Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Efficient KEA-Style Lattice-Based Authenticated Key Exchange

  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Frontiers in Cyber Security (FCS 2018)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 879))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Lattice-based cryptographic primitives are believed to have the property against attacks by quantum computers. In this work, we present a KEA-style authenticated key exchange protocol based on the ring learning with errors problem whose security is proven in the BR model with weak perfect forward secrecy. With properties of KEA such as implicit key authentication and simplicity, our protocol also enjoys many properties of lattice-based cryptography, namely asymptotic efficiency, conceptual simplicity, worst-case hardness assumption, and resistance to attacks by quantum computers. Our lattice-based authenticated key exchange protocol is more efficient than the protocol of Zhang et al. (EUROCRYPT 2015) with more concise structure, smaller key size and lower bandwidth. Also, our protocol enjoys the advantage of optimal online efficiency and we improve our protocol with pre-computation.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

References

  1. Agrawal, S., Boneh, D., Boyen, X.: Efficient lattice (H)IBE in the standard model. In: Gilbert, H. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6110, pp. 553–572. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13190-5_28

    Chapter  MATH  Google Scholar 

  2. Aiello, W., et al.: Just fast keying: key agreement in a hostile internet. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 7(2), 242–273 (2004)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Alkim, E., Ducas, L., Poppelmann, T., Schwabe, P.: Post-quantum key exchange-a new hope. In: USENIX Security Symposium, pp. 327–343 (2016)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Entity authentication and key distribution. In: Stinson, D.R. (ed.) CRYPTO 1993. LNCS, vol. 773, pp. 232–249. Springer, Heidelberg (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48329-2_21

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Berlekamp, E., McEliece, R.J., Van Tilborg, H.: On the inherent intractability of certain coding problems. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 24(3), 384–386 (1978)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  6. Blake-Wilson, S., Johnson, D., Menezes, A.: Key agreement protocols and their security analysis. In: Darnell, M. (ed.) Cryptography and Coding 1997. LNCS, vol. 1355, pp. 30–45. Springer, Heidelberg (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0024447

    Chapter  MATH  Google Scholar 

  7. Bos, J., Costello, C., Naehrig, M., Stebila, D.: Post-quantum key exchange for the TLS protocol from the ring learning with errors problem. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 553–570 (2015)

    Google Scholar 

  8. Brakerski, Z., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Efficient fully homomorphic encryption from (standard) LWE. SIAM J. Comput. 43(2), 831–871 (2014)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  9. Brakerski, Z., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Fully homomorphic encryption from ring-LWE and security for key dependent messages. In: Rogaway, P. (ed.) CRYPTO 2011. LNCS, vol. 6841, pp. 505–524. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_29

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Analysis of key-exchange protocols and their use for building secure channels. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 453–474. Springer, Heidelberg (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44987-6_28

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  11. Cash, D., Hofheinz, D., Kiltz, E., Peikert, C.: Bonsai trees, or how to delegate a lattice basis. J. Cryptol. 25(4), 601–639 (2012)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  12. Dagdelen, Ö., et al.: High-speed signatures from standard lattices. In: Aranha, D.F., Menezes, A. (eds.) LATINCRYPT 2014. LNCS, vol. 8895, pp. 84–103. Springer, Cham (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16295-9_5

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  13. Dierks, T., Allen, C.: The TLS protocol version 1.0 (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Ding, J., Xie, X., Lin, X.: A simple provably secure key exchange scheme based on the learning with errors problem. http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/688

  15. Ding, J., Alsayigh, S., Saraswathy, R.V., Fluhrer, S., Lin, X.: Leakage of signal function with reused keys in RLWE key exchange. In: 2017 IEEE International Conference Communications (ICC). IEEE (2017)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Freier, A., Karlton, P., Kocher, P.: The secure sockets layer (SSL) protocol version 3.0 (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Fujioka, A., Suzuki, K., Xagawa, K., Yoneyama, K.: Strongly secure authenticated key exchange from factoring, codes, and lattices. In: Fischlin, M., Buchmann, J., Manulis, M. (eds.) PKC 2012. LNCS, vol. 7293, pp. 467–484. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30057-8_28

    Chapter  MATH  Google Scholar 

  18. Fujioka, A., Suzuki, K., Xagawa, K., Yoneyama, K.: Practical and post-quantum authenticated key exchange from one-way secure key encapsulation mechanism. In: ASIACCS 2013, pp. 83–94 (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  19. Gentry, C., Peikert, C., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Trapdoors for hard lattices and new cryptographic constructions. In: Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2008), pp. 197–206. ACM, New York (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  20. Jager, T., Kohlar, F., Schäge, S., Schwenk, J.: On the security of TLS-DHE in the standard model. In: Safavi-Naini, R., Canetti, R. (eds.) CRYPTO 2012. LNCS, vol. 7417, pp. 273–293. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32009-5_17

    Chapter  MATH  Google Scholar 

  21. Jin, Z., Zhao, Y.: Optimal key consensus in presence of noise. http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1058

  22. Kaufman, C.: Internet key exchange (IKEv2) protocol (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  23. Krawczyk, H.: HMQV: a high-performance secure Diffie-Hellman protocol. In: Shoup, V. (ed.) CRYPTO 2005. LNCS, vol. 3621, pp. 546–566. Springer, Heidelberg (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/11535218_33

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  24. Krawczyk, H.: SIGMA: the ‘SIGn-and-MAc’ approach to authenticated Diffie-Hellman and Its use in the IKE protocols. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 400–425. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_24

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  25. Lauter, K., Mityagin, A.: Security analysis of KEA authenticated key exchange protocol. In: Yung, M., Dodis, Y., Kiayias, A., Malkin, T. (eds.) PKC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3958, pp. 378–394. Springer, Heidelberg (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/11745853_25

    Chapter  MATH  Google Scholar 

  26. Lindner, R., Peikert, C.: Better key sizes (and attacks) for LWE-based encryption. In: Kiayias, A. (ed.) CT-RSA 2011. LNCS, vol. 6558, pp. 319–339. Springer, Heidelberg (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19074-2_21

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  27. Liu, M., Nguyen, P.Q.: Solving BDD by enumeration: an update. In: Dawson, E. (ed.) CT-RSA 2013. LNCS, vol. 7779, pp. 293–309. Springer, Heidelberg (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36095-4_19

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  28. Lyubashevsky, V., Peikert, C., Regev, O.: On ideal lattices and learning with errors over rings. J. ACM 60(6), 1–35 (2013)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  29. Menezes, A., Qu, M., Vanstone, S.: Some new key agreement protocols providing mutual implicit authentication. In: SecondWorkshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography (1995)

    Google Scholar 

  30. Peikert, C.: Lattice cryptography for the internet. In: Mosca, M. (ed.) PQCrypto 2014. LNCS, vol. 8772, pp. 197–219. Springer, Cham (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11659-4_12

    Chapter  MATH  Google Scholar 

  31. Regev, O.: On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptography. J. ACM 56(6), 34 (2009)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  32. Saint, E.L., Fedronic, D., Liu, S.: Open protocol for access control identification and ticketing with privacy. OPACITY protocol specification (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  33. Skipjack, N.: KEA algorithm specifications (1998)

    Google Scholar 

  34. Wang, Z., Hu, H.: Efficient KEA-style lattice-based authenticated key exchange. http://eprint.iacr.org/2018/690

  35. Yao, A.C.C., Zhao, Y.: OAKE: a new family of implicitly authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocols. In: Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2013), pp. 1113–1128. ACM, New York (2013)

    Google Scholar 

  36. Zhang, J., Zhang, Z., Ding, J., Snook, M., Dagdelen, Ö.: Authenticated key exchange from ideal lattices. In: Oswald, E., Fischlin, M. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2015. LNCS, vol. 9057, pp. 719–751. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46803-6_24

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Key Laboratory of Electromagnetic Space Information, Chinese Academy of Sciences, School of Information Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, 230027, China

    Zilong Wang & Honggang Hu

Authors
  1. Zilong Wang
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Honggang Hu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding authors

Correspondence to Zilong Wang or Honggang Hu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China

    Fagen Li

  2. University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan

    Tsuyoshi Takagi

  3. University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China

    Chunxiang Xu

  4. University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China

    Xiaosong Zhang

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.

About this paper

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this paper

Wang, Z., Hu, H. (2018). Efficient KEA-Style Lattice-Based Authenticated Key Exchange. In: Li, F., Takagi, T., Xu, C., Zhang, X. (eds) Frontiers in Cyber Security. FCS 2018. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 879. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-3095-7_8

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-3095-7_8

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-13-3094-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-13-3095-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation