Dynamic Games of Firm Social Media Disclosure
Firm social media disclosure is a complex game. This paper proposes three stages dynamic games model to analysis the process of social media information disclose. In the first stage model, firms disclose on social media because of low cost and high income, and this can make firms obtain more attention in competition. We introduced investors in the second stage model. Firms disclose exaggeratedly in order to get more benefits from investors in the complete information static game. And investors would not believe social media disclosures and not invest. When reputation model of KMRW is introduced in this stage, the model becomes repeated game with incomplete information. If the game is repeated enough times, the cooperative equilibrium can be achieved. But investors always act in the short run and the model of KMRW does not work. So, the external regulators are introduced in the third stage model. If the benefits which firms get from exaggerated disclosure can be given to the investors through punishment mechanism firms finally disclose truly on social media.