Axial Shift pp 47-85 | Cite as

Scale Invariance in Constitutional Political Economy (CPE)

  • Benjamen GussenEmail author


It would not be simplistic to suggest that Western civilization can be explained as a series of dichotomies—a series of either/or reasoning. In the Western tradition, dichotomies involve categories that are mutually exclusive. My assertion in this chapter is that all dichotomies so construed, save for ones involving trivial constructs, are false. This is a simple fact in oriental philosophies. For example, take the dichotomy represented by the yin and the yang. Note how the yin and the yang are represented as interacting parts or manifestations of the whole. This is the essential feature of the ‘dichotomy.’ There is always a dialectic between the polar positions reconciling these into a unified whole. Not only that, but change is cyclical—there is a ‘weaving’ of the two polar positions over time, unless of course we prevent so from happening through conscious design.


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of LawSwinburne University of TechnologyMelbourneAustralia

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