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Governance: Some Observations

  • Sumon Kumar BhaumikEmail author
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Abstract

According to the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), governance “is the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented).” Drawing on the existing literature to characterize governance, this chapter discusses the likelihood of influencing country-level governance via mechanisms such as aid and private cross-border capital flows and a heuristic framework is developed. The framework posits that governance is an equilibrium outcome in a bargaining game between rulers and subjects, when the identities of these players depend on historical events as the country evolves from its natural state.

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Notes

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Jeffrey Nugent, Timur Kuran, Pauline Dibben, and workshop participants at the 2015 summer school of the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (IoS), Regensburg, Germany, and the 2017 Development Economics Conference at the University of Lincoln, UK, for useful feedback on early thoughts on governance. He remains responsible for all remaining errors.

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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sheffield University Management School, University of SheffieldSheffieldUK
  2. 2.IZA - Institute of Labor EconomicsBonnGermany
  3. 3.Global Labor OrganizationGenevaSwitzerland

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