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Mexico’s AD on China and Empirical Evidence

  • Yi Liu
  • Laixun Zhao
Chapter
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Economics book series (BRIEFSECONOMICS)

Abstract

This chapter tests empirically the macroeconomic factors that impact Mexico’s AD on China using count data models. While previous research uses AD cases as the independent variable, we use an alternative variable—tariff lines under AD—as the new independent variable. In addition, we provide reasonable explanation for why Mexico’s AD measure is discriminating against intermediates and consumer goods. The results indicate that China is an important intermediates supplier for Mexico under the global value chain. Chinese cheap intermediates help to improve the competitiveness of Mexican manufacturing sectors in the domestic and global markets.

Keywords

Antidumping Tariff lines Count data model Intermediates and consumer goods Global value chain Manufacturing Market competitiveness 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of International Trade and EconomicsJiangxi University of Finance and EconomicsJiangxiChina
  2. 2.Research Institute for Economics and Business AdministrationKobe UniversityKobeJapan

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