Managers’ Window Dressing and Liability for Damages to a Stock Sales in Management Buyouts

  • Ryutaro NozakiEmail author
Part of the New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives book series (NFRSASIPER, volume 18)


This paper analyzes the inverse window dressing of managers in their management buyouts (MBOs) and the claims of damages for compensation filed by the small shareholders against the manager.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Kurume UniversityKurumeJapan

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