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Network Theory and Agent-Based Modeling in Economics and Finance pp 429–458Cite as

Network Games: The Cooperative Approach

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Abstract

We survey the recent developments in network games under cooperative framework. Network structures are important in describing and analysing social and economic phenomena through which people interact with each other and are influenced by their peers. Game theory has been successfully applied as a tool for such descriptions and analysis. The corresponding games are called network games. Situations, where people cooperate under binding agreements, are best modelled by cooperative games. One of the primary concerns in the field of social and economic network theory is to design networks on the basis of such binding agreements among the interacting agents. Bi-cooperative games are a special class of cooperative games where people can choose to support or oppose an issue or remain indifferent while making binding agreements. Bi-cooperative network games are network games where agents can make positive or negative links or remain isolated based on their choices of supporting or opposing the issue. We primarily focus on both standard and non-trivial solution concepts of network games under cooperative and bi-cooperative set ups and highlight the recent applications of the theory in dealing with socio-economic issues.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The value proposed by Labreuche and Grabisch (2008) is named as the LG value by Borkotokey and Gogoi (2014), Borkotokey et al. (2018) to distinguish it from the original Shapley value of TU games.

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Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge the financial support from the UKIERI grant [184-15/2017(IC)].

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Dibrugarh University, Assam, India

    Surajit Borkotokey

  2. Department of Mathematical Sciences, Tezpur University, Assam, India

    Loyimee Gogoi

  3. Economics Group, Queen’s Management School, Queen’s University, Belfast, UK

    Rajnish Kumar

Authors
  1. Surajit Borkotokey
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  2. Loyimee Gogoi
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  3. Rajnish Kumar
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Surajit Borkotokey .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Ahmedabad, Gujarat, India

    Anindya S. Chakrabarti

  2. College of Liberal Arts, International Christian University, Tokyo, Japan

    Lukáš Pichl

  3. Division of Social Sciences, International Christian University, Mitaka, Tokyo, Japan

    Taisei Kaizoji

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Borkotokey, S., Gogoi, L., Kumar, R. (2019). Network Games: The Cooperative Approach. In: Chakrabarti, A., Pichl, L., Kaizoji, T. (eds) Network Theory and Agent-Based Modeling in Economics and Finance. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8319-9_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8319-9_21

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