-shi discouraged him from withdrawing, “The current priority is Nanjing instead of Nanchang. We can take this opportunity to go east along the Yangtze River and occupy Nanjing as soon as possible. As long as you ascend the throne, Nanchang will inevitably submit to your rule.” However, instead of taking Li’s advice, Zhu first dispatched an advanced detachment of 20,000 soldiers to come to the rescue of Nanchang, and then he directed the rest of his army to March toward Nanchang .

Wang was informed of Zhu’s withdrawal on July 22. With an army of twenty to thirty thousand soldiers in total, Wang neither had any support of soldiers from the neighboring provinces nor from the Imperial Court . Confronted with Zhu’s reinforcement to Nanchang , serious understaffing of soldiers would become a critical issue for Wang. Many of Wang’s military officers suggested that the best policy should be to defend Nanchang all out, expecting the arrival of reinforcements. Otherwise, it would be hard for Wang to fight alone against Zhu’s 100,000 crack troops. At this time, there was a military setback that caused Wang to almost kill his chief commander Wu Wen-ding .

It turned out that Zhu’s advanced detachment totaling 20,000 soldiers marched hastily day and night in order to support Nanchang . Attempting a sneak attack against Wang, a division of 1000 soldiers took a shortcut to access Nanchang. Simultaneously, Wang also detached a division of 500 soldiers under the command of Magistrate Wu to challenge Zhu’s division halfway and block them. Both sides had an unexpected and fierce encounter halfway, with Wu ending up defeated. Hearing about the defeat, Wang got irritated and blamed his chief commanders for being unable to carry out his military tactics, believing them to be too attached to their own viewpoints. He intended to punish Wu and others “according to military rules.” On second thought, however, as he needed all the military talents he could get, it would be better to be lenient and monitor their future behavior. This small setback had some impact on the mood of the chief commanders who were in favor of defending Nanchang .

Nevertheless, Wang firmly believed that it was not the best policy to risk annihilation by holding Nanchang in defense. In his view, although the disadvantage was obvious in terms of the number of soldiers he had, knowing how to mobilize soldiers was more important than simply having an advantage in numbers. In Wang’s view, he had at least two advantages. First, morally speaking, Zhu and his soldiers were uneasy rebels while Wang’s army meant to be an army of justice with high morale, which was a prerequisite for victory. Second, it was predictable that Zhu became irritable upon hearing Nanchang , once his own base, had been taken. After marching all the way from Anqing , his troops were both arrogant and sluggish. Although they were large in number, their fighting capacity seemed inadequate. Wang concluded, “Zhu Chen-hao’s idea was probably the same as yours, maintaining that we can only hold Nanchang in defense. If we take the initiative to attack them instead of defending Nanchang , we will surprise Zhu and be victorious by undertaking the unexpected.” Wang helped his chief commanders reach consensus and emphasized once again the strict military disciplines, followed by a detailed military deployment to block Zhu’s troops on Poyang Lake .

According to his deployment, a small division totaling 400 soldiers would go back and forth on Poyang Lake to deceive and ambush Zhu’s troops, making full use of reed marshes as cover. Frontal, side, and rear attacks would be deployed and undertaken by different divisions. As soon as the deceiving soldiers led Zhu’s troop into the encirclement, the frontal attack would be launched, followed by side and rear attacks.

On July 23, Zhu’s advanced detachment arrived in Qiaoshe .⁶⁹ It was quite a view with numerous ships lining the river for several kilometers. On July 24 at dawn, Zhu’s arrogant troops were in full sail, approaching Wangjiadu along Gan River . Wu Wending, Ji’an Zhifu , launched a frontal attack first and then pretended to be defeated. This served as bait to mislead Zhu’s troops to go further. Seeing that Wu and his soldiers were defeated, Zhu’s troops raced to chase them. Thus, the soldiers at the front could not shield those at the back. At this moment, Wang ordered the divisions to attack Zhu’s troops from all directions all at once. Wang’s soldiers ambushed them on a large scale, shouting loudly. Wu turned around to join the fight against Zhu’s terrified troops. Over 2000 soldiers were killed and tens of thousands of soldiers drowned. The battle added to Zhu’s terror, and he had no choice but to withdraw. In the meantime, Zhu mobilized troops stationed in Jiujiang and Nankang to help make up for his loss of soldiers.

As soon as Wang knew that the soldiers guarding Jiujiang and Nankang were redeployed out of town, he detached troops immediately that night. The quick reoccupation of Jiujiang and Nankang by Wang’s army cleared the way for their final decisive battle with Zhu.

Zhu launched a massive attack on the following day (July 25). At first, affected by unfavorable wind, Wang’s troops had to withdraw, with a loss of several dozen soldiers. Seeing that, Wang immediately issued an order that all soldiers should withstand the attack without backing off. Those who did were beheaded. Wu, Zhifu of Ji’an , dared not back off a little bit. Standing on the prow of the warship beside the cannons, with his hair and beard burnt by the artillery fire from Zhu’s troops, he summoned his courage and commanded his soldiers to charge and fight desperately. Suddenly a piece of white cloth rose from the command ship where Wang stayed, and written on it was, “The Ning Wang has been taken! Stop the large-scale killing!” which sent out a message that Zhu had been captured and that there was no need to kill his soldiers excessively. On hearing it, Zhu’s soldiers were shocked and flew into a panic. Suspicious and confused, they had no desire to continue fighting. Zhifu Wu took this opportunity to order his soldiers to advance. Zhu’s army was defeated and Zhu had to withdraw after his warship got hit by Wang’s artillery fire. After retreating to Qiaoshe , Zhu ordered that all the warships be connected to one another to form a square pattern, getting ready for a battle the following day.

On July 26, after a fierce struggle with Zhu and his army at Poyang Lake , Wang eventually captured Zhu alive. In the end, it all went more smoothly than expected. As soon as Wang knew that Zhu had connected all his warships together, he decided to attack the enemy with fire. With several warships connected to one another as a whole, no single ship could move freely or quickly. If one warship caught fire, those connected to it could not escape. Wang asked Wu to prepare tools for the fire attack that very night and reassigned the operation tasks to all the divisions involved. The minute the battle began, “fire arrows” were shot toward Zhu’s warships like rainfall. Under the heavy fire attack, Zhu’s ships were in such confusion that they could not strike back. One of the ships among Zhu’s ship assemblage suddenly caught fire, and all those on board tried in vain to escape. Among them were Zhu’s concubines and maids. Shouting and crying loudly, they had no choice but to jump into water.

Having realized that nothing could be done about the situation, Zhu tried to escape by disguising himself as a fisherman. He looked around in panic and happened to see a fishing boat in the reed marsh by the lake. He hastily gestured the fisherman on the boat to come over. Without any hesitation, Zhu got aboard the boat and asked the fisherman to go immediately. The fisherman rowed quickly, heading for Wang’s commanding ship. It turned out that this trick had been arranged by Wang beforehand. After the capture of Zhu, all his commanders and chief officers, including Li Shi-shi and Liu Yang-zheng , were captured alive. Meanwhile, Wang gave orders that any of Zhu’s escaping soldiers should be captured. By July 28, Zhu’s remaining troops had been eliminated, marking victory in the suppression of rebellion.

With his hands tied behind his back, Zhu was sent under escort to see Wang. Upon seeing Wang from afar, he yelled at him, “Mr. Wang, would it be enough if I dismiss all my guards and reduce myself to a plebeian?” Wang replied, “You are subject to the state law.” It was obvious that Zhu, though a captive, still behaved with arrogance. When Zhu entered Nanchang under escort, he noticed that Wang’s soldiers looked orderly and powerful. Zhu laughed at Wang, saying, “Mr. Wang, I rebel for personal reasons. Why did you bother to fight with me?” In the end, Zhu said to Wang in a sincere tone, “Mr. Wang, could you please do me a favor? My concubine Ms. Lou was a virtuous woman, who, from the very beginning, tried in vain to persuade me to give up. I regret not taking her advice. Now that she drowned herself, I wish you could help bury her in a decent way. In ancient times, the tragedy of King Zhou of Shang resulted from listening to his consort Daji . In contrast, my tragic ending was the result of failing to take my concubine’s advice. It’s too late for me to regret now!” From this, it was clear that Zhu still had a sense of conscience.

Zhu’s concubine, Ms. Lou , was the daughter of a well-known scholar, Lou Liang .⁷⁰ She was virtuous, respectful, and educated, and had attempted to dissuade Zhu from rebelling from the very beginning. Thirty years earlier, after Wang got married in Nanchang , he and his new wife dropped by Shangrao ⁷¹ and paid a visit to Lou Liang on their way to his hometown Yuyao . Wang had a discussion with Lou Liang about Zhu Xi’s theory of “Gewu Zhizhi .” According to the old customs, Lou Liang might be viewed as one of Wang’s teachers. On hearing that Concubine Lou drowned herself, Wang sent people to search for her body in the lake. When her body was found, they discovered that she had tied herself tightly with paper strings all over her body before drowning to keep her clothes tidy. Wang was saddened by her death and asked his soldiers to bury her by keeping to the local protocol.

Zhu’s rebellion was one of the important political events that shocked the Imperial Court . Thanks to Wang’s great strategy, the rebellion was quickly suppressed. The rebellion lasted only for 41 days, starting from Zhu’s rise in arms on June 14 and ending with Zhu’s capture on July 26. It only took about 1 week, starting on July 20 for Wang to launch an attack on Nanchang and capture Zhu. It took less than 10 days to bring an end to the battle by capturing all of Zhu’s forces on July 28.

One thing worth mentioning is that throughout the whole military operations, Wang relied on twenty to thirty thousand commoners assembled in Jiangxi Province . In his own words, “an army with a total number of twenty to thirty thousand disorderly people defeated a strong army of one hundred thousand soldiers,” which indeed proved to be a military miracle.

For more than 40 days, Wang and his soldiers were fighting alone, without any support from the Imperial Court or the neighboring provinces. Fujian was the only province responding to his request for support. However, when the reinforcement from Fujian finally arrived, the battle had already come to an end. Wang rewarded the officials and soldiers from Fujian according to the usual practice, and made subsequent arrangements for them to go back.

At the time when Zhu rebelled against the Imperial Court , Wang just happened to be passing by the province. Without any military order, the so-called “Imperial Order,” he could have played it safe by turning a blind eye to what was going on. However, this was not his character. As mentioned many times, Wang was both an advocate for and a practitioner of “The Oneness of Knowing and Doing ,” who took every opportunity to put his own thoughts, ideas, and knowledge into practice. Being an ambitious and noble man, he would not sit by and tolerate Zhu’s rebellion. With his brilliant military wisdom and great strategic skills, he stepped forward bravely to suppress the rebellion and saved the Ming dynasty at the critical moment. He once called himself a “paralyzed wreck,” but this “paralyzed wreck” made vigorous efforts to turn the tide and saved the future of the Ming dynasty.

Wang submitted to the Imperial Court a formal report entitled “Victory Report on Capturing Zhu Chen-hao ,” describing the suppression of the rebellion in great detail. What was more, he also submitted to the Imperial Court a list of people worthy of merit for recognition. He arranged a messenger to deliver the “Victory Report” to the Imperial Court promptly.

After the “Victory Report ” was presented to the Imperial Court, Wang set about routine post-war affairs, such as consoling the civilians, dismissing the troops, and bringing life in Nanchang back to normal. In the meantime, he saw to it that all the captives were identified and their personal information recorded, prior to being imprisoned. After that, a roll of the captives was submitted to the Imperial Court .

It was at this very moment that a shocking message from the Imperial Court arrived. Emperor Zhu Hou-zhao had decided to “lead the military operation in person” on Zhu Chen-hao , although the latter was already captured. As was widely known, it was on July 26 that Zhu was captured in the battle on Poyang Lake , and it was on July 28 that Zhu’s remaining troops were eliminated and the battle came to an end. On July 30, Wang had sent an express messenger to deliver the “Victory Report on Capturing Zhu Chen-hao ” to the Imperial Court . It was not until early August that the Zhengde Emperor called a meeting of the Bing Bu , negotiating a “Strategy on Suppressing Zhu Chen-hao .” He issued an imperial decree to the Bing Bu, stating, “In reference to the priority case of the Ning Wang in Jiangxi plotting an uprising, your Ministry has agreed to exterminate the rebels. I myself shall lead the imperial army to go on a punitive expedition. No appointment of a commander-in-chief is needed.” That is to say, Zhu Chen-hao , the Ning Wang , was so abhorrent in plotting an uprising that the Bing Bu decided to suppress the rebels after negotiating with officials at a meeting. I will personally lead an imperial army to exterminate the rebels. Such being the case, it is unnecessary to appoint a commander-in-chief for this purpose. The emperor, self-entitled “The Mighty Punitive Expedition General Zhenguogong ,” led an imperial army of over 10,000 soldiers and left Beijing for the South. He ordered that Eunuch Zhang Yong , Eunuch Zhang Zhong and Xu Tai , a frontier commander, go with him.

When the emperor and his army reached Liangxiang (today’s Fangshan District in Beijing), the Memo on the Capture of Zhu Chen-hao from Wang had arrived. Now that Zhu was captured alive and the anti-rebellion battle was over, it seemed unnecessary and ridiculous for the emperor to go on the punitive expedition in person. However, the emperor maintained a lofty stance by announcing the victory to the public. He could have abandoned the punitive expedition and returned to Beijing . However, being an emperor, Zhu Hou-zhao believed that it was a rare opportunity for him to lead the punitive expedition in person, and he could not give up halfway. Instead, he continued his punitive expedition for the pretentious reasons that “although the head of the rebellion was captured, his remaining troops were yet to be eliminated. If not, they would bring dire consequences.” That is to say, even though Zhu was captured, his influence was still out there. If they were not wiped out, endless troubles would follow. In this way, the emperor justified his punitive expedition.

Undoubtedly, Emperor Zhu Hou-zhao’s behavior was absurd. As a matter of fact, it was the absurdity of the emperor that resulted in a series of dangerous political situations in the following days. It also put Wang Yang-ming in a series of tough situations. Why did Emperor Zhu Hou-zhao insist on “leading the punitive expedition in person?” How did it put Wang Yang-ming in tough situations? What did he do to address them?

(Translated by Zhang Ping; Proofread by Lu Rui-rong)