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Saving Supervaluationism from the Challenge of Higher-Order Vagueness Argument

  • Hao-Cheng FuEmail author
Conference paper
  • 118 Downloads
Part of the Logic in Asia: Studia Logica Library book series (LIAA)

Abstract

The phenomenon of the higher-order vagueness is one of the most controversial issues of the semantics for vagueness. Timothy Williamson has argued that any theory would inevitably fail if it aims at explicating higher-order vagueness in terms of revising classical logic, for the problem of higher-order vagueness consists not in the inadequacy of classical logic but rather in the limitation of our cognitive ability. Williamson proposes the epistemic theory and claims that it is the best option to dissolve the challenge of the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness. Nevertheless, I disagree with Williamson. In this paper, I will argue that the most promising response to the challenge of higher-order vagueness argument is supervaluationism rather than the epistemic theory. However, the orthodox supervaluationism cannot dissolve the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness because the model is static. I suggest that we should turn the static model of supervaluationism into a dynamic one, which, as I will argue, release the pressure of supervaluationism from the challenge of higher-order vagueness argument.

Keywords

Vagueness Higher-order vagueness Supervaluationism Timothy Williamson 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyChinese Culture UniversityTaipeiTaiwan

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