Abstract
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BR) projects a distinctive rendering of global space(s). The plans and maps invoked by Chinese investments are suggestive of shifting geopolitical imaginaries that envision the future of Eurasia. This chapter employs a co-productive lens to approach the geo-visions inherent to these visual materials and related infrastructural projects. It probes into the socio-technical reconstruction of space in general and maritime space in South Asia in particular. While the newly emerging image of the world moves India and the Indian Ocean to the center, territory seems to be organized by “corridorization” rather than regions or nation states. As China and India aim to cooperate for investments, their differing territorial imaginaries complicate the implementation of the Silk Road initiative.
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Notes
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We are thankful for all precious comments and feedback to this chapter by Chen Dingding, Cora Lacatus, Walter Andersen, Christian Bueger, and many others received during presentations at Tongji University, School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, and at the 2017 International Studies Association annual convention in Baltimore.
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The collection of original maps, stemming from both official and unofficial sources, on which this part of the study is based includes 25 Chinese maps and 5 non-Chinese renderings of the Silk Road Initiative. The maps where all published between 2014 and 2017.
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Mayer, M., Balázs, D. (2018). Modern Silk Road Imaginaries and the Co-production of Space. In: Mayer, M. (eds) Rethinking the Silk Road. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5915-5_13
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