A Profit Allocation Model of Employee Coalitions Based on Triangular Fuzzy Numbers in Tacit Knowledge Sharing

Conference paper
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 758)


We consider a profit allocation of employee coalitions in tacit knowledge sharing. Owing to the existence of uncertain factors, the allocation of profits cannot be accurately expressed among players. Triangular fuzzy numbers, which are expressed as the payoffs of coalitions, are used to give an allocation solution. Meanwhile, the allocation also addressed the influence of coalitions’ importance. A quadratic programming model is built to obtain a suitable solution, which is a triangular fuzzy number distribution value of each player. Further, we add a constraint to the built model: effectiveness, and obtain the pre-allocated solution. Finally, the rationality and superiority of the proposed model are verified through a numerical example.


Triangular fuzzy number Coalitions’ weight Tacit knowledge Cooperative game Profit allocation 


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© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Economics and ManagementFuzhou UniversityFuzhouChina

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