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Optimal Cooperation of Medical Care and Nursing Care in a Two-Region Spatial Model

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Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of the optimal cooperation of medical care service and nursing care service under two regions with an asymmetric density of patients. We apply Aiura and Sanjo (2010) by introducing cooperation between hospitals and nursing care facilities and analyze the effects of cooperation on the equilibrium medical service level, nursing care service level, optimal medical and nursing care fee, and social welfare. Results of the analysis show that the introduction of cooperation between hospitals and nursing care facilities increases social welfare, although it decreases the medical care service and nursing care service level in equilibrium.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Here we assume that the range of p satisfies \(p\in (0,1)\).

  2. 2.

    Although Aiura and Sanjo (2010) assume a quadratic transportation cost, we follow Miura and Tajika (2015) and assume a linear transportation cost with respect to distance.

  3. 3.

    Although Aiura and Sanjo (2010) assume that the fixed cost is constant, we consider that the demand independent cost depends on the medical service quality proposed by the hospital, as do Miura and Tajika (2015).

  4. 4.

    Please see Appendix A for this reason.

  5. 5.

    Similarly to medical service fees, we assume that s and N are also determined by the central government. For simplification, burden rates of medical care cost and nursing care costs has a common rate.

  6. 6.

    It is noteworthy that the cost function of nursing care service facility differs from that of a hospital. Although the marginal cost of medical service is an increasing function with respect to service quality, that of nursing care service is constant. Hospitals must install advanced medical equipment to increase medical service quality generally. However, the job of nursing care service requires no advanced medical equipment than medical service. Therefore, we consider that the cost for a unit of nursing care service is constant in our model.

  7. 7.

    Strictly speaking, we should consider both medical service and nursing care service when we consider social welfare.

  8. 8.

    The values of the parameters used in Fig. 15.5 are \(\alpha =4,~\gamma =2,~\beta =\delta =c=t=1,~s=0.3\). Because the self-pay ratio is 30\(\%\) of the total medical fee in Japan, we set the value of s to 0.3. Moreover, we assume that the marginal benefits of medical service are greater than those of nursing care services.

References

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Acknowledgements

This study is supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research B (17H02533) and Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research C (18K01632) from Japan Society of the Promotion of Science. The previous version of this chapter was presented in 2018 annual meeting of Korean Association of Applied Economics. The author thanks Seik Kim (Korean University) for very useful comments to the previous version of this chapter.

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Correspondence to Tohru Naito .

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Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Proof of \(\bar{x}^{**}\ngtr 0\)

Substituting (15.17) for (15.3), \(\bar{x}^{**}\) in equilibrium is given as shown below.

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{x}^{**}= & {} \frac{1}{2}\left( 1-\frac{1}{p}\right) +\left( \frac{\alpha \left( 3\alpha \left( 1-p\right) +4pt\beta \right) }{p\left( 3\alpha -2t\beta \right) \left( \alpha -2t\beta \right) }\right) >0 \end{aligned}$$
(15.58)

Now we assume that \(\alpha \) is sufficiently large. When \(\alpha \) is sufficiently large, p is larger than 1. However, (15.58) is not satisfied because the range of p is from 0 to 1. Consequently, \({\bar{x}}^{**}\) is not positive.

1.2 Proof of \({\tilde{x}}^{*}\le 0\)

Substituting (15.48), (15.49), (15.50), and (15.51) for (15.52), we derive the \(\tilde{x}^{*}\) in equilibrium as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{x}^{*}=\frac{1}{2}\left( 1-\frac{1}{p}\right) -\frac{\left( p\theta \gamma ^{2}-2t\alpha \delta \right) }{\varGamma }\left[ \theta \left( 1-p\right) 2t\delta \left( 2t\beta +p\theta \alpha \right) \right] \end{aligned}$$
(15.59)

Because \(\tilde{x}^{*}\) is not positive, the following inequality must hold.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{2}\left( 1-\frac{1}{p}\right) -\frac{\left( p\theta \gamma ^{2}-2t\alpha \delta \right) }{\varGamma }\left[ \theta \left( 1-p\right) 2t\delta \left( 2t\beta +p\theta \alpha \right) \right] <0 \end{aligned}$$
(15.60)

Simplifying (15.60), we obtain the simplified inequality as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{2}\left( 1-\frac{1}{p}\right) -\frac{\left( p\theta \gamma ^{2}-2t\alpha \delta \right) }{\varGamma }\left[ \theta \left( 1-p\right) 2t\delta \left( 2t\beta +p\theta \alpha \right) \right]<0\Leftrightarrow -p\theta \alpha <2\beta t \end{aligned}$$
(15.61)

Now \(-p\theta \alpha <2\beta t\) always holds because we assume that p, \(\theta \), \(\alpha \), \(\beta \), and t are positive. Consequently, we can prove that \(\tilde{x}^{*}\) is not positive under \(\tilde{q}_{1}^{*}\), \(\tilde{q}_{2}^{*}\), \(\tilde{w}_{1}^{*}\), and \(\tilde{w}_{2}^{*}\).

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Naito, T. (2019). Optimal Cooperation of Medical Care and Nursing Care in a Two-Region Spatial Model. In: Hosoe, M., Ju, BG., Yakita, A., Hong, K. (eds) Contemporary Issues in Applied Economics. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7036-6_15

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