Abstract
The chapter uses two survey experiments to see how information stimulus can change public perception on two key foreign policy instruments: foreign aid and military coalition. Foreign aid is financed by tax revenue and must be supported by a wide range of general public to continue. In a similar vein, use of force abroad needs public support, and this is especially true in democracies. To conduct comparative survey experiments on these two foreign policy instruments, Japan was selected as a field of experiment. This is because the country is an interesting case due to its constitutional prohibition of using force abroad and heavy reliance on foreign aid as a means to exercise its influence abroad. We take advantage of this unique setting and reveal how political information can change the level of public support for key foreign policy agendas.
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Notes
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Somewhat surprisingly, levels of support for foreign aid in Japan are relatively low when compared with other developed countries. Indeed, a cross-national survey of 17 countries (Paxton and Knack 2012: 27) reveals that Japan had the lowest level of support (about 45%) for an increase to level of foreign aid. It was about 20 points lower score compared with the overall mean of 67%.
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This survey was conducted with multiple choice methods, which are perhaps not the most appropriate to determine public opinion on peace and security.
- 4.
In the Japanese survey, we consistently asked respondents to consider the impact of injuries/deaths.
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Appendices
Appendix for Aid Experiment
Part 1
Scenario provided to all respondents
Japan has been providing foreign aid to developing countries because foreign aid contributes to the national interests of Japan and providing it is a responsibility of advanced countries. However, considering the fact that Japan has a national deficit of more than 10 million yen per person, there has been some criticism of the foreign aid policy.
Recently, in an article contributed by a specialist, the following opinion was presented as a part of government public relations.
Part 2
There are six scenario patterns in our experiment and the sentences in non-italic are the key stimuli.
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Scenario 1. (Uncertain effect on recipient countries)
Japanese foreign aid attempts to improve infrastructure in recipient countries but in fact, its effect is not certain.
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Scenario 2. (Definitive effect on recipient countries)
Japanese foreign aid improves infrastructure in recipient countries and promotes economic growth.
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Scenario 3. (Economic effect on Japan)
Providing foreign aid benefits Japan, as it helps us to secure our energy resources.
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Scenario 4. (Soft-power effect on Japan)
The provision of foreign aid creates a positive image of Japan in the world, engendering feelings of trust.
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Scenario 5. (Macro-level educational effect on recipient countries)
Japanese foreign aid enables children in many countries to receive education and therefore has a positive effect for the training of future generations.
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Scenario 6. (Micro-level educational effect on recipient countries)
Japanese foreign aid enabled a girl named Sally (6Â years old) in a developing country to receive compulsory education 30Â years ago. Now she is working to spread education in poor areas.
Appendix for Coalition Experiment
There are six scenario patterns in our experiment and the sentences in non-italic are key stimuli.
Scenario 1
The Japanese government has dispatched its Self-Defense Forces to State A in the Middle East as a member of the U.S.-led coalition forces to provide back-up logistical support. A large-scale terrorist attack targets the military coalition. There is the possibility of Self-Defense Force casualties. As a result, the Japanese government decides to withdraw 2000 troops from State A. The U.S. opposes this decision.
Scenario 2
The Japanese government has dispatched its Self-Defense Forces to State A in the Middle East as a member of the U.S.-led coalition forces to provide back-up logistical support. A large-scale terrorist attack targets the citizens in State A in a specific area. There is the possibility of Self-Defense Force casualties. As a result, the Japanese government decides to withdraw 2000 troops from State A. The U.S. opposes this decision.
Scenario 3
The Japanese government has dispatched its Self-Defense Forces to State A in the Middle East as a member of the U.S.-led coalition forces to provide back-up logistical support. A large-scale terrorist attack targets the military coalition. The Self-Defense Forces suffer a number of casualties. As a result, the Japanese government decides to withdraw 2000 troops from State A. The U.S. opposes this decision.
Scenario 4
The Japanese government dispatches its Self-Defense Forces to State A in the Middle East as a member of the U.S.-led coalition forces to provide back-up logistical support. A large-scale terrorist attack targets the military coalition. The Self-Defense Forces have not suffered any casualties, but another member state of the military coalition force has, leading to its withdrawal. As a result, the Japanese government decides to withdraw 2000 troops from State A. The U.S. opposes this decision.
Scenario 5
The Japanese government has dispatched its Self-Defense Forces to State A in the Middle East as a member of the U.S.-led coalition forces to provide back-up logistical support. A large-scale terrorist attack targets the military coalition. The Self-Defense Forces suffer a number of casualties. As a result, the Japanese government decides to withdraw 2000 troops from State A. The U.S. understands this decision.
Scenario 6
The Japanese government has dispatched its Self-Defense Forces to State A in the Middle East as a member of the U.S.-led coalition forces to provide back-up logistical support. A large-scale terrorist attack targets the military coalition. The Self-Defense Forces have not suffered any casualties, but another member state of the military coalition force has, leading to its withdrawal. As a result, the Japanese government decides to withdraw 2000 troops from State A. The U.S. understands this decision.
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Komiya, Y., Miyagawa, M., Tago, A. (2018). Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Effect of Information Stimulus on Levels of Support for Foreign Aid and Coalition Withdrawal. In: Tadokoro, M., Egashira, S., Yamamoto, K. (eds) Emerging Risks in a World of Heterogeneity. Evolutionary Economics and Social Complexity Science, vol 10. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7968-9_7
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