Bargaining Model of Mutual Deterrence Among Three Players with Incomplete Information
The tripartite bargaining problem of mutual deterrence has been investigated from the perspective of Rubinstein indefinite bargaining and cooperative game theory. Considering the situation of incomplete information in reality, this paper established a tripartite mutual deterrence bargaining model with unilateral and bilateral incomplete information by introducing incomplete information into the model and defining a discount factor. And particularly, the formula is furnished for calculating the Nash equilibrium distribution of every player under the incomplete information. Finally, an illustrative example is presented to show that the established model is feasible and effective and can provide a new way and method to analyze and solve multi mutual deterrence or conflict problems with incomplete information.
KeywordsDeterrence Bargaining Incomplete information Game theory
This work was supported by the Key Project of Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 71231003).
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