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Symmetric Lattice-Based PAKE from Approximate Smooth Projective Hash Function and Reconciliation Mechanism

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Frontiers in Cyber Security (FCS 2019)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 1105))

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Abstract

Password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols allow two users who share only a short, low-entropy password to establish a consistent cryptographically strong session key. In 2009, Katz and Vaikuntanathan gave the first lattice-base PAKE from approximate smooth projective hash function (ASPHF) which is a variant of smooth projective hash function (SHPF). In 2017, Zhang and Yu introduced a two-round PAKE based on splittable PKEs. An error-correcting code (ECC) was used in these protocols to deal with the errors intrinsically in learning with errors (LWE) assumption, and the protocol is asymmetric as the session key is decided be just one user. In this paper, an error correcting technique called reconciliation mechanism, which was first introduced to construct a key exchange protocol from lattice, is adopted to construct more efficient lattice-based PAKEs with reduced computation complexity and communication complexity. Moreover, the new PAKEs are symmetric.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The additions in this paper are performed in \(\mathbb Z_q\).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Key Laboratory of Electromagnetic Space Information, Chinese Academy of Sciences, School of Information Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, 230027, China

    Zilong Wang, Honggang Hu, Mengce Zheng & Jiehui Nan

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  1. Zilong Wang
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  2. Honggang Hu
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  3. Mengce Zheng
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  4. Jiehui Nan
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Correspondence to Zilong Wang or Honggang Hu .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Xidian University, Xi’an, China

    Bazhong Shen

  2. Xidian University, Xi’an, China

    Baocang Wang

  3. Queen's University Belfast, Belfast, UK

    Jinguang Han

  4. Shaanxi Normal University, Xi'an, China

    Yong Yu

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Wang, Z., Hu, H., Zheng, M., Nan, J. (2019). Symmetric Lattice-Based PAKE from Approximate Smooth Projective Hash Function and Reconciliation Mechanism. In: Shen, B., Wang, B., Han, J., Yu, Y. (eds) Frontiers in Cyber Security. FCS 2019. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 1105. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0818-9_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0818-9_7

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