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A Multi-location Defence Scheme Against SSDP Reflection Attacks in the Internet of Things

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Cyberspace Data and Intelligence, and Cyber-Living, Syndrome, and Health (CyberDI 2019, CyberLife 2019)


The proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) has led to a rapid increase in SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol) reflection attacks. However, there is very scarce work on defending these attacks, with only some engineering advices on shutting down attacked services. This paper proposes a comprehensive approach to defend SSDP reflection attacks, which is called multi-location defence scheme (MLDS). MLDS operates at multiple places, working throughout the attacking link, starting from attack sources to victims, without prior detecting attacks. Attackers usually utilized bots in a botnet to launch attacks, but bots can act as defenders to carry out defence strategies in our MLDS, which is an unconventional approach to make the defence effective. Finally, we analyzed thoroughly packet traffic situations when deploying MLDS to different defence locations.

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This work is supported by the Key Research Program of Shandong Province (No. 2017GGX10140), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (19CX05027B, 19CX05003A-11) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (61702399, 61772291, 61972215).

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Correspondence to Xin Liu .

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Liu, X. et al. (2019). A Multi-location Defence Scheme Against SSDP Reflection Attacks in the Internet of Things. In: Ning, H. (eds) Cyberspace Data and Intelligence, and Cyber-Living, Syndrome, and Health. CyberDI CyberLife 2019 2019. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1137. Springer, Singapore.

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  • Print ISBN: 978-981-15-1921-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-15-1922-2

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