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Two Bargain Game Models of the Second-Hand Housing Commence

  • Rui Wang
  • Deng-Feng Li
Conference paper
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 758)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to discuss a bargaining problem between sellers and buyers in the case of the final price of the house for sale in the second-hand house market. Two bargaining models are established for the sellers and buyers in indefinite period and finite period. For the indefinite period, the complete equilibrium solution of the bargaining game between the buyers and sellers is obtained. Hereby, imposing some constraints on the time, the game equilibrium solution on the second stage is obtained. At the same time, a multiple game model is constructed and the commence point is discussed. The result shows that the game between sellers and buyers depends on the ratio of each one’s discount factor. The time and commitment between sellers and buyers increase the sellers’ cost, hence the final price can only be implemented within a certain range, which is related with the proposal cost of sellers, the number of games, and the punishment cost in each round.

Keywords

The second-hand housing commence Equilibrium Bargaining Game model 

Notes

Acknowledgment

We are grateful to the referees for their helpful and constructive comments, which have significantly improved the presentation of this paper. This work is supported by Key Project of Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 71231003) and young teacher education research project of Fujian province (Nos. JAS150641).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Economics and ManagementFuzhou UniversityFuzhouChina
  2. 2.School of Business ManagementFujian Jiangxia UniversityFuzhouChina

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