U.S. Think Tank and China Policy Debates

Wu, Shengqi

doi:10.1007/978-981-10-4974-3_6

Shengqi Wu²

635 Accesses

Abstract

The end of the Cold War has brought a deep change to the international structure and weakened the strategic foundation of China-U.S. relations. Under this background, how to look at China and adjust U.S. China policy have become a debatable issue among American think tanks as well as the political and academic circles.

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Notes

1.
The main works studying American perceptions of China in general and China threat in particular in the post-Cold War era include: Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2, Fall 2005, pp. 7–45; David L. Rousseau, Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities: The Social Construction of Realism and Liberalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2006), pp. 148–208; David Scott, China Stands Up: The PRC and the International System (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 116–120; Steve Chan, China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory: A Critique (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); Suisheng Zhao, ed., China-U.S. Relations Transformed: Perspectives and Strategic Interactions (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, eds., China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Rex Li, A Rising China and Security in East Asia: Identity construction and security discourse (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 3–30; Richard Rosecrance and Gu Guoliang, eds., Power and Restraint: A Shared Vision for the U.S.-China Relationship (New York: Public Affairs, 2009). The main works studying American perceptions in this regard include Wenzhao Tao, Zhongmei guanxishi (1972–2000) [A History of China-U.S. Relations] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 2004), pp. 282–297; Liu Xiaobiao, Changshuai zhongguo de beihou [Behind Discrediting China] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2002); Lu Gang and Guo Xuetang, Zhongguo weixie shui?—jiedu zhongguo weixielun [China Threatens Whom?—Interpreting the China Threat Argument] (Shanghai: Xuelin Press, 2004); Shi Aiguo, Aoman yu pianjian—dongfang zhuyi yu meiguo de zhongguo weixielun yanjiu [Arrogance and Prejudice—A Study on Orientalism and American Argument of China Threat] (Guangzhou: Sun Yat-sen University Press, 2004); Zhu Feng, “Zhongguo Jueqi yu zhongguo weixie—meiguo yixiang de youlai” [China Rise and China Threat—The Causes of American Image], Meiguo yanjiu [American Studies Quarterly], No. 3, 2005; Jiang Xiaoyan and Xinqiang, Meiguo guohui yu meiguo duihua anquan zhengce [American Congress and U.S. China Policymaking on Security] (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2005), Chap. 3.
2.
See David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), pp. 25–32.
3.
Quoted from Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 291.
4.
Peter Ferdinand, “Russian and Soviet Shadows over China’s Future,” International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2, April 1992, pp. 279–292.
5.
Gerald Segal, China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy (Adelphi Paper 287) (London: Brassey for IISS, 1994).
6.
Shaun Breslin, China in the 1980 s: Centre-Province Relations in a Reformed Socialist State (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996).
7.
Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York, NY: Random House, 2001), pp. 284–285.
8.
Gordon G. Chang, “Halfway to China’s Collapse,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 169, No. 5, June 2006, p. 25, p. 28.
9.
Roderick MacFarquar, “Why Leadership Analysis Counts,” speech at the conference “Behind the Bamboo Curtain: Leadership, Politics, and Policy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., November 22, 2005. Transcript from Federal News Service, quotation on p. 12. Roderick MacFarquar, “China’s Political System: Implications for U.S. Policy,” in U.S.-China Relations: Fourth Conference (The Apsen Institute) 17, No. 3, 2002, p. 15. “Debate 1: Is Communist Party Rule Sustainable in China? Remarks by Roderick MacFarquar, Harvard University,” in Reframing China Policy: The Carnegie Debates (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, October 5, 2006).
10.
The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, The Chinese Celebrates Their Roaring Economy, As They Struggle With Its Costs, July 22, 2008, http://pewglobal.org/2008/07/22/the-chinese-celebrate-their-roaring-economy-as-they-struggle-with-its-costs/.
11.
Opinion of China: Do you have a favorable view of China?
For the survey of 2005, see http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=24&survey=6&response=Favorable&mode=chart; for that of 2006, see http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=24&survey=7&response=Favorable&mode=chart;
2007 at http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=24&survey=8&response=Favorable&mode=chart; 2008 at http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=24&survey=9&response=Favorable&mode=chart: and 2009 at http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=24&survey=10&response=Favorable&mode=chart.
12.
Melanie Manion, Retirement of Revolutionaries in China: Public Policies, Social Norms, Private Interests (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1955).
13.
Andrew J. Nanthan, “China’s Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No.1, January 2003, pp. 6–17. Andrew J. Nanthan, “Reframing China Policy: The Carnegie Debates. Debate 1: Is Communist Party Rule Sustainable in China?” (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, October 5, 2006). Remarks by Andrew Nathan, professor of political science, Columbia University.
14.
Fred Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas Lardy, and Derek Mitchell. China: The Balance Sheet—What the World Needs to Know Now About the Emerging Superpower (New York: Public Affairs, 2006).
15.
China, The Balance Sheet, 2006, pp. 71–72.
16.
David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008), p. 4.
17.
David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, April 2, 2008. Editorial Review from The Washington Post, 2008.
18.
Gordon G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House Group, 2001).
19.
Gordon G. Chang, “China’s Coming Decline under the Impact of TWO Entry,” China Times, February 2, 2002.
20.
Joe, China Dream, 2001. Quoted from Liu Xiaobiao, Changshuai zhongguo de beihou [Behind Discrediting Chinas] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2002).
21.
Minxin Pei, China’s Trapped Transition, 2005.
22.
Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China into the Global Economy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions Press, 2002), pp. 132–133.
23.
Fred Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas Lardy, and Derek Mitchell. China: The Balance Sheet— What the Word Needs to Know Now About the Emerging Superpower (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), p. 4, p. 19.
24.
Albert Keidel, “China’s Economic Rise—Fact and Fiction,” Policy Brief, No. 61, July 2008, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb61_keidel_final.pdf.
25.
Douglas H. Paal, Thomas Byrne, Albert Keidel, and Pieter Bottelier, “China’s Economy in the Post-Crisis World,” March 17, 2010, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=2827.
26.
Bruce J. Dickson, “Updating the China Model,” The Washington Quarterly, Fall 2011, p. 49.
27.
David Wingrove, Chung Guo. The Middle Kingdom (New York: Dell, 1990).
28.
Ross Munro H., “Awakening Dragon: The Real Danger in Asia Is from China,” Policy Review, No. 62, Fall 1992, pp. 10–16.
29.
Richard Bersten and Ross Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997); Edward Timperlake and William Triplett, Red China Rising. Communist China’s Military Threat to America (Lanham: Regnery, 1999); Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s Republic of China Targets America (Washington: Regnery, 2000); Hegemon Mosher, China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000).
30.
Robert Ross, “The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,” in Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003). Wenzhao Tao, ed., Lengzhan hou de meiguo duihua zhengce [The United States’ China Policy after the Cold War], Chongqing: Chongqing Publishing House, 2006, p. 341.
31.
John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001, p. 29, pp. 20–21.
32.
John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 400.
33.
Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000), p. 26, p. 94, p. 99.
34.
Director of Central Intelligence Agency George Tenet, “The Worldview Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World,” Feb. 11, 2003, http://www.cia.gov/public-affairs/speeches/2003/dci_speech_01112003.html.
35.
Samuel P. Huntington, “America’s Changing Strategic Interests,” Survival, Vol. 33, No. 1, January/February 1991, p. 12.
36.
Paul Wolfowitz, “Bridging Centuries: Fin de Siecle All Over Again,” The National Interest, No. 47 (Spring 1997), pp. 3–8.
37.
Cited in Joseph Nye, “Zhongmei guanxi de weilai” [The Future of China-U.S. Relations], Meiguo yanjiu [American Studies Quarterly], Vol. 1, 2009, p. 15.
38.
Robert Kagan, “The Illusions of ‘Managing’ China,” The Washington Post, May 15, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/13/AR2005051301405.html.
39.
Robert D. Kaplan, “How We Would Fight China,” The Atlantic, June 2005, http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200506/kaplan.
40.
Steven Chan, “Realism, Revisionism, and the Great Powers,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 40, No. 1, March 2004, p. 136.
41.
Randall L. Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: Theory and History,” in Johnston and Ross, Engaging China, pp. 18–22.
42.
David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3, Winter 2004/2005, p. 95.
43.
Robert Ross, “China as a Conservative Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2, March/April 1997, pp. 33–44.
44.
Zibigneiw Brzezinski, “Major Foreign Policy Challenges for the Next U.S. President,” International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 1, 2009, p. 56.
45.
Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, Spring 2003, pp. 5–56; Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).
46.
Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, Spring 2003, pp. 5–56. See also, The Rise of China and International Law (2005); China Turns to Multilateralism (2006), etc.
47.
Quoted from John Miller, China & America’s Emerging Partnership: A Realistic New Perspective, translated by Dai Min (Beijing: China CITIC Press 2008), p. 143.
48.
Benjamin Schwarz, “Managing China’s Rise,” The Atlantic, June 2005.
49.
Fred Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas Lardy, and Derek Mitchell. China: The Balance Sheet. What the Word Needs to Know Now About the Emerging Superpower (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), pp. 139–140.
50.
Following the publication of The Coming Conflict with China by Richard and Ross Munro, some American figures continue to spotlight China’s military threat. For example, the Department of Defense submit Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (except for the year of 2001) with a length of several dozens of pages, and publicize it. Reports issued by the US-China Economic and Security Review Committee, RAND reports on China’s army, navy and air force development, and the AEI scholars’ relevant articles are all exaggerated Chinese military buildup. In fact, when writing annual report, the Department of Defense often refers to research products of think tanks. A considerable number of people at US-China Economic and Security Review Committee come from the RAND, the AEI and other think tanks. In writing reports, the committee will hold a serial of testimonies, inviting university professors and thank tanks experts. For example, the committee member Dan Blumenthal comes from the AEI, Larry M. Wortzel comes from the Heritage Foundation. Blumenthal once served as vice chair of the committee and is still its member. RAND fellow Roger Cliff gave testimonies before the committee for many times, talking a lot of China’s anti-access strategy. Heritage Foundation expert John Tkacik points out at the beginning of the article Challenge of Chinese Submarine, the trend of navy development on the Pacific Ocean is worrisome. The Chinese navy will have dominated over Pacific by 2025. Heritage Foundation expert Ding Cheng talks a lot at the committee about China’s defense strategy and its impact on Asia-Pacific. The Center for Strategic and Budget Assessments (CSBA) Vice President Jim Thomas gave a testimony before the committee, highlighting China’s “active defense policy and its impact on Asian-Pacific region. For example, see (1) Larry M. Wortzel, “China and the Battlefield in Space,” The Heritage Foundation, October 15, 2003,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiandthePacific/wm346.cfm; (2) Roger Cliff, The RAND Corporation, “The Development of China’ s Air Force Capabilities,” Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 20, 2010; (3) Roger Cliff, “Anti-Access Measures in Chinese Defense Strategy,” Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, on January 27, 2011, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2011hearings/transcripts/11_ (4) Roger Cliff, John Fie, Jef Hagen, Elizabeth Hague, Eric Heginbotham, and John Stilion, Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth: Chinese Air Force Employment in the 21st Century, The RAND Corporation, 2011; (5) John J. Tkacik, Jr., “China’s Submarine Challenge,” The Heritage Foundation, March 1, 2006,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm1001.cfm; (6) Deng Cheng, “China’s Active Defense Strategy and Its Regional Impact,” Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission on January 26, 2011,
http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2011/01/chinas-active-defense-strategy-and-its-regional-impact; (7) Jim Thomas, “China’ s Active Defense Strategy and Its Regional Implications,” January 27, 2011, http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/2011. 01.27-Chinas-Active-Def.pdf. Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2002, pp. 2–5, 9–10, 55–56,
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2002/d20020712china.pdf.
51.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report 2010, pp. 73–91,
http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2010/annual_report_full_10.pdf.
52.
2009 Report to Congress of the U. S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 2009, pp. 123–127, 144–146, http://www.uscc.gov/annual_ report/2009/annual_report_full_09.pdf
53.
U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2011 Report, Chapter 2, “China’ s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests,” p. 165, http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/annual_report_full_11.pdf.
54.
The People’s Republic of China State Council Press Office, Zhongguo de heping fazhan [China’s Peaceful Development] (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2011), p. 15.
55.
Harold Brown, Joseph Prueher, and Adam Segal, Chinese Military Power, Report of an Independent Task Force, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geo-economic Studies. 2003, p. 2.
56.
Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency), “Global Threats and Challenges through 2015,” Statement for the Record, Senate Armed Service Committee, March 8, 2001,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/2001_hr/010308tw.pdf.
57.
Robert S. Ross, “Assessing China’s Threat,” The National Interest, Fall 2005, pp. 83–84.
58.
Drew Thompson, “Think Again: China’s Military It’s not time to panic Yet,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/think_again_chinas_military?page=0,0.
59.
Kenneth Lieberthal, “Is China Catching Up with the US?” ETHOS, Issue 8, August 2010, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/articles/2010/08_china_development_lieberthal/08_china_development_lieberthal.pdf.
60.
Michael Swaine, “China’s Military Muscle,” Video Q & A, January 19, 2011, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=42332.
61.
Douglas H. Paal, “Calming the Storm in U.S.-China Relations,” Video Q & A, January 11, 2011,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=42274.
62.
Paul R. Viotti & Mark V. Kauppi, eds., International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), p. 58.
63.
Joseph Nye, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations” [Zhongmei guanxi de weilai], Meiguo yanjiu [American Studies Quarterly], No. 1, 2009, pp. 13–16.
64.
Robert Kagan “Ambition and Anxiety: America’s Competition with China,” In Gary J. Schmitt, ed., The Rise of China” Essays on the Future Competition (New York & London: Encounter Books, 2009), pp. 15–16, p. 22.
65.
John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 2, 1950, pp. 157–158. See also John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 36, or Xu Jia et al., eds., A Study of International Relations Theories in America (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2008), p. 391.
66.
John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 32–33; 41–42, p. 400.
67.
Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 2, Fall 2005, p. 22.
68.
Denny Roy, “Tensions in the Taiwan Strait,” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 76–96.
June Teufel Dreyer, “Flashpoint: The Taiwan Strait,” Orbis, Vol. 44, No. 4, Autumn 2000, pp. 615–629.
Andrew J. Nathan, “What’s Wrong with American Taiwan Policy,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 2, Spring 2000, pp. 93–106.
69.
Michael McDevitt, “Beijing Bind,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3, Summer 2000, pp. 176–186. Thomas J. Christiansen, “Theater Missile Defense, and Taiwan’s Security,” Orbis, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 79–90.
70.
Robert Ross, “The Geography of Peace,” and Michael McDevitt, “Roundtable: Net Assessment —Objective Conditions versus the U.S. Strategic Tradition,” in Paul D. Taylor, ed., Asia and the Pacific: U.S. Strategic Tradition and Regional Realities (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2001), pp. 101–105.
71.
Avery Goldstein, “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival,” International Security, Vol. 22. No. 3, Winter 1997/98, p. 70. For general arguments regarding the presumed stabilizing effects of nuclear weapons, see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
72.
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.).
73.
David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams, p. 168. David M. Lampton, “A Growing China in a Shrinking World: Beijing and the Global Order,” in Ezra F. Vogel, ed., Living with China: U.S./China Relations in the Twenty-First Century (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997), pp. 120–140.
74.
David Lampton, “China’s Rise Need Not at the Expense of the US,” in David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: the Changing Dynamics in Asia, 2005, p. 308.
75.
James Shinn, ed, Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), pp. 3–4.
76.
Alastair Iain Johnston & Paul Evans, “China’s Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions,” in Johnston and Ross, Engaging China, p. 265.
77.
Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Myth of the ASEAN Way? Explaining the Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” in Helga Haftendorn, Robert Koehane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 287–324.
78.
James Dobbins, David C. Gompert, David A. Shlapak, and Andrew Scobell, “Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence,” Occasional Paper, RAND Aroyo Center, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, October 11, 2011, p. 1, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_ papers/2011/RAND_ OP344.pdf.
79.
Ibid, p. 1.
80.
Ibid, p. 8. In the article, the authors borrow a concept from traditional nuclear deterrence theory, mutually assured destruction (MAD), and develop a new concept of mutual assured economic destruction (MAED).
81.
William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter, “The Content of U.S. Engagement with China,” The Stanford-Harvard, Preventive Defense Project, July 1998, pp. 2–3, 25–26.
82.
Bill Clinton, The National Security for a New Century, May 1997, http://fas.org/man/docs/strategy97.htm.
83.
Bill Clinton, The National Security for a New Century, December 1999, http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/#threats.
84.
George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002,
http://australianpolitics.com/downloads/usa/02-09-20_national-security-strategy.pdf.
85.
Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Remarks to NCUSCR, New York City, September 21, 2005, http://www.ncuscr.org/files/2005Gala_RobertZoellick_Whither_China1.pdf.
86.
Evans S. Medeiros, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability,” The Washington Quarterly, 2005, pp. 145–147.
87.
Ashley J. Tellis, “Indo-U.S. Relations Headed for a Grand Transformation?” Yale Global, July 14, 2005, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=99.
88.
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, pp. 41–42.
89.
Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, “China’s Rise in American Military Strategy,” in Kurt M. Campbell and Willow Darsie, eds., Co-Chairmen: Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Brent Scowcroft. China’s March on the 21st Century (Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 2007), p. 107. This report was published in January 2007. The two authors’ article is also published in The National Interest. See Ashton B. Carter & William J. Perry, “China on the March,” The National Interest, March/April 2007, pp. 16–22, 115–116.
90.
U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course. Report of an Independent Task Force. Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. April 2007, pp. 9–10.
91.
James Steinberg, “China’s Arrival: The Long March to Global Power,” Center for a New American Security, September 24, 2009, http://www.doam.org/images/projekte/friedensicherheit/Deputy%20Secretary%20James%20Steinberg's%20September%2024,%202009%20Keynote%20Address%20Transcript.pdf.
92.
Kurt M. Campbell, Nirav Patel, Vikram J. Singh, “The Power of Balance: America in Asia,” “The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration,” jointly issued by Pacific Forum CSIS, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), Center for Naval Analyses (CAN), Institute for National Strategic Studies/National Defense University (INSS) and Center for a New American Security (CNAS), February 2009; Abraham Demark and Nirav Patel (eds.), “China’s Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship,” Center for a New American Security, September 2009, p. 6, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20China’s20%Arrival_Final%20Report.pdf; “Cooperation and Competition: China and Asia-Pacific: A Roundtable Discussion,” moderated by David Sanger, Featured speakers include Bernard D. Cole, Patrick Cronin, Douglass Paal, and Admiral Patrick M. Wash, CNAS Fifth Annual Conference, Center for a New America Security, June 2, 2011, http://www.cnas.org/files/multimedia/documents/Transcript_Cooperation%20and%20Competition%20China%20and%20the%20Asia-Pacific_0.pef; Patrick M. Cronin, ed., “Cooperation from Strength: The United States, China and the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security, January 2012.
93.
Abraham Demark and Nirav Patel, eds., China’s Arrival: A Strategic Framework for a Global Relationship (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2009).
94.
James Steinberg, “China’s Arrival: The Long March to Global Power,” Center for a New American Security, September 24, 2009.
95.
U.S.-China Joint Statement, November 17, 2009, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-china-joint-statement.
96.
Barack Obama, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010, p. 17, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
97.
David M. Lampton, “Power Constrained: Sources of Mutual Strategic Mistrust in U.S.-China Relations,” NBR Analysis, June 2010.
98.
Michael Swaine, “Perceptions of An Assertive China,” China Leadership Monitor, No.32, Spring 2010; Michael Swaine and M. Talor Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership Monitor, No.35, Summer 2011; Michael Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part Three: The Role of the Military in Foreign Policy,” China Leadership Monitor, No.6, Winter 2011; Michael Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part Four: The Role of the Military in Foreign Crisis,” China Leadership Monitor, No.37, Spring 2012; Wang Yaping, “Zhongguo de jianding zixin: zhongxi wenxian bijiao” [China’s Determine and Confidence: A Chinese-Western Literature Comparison], Carnegie China Insight Monthly, No. 7, 2010, accessed at http://chinese.carnegieendowment.org/newsletter/pdf/july10.pdf; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 2011 Report, November 2011, pp. 169–172.
99.
Henry Kissinger, On China (New York, NY: The Penguin Press, 2011), p. 529; Zbigniew Brzezinski, “How to Stay Friends with China,” The New York Times, January 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/opinion/03Brzezinski.html?_r=1&hp; Douglass Paal, “Calming the Storms in U.S.-China Relations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 11, 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/01/11/calming-storm-in-u.s.-china-relations/38y; David M. Lampton, “Power Constrained: Sources of Mutual Strategic Mistrust in U.S.-China Relations.”.
100.
U.S.-China Joint Statement, January 19, 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/us-china-joint-statement.
101.
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), cited in The Epilogue, p. 441, 442, 448, 538.
102.
Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Eagle Has Crashed Landed,” Foreign Policy, Issue 131, July/August 2002, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2002/07/01/the_eagle_has_crash_landed.
103.
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New York: The New Press, 2003). Editorial review.
104.
Michael Mandelbaum, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era (New York: Public Affairs, 2009).
105.
Gideon Rachman, “Think Again: American Decline—This time is for real,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/think_again_american_decline.
106.
Gideon Rachman, Zero-Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011).
107.
Daniel Burstein, Yen: Japan’s New Financial Empire and Its Threat to America (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988). See Publisher’s Review.
108.
Quoted from Craig K. Elwell, Marc Labonte, and Wayne M. Morrison, “Is China a Threat to the US Economy?” Congressional Research Service, CRS-2, January 23, 2007.
109.
Craig K. Elwell, Marc Labonte, and Wayne M. Morrison, “Is China a Threat to the US Economy?” Congressional Research Service, CRS-4, Jan 23, 2007, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33604.pdf.
110.
Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 6.
111.
Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 5–6.
112.
“Power Constrained: Sources of Mutual Strategic Mistrust in U.S.-China Relations,” NBR Analysis, June 2010).
113.
William R. Cline, “Renminbi Undervaluation, China’s Surplus and the US Trade Deficit,” Policy Brief, August 2010, Number 10–20, p. 1, http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb10-20.pdf.
114.
Ibid, p. 6.
115.
C. Fred Bergsten, “Correcting the Chinese Exchange Rate,” Testimony before the Hearing on China’s Exchange Rate Policy, Committee on Ways and Means, US House of Representative, September 15, 2010, http://www.piie.com/publications/testimony/bergsten20100915.pdf.
116.
Zhang Ning, “Zhongmei maoyi bupingheng de duochong yuanyin” [Multiple Causes of China-U.S. Trade Imbalances], in Xia Xianliang, etc., Zhongmei maoyi pingheng wenti yanjiu [A Study on China-U.S. Trade Imbalances] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2011), pp. 106–130.
117.
Shi Benye, “Guanyu zhongmei maoyi shiheng shencengci yuanyin tanxi” [On the Deep Roots of China-U.S. Trade Imbalances], in Pudong Research Center for American Economy, Houweiji shiqi de quanqiu jingji geju yu zhognmei jingmao guanxi [Global Economic Structure and China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations in the Post-Crisis Period] (Shanghai: Shanghai Social Sciences Press, 2011), pp. 308–317. In analyzing the main causes of China-U.S. trade imbalances, Shi mentions five factors, including U.S. domestic economic imbalances, industrial transfer, foreign investment, assembly processing trade, and American restrictions on export to China, which will be further discussed in the following pages.
118.
Wang Rongjun, “Zhongmei jingmao zaipingheng: lujing yu qianjing” [Rebalance of China-U.S. Trade: Path and Prospect], Waijiao pinglun [Diplomacy Review], No. 2, 2010. Yu Yongding, “Meiguo jingji zaipingheng shijiaoxia zhongguo mianlin de tiaozhan” [China’s Challenge from the Perspective American Economic Rebalance], Guoji jingrong yanjiu [International Finance Studies], No. 1, 2010, pp. 16–21.
119.
Li Wei and Xu Jiajia, “Mei zai hua FDI dui zhongmei maoyi shiheng de yingxiang yanjiu” [A Study on the Influence of American Direct Investment in China on China-U.S. Trade Imbalances], Tequ jingji [Special Zones Economy], December 2011, p. 95; Jing Yan, “Mei zai hua zhijie touzi yu zhongmei maoyi pingheng de yingxiang” [American Direct Investment in China and Its Impact on China-U.S. Trade Balances], Dangdai jingji [Contemporary Economy], September (B) 2010, pp. 72–74; Zhang Ning, “Multiple Causes of China-U.S. Trade Imbalances,” pp. 107–109; Wu Yunyan, “Maoyi fangshi de zhuanbian dui zhongmei maoyi shiheng de yingxiang fenxi” [An Analysis of the Influence of Change in Trade Means on China-U.S. Trade Imbalances], Shangchang xiandaihua [Business Circle Modernization], May 2007, pp. 11–12.
120.
Quote from Zhang Ning, ibid, pp. 110–114.
121.
Wang Yong, Zhongmei jingmao guanxi [China-U.S. Economic and Trade Relations] (Beijing: China Market Press, 2007), Chap. 6, pp. 230–244.
122.
Xi Jinping, “Zhuoyan changyuan, xieshou kaichuang zhongmei hezuo xin junmian” [Have a Farsighted View and Jointly Open a New Platform for China-U.S. Cooperation], Xinhua Agency telegram from Loa Angels, February 17, 2012, http://www.gov.cn/ldha/2012-02/18content_2070420.htm.
123.
For example, David M. Lampton argues that reforming export restrictions (including restrictions on experts to China) will not only promote American economic growth, but also deepen economic interdependence of the United States and China, which is good for both countries. In the abovementioned article—“Power Constrained”—Lampton emphasizes that reforming U.S. restrictions on exports can play a positive role in reducing U.S.-China strategic distrust. See David M. Lampton, “Power Constrained: Sources of Mutual Strategic Mistrust in U.S.-China Relations,” NBR Analysis, June 2010. This author believes loosing restriction on exports to China is very helpful to balance China-U.S. trade.
124.
Quoted from Xia Xianliang, etc., Zhongmei maoyi pingheng wenti yanjiu [A Study on China-U.S. Trade Imbalances] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2011), pp. 97–101, 118–119.
125.
Quoted from Zhang Ning, ibid, pp. 123–124.
126.
Quoted from Wang Yong, Zhongmei jingmao guanxi, p. 299.
127.
Robert E. Scott, “Rising China Trade Deficit Will Cost One-Half Million U.S. Jobs in 2010,” Issue Brief, No. 283, September 20, 2010. Economic Policy Institute is located in Washington, DC, financially supported by various foundations and American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization, see http://www.epi.org/page/-/pdf/ib283.pdf. For more details, see Robert E. Scott, “Unfair China Trade Costs Local Jobs: 2.4 Million Jobs Lost, Thousands Displaced in Every U.S. Congressional District,” EPI Briefing Paper, Economic Policy Institute, No. 260, March 23, 2010, p. 1, p. 5; Robert E. Scott, “Currency Manipulation: History Shows That Sanctions Are Needed,” Policy Memorandum, Economic Policy Institute, April 28, 2010, pp. 1–2, http://www.epi.org/page/-/pm164/pm164.pdf.
128.
Wang Rongjun, “Zhongmei jingmao zaipingheng: lujing yu qianjing” [Rebalance of China-U.S. Trade: Path and Prospect], Waijiao pinglun [Diplomacy Review], No. 2, 2010, p. 16.
129.
David M. Lampton, “China’s Rise Does Not Need to Come at America’s Expense,” in David M. Lampton and Alfred D. Welhelm Jr., eds., United States and China Relations at a Crossroads (Lanham, MA: University Press of America, Inc., 1995); Bruce J. Dickson, “Updating the China Model,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Fall 2011), pp. 39–58.
130.
Xia Xianliang, etc., Zhongmei maoyi pingheng wenti yanjiu [A Study on China-U.S. Trade Imbalances] (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2011).
131.
Hot Topics, The Chinese Exchange Rate, http://www.iie.com/research/topics/hottopic.cfm?HotTopicID=3.
132.
Peterson Perspectives, Interviews on Current Topics: “Is China a Currency Manipulator?” Steve Weisman interviews Morris Goldstein. Recorded January 28, 2009, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/pp20090128goldstein.pdf.
133.
Josh Bievens and Robert E. Scott, “China Manipulates Its Currency—A Response is Needed,” Policy Memorandum, No. 116, September 25, 2006, http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/pm116/.
134.
Stephen S. Roach, Albert Keidel, Charles A. Kupchan, Sebastian Mallaby, Alan Tonelson, and Fred Bergsten, “Is China a Currency Manipulator?” Expert Roundup, Council on Foreign Relations, April 15, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-currency-manipulator/p21902.
135.
Wang Yaping, “Zhuanjia tan zhongmei maoyi yu renminbi huilv” [Expert Talks about U.S.-China Trade and RMB Exchange Rate], Carnegie China Insight Monthly, April 23, 2010, http://chinese.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=40662.
136.
Xu Yan, “Renminbi huilv zhizheng: Zhongmei de gongshou zhishi” [Dispute on RMB Exchange Rate: Offense and Defense between China and the United States], in Su Zhe, ed., Houweiji shijie yu zhongmei zhanlue jingzhu [Post-Crisis World and China-U.S. Strategic Competition] (Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2011), pp. 124–156.
137.
Ibid.
138.
H. R. 2378 (111th Congress), Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, passed by the House of Representatives on September 29, 2010, http://govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr2378. For Ryan’s testimony on September 15 before House Committee on Ways and Means, see Representative Ryan and Boccieri Testify on Behalf of China Currency Legislation, September 15, 2010, http://timryan.house.gov/press-release/reps-ryan-and-boccieri-testify-behalf-china-currency-legislation.
139.
U.S.-China Joint Statement, January 19, 2011, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/us-china-joint-statement.
140.
“Goldman Sachs Group President Jim O’ Neill: American Asks RMB Appreciation Is Playing with Politics,” Cankao xiaoxi, November 29, 2011, A16.
141.
Wei Jianguo, “A Game between China and the United States on RMB Exchange Rate,” Nangfengchuang (Bimonthly), No. 9, 2010, pp. 72–73.
142.
Nicholas R. Lardy, “The Economic Rise of China: Threat or Opportunity?” Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, August 1, 2003.
143.
Fred Bergsten, Bates Gill, Nicholas Lardy, and Derek Mitchell, China: The Balance Sheet. What the Word Needs to Know Now About the Emerging Superpower (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), p. 80, 116.
144.
Craig K. Elwell, Marc Labonte, and Wayne M. Morrison, “Is China a Threat to the US Economy?” Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2007, p. 4, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/81360.pdf.
145.
Craig K. Elwell, Marc Labonte, and Wayne M. Morrison, “Is China a Threat to the US Economy?” Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2007.
146.
Craig K. Elwell, Marc Labonte, and Wayne M. Morrison, “Is China a Threat to the US Economy?” Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2007, pp. 3–4.
147.
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., “China’s Rise Isn’t Our Demise,” The New York Times, September 7, 2011.
148.
Edward S. Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why China’s Rise Doesn’t Threaten the West (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 18.
149.
Ibid, p. 234.
150.
Charles W. Freeman III, “Chasing the Currency Dragon,” Commentary, CSIS, January 28, 2009, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/090128_freeman_chinacurrency.pdf.
151.
Wang Yaping, “Expert Talks about U.S.-China Trade and RMB Exchange Rate,” Carnegie China Insight Monthly, April 23, 2010, http://www.chinaelections.com/article/1082/173396.htm.
152.
Daniel J. Ikenson, “Appreciate this: Chinese currency rise will have a negligible effect on the trade deficit,” March 24, 2010, http://www.cato.org/pubs/ftb/FTB-041.pdf.
153.
Laura Tyson and Stephen Roach, “Opportunities and Challenges in US-China Economic Relationship,” testimony presented to US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 23, 2010. Hearing on “the New US-China Economic Relations, Living with Friction.”.
154.
William H. Overholt, “Cost of Unleasing Chinese Currency: Congress, Be Careful What You Wish for,” The Christen Science Monitor, July 13, 2007, http://www.rand.org/blog/2007/07/cost-of-unleashing-chinas-currency.html; http://www.rand.org/commentary/2007/07/13/CSM.html.
155.
Daniel J. Ikenson, “China Trade and American Jobs,” The Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2010, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/china-trade-american-jobs.
156.
Laura Tyson, “The Outlook on China’ Currency,” The New York Times, May 6, 2011, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/the-outlook-for-chinas-currency/. Atlantic Council senior fellow Albert Keidel frankly stated in a roundtable discussion of Council on Foreign Relations on April 15, 2010, that U.S. spending bubble and unbridled credit expansion are the fundamental causes of U.S.-China trade imbalance. Stephen S. Roach, Albert Keidel, Charles A. Kupchan, Sebastian Mallaby, Alan Tonelson, and Fred Bergsten, “Is China a Currency Manipulator?” Expert Roundup, Council on Foreign Relations, April 15, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-currency-manipulator/p21902.
157.
William H. Overholt, “Exposing the Myths,” South China Morning Post, November 17, 2003, http://www.rand.org/blog/2003/11/exposing-the-myths.html.
158.
Daniel J. Ikenson, “China Trade and American Jobs,” The Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2010.
159.
Stephen S. Roach, Albert Keidel, Charles A. Kupchan, Sebastian Mallaby, Alan Tonelson, and Fred Bergsten, “Is China a Currency Manipulator?” Expert Roundup, Council on Foreign Relations, April 15, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-currency-manipulator/p21902.
160.
Homi Khara, “On Chinese Currency Issue: Narrative and Reality,” The Brookings Institution, November 20, 2010, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/1110_chinese_currency_kharas.aspx.
161.
Laura Tyson and Stephen Roach, “Opportunities and Challenges in US-China Economic Relationship,” testimony presented to US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 23, 2010. Hearing on “the New US-China Economic Relations, Living with Friction.”.
162.
Jeffrey A. Bader, “U.S.-China Senior Dialogue: Maintaining the Balance,” John L. Thornton China Center, the Brookings Institution, May 6, 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0506_strategic_economic_dialogue_bader.aspx; http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0506_strategic_economic_dialogue_bader.aspx.
163.
Eswar Prasa, senior fellow, Global Economy and Development, “The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue: A Preview of Key Economic Issues,” The Brookings Institution, May 6, 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/1110_chinese_currency_kharas.aspx.
164.
Charles Freeman, and Bonnie S. Glaser, “The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” May 9, 2011, CSIS, http://csis.org/publication/us-china-strategic-and-economic-dialogue-0.
165.
Daniel Ikenson and Sallie James, “Trade,” in David Boas, ed., Cato Handbook For Policymakers (7th Edition) (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2009),
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2009/9/hb111-59.pdf.
166.
The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, Zhongguo de heping fazhan [China’s Peaceful Development] (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2011), p. 7.
167.
Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), pp. 11–12.
168.
Chinese mainstream scholars usually do not agree with the thesis of the “Beijing Consensus,” and are cautious to the concept of “China model,” showing that China has no intention to export its “model.” For example, Central Party School professor Li Junru wrote an article in Xuexi shibao in 2009 titled “Shenti zhongguo moshi” [To be Cautious in Mentioning the China Model]. Li does not agree with the idea of “China model,” and suggests avoiding mention of it. He argues that China should learn from its own developmental experience and institutional characteristics from the principle of seeking truth from the facts, rather than selling the China model. National Committee of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Spokesman Zhao Qizheng wrote another article in the same issue of Xuexi shibao titled “Zhongguo wuyi shuchu moshi” [China Has No Intention to Export Its Model]. According to Zhao, the word “model” carries the meaning of demonstration and example, but China has no intention to demonstrate its experience for other countries to follow. Therefore, it should be very cautious when using the word model. As Zhao puts it, China model is not universal, just like the model of highly developed countries that is not universal as well.
169.
Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, pp. 2–6.
170.
Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus, pp. 2–6.
171.
The “Washington consensus” has been criticized by more and more scholars because of its failure in practice, particularly in economic reform in Argentina and Mexico. According to Zhao Xiao, three factors have contributed to the declining popularity of the “Washington Consensus.” First, economic restructure brought about economic disaster to Latin America. Second, “shock therapy” resulted in collapse of Russian economy. Third, wrong countermeasures taken during the Asian financial crisis made regional economy even worse. Just as Nobel laureate in economics Joseph Stiglitz argues, IMF policy not only deteriorated Asian economic decline, but partly contributed to the occurrence of the crisis. See Zhao Xiao, “Cong Washington gongshi dao Beijing gongshi” [From the “Washington Consensus” to the “Beijing Consensus,” Nanfengchuang [South Reviews], July 16, 2004, p. 43.
172.
Stafan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-first Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010), p. 32.
173.
Stafan Halper, The Beijing Consensus, p. 11, 72.
174.
Stafan Halper, The Beijing Consensus, p. 209.
175.
John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform,” PIIE, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=486.
176.
John Williamson, “A Short History of the Washington Consensus,” Paper commissioned by Fundación CIDOP for a conference “From the Washington Consensus towards a new Global Governance,” Barcelona, September 24–25, 2004, pp. 1–2, p. 6, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf.
177.
David Shambaugh, “Is there a Chinese model?” China Daily, March 1, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-03/01/content_9515478.htm.
178.
Stafan Halper, The Beijing Consensus, p. 32.
179.
Kenneth Lieberthal, “Is China Caching Up with the US?” ETHOS, Issue 8, August 2010.
180.
Cheng Li,“Zhongguo moshi xuyao baochi baorong yu kaifang” [China Model should be Accommodative and Open], International Herald Leader, January 3, 2011, http://www.brookings-tsinghua.cn/research-and-commentary/2011/cheng-li_20110103.aspx.
181.
Stafan Halper, The Beijing Consensus, p. 32.
182.
Robert Kagan, “Illiberal Capitalism,” Financial Times, January 22, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/f820a134-c509-11dc-811a-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz4KKLWIN2b.
183.
Robert Kagan, “Illiberal Capitalism.”.
184.
John Williamson, “Beijing Consensus versus Washington Consensus?” Interview by Steve Weisman at PIIE on Nov. 2, 2010, http://www.iie.com/publications/interviews/pp20101102williamson.pdf.
185.
Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?”.
186.
Ibid.
187.
Richard Baum, James A. Kelly, Kurt Campbell and Robert Ross, “Whither U.S.-China Relations?—Roundtable Discussion,” NBR Analysis, Volume 16, December 2005, http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/pdf/Preview/vol16no4_preview.pdf.
188.
Richard Baum, “Zoellick’s Roadmap and the Future of U.S.-China Relations,” Richard Baum, James A. Kelly, Kurt Campbell and Robert Ross, “Whither U.S.-China Relations?” NBR Analysis, Vol. 16, Dec. 2005, pp. 7–21.
189.
Kurt M. Campbell, “Zoellick’s China,” in Richard Baum, James A. Kelly, Kurt Campbell and Robert Ross, “Whither U.S.-China Relations?” pp. 23–28.
190.
James A. Kelly, “United States Policy Toward China: A Timely Restatement,” in Richard Baum, “Zoellick’s Roadmap and the Future of U.S.-China Relations,” in Richard Baum, James A. Kelly, Kurt Campbell and Robert Ross, “Whither U.S.-China Relations?” NBR Analysis, pp. 29–32.
191.
Robert Ross, “Toward a Stable and Constructive China Policy,” in Richard Baum, “Zoellick’s Roadmap and the Future of U.S.-China Relations,” Richard Baum, James A. Kelly, Kurt Campbell and Robert Ross, “Whither U.S.-China Relations?” NBR Analysis, Vol. 16, Dec. 2005, pp. 33–36.
192.
Bates Gill, Dan Blumenthal, Michael Swaine, and Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “China as a Responsible Stakeholder,” Monday June 11, 2007, Washington, D.C., http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/070622_transcript1.pdf.
193.
Bates Gill, “China Becoming a Responsible Stakeholder,” Reframing China Policy: The Carnegie Debate. June 17, 2007, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Bates_paper.pdf.
194.
David Shambaugh, “The New Strategic Triangle: U.S. and European Reactions to China’s Rise,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3, Summer 2005, pp. 7–25.
195.
Thomas Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “China’s Role in the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?” Statement before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, August 3, 2006, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf. Christensen expresses similar arguments in an article published on October 30, 2005 at Harvard Hoover Institute’s China Leadership Monitor. See Thomas Christensen, “Will China Become a ‘Responsible Stakeholder?’ The Six Party Talks, Taiwan Arms Sales, and Sino-Japanese Relations,” China Leadership Monitor, October 30, 2005, http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/clm16_tc.pdf.
196.
Katherine A. Fredriksen, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy and International Affairs, United States Department of Energy, “China’s Role in the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?” Statement before U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on August 4, 2006, http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/8.3-4.06HearingTrascript.pdf.
197.
Dan Blumenthal, “Is China at Present (or Will China Become) a Responsible Stakeholder in the International Community?” Reframing China Policy: The Carnegie Debate, June 17, 2007, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Blumenthal_Responsible%20Stakeholder%20Final%20Paper.pdf.
198.
Aaron L. Friedberg, “What Does It Take for China to Be a ‘Responsible Stakeholder’?” The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), International Symposium on Security Affairs, 2007, Tokyo, Japan, pp. 83–93, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2006/e2006_10.pdf.

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Wu, S. (2018). U.S. Think Tank and China Policy Debates. In: Tao, W. (eds) The US Policy Making Process for Post Cold War China. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4974-3_6

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