Skip to main content

India at the WTO: Punching Above Its Weight

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Negotiation Dynamics of the WTO
  • 340 Accesses

Abstract

India’s negotiating stance at WTO has been a subject of research, amusement and speculation among knowledgeable observers. There is first the impression that India is often “isolated” in multilateral trade negotiations. Second, there is some amusement at the company we keep: for example, the famous Like-Minded Group in which India shared the negotiating stage with the likes of Cuba, Venezuela, Dominican Republic and Pakistan. Last, how could India which received a large amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) possibly object to negotiations in this area at the WTO?The Chapter broadly explains the justification of India’s negotiating stance. For starters, a large part of the population (estimated by some at 300 million) lives in extreme poverty. Any move that would affect them adversely is political suicide for the government in a country like India. The second consideration lies in the area of Agriculture and things like rural distress, farmer suicides etc. are hugely sensitive subjects. Last but not least, the quintessential obsession of India for retaining “policy space”.The mechanics of decision-making in trade policy is covered in some detail. While the Commerce Minister may seem as the ultimate arbiter, it is nevertheless true that the Prime Minister (and his office) has the last word when it comes to final negotiating decisions on sensitive subjects. In the previous coalition era, the Government used the “Group of Ministers” as a mechanism to decide the negotiating stance. With the assumption of office of the new Government led by Prime Minister Modi in 2014, the main vehicle is Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs whose composition is given in the Annexure.The Permanent Mission of India to the WTO, led by an Ambassador, has only a handful of trade diplomats to service the WTO negotiations. The Trade Policy Division in the Ministry of Commerce is not too big either. But many smaller developing countries do not even have as many negotiators as India does. Developing countries and least developed countries are therefore at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their developed counterparts.The system of consulting with domestic stakeholders has gotten better in India. Chambers of Commerce, Think Tanks and other Non-Governmental Organizations now play a more active role with the Government in the formulation of trade policy.The Chapter makes the point that for a variety of reasons, therefore, India and its negotiating stance may best be described as “sui generis”.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 79.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 129.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Constitution of India, Allocation of Business Rules. 1961. Article 77, http://india.gov.in.

  2. 2.

    Allocation of Business Rules. 1961 can be downloaded at: http://cabsec.nic.in.

  3. 3.

    Department of Commerce, Organizational set-up and functions, http://commerce.nic.in.

  4. 4.

    Sen, Julius. 2004. Trade Policy Making in India: The Reality Below the Water Line, London School of Economics, CUTS.

  5. 5.

    There are no written records available. But the above account was verified by the author with the Chief Trade Policy Negotiator of India at the time.

  6. 6.

    Press Release of Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 29 November 2002, http://commerce.nic.in.

  7. 7.

    Poddar, Tushar and Yi, Eva. “Goldman Sachs”, Global Economics Paper No. 152, January 2007.

  8. 8.

    Human Development Report for India. 2009. http://hdrstats.undp.org.

  9. 9.

    Ibid.

  10. 10.

    Population Reference Bureau, Haub, Carl and Sharma, O.P. 2010. What Is Poverty, Really? The Case of India, http://www.prb.org.

  11. 11.

    Narayan, S. Dr. 2005. “Trade Policy Making in India”, May 2005.

  12. 12.

    Ibid.

  13. 13.

    Panagariya, Arvind. 2008. India: The Emerging Giant, Oxford University Press.

  14. 14.

    Ibid.

  15. 15.

    Smith, David Clinging. 2006. Economic Development in India, 1931–1961, Harvard University Press.

  16. 16.

    Panagariya, Arvind. 2008. India: The Emerging Giant, Oxford University Press.

  17. 17.

    Ibid.

  18. 18.

    Narayan, S. Dr. 2005, “Trade Policy Making in India”, May 2005.

  19. 19.

    Preeg, Ernest H. 1995. Traders in a Brave New World, University of Chicago Press.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., p. 7.

  21. 21.

    For an interesting account see Hopewell, Kristen. March 2017. “Recalcitrant Spoiler? Contesting Dominant Accounts of India’s Role in Global Trade Governance”, Third World Quarterly.

  22. 22.

    Mattoo, Aditya and Stern, Robert. 2003. India and the WTO, World Bank and Oxford University Press, p. 43.

  23. 23.

    Narayan, S. Dr. 2005. “Trade Policy Making in India”.

  24. 24.

    Following are some publications in this regard:

    • Sen, Julius. 2004. Trade Policy Making in India: The Reality Below the Water Line, London School of Economics, CUTS; Narayan, S. Dr. 2005. “Trade Policy Making in India”, May 2005; Srinivasan, T.N. 2000. Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System, Westview Press; Hudec, R.E. 1987. Developing Countries in the GATT/WTO Legal System, Trade Policy Research Centre; Narlikar, Amrita. 2003. “Peculiar Chauvinism or Strategic Calculation? Explaining the Negotiating Strategy of a Rising India”, International Affairs, Chatam House, Volume 82, Issue 1; Blaas, Wolfgang and Becker, Joachim. 2007. Strategic Arena Switching in International Trade Negotiations, Ashgate Publishing Company.

  25. 25.

    Winham, G.R. 1990. “GATT and the International Trade Regime”, International Journal.

  26. 26.

    Preeg, Ernest H. 1995. Traders in a Brave New World, University of Chicago Press.

  27. 27.

    Shukla, S.P. 2000. From GATT to WTO and Beyond, United Nations WIDER Publication.

  28. 28.

    WTO “The Legal Texts”, Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the Settlement of Disputes, www.wto.org.

  29. 29.

    Ibid.

  30. 30.

    Mattoo, Aditya and Stern, Robert M. 2003. India and the WTO, World Bank and Oxford University Press.

  31. 31.

    European Commission, Monitoring Agri-Trade Policy, “India’s Role in World Agriculture”, December 2007, http://ec.europa.en/agriculture.

  32. 32.

    Baruah, Nandana. June 2007. “An Analysis of Factors Influencing the Anti-dumping Behaviour in India”, The World Economy.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mohan Kumar .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Kumar, M. (2018). India at the WTO: Punching Above Its Weight. In: Negotiation Dynamics of the WTO. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8842-1_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics