Skip to main content

Arms Control in Outer Space: ASAT Weapons

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
  • 1298 Accesses

Abstract

No sooner did the first man-made object traversed in Outer Space than it was realized conquest of space is not going to be that romantic, but rather it could be a battleground for the future and an arms race therein would be devastating. Within a year of the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the United Nations General Assembly recognized that the “Outer Space should be used only for peaceful purpose” and desired “to avoid the extension of national rivalries into this field”. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty significantly covers arms control measures, but it leaves much to be desired as it permits certain military activities and placing of certain weapons in Outer Space. Usage of anti-satellite weapons in the recent past by some space-faring nations necessitates paying attention to arms control questions relating to Outer Space. The destruction of satellites by ASAT weapons not only generate space debris increasing the vulnerability of space exploration but it may possibly precipitate arms race in space that may escalate conflicts among the nations making space a battleground for future. Since the beginning of the space age, the United Nations considered the question of preventing an arms race in Outer Space and has significantly ensured that Outer Space is used for peaceful purpose. It does provide an institutional framework to address the issue of disarmament in Outer Space, but as of today there is no Treaty prohibiting ASATs. The aspirations for arms control in Outer Space can only become reality with global cooperation. The paper unfolds the role of UN in prevention of weaponization of space and examines the existing laws on arms control measures in Outer Space in the light of ASATs and advocates for a Treaty prohibiting ASAT weapons.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Notes

  1. 1.

    President Lyndon Johnson announced in a 1964 speech that “To insure that no nation will be tempted to use the reaches of space as a platform for weapons of mass destruction we began in 1962 and 1963 to develop systems capable of destroying bomb-carrying satellites”. See P.B. Stares, The Militarization Of Space: U.S. Policy 19451984 (Cornell University Press, 1985).

  2. 2.

    Disarmament: Problems Related to Outer Space, UNIDIR 33 (1987).

  3. 3.

    John Pike, “Anti-satellite Weapons and Arms Control”, Arms Control Today 5–7 (December 1983).

  4. 4.

    The systems are obsolete and were withdrawn from 1967 to 1975, respectively.

  5. 5.

    In 1982, tests of Soviet ASAT system were terminated, but the US Secretary of Defense claims that Soviet ASAT weapons are operational.

  6. 6.

    Bhupendra Jasani, “Emerging Technologies in Disarmament: A Period Review by the United Nations” (Vol. X, No. 2, 1987).

  7. 7.

    The January 2001 report of the Commission to assess United States National Security and Space Management and Organization (chaired by Donald Rumsfeld shortly before he became Secretary of Defense in the George W. Bush administration) specifically called for ASAT technology, stating that “The U.S. will require means of negating satellite threats, whether temporary and reversible or physically destructive”. See http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.html.

  8. 8.

    The US military shot it down with a Standard Missile-3, whose primary vocation is interceptor for the US Navy’s missile defence system.

  9. 9.

    In January 2007, China tested an anti-satellite weapon against one of its own non-functional weather satellites.

  10. 10.

    See Jon E. Dougherty, “Russia Now Testing Anti-satellite Weapons” National Security News (3 December 2015).

  11. 11.

    See https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/real-danger-space-weapons.

  12. 12.

    G. Neuneck, “China’s ASAT test—A Warning Shot or Beginning of An Arms Race in Space?” in K.-U. Schrogl, C. Mathieu and N. Peter eds. Yearbook on Space Policy 2006/2007: New Impetus for Europe (Springer, 2008). Also see, J.T. Hackett, “Ramifications of China’s ASAT Test”, Space News International, USA (5 February 2007), at 19.

  13. 13.

    See, “US Missile Hits Toxic Satellite” BBC News (21 February 2008), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/7254540.

  14. 14.

    L. D. Kala, “Why Do We Explore Outer Space?” Hill Post (6 January 2016).

  15. 15.

    Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, International Space Law and the United Nations (Kluwer Law International 1999).

  16. 16.

    G.A.Res. 1348 (XIII) (13 December 1958).

  17. 17.

    G.A.Res. 1472A(XIV) (12 December 1959).

  18. 18.

    See U.N. Doc. A/5109 (30 March 1962) and U.N. Doc. A/5181 (27 September 1962).

  19. 19.

    Manfred Lachs, “Foreword” in N. Jasentuliyana et al., Manual on Space Law (Vol.1, Dobbs Ferry, 1979).

  20. 20.

    The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space; the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects; the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space and the 1979 Agreement Governing Activities of States on the moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

  21. 21.

    The 1982 Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting; the 1986 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space; the 1992 Principles Relevant to the Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space; the 1996 Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefits and in the Interests of All states, Taking into Particular the Needs of Developing Countries; the 2004 Resolution on the Application of the Concept of the Launching state; the 2007 Resolution on Recommendations on Enhancing the Practice of States and International Intergovernmental Organizations in Registering Space Objects; the 2007 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Outer Space; the 2013 Resolution on Recommendations on Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful Exploration and Use of Outer Space.

  22. 22.

    Supra note 15 at 31.

  23. 23.

    The Conference role was performed in the past by different bodies that can be considered to be its forerunners. The Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee that acted between the end of the 1959 and June 1960. Subsequently, at the request of the General Assembly, the USA and the then Soviet Union proposed the establishment of an Eight-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which began sessioning on 15 March 1962. By 1969, membership of the latter was expanded to include 26 states; the Committee changed its name then to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). In 1979 again, the CCD was succeeded by the Committee on Disarmament, which, in turn, was renamed Conference on Disarmament in 1984 and given its present status.

  24. 24.

    See Resolution 36/97 C and 36/99.

  25. 25.

    The ad hoc committee made continuous efforts towards PAROS. A number of working papers were also submitted by states to the committee.

  26. 26.

    2008, Russia and China presented to the CD a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space; 1985, Sweden tabled proposal for the PAROS to the ad hoc committee of CD (CD/OS/WP.8. 1 August 1985); 1982, Canada offered a conceptual paper to arms control in Outer Space (CD/320, 26 August 1982); 1983, France introduced working paper (CD/375, 14 April 1983); 1982, the then Soviet Union introduced a draft Treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in Outer Space (CD/274,7 April 1982); 1979, Italy submitted CD a draft additional protocol to the OST (CD/9, 26 March 1979).

  27. 27.

    Laura Grego, A History of Anti-Satellite Programs (The Union of Concerned Scientists).

  28. 28.

    The 1967, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of State in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

  29. 29.

    Article III OST; see, Olivier Ribbelink, Article III, in Stephan Hobe, Bernard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds. Cologne Commentary on Space Law 1 (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2009).

  30. 30.

    V.S. Vereschetin, “Limiting and Banning Military Use of Outer Space: Issues of International Law” in J. Makarczyk ed. Essays in International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984).

  31. 31.

    Article 2 UN Charter. See Thomas Frank, “Who Killed 2(4)? Or Changing Norms Governing of the Use of Force by states”, The American Journal of International Law 64: 809 (1970).

  32. 32.

    Article 51 UN Charter.

  33. 33.

    Supra note 15 at 102.

  34. 34.

    Ibid.

  35. 35.

    Ibid.

  36. 36.

    Article IV OST.

  37. 37.

    C.M. Petras, “The Debate over the Weaponization of Space—A Military-Legal Conspectus”, Annals of Air and Space Law 184 (2003); also see Stephan Gorove, “Arms Control Provisions in the Outer Space Treaty: A Scrutinizing Reappraisal”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 3: 116 (1973).

  38. 38.

    Kai-Uwe Schrogl and Julia Neumann, “Article IV” in Stephan Hobe, Bernard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds. Cologne Commentary on Space Law, 1:78–79 (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2009).

  39. 39.

    Ibid. at 80.

  40. 40.

    Stephan Hobe and Niklas Hedman, “Preamble” in Stephan Hobe, Bernard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds. Cologne Commentary on Space Law, 1: 22 (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2009).

  41. 41.

    C.G. Hasselmann, “Weapons of Mass Destruction, Article IV Outer Space Treaty and the Relationship to General Disarmament” IISL Proceedings of Annual Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (AIAA, 1982) at 100.

  42. 42.

    1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

  43. 43.

    Stephan Hobe and Fabio Tronchetti, “Article I” in Stephan Hobe, Bernard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds. Cologne Commentary on Space Law 2:351 (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2013).

  44. 44.

    Article 3—(1) “The moon shall be used by all states Parties exclusively for peaceful purposes.

    (2) Any threat or use of force for any other hostile act or threat of hostile act on the moon is prohibited. It is likewise prohibited to use the moon in order to commit any such act or to engage in any such threat in relation to the earth, the moon spacecraft, the personnel of spacecraft or man-made space objects.

    (3) State-parties shall not place in orbit around or the trajectory to or around the moon objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or place or use such weapons on or in the moon.

    (4) The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on the moon shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration and use of the moon shall also not be prohibited”.

  45. 45.

    Ram Jakhu and Peter Stubbe, “Article 3 Moon Agreement” in Stephan Hobe, Bernard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds. Cologne Commentary on Space Law 2:363 (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2013).

  46. 46.

    Kai-Uwe Schrogl and Julia Neumann, “Article IV” in Stephan Hobe, Bernard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., Cologne Commentary on Space Law, 1:88 (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2009).

  47. 47.

    Paragraph 8 of the CTBT.

  48. 48.

    The 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environment Modification Techniques.

  49. 49.

    Article I and Article II of the ENMOD Convention.

  50. 50.

    C.M. Petras, “The Debate over the Weaponization of Space—A Military-Legal Conspectus”, Annals of Air and Space Law (2003).

  51. 51.

    The 1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.

  52. 52.

    Both 1975 Registration Convention as well as the 1972 Liability Convention defines launching state as (i) a state, which launches or procures the launching of space object; (ii) a state from whose territory or facility a space object is launched.

  53. 53.

    Article II (1) Registration Convention.

  54. 54.

    Article IV Registration Convention.

  55. 55.

    As per Article IV of the Registration Convention, the state of registry is obliged to be furnish minimally the following information—name of launching state or states; an appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number; date and territory of location of launch; basic orbital parameters (nodal period, inclination, apogee, perigee); general function of the space object; additional information from time to time as to the current status (including deorbiting) of registered space objects.

  56. 56.

    Supra note 15 at 114.

  57. 57.

    Ibid. at 114.

  58. 58.

    Kai-Uwe Schrogl and Julia Neumann, “Article IV” in Stephan Hobe, Bernard Schmidt-Tedd and Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds. Cologne Commentary on Space Law 1:71 (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2009).

  59. 59.

    Ibid. at 72.

  60. 60.

    Ibid at 87.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kumar Abhijeet .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2017 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Abhijeet, K. (2017). Arms Control in Outer Space: ASAT Weapons. In: Rao, R., Gopalakrishnan, V., Abhijeet, K. (eds) Recent Developments in Space Law. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4926-2_10

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-4926-2_10

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-10-4925-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-10-4926-2

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics