Abstract
Although it is extremely difficult to define its scope as its boundaries are fuzzy, and to measure corruption since only those convicted are figured in statistics, which may or may not be reflected in perceptions that are themselves subjective, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) constructed by Transparency International ranked China as the 79th most corrupt nation among 175 countries in 2016.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
The State Administration of Taxation (SAT) is responsible for the collection of corporate tax of central-SOEs. Local governments are responsible for collecting the corporate tax from local SOEs and all other non-SOEs, and then transfer the 60% revenue collected to the central government.
- 3.
The CSMAR database is developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Corporation Limited. Co., Ltd., and designed by the China Accounting and Finance Research Centre of the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
- 4.
Theoretically, the conviction rate and the number of registered cases of corruption are different. But in China, they tend to be highly correlated, even not identical. Generally, in most cases in China, suspect officials are first investigated by the discipline inspection commission of the Chinese Communist Party and its local branches. Only after they have obtained enough evidence, the discipline inspection commission and its local branches will refer corrupt cases to the procuratorates, then the procuratorates will register the cases. Moreover, in China, the courts and the procuratorates are both controlled by the government. Thus, except in a few very limited circumstances, the courts will not reject public prosecutions against corrupt cases.
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Zhang, C., Rasiah, R., Cheong, K.C. (2019). Corruption, Institutions, and Markets. In: Governing Corporate Tax Management. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9829-2_5
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